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prefa ce 
T HE pr=nt study developed out of a de><rre to 
understand the character of liberalism and conservatism in Prussia on 
the eve of German unification. Who were the liberals? Who were the 
Conservatives? What were their ideals and how did they conduct 
themselves in public? How powerful was each group in the state? 
In conflict throughout the Nineteenth Century, the opponents reached 
the peak of their antagonism in the years between 1858 and 1866, the 
the years of the New Era, the constitutional conflict, and the first 
two wars of German unification. Fundamental social, economic, and 
political ideals were at stake. One group would have aligned the 
country with the West; the other sought to preserve the Old Regime. 
Since the story of Bismarck's crushing defeat of the liberals by his 
Realpolitik after 1864 is well known, the present analysis concentrates 
upon the internal crisis of 1858 to 1864 within Prussia; and in keeping 
with the nature of the subject, the method of treatment is topical 
rather than chronological. 
Analyses of social and institutional forces in conflict in the past 
century and a half should be made for each of the European countries. 
The Old Regime survived over much of the continent well into the 
Twentieth Century, and controversies like the one in Prussia occurred 
in every state. The present study can be justified not merely as a 
treatment of a crucial period in German history but as an essential 
chapter in the history of modern Europe. It should help toward 
making possible a comparative analysis of society and institutions in 
the modern world, by means of which we should, for example, be able 
to explain the remarkable difference between the course of develop-
ment of Europe and that of the United States. 
ii 
The preliminary research for the present volume was done in Ger-
many over two decades ago. The long delay in completing the work 
is to be explained first by the author's study of the Stein-Hardenberg 
period and then by government service. A Social Science Research 
Fellowship in 1930-31 and further financial assistance from the Re-
search Council of the University of Nebraska have aided substantially 
in the writing of this book. In addition, the University has made 
possible its publication. The author wishes to express his gratitude 
to both organizations. 
The extent to which his wife has participated in making this book 
will be appreciated only by those who know her. 
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I 
THE ISSUES 
1 / How the Conflict Arose 
IN 1858 King Frederick William IV of Prussia became 
mentally deranged and had to relinquish the royal authority to his 
brother, Prince William. The Regent quickly ousted most of the 
Conservatives in the ministry and appointed right-wing liberals in 
their stead. The people of Prussia interpreted the Regent's words and 
actions as an indication of liberalism. In the elections to the Lower 
House of the Landtag in the next year they threw out the Conservative 
majority in favor of the liberals. During the course of the next three 
years, popularly called the New Era because of the hope for the liberal 
refornl of Prussia and the national unification of Germany, the ruler 
and the liberal majority learned to their dismay that each wished some-
thing different from the other. The former harbored two aims, to re-
form and strengthen the army and to keep his absolute power, while 
the latter was equally determined to reform Prussia in a liberal sense 
and to unify Germany. Both William and the liberals confused reality 
with desire. The Prince thought that he was governing a Prussia 
like that of his beloved father, Frederick William III (d. 1840), but 
actually he faced a state in which society had considerably altered. 
The liberals believed that the Regent appreciated the needs of the 
time and could be led or pushed into a movement of reform. Through 
initial misunderstanding and subsequent refusal to compromise they 
drifted by 1862 into a constitutional conflict. The ruler, who became 
King on the death of his brother in January, 1861, dismissed the liberal 
ministers in the next year, again turned to the Conservatives, and in 
September, 1862, appointed Bismarck as Minister President. The 
selection of this Junker statesman signified that the controversy over 
the meaning of the constitution would be resolved by Machtpolitik. 
J 
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In spite of the fact that the elections to the Lower House in 1861 and 
in 1862 had almost eliminated the Conservatives, the government, 
through the exercise of all possible pressure upon the voters, tried i~ 
1863 to replace the overwhelming liberal majority by Conservatives. 
The attempt failed; but the King and his Conservative ministers con-
tinued to rule, and as a result of their successful resistance to the 
liberals they imparted to the constitution the absolutistic interpretation 
that they wished. Apparently so promising at the beginning of the 
New Era, liberalism went down to crushing defeat. 
How did the conflict between the liberals on the one hand and the 
King and the Conservatives on the other come about? An explanation 
involves, first, a portrayal of the ruler's character, second, a comparison 
between his aims and those of the liberals, and third, a summary of 
the economic and social changes that had occurred in Prussia since the 
formative years of the new ruler's youth. 
The Prince Regent in 1858 was already sixty-one years old. He had 
fought in the War of Liberation against Napoleon with the distinction 
expected of a royal prince and had spent his life in the army. As a 
second son he had never been intended for the kingship and had 
received no preparatory training for that position. The family had 
expected that Frederick William, the eldest son, would ascend the 
throne, that in due time he would have a male heir, and that Prince 
William would remain one of the many minor Hohenzollerns, a 
younger son on the periphery of power, adept, if he had the energy 
and ambition, in the military (other professions were scarcely of 
comparable worth) and adjusted to a life of frustration. With the 
position of supreme power in the state at stake, too thorough and all-
round an education might have made a second son dangerous to the 
legitimate heir; it might have led to comparisons and aroused trouble-
some ambitions. A careful restriction of training and, after maturity, 
of employment offered assurance of family and state harmony. No 
more efficient school in subordination could have been found in the 
uneventful years after 1815 than the Pruss ian army. 
By the time he became ruler Prince William was too old to change 
his fundamental views and ways of doing things. He belonged to the 
ranks of those Hohenzollerns with modest talents and steadiness of 
character, for he had the moderate and tenacious personality of his 
father and he lacked entirely the brilliance of his older brother. He 
had no relations with the artistic and intellectual life of the period. 
He was first of all a Hohenzollern and then an officer, but an officer 
of the ordinary, unimaginative, military type and not one like Boyen 
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with a love of literature and philosophy. His model was not that of 
Frederick the Great but of Frederick William III, his father, a dull, 
commonsense, conservative person, who in the Napoleonic period had 
had to be pushed into taking every decision that made him famous 
and who had reverted to the commonplace as soon as the pressure of 
international affairs had been removed. Prince William was content 
to abide within the spiritual limitations of his character, concentrating 
his emotions as well as his intellect upon the responsibilities of his 
office. Possessed of a fine sense of moral uprightness and an aversion 
to hypocrisy, he lived in accordance with the Pruss ian tradition of 
frugality, asceticism and the categorical imperative. In keeping with 
this tradition he appreciated and expected ability in his advisers and 
loyally held to men of greater talent than himself. He had no under-
standing of popular politics and did not acquire any after he became 
ruler. Indeed, he seems to have disliked politics from an instinctive 
aversion to any source of competition with Hohenzollern power. 
As soon as Prince William became Regent, he formulated a program 
to which he clung tenaciously. The nature of the entire program, con· 
sisting mainly of a set of moral standards, can be judged from the 
initial sentences. After justifying his change of ministers on grounds 
of harmony of views, he said that "there should not be at present and 
there should never be any talk of a break with the past. The careful, 
improving hand shall be laid upon that which shows itself to be 
arbitrary or contrary to the needs of the time." 
The program reflected the inconsistency of thought in William's 
mind. During the Manteuffel period the Prince had shown a deep 
antipathy to the hypocrisy, intrigue and brutality of the Conservatives 
in power and had expressed himself freely against their activity. He 
had thereby acquired their enmity, and he knew that they had tried 
as long as possible to prevent his becoming Regent. His program was 
aimed to rebuke the Conservatives and encourage the mildest form of 
liberalism, under the one fundamental condition that the monarch reo 
tain his power. Thus he spoke of kingship by divine right but also 
of abiding loyally by the constitution, of advocating apparently liberal 
reforms but of keeping within the historical tradition of absolutism. 
The passages about preserving the ruler's authority were clear and 
emphatic and were repeated throughout the entire document; the 
statements about reforms never rose above the general, except on the 
subjects of the military and of taxation to support it. It is clear that 
the author of this program leaned far more toward the past than to-
ward the future, that his interest in reform was limited by his determi-
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nation to preserve his own power by divine right, and that in his con-
ception the process of reform consisted of the Landtag's approving his 
proposals. His idea of kingship under the constitution of 1850 con-
formed to that held by Conservatives in about every sphere of life. 
Just as under pressure from the liberals the Conservatives later pro-
posed to have the survivals of the Old Regime-the patrimonial police 
power, for example-confirmed to them by law, so William regarded 
the constitution as a legal support to his absolute authority. 
The King's lack of understanding of liberalism was evident in his 
personnel policy. In revamping the ministry in 1858, he appointed 
right·wing liberals like Count von Schwerin, a type he called con-
servative constitutionalist;! but at the same time he retained von der 
Heydt as Minister of Commerce and soon added the reactionary 
General von Roon as Minister of War. The conception of ministerial 
unity was alien to him; while the ministry had a Minister President, 
the latter acted as primus inter pares and exercised slight authority 
over the others. The system assured the King greater power by en-
abling him to pick whom he wished as advisers without being de-
pendent upon one prime minister or one party for the selection of the 
other members. In the same way William refused to oust reactionary 
officials from their positions even when their abuse of power had been 
notorious. When the liberals urged him to dismiss police president 
Zedlitz in Berlin, as infamous a reactionary as could be found serving 
the Manteuffel ministry, the King refused, flatly and angrily. One 
expected officials to be demigods, he scornfully said.2 Officials existed, 
he believed, to carry out his orders; they should take on the qualities 
required of them. That they might sabotage or misinterpret the 
King's instructions and continue quietly to play the tyrant without 
the victim's being able to obtain justice was far beyond William's 
comprehension. Such a thing smacked of politics. The machine of 
officials, geared for decades to authoritarianism, remained unchanged 
by the liberal ministers in organization and personnel and stood ready 
for Bismarck to set again in motion. 
Although the King preferred as advisers and ministers men of 
authoritarian, aristocratic qualities like his own, he could not always 
handle them. His honest revulsion against hypocrisy could not and 
1 Aus dem Leben Theodor von Bernhardis, 1834·71 (Leipzig, 1893-1906), IV, 182, 
187; Kaiser Wilhelms des Crossen Briefe, Reden und Schriften, edited by Ernst Berner 
(Berlin, 1906), II, 22. 
"Ibid., pp. 106-7, 126-27. Zedlitz later became involved in political scandal and 
in 1861 had to be ousted. 
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did not compensate for the effects of his intellectual limitations. 
Persons like Bismarck could convince him, in case it was in his intetest 
and he wished to be convinced, that black was white. Although usually 
wrong in the fundamental decisions of his career, as a rule he had 
the extraordinary capacity for being led back to the right track with-
out loss of face or self-confidence. The constitutional conflict offered 
rich examples of specious reasoning which he was persuaded to believe 
as honest fact. 
Early in his military career Prince William had concluded that the 
army needed to be reformed-the size increased, the reserves brought 
under the direct control of the regular officers, and the term of service 
lengthened. As long as his father and brother reigned, he had been 
unable to make headway with his ideas; but as soon as he himself 
assumed power he set to work to achieve his life's purpose. Of one 
thing he was sure-that he understood military affairs and knew what 
reforms the army needed. He asserted flatly that anyone, whether 
military or civilian, who disagreed with him on this question possessed 
neither the necessary knowledge nor good judgment. To have the 
Lower House of the Landtag, for which in any case he had little 
respect, criticize his military program and refuse the funds for carry-
ing it out angered and personally offended him. 
Prince William did not comprehend what a flood of reform de-
mands he caused by his modest proposals. His conception of the kind 
of society in which he lived may be seen from a statement in his pro-
gram of 1858 about education. The different classes of the population 
should be given the "necessary education without raising these classes 
[he meant social classes] above their proper sphere." All too obviously, 
he still thought of society as it existed in the Old Regime. Although 
he had bourgeois acquaintances, the society of industrialism and com-
merce, of freedom of activity and thought, was unknown to him. 
The liberal masses were not aware of the ruler's autocratic beliefs 
and during the New Era supposed that he was on their side. From 
the little town of Angerburg in East Prussia came an address to that 
unregenerate democratic deputy, Waldeck: "The people look with 
trust to you as its courageous fighter for right and truth. Hail to our 
Royal House! Twice hail to it when men like you are its advisers! 
The Royal House stands firmly for eternity; its foundation is the 
people." The non-Prus&ian Weser-Zeitung stated in January, 1861, 
that there now "sits on the Pruss ian throne a man whom the German 
liberals would confidently like to see march at their head." Early in 
1861 the Kolnische Zeitung jubilantly remarked about the King's 
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proclamation "To My People": "\lVe do not know what we would add 
to this masterful address of our King William other than a thousand-
fold 'yes'! ... Not only Prussia but all Germany will listen to the 
glorious words of King William, whose name recalls the greatness of 
princes, the constitution, legal freedom, for they know that a man 
wears Prussia's Crown who is as good as his word."3 
The liberal enthusiasm about the new ruler was hardly justified. 
As early as 1859 Prince William was becoming alarmed over the effects 
of his action. The reappearance in politics of persons like Jacoby and 
Rodbertus, who had been active in the Revolution of 1848, greatly 
disturbed him.4 The liberal ministers were pressing him for more 
reforms, and specific ones, for they in turn were being urged to act by 
the majority in the Lower House. One of the two reforms in which the 
ruler was interested, namely, the military, was intensely disliked by all 
liberals as a measure preserving those Prussian social and institutional 
forces which the liberals wished to overcome-militarism, caste and 
absolutism. The liberal ministers were caught between a ruler 
increasingly concerned about losing his own power and a Lower House 
of liberals determined to see Prussia reformed and the constitution 
become a fact. 
By the time of the opening of the Landtag in January, 1860, the 
ministers had persuaded the Regent to state somewhat specifically the 
reforms he supported. On the question of national unification he 
remained vague, but he urged reform of the land tax, and he reported 
that the conditions of provincial and local government were being 
investigated and that a bill concerning county government would be 
introduced into the Landtag. These statements marked an advance 
over the vague phrases of 1858. He proposed to introduce a bill to 
fix the election districts, a crying need to prevent the repetition of the 
scandalous gerrymandering in the Manteuffel era. He promised a 
bill to legalize civil marriage and one to improve education. He de-
voted most attention, however, to urging the approval of the military 
reforms. Nor did he offer anything more at the opening of the Landtag 
in 1861.5 
• Tagesbericht, No. 75, March 30, 1861, quoting Volkszeitung (Berlin), No. 75; 
Tagesbericht, No. 17, Jan. 21, 1861; ibid, No.7, Jan. 9, 1861. The Tagesbericht was 
a summary of the daily press prepared for the King. A copy was to be found in the 
Prussian State Archives in Berlin-Dahlem. 
• Von Bernhardi, op. cit., III, 156·57. 
• Horst Kohl, Dreissig Jahre preussisch-deutscher Geschichte 1858-1888 in amt-
lichen Kundgebungen (Giessen, 1888), pp. 12-15, 20-23. 
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One may imagine that the liberals would scarcely be satisfied 
with such a meager program of reform, especially in view of the 
sacrifices they were expected to make for the sake of strengthening the 
army. They noted the absence of any reference to reform of the 
solidly Conservative Upper House or to the introduction of ministerial 
responsibility; they noted the absence of action against reactionary 
officials; they were disturbed by the apathy toward national unification 
and by the general inability to accomplish anything. Their reaction 
to the King's opening address to the Landtag in 1861 was, according to 
one observer, glacia1.6 
The aggressive wing of the liberals began in 1860 to take steps 
toward organizing a vigorous, active party. The next year the German 
Progressive party emerged, and it soon became the most powerful of 
all the liberal groups in the state. The election of 1861 reduced 
radically the number of right-wing Old Liberals or Constitutionals, 
who had been the government's main supporters, and returned in their 
stead the Progressives and the like-minded Left-Center party, the one 
especially powerful in the East, the other in the West, and both in the 
Central provinces. Between a stubborn ruler and an aggressive Lower 
House, the liberal ministers found themselves in a more embarrassing 
position than ever. They urged the slogan "Do not Press!", which 
the Lower House was decidedly disinclined to heed. 
By 1862 the cleft between the King and the liberals could scarcely 
have been wider. The more acute the conflict became, the more 
irascible grew the monarch. Easily roused to anger, he was at times 
inclined to weep. Accustomed to obedience as an officer, a Hohenzol-
lern and a king, he was distressed by the outcome of the elections and 
needed reassurance of the devotion of his people. 
Angry at the Conservatives in the early part of the period, Prince 
William had resisted their efforts to intrigue against the liberal minis-
ters. When in 1858 Count Eberhard Stolberg, one of the Conservative 
leaders, had tried to interest William in the plan to establish a Con-
servative newspaper, the Regent had opposed it and spoken in a 
decidedly liberal vein.7 In 1859 he said to the intriguing Stolberg, 
"In short, this is my ministry and will remain so as long as I live and 
reign."s The Regent disapproved thoroughly of the Conservatives' 
resistance to reform of the land tax. Since he needed the extra 
money to support his military, he forced the tax bill through the 
• Von Bemhardi, op. cit., IV, 135-36. 
• Ibid., III, 228. 
I Ibid., III, 233-34. 
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Upper House. Thereafter, no basic controversy divided him from 
the Conservatives, and as he became increasingly involved in difficulty 
with the liberals, he found the Conservatives, eager to serve him, more 
and more to his liking. 
Throughout the New Era the Conservatives had never lost in-
fluence at court. They practically monopolized the positions there 
and were expert at exerting social pressure through personal channels 
not subject to public control. By way especially of the royal military 
attaches and Minister of War von Roon they aroused fear of revolution 
and encouraged the ruler toward absolutism. In 1862 they utilized 
the latter's anger at the liberals over the military reform~ to return to 
power in the government. Their embarrassment during the New Era 
at having to be more royal and more conservative than the King was 
past; henceforth they crowded behind their lord and their lord's new 
Minister President, Bismarck, in a fight to the finish against liberalism. 
In order to understand the other major side in the constitutional 
conflict, namely, the liberals, we must analyze the main lines of eco-
nomic and social change that had occurred in Prussia during the pre-
ceding half century. The analysis will reveal why in the elections to 
the Landtag the opposition proved to be so strong and the Conserva-
tives so weak. 
In May, 1862, a liberal newspaper wrote: "The Prussian people are 
no longer that mass of peasants just freed from serfdom or of servile 
and powerless town-dwellers that Frederick William III ruled. Just 
as Berlin has risen in two decades from a wretched town of the royal 
court with 200,000 population to the leading industrial city of Germany 
and the second commercial city of North Germany, in the same way 
Breslau, Cologne, Magdeburg and other provincial towns have also 
grown to be large commercial centers. The anger of the government 
can no longer strike the big industrialists and merchants of these cities 
as long as they observe the law. Despotism is no longer possible; the 
Prussian people have become too intelligent and wealthy for it. The 
more the estate-owner has withdrawn from community affairs, the more 
independent the peasant has become. We use the word 'peasant,' 
which will soon be only a myth, to refer to persons whom it no longer 
describes. In many areas the peasant already behaves like a townsman 
and feels and thinks like one. He no longer stands in his village, iso-
lated and dependent upon his own physical strength; through common 
interests and contacts he has become a conscious part of the nation."9 
• Quoted in Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, May 8, 1862. 
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Although somewhat exaggerated, particularly in its description of the 
peasant, the article correctly estimated the general situation. 
Between 1816 and 1858, when Prince William became regent, the 
population of Prussia had increased from 10,320,000 to 17,673,000. By 
1864 it rose to 19,200,000. The increase had been a steady one, with 
the largest gains registered since 1830. All parts of the country had 
participated in the growth, the Administrative Districts of Liegnitz, 
Erfurt, Munster, Minden and Aachen showing least, percentagewise, 
and Koslin, Oppeln and Bromberg enjoying the largest. Some pre-
dominantly agricultural Districts had grown in population as much as 
those with developing industries. A breakdown of the increase by 
decades discloses that up to 1849 for the state as a whole the rural 
population had grown faster than the urban; after that date the re-
verse was true. By the end of 1858 there were in the rural areas 1,672, 
and in the towns 1,817 persons for every 1,000 in 1816; in 1840 the 
comparable figures had been 1,461 and 1,411, and in 1849, they had 
been 1,575 and 1,590.10 
While the towns and cities with a population of about a thousand 
or more had scarcely increased in number (some 994 in 1860) since 
the close of the Napoleonic wars, they had shared in the general growth. 
The greatest gain had occurred in the large cities, which were well 
scattered over the state. (See Appendix A.) The areas of coal mining 
and iron and steel works attracted people in particularly large num-
bers, nearly doubling their population between 1819 and 1861.11 
Since the increase cannot be accounted for by natural growth, the 
towns and cities were manifestly drawing people from the rural dis-
tricts and from the small towns that as yet lacked the opportunities 
being made available by industry and transportation .. 
Industrial production, especially since the 1830s, had begun to as-
sume factory proportions and to show a growth in size of plant, capitali-
zation and number of workers. The textile and clothing industry 
remained the largest employer in 1861. The iron, steel and machinery 
industry ranked a poor second but gave promise of speedily overtaking 
textiles. Commerce and construction occupied the third and fourth 
places respectively, with very little difference between them. Produc-
tion had been changing to meet the needs of the increasing population. 
Since master tailors could not turn out enough clothes at a low price 
10 See the tables in Jahrbuch filr die amtliche Statistik des Preussischen Staates 
(Berlin, 1863), pp. 109-10. 
11 See Gustav Neumann, Das Deutsche Reich in geographischer, statistischer und 
topographischer Beziehung (Berlin, 1874), I, 368. 
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to satisfy the demand, the factory assumed the responsibility. The 
building industry had to expand to house the people and the new 
machines. The master builders were giving way to construction com-
panies. Iron and steel production was adjusting to the opportunities 
made available by the construction of railroads, gas works, factories, 
and the numerous other creations of modern technology. Steam en-
gines were becoming fairly common. The results of the changes in 
production were evident in the statistics on employment. The number 
engaged in industry was rising. In 1846 it had been 1,343,821; in 1861 
it was 1,786,145. The number of handworkers, male and female, dur-
ing the same time had declined from 1,470,091 to 1,087,924.12 
The expansion of industry and the resulting increase in the turn-
over of goods afforded the opportunities for a rapid enlargement of 
the middle class. Local persons and capital were being mobilized, and 
new resources were moving from outside into promising centers.IS By 
1860 Prussia had produced a crop of entrepreneurs in each town except 
those remaining largely local in character; even in the latter, in-
dividuals were to be found who were eager to participate in the eco-
nomic growth and were angry over the frustration of their ambitions. 
The number of persons who, beginning with modest or almost no 
means, succeeded in a few decades in accumulating a considerable 
amount of wealth or even, for those times, a fortune was comparable 
to that in other continental countries. These provided the leaders 
in the development of industrial society. The process remained in an 
early stage; but by 1860 the outlines of the future social organization 
were fairly clear. 
The changes in the countryside lacked the sharpness of cultural 
outline of those in the towns, but they were nonetheless real and im-
portant. After the Battle of Jena the effort to aid in the revival of 
Prussia by emancipating the peasants had aroused the ambitions of 
the rural people and put land in the category of mobile property 
along with factories and other urban objects. By 1860 peasant emanci-
pation had produced marked economic results. An area of 56,683,005 
Morgen of land with 1,478,022 owners had been freed of manorial 
restrictions. By April I, 1859, mortgages to the amount of 78,568,380 
u In 1846 Prussia possessed 1,139 steam engines with 21,715 horsepower; in 1861, 
the figures were 6,669 engines with 137,377 horsepower. Jhb. fur die amtliche 
Statistik des Preuss. Staates (1863), pp. 460-62. 
,. See, for example, the situation in Stettin described in Bremer Handelsblatt, 
March 19, 1859, pp. 121-23. 
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Thalers had been issued.14 When one considers that in every case 
property ownership and in most cases money transactions had been 
involved, that in every case legal rights and claims had been at stake, 
one must conclude that a large percentage of the peasantry was being 
c6mpelled to cultivate the virtues of private ownership and initiative 
to keep its property. The peasant was forced to assume some of the 
characteristics of the urbanite; he had to deal in money, to calculate. 
The responsibilities accruing from emancipation were pushing him 
into modern society. 
The effects upon the large landowners were more evident than 
those upon the peasantry. Even in the preceding century large-scale 
agrarians had begun to buy and sell land in order to take advantage 
of rising prices. In this way some burghers had been able to pur-
chase noble estates (Rittergiiter) and other extensive properties, 
erasing the sharp social and economic separation between town and 
country. After the period of the Stein-Hardenberg reforms the process 
had continued at a speedy pace. Although the evidence about land 
transactions in the Nineteenth Century is inadequate, some trends are 
to be discerned. Many persons from the Western provinces, the Rhine-
land and Westphalia, where land was expensive, had been purchasing 
estates in the Eastern provinces, where land was considerably cheaper. 
The 1820s and '30s had been hard on owners in the Eastern provinces, 
who having bought their land at high prices had suffered greatly from 
the severe decline in the price of agricultural products. Except in 
Silesia, where many estate-owners had come through the crisis years 
primarily by raising sheep and seIling the wool in the world market, 
the turnover in estates had been large. Wealthy burghers had bought 
land not merely around the larger towns and cities but even in re-
mote areas. Droysen, a contemporary expert, published the following 
data on the ownership of noble estates in 1859.111 
H As many as 82,855 peasant holdings had been established with 5,497,085 Morgen 
of land; 1,180,133 other properties had been freed of servile duties, involving the 
abolition of 6,319,352 days of service by animals and 23,444,396 days of personal 
service. In compensation the peasants had paid or agreed to pay 34,210,962 Thalers 
in capital, 5,347,323 Thalers in money rent, 287,972 Scheffels of rye, 10,633 Scheffels 
of wheat, barley and oats, and 1,630,055 Morgen of land. Dr. Georg von Viebahn, 
Statistik des zollverein ten und N6rdlichen Deutschlands (Berlin, 1858-68), II, 584-85. 
A Scheffel was equal to about I y:! bushels, a Morgen nearly an acre, a Thaler about 
3 marks, or 75 cents. 
15 Eduard Pfeifer, "Ober die Grundsteuer," Vierteljahrschrift filr Volkswirtschaft 
und Kulturgeschichte (1864), IV, 96 note. Johannes Ziekursch, Ein Hundert Jahre 
Schlesischer Agrargeschichte (Breslau, 1927), pp. 328, 386. August Meitzen, Der 
Boden und die landwirtschaftlichen Verhiiltnisse des Preussischen Staates (Berlin, 
1868-71) , I, 502-3; III, 116, 411, 430-32, 596-98. Von Viebahn, op. cit., II, 984-93. 
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Prussia 2,313 Noble estates, of which 788 were in burgher possession, or 34% 
Posen 1,440 " 957 " 66 
Pomerania 1,654 1,046 64 
Branden-
burg 1,798 
Silesia 3,132 
Saxony 1,047 
Westphalia 425 
Rhineland 466 
Total 12,275 
1,116 
1,857 
563 
378 
318 
7,023 
62 
59 
" 54 
" 89 
68 
Average 57% 
A contemporary writer of an informative work on the province of 
Prussia stated that in 1859 only fifty-nine estates in the entire pro-
vince had remained in the possession of the same family for at least 
a hundred years, whereas in Brandenburg there were 395 such estates. 
He concluded that "a real landed aristocracy" practically no longer 
existed in the province of Prussia.16 All in all, with the exception of a 
few areas, the writer's conclusion about the province of Prussia seems 
to have applied to the entire state; land had become a commodity of 
sale and had in the main lost its prestige as the basis for an aristocratic 
caste. Too many of the estate-owners, whether of noble or of burgher 
origin, were paying tribute to the ways of capitalism for them to pass 
as traditional gentry. 
The evidence is augmented by a consideration of the expansion of 
industry into the rural areas. In the Eighteenth Century noblemen 
had built on their estates distilleries, saw mills, and other kinds of 
businesses closely associated with agriculture; but by 1860 both the 
variety and the number of these industries had greatly increased. It 
was estimated that 64,445 such enterprises were then in operation and 
that they employed 229,500 technicians and workers. The list in-
cluded lime burners, brick kilns, several kinds of mills, factories for 
preparing foods, tobacco factories, sugar refineries, breweries, and so 
on. By 1861 there were in use for agricultural purposes 242 steam en-
gines with 4,172 horsepower (in 1846 the figures had been 48 and 504 
respectively); the saw mills in 1861 used 230 steam engines of 2,913 
horsepower (in 1846 the figures had been 25 and 268 respectively) ; 
the flour mills in the same year employed 600 steam engines of 8,101 
horsepower (in 1846 the figures had been 7I and 927 respectively). 
Although flour milling was also being done in the towns, one can per-
ceive that the gentry knew the value of modern machinery and meth-
ods. The evidence makes conditions sound dangerously like capitalism, 
,. Die Provinz Preussen (Konigsberg, 1863), pp. 430, 434. 
How the Conflict Arose / 15 
with all the resulting implications of social mobility and the break-
down of the caste-state. When one adds the story of the establishment 
in the villages and rural districts of many factories by bona fide busi-
nessmen of burgher origin,17 the impression is strengthened that the 
ways of the middle class, the curse of vulgar materialism, the pursuit 
of Mammon, had overcome the stronghold of Junker moral purity, 
and that the difference in standards and objectives between town and 
country was far less noticeable in 1860 than in 1815 or even 1840. 
Some aristocrats, like the Prince of Pless, went into business on a large 
scale at the same time that they tried to remain lords of the Old 
Regime. This type eventually became the backbone of the Free 
Conservative party and accepted national unification and the eco-
nomic legislation put through by Bismarck. 
Too little is known about the social history of the nobility in the 
Nineteenth Century for us to be able to state how many aristocrats re-
mained loyal to the Old Regime, how many took the line of the Prince 
of Pless, and how many turned liberal. It is clear that in the half 
century or more prior to the constitutional conflict the material and 
the social structure of the large landownership had been in a process of 
rapid transformation. Not merely the emancipation of the peasantry 
and the legalization of the sale of landed estates had brought about 
this change; the desire to take advantage of the developing opportunties 
to make money had seized upon this class and was imparting to it some 
of the characteristics of the bourgeoisie. Material interests were draw-
ing the rural population, aristocratic and peasant, in the direction of 
liberalism. Whether the attraction proved to be superior to that of 
the Old Regime depended upon one's social ideals and one's knowledge 
and understanding of the forces of the age. 
The most striking example of the material facilities for change was 
offered by the improvement in the means of transportation and com-
munication. During the quarter of a century prior to 1860 Prussia 
had built a railroad system of 737.9 Prussian miles, of which 231.3 
miles were double-tracked.18 In 1816 Prussia had had 419.8 Prussian 
miles of all-season roads; by 1862 it had 3,756.2 miles. Likewise the 
local roads were being improved with state aid. People and goods 
were moving on a scale unprecedented in history. The rate of awaken-
ing to non·local interests can be seen from the four-fold increase in 
.. Meitzen, op. cit., I, 336 If.; ]hb. filr die amtliche Statistik des Preuss. Staates 
(1863), pp. 461·62. 
'8 A Prussian mile was equal to 7,420.4 meters. Meitzen, op. cit., III, 232, 600. 
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the number of letters sent through the mail between 1842 and 1860 
and in the ten-fold increase in the number of telegrams sent in the 
1850s.19 Speed was becoming valuable. 
Higher education exhibited far less change than the economic and 
social aspects of Prussian life. The universities, which should have 
acted as intellectual leaders, preserved the standard curriculum of 
half a century earlier. Except in theoretical and experimental science, 
they had made few concessions to the needs of the developing in-
dustrial society. In the summer semester of 1820 there had been 2,368 
students in the Prussian universities; in the summer semester of 1861 
there were 4,466 students.2o In only one area, that of the Humanities 
and the Social Sciences, had the percentage increase in enrollment ex-
ceeded that of the population. In consequence there were, for example, 
fewer doctors per capita in the state than there had been in 1849 
(one doctor to 3,076 people in 1861, one to 2,929 in 1849), and in four 
Administrative Districts the number in absolute terms had declined. 
As for technical schools, Prussia possessed only one which might be 
called a school of engineering and it was of modest proportion (385 
students in 1864). Most young men had to study that subject in other 
states. The presence of a couple of small mining schools and an 
agricultural institute could scarcely compensate for the absence of 
other facilities. Official Prussia had not yet become aware of the fact 
that industrialism was able to raise the general standard of living and 
greatly enhance the per-capita need for professional services.21 
In 1860 Prussian society was on the move. The hope and promise 
of a new culture were found over most of the state, in town and 
country and among all classes. By the time of the constitutional con-
flict the psychological adjustments of the population varied from that 
of the person who still tried to be a grand seigneur of the Old Regime 
while participating on a large scale in modern industrial activity to 
that of the individual who saw clearly the implications for the total 
.9 Ibid., III, 221, 232, 286, 290. 
'0 Of these, 729 had studied Evangelical theology, 153 Catholic theology, 741 
law, 398 medicine, 347 humanities and what passed as social science. In the summer 
session of 1861 there were 4,466 students, among them 1,040 in Evangelical theology. 
596 in Catholic theology, 655 in law. 753 in medicine. 1,422 in humanities and 
social sciences. During that time the population had grown from ten million to 
eighteen million. Tabellen und Amtliche Nachrichten uber den Preussischen Staat 
fur das Jahr 1849, Hrsg. vom Statistischen Bureau zu Berlin (Berlin, 1851), II. 
573-74; Preussische Statistik, Hrsg. vom Kgl. Statistischen Bureau in Berlin (1864), 
p. 47; von Viebahn, op. cit., III, 1146-49 . 
.. On the number of doctors and druggists see Zeitschrift des Kgl. Preussischen 
Statistischen Bureaus (Berlin, 1863), pp. 236·39. 
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culture of changing from a society of caste and local economy to one 
of mobility. The economic and social turn toward liberalism did not 
necessarily entail the introduction of political and governmental free-
dom, but a trend lay definitely in that direction. Could a state intro-
duce freedom into its economy and social organization while pre-
serving absolutism in its government? While the liberals thought not, 
the King remained emotionally bound to the Old Regime, even when 
he paid lip service to constitutionalism. The Conservatives were de-
termined to preserve the past and hated the constitution and all those 
ideals for which it stood. Out of this opposition of cultural values 
developed the crisis of the early 1860s, when the institutional organiza-
tion and distribution of political and social power in Prussia and 
Germany were decided for the next two generations. 
2 / Caste and Privilege 
AmcLE FOUR of the Pru",ian comtitution of 1850 
stated: "All Prussians are equal before the law. Caste privileges are in-
valid. Subject to conditions established by law, all public offices are 
equally open to all who are competent." In 1856 the Conservative lead-
er in the Lower House had introduced a resolution for the abolition of 
the first two sentences of this article as "wrong" and "reprehensible." 
The Conservative Minister of Interior had reassured him as follows: 
The government has found and recognized in Article Four 
the sense that for equal legal conditions, relations and actions 
equality of the law with respect to the estate shall obtain. But 
the government has always regarded it as compatible with this 
position that . . . the special rights and dutIes of individual 
estates, classes and corporations which exist according to special 
and particular laws and are an essential part of the organism 
of the state-that these special organizations which have the pur-
pose of preserving an estate or a corporation belonging to the 
State organism-, are not to be regarded as absolutely abolished 
by Article Four but are far more to be considered as continuing 
to exist. This interpretation is further to be recognized as cor-
rect because the constitution itself sanctions such special legal 
rights for individual classes and estates-something which it 
could not do if this recognition contradicted Article Four. Such 
are the special rights and legal limitations of the military estate, 
the speClal rights of judges, the privileges of deputies according 
to Article Eighty-four. 
The minister concluded that it was not necessary to annul Article 
Four.l 
1 Ludwig von Roenne, Das Staats·Recht der Preussischen Monarchie (Leipzig, 
1864), Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 181-82. 
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The contrast between the explicit words of the constitution and 
the interpretation given it characterized the Pruss ian state as a whole. 
Article Four contained an assertion of a fundamental principle of 
social organization formulated in the Revolution of 1848. Upon re-
covering control of the country the Conservatives, not daring to 
eliminate it, had chosen to annul it by interpretation. To infer that 
the stipulations of special qualifications, rights and responsibilities of 
professional groups like military personnel, judges and representatives 
in the Lower House of the Landtag :qleant that privileges of the 
nobility, guildsmen and other sharply separated social groups were 
also legal transformed Article Four, said the liberals, into an expres-
sion of nonsense. 
The interpretation of Article Four harmonized with the social 
ideals to which the Conservatives adhered. They believed in in-
equality and wished to preserve the organization of society in estates, 
with each person legally as well as socially restricted to the rights and 
responsibilities of his caste. Their eyes were directed toward the past, 
the estates-state; their objective was simply to preserve as much of that 
social system as they could, above all to preserve the basic structure 
even if a few concessions in details or in a formal sense, like Article 
Four, had to be made. The concept of status predominated in their 
thinking, a concept that opposed social movement and change. It 
operated in accordance with the ideal of social relationship expressed 
in the terms lordship and subjection. The three terms summarized 
the bases of the Conservative social philosophy, the hard core of Con-
servative behavior around which was elaborated any further theoretical 
justification. 
To the liberals the basic ideal of social philosophy was clearly ex-
pressed in Article Four. They interpreted the article as referring to 
individual persons, and rejected the Conservative interposition of 
castes and estates, of feudal orders, between the individual person 
and the state. They believed in freedom of the single person, not 
freedom of the estate to which the individual members had to be 
subordinated. They wished, as the liberal Karl Twesten wrote in 1861, 
"equality before the law and legal security against aristocratic pre-
ference and arbitrary power"; they aimed at "the independence and 
unobstructed development of all for the benefit of all." "Today the 
world is liberal," Tweston declared with more optimism than truth.2 
• Karl Twesten, Was Uns Noch Retten Kann (1861), pp. 24-26. 
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The liberals were starting with the New Era in 1858 the third large-
scale attempt in Nineteenth Century Prussian history to transform the 
state of the Hohenzollerns and Junkers into a modern, free society. 
During the first attempt, made in the urgent effort to revive the society 
to fight against Napoleon, the principle of equality had been accepted 
in law and to some extent in fact. The decree of October 9, 1807, had 
created the legal possibility for a burgher or a peasant to purchase a 
noble estate, for a noble or a peasant to take up a burgher occupation, 
and for a burgher to turn to agriculture. The class restrictions upon 
occupation were thereby abolished, and in subsequent decades the legal 
right became an economic reality.3 
With the elimination of the Napoleonic menace the Conservatives 
reestablished themselves in authority and restored as much of the Old 
Regime as they could. The caste restrictions upon the sale and pur-
chase of property could not be re-introduced, for the noble land-
owners liked the economic advantages of this freedom. But, as we 
shall see, the nobility succeeded in preserving most of their other pri-
vileges and were well established in power when the Revolution of 
1848 endangered them once more. The threat to the aristocratic posi-
tion which arose from a revolution from within proved to be even 
more serious than that which a half century earlier had come from 
without in the form of the French under Napoleon. Again the Con-
servatives were able to survive and to restore their authority, but only 
by the official introduction of a potentially liberal constitution. When 
the New Era began, they still controlled Prussia in all the key positions, 
for even though the constitution used the language of liberalism it 
remained in 1858 the fa~ade of a society dominated h.y caste and 
privilege. 
Liberals of all shades agreed that the crucial struggle in Prussia was 
between Junkerism and the middle class. In April, 1862, the central 
election committee of the Constitutional party declared in an election 
broadsheet that "the Prussian people wish and can no longer forego 
the conclusion of the conflict between burgher and Junkerism."4 The 
National Zeitung of June 13, 1861, stated that 
... According to the program of the German Progressive Party 
and . . . according to our own conviction the main task for 
Prussia in our age is the political elevation of the burgher 
estate. 1£ the burgher estate is politically to carry any weight 
and to exercise influence on the entire action of the government 
• Von Roerme, op. cit., (1864), Vol. I, Part 2, p. 179. 
• Volkszeitung, April 5, 1862. 
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to the degree appropriate to it today, it must be represented in 
a chamber filled with its spirit and independent of any other 
power. In any case it has to show itself in the Chamber which 
according to the constitution is called to represent it not as de-
pendent upon the ministry but as a free and strong political 
power. 
Critics will say, the writer continued, that the realization of this claim 
would give a preferred position to one class, whereas the constitution 
belonged to the entire nation. The objection could be met by point-
ing to the fact that a constitutional state should be one of equality 
before the law, a position supported only by the burghers since the 
Prussian nobility was hopelessly feudal. 
A correspondent from Pomerania to the W ochenschrift des N ational-
vereins (November 7, 1862) elaborated upon the shortcomings of the 
Junkers. These nobles, he asserted, lacked the wealth, the intelligence 
and the record of public service to maintain their present position. 
They lacked everything which would justify their retention of power 
and significance. "It is doubtful," he continued, "whether this party 
is at all capable of reorganization .... Pretentious and boastful it presses 
forward as if to protect the throne, when in reality it is driven only 
by the narrowest selfishness to find there a refuge for itself." The 
writer lived in a Junker stronghold and spoke with the anger of one 
who had learned from experience. Another author complained in the 
same journal that the equal right of all citizens to occupy state offices 
existed only on paper, that army officers, ministers and members of 
the foreign service were almost always aristocrats, that they seem to 
grow only on family trees. "The real aristocrat, that is, the upper, 
independent nobility distinguished by rich land holdings, is," he said, 
"least represented among those who reach for the high and influential 
positions in the state." This poor court nobility, the Junkers, found 
the means for its existence solely at court or in state service and there-
fore eagerly pressed forward into these positions. This nobility, he 
declared, was "the cancer in our public life."5 
Neither social origin nor social environment appears to have been 
basic in conditioning the individual Prussian's attitude toward pri-
vilege. One would rightly expect representatives of the middle class, 
especially from the larger towns and from the Western provinces, to 
uphold liberalism against the Junkers; but numerous members of the 
aristocracy condemned their Conservative colleagues as vehemently 
• Wochenschrift des Nationalvereins, Sept. 12, 1862. 
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as any urban democrat. Freiherr von Vincke, a member of an old 
and distinguished Westphalian family, depicted them as follows: 
How can a party claim the name 'Conservative' when in the 
first instance it conserves only its private interests, I may even 
say, its unconstitutional privileges, when it does not above all 
conserve that which is the basis of all private right, the public 
law of the land! How can a party call itself an aristocracy 
when, unfaithful to the great precedent of the proudest aristoc-
racy of the world, the English, it does n9t place on its shield the 
principle of noblesse oblige and press to the front to protect at 
all times the constitutional rights of the nation!6 
On another occasion the same speaker remarked in the Lower House 
that as for the claim of the Conservatives to superior patriotism he had 
not heard that the noble lords had been especially active as sub-
scribers to the recent government loan. "I believe much more," he 
continued, "that the patriotism of the towns set an example for them 
at that time."7 
Von Vincke's colleagues, Professors von Sybel and Gneist, agreed 
with him completely. "In internal affairs," stated von Sybel in a 
speech in 1862, "the great conflict of our time is truly not one between 
crown and parliament but one between the excessive privileges of the 
nobility and the free right of merit." Gneist asserted that "the lesser 
rural nobility, alternating as court official and as aide-de-camp, has re-
mained the reason of state in Prussia as in Strelitz" (a small German 
state).8 
Religion exercised no more influence upon an individual's view 
about the Junkers than social position. The right-wing Catholic poli-
tical leader, Reichensperger-Geldern, criticized the Prussian nobility 
in terms almost identical with those of the Protestant von Vincke. 
Like von Vincke, he emphasized the difference between the ideals and 
behavior of the English and of the German nobility. In England, he 
said, sharp conflicts between the different classes in society had riot ap-
peared as they had in Germany and France and indeed in all con-
• Stenographische Berichte fiber die Adres5·Debatte des Preussischen Abgeord. 
netenhauses am 27., 28. und 29. Januar 1863 (Berlin, 1863), pp. 171·72. Henceforth 
referred to as Adressdebatte 1863. The debates were published in book form and 
within a week 100.000 copies were sold. See Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift (Stuttgart, 
1863), No.3. p. 92. 
• Preussen Stenographische Berichte des Hauses der Abgeordneten, March 8, 1861; 
I, 426. Henceforth this source will be referred to as Abg. H., St. B. 
8 Julius Heyderhoff (ed.) , Deutscher Liberalismus im Zeitalter Bismarcks (Bonn 
and Leipzig, 1925). I, 88 note, 103. 
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tinental states. England had been spared "the bloody traces" of these 
conflicts. "Herein lies the punishment for the fact that the French 
and the German nobility was not receptive to the same knowledge 
and unselfishness which has made the English nobility and England 
itself great and glorious and has founded English freedom."9 
How well entrenched the ideals and practices of privilege and caste 
were in Prussia in 1860 can be seen from an analysis of the extent to 
which they dominated the personnel holding the positions of power. 
At court, in the central government, in the provincial, county and local 
governments, in the army, wherever political power wa$ exercised, the 
old Prussia remained largely in control. It held swav over a society 
which was rapidly increasing the degree of industrialism and com-
merce, was expanding the professions, and was developing the economic 
and occupational interests expressed in liberalism. The contrast in 
the number adhering to the two ways of life, that of caste and privilege 
and that of liberalism, was extraordinarily sharp; but the former more 
than compensated for its inferior numerical strength by its occupancy 
of the strategic positions of authority. 
At the top of the structure of power stood the King, William I, filled 
with faith in his own divine right as ruler and automatically thinking 
of all Prussians as his subjects. The King had no inclinations whatever 
toward tyranny. He proposed to be an absolute monarch in the 
Hohenzollern sense, that is, a ruler who decided personally all issues 
after consulting the subjects chosen by him as his advisers. A subject 
who opposed William's authority on a matter of importance to him 
felt the impact of his anger, whether that subject was a Conservative 
noble and official or a liberal. When the liberal von Saucken-Julien-
felde, an old acquaintance, sought to explain the liberal position dur-
ing the constitutional conflict, the King would not grant him an 
audience. When the aristocratic member of the House of Lords, General 
von der Groben, refused to vote for the land tax reform, the King 
rebuked him personally and cut him off from court.1° 
The Conservatives were entitled to claim the King-once the liberal 
ministers could be eliminated. It is clear why the deputation sent 
to the King in late 1862 aI1-d in 1863 to protest the loyalty of the folk 
to the absolute sovereign and its repugnance to liberalism should have 
proved to be so effective. The King was deeply moved by these deputa-
tions; they represented the Prussian folk as he knew it-peasants, a 
• Abg. R., St. B., March 9, 1861; I, 440-41. 
10 Von Bernhardi, op. cit~, IV, 123-24. 
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pastor and a country school teacher or two, and a country nobleman to 
lead them. The society of the Old Regime was perfectly reflected by 
them; this reflection, moving the King to tears, hardened his heart 
against the liberals. The Old Regime was the Prussia he could under-
stand, the Prussia for which he had the sympathy of an absolute 
monarch. 
Among the members of the King's immediate family, his wife, a 
member of one of the lesser German ruling houses, was a staunch 
liberal. The King had married her after he had been forced to re-
nounce the lady he loved (her noble rank had been too low for a 
Hohenzollern), and it is doubtful whether Queen Augusta was able 
in fundamental matters to exercise much influence on her husband. 
When the Queen urged her views upon him with the zeal of a reformer, 
the King referred to her in some admiration and awe as a "hot-head." 
That he was able to resist even her temperament is clearly seen in his 
relation to Bismarck. She had regarded Bismarck as a bitter enemy 
since the days of 1848 when as a vehement Junker he had severely 
criticized the ruling King to her for making any concessions to the re-
volution and had even proposed, she claimed, to dethrone him. The 
enmity between the two persisted during the rest of their lives. How 
much this hostility counted with William may be judged by the fact 
that in 1862 he appointed Bismarck as Minister President and kept 
him in power until the end of the reign. 
The Crown Prince, William's son, had married a daughter of Queen 
Victoria of England and was in many respects a liberal. At the height 
of the constitutional conflict his wife made it known to liberal leaders 
not only that she read the London Times and the National Zeitung, the 
prominent Progressive Party organ in Berlin, but, further, that she 
sympathized with them. The Crown Prince was treated kindly and 
respectfully by his father and given some minor share in government; 
but he lacked the conviction and the courage to defend liberalism 
against the authority of the crown, and paternal rebuke drove him into 
silent acquiescence. 
While the King was acquainted with many prominent members of 
the middle class and occasionally associated with them, his regular en-
tourage was drawn from the nobility. Apart from the Queen's and 
the Crown Prince's personal aides, the court was the incarnation of 
feudalism. It remained about what it had been under Frederick Wil-
liam IV, a group of noble men and women to whom liberals were 
repulsive persons unfit for the company of aristocrats. The noble 
military adjutants, Count von Alvensleben and Edwin von Manteuffel, 
Caste and Privilege / 25 
had more influence upon the King than most of his ministers of the 
New Era. This feudal, military personnel was constantly spreading 
rumors of revolution on the part of liberals, democrats and com-
munists: they scarcely distinguished among these factions, labeling any 
critic of the Old Regime a 'red' and encouraging in the King a mistrust 
of liberal advisers. The Minister of War, General von Roon, along 
with other officers, was to be found far more frequently in the King's 
company than any liberal, whether aristocrat or burgher, and they 
fed the royal mind with the same kind of reactionism. "Vulgar 
Philistines," von Roon called the liberals. The liberals knew about 
the monopoly held by aristocratic Conservatives at court, and the 
liberal ministers of the New Era were urged to try to modify the 
situation. The obstacles proved to be too great for them to overcome; 
the King remained surrounded by persons of the Old Regime. l1 
The extent to which the nobility ran the state may be seen from 
statistics which a democrat collected and published at Hamburg in 
1860. The higher bureaucratic positions were held predominantly 
by nobles. In the period from April 1, 1858, to April 1, 1860, that 
is, in the first years of the New Era, six presidents of the provincial ad-
ministration were appointed, of whom four, or 66.7 per cent, were 
nobles; ten divisional heads under the presidents were appointed, of 
whom four, or 40 per cent, were nobles; of the next lower grade only 
16.6 per cent were nobles. The position of Landrat was, as we shall 
see, the most significant one in local goverment; 65.5 per cent of the 
appointees were nobles. In general, the author estimated, 42.7 per 
cent of all the newly appointed administrative officials in these years 
came from the nobility. He showed that the percentages had remained 
fairly uniform since 1853; that is, the replacement of the Conservative 
regime of Manteuffel-Westphalen by the supposedly liberal New Era 
had made almost no difference in the social origin of the powerful 
administrative personnel. 
The same author compiled similar figures for the judicial officials, 
where, significantly, he found fewer nobles. The judiciary required 
hard preparatory training and a strict adherence to law which were 
usually foreign to noble temperaments. The nobility preferred the 
influential administrative posts, in which aristocratic qualities of 
leadership could dispense with rigorous intellectual preparation. In 
1860, out of 4,964 justice officials, only 463, or 9.3 per cent, were nobles. 
11 Martin Philippson, Max von Forckenbeck (Leipzig), p. 56; von Bernhardi, op. 
cit., passim. 
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The percentage of nobles serving as lawyers and notaries was but 5.7. 
Of the 667 higher officials in the Ministry of Justice, on the Supreme 
Court, the appellate courts, the courts of first instance, and the higher 
state attorneys' office, only 114, or 17 per cent, were nobles, while the 
lower official positions attracted not quite half of even that low figure. 
The town and city courts were filled almost entirely by persons of 
burgher origin, and the county judicial system drew no more nobles 
than the towns, that is, less than 10 per cent. It is not difficult to 
imagine what pattern took shape: the administrative official, the county 
Landrat, was an aristocratic conservative who found himself opposed 
by a burgher county judge devoted to the ideals of liberalism.12 
The King's ministers were selected almost entirely from the aristo-
cracy. The Minister Presidents from the beginning of his rule to the 
appointment of Bismarck mirror by their names alone the King's social 
philosophy. The first was a relative, Prince Karl Anton von Hohen-
zollern, a figurehead who bore the title until early 1862. When the 
Prince was able finally to escape the office on grounds of ill health, he 
was succeeded by the President of the Upper House, Prince von 
Hohenlohe-Ingolfingen. Neither Minister President took his duties 
other than lightly; each avoided the work as thoroughly as possible. 
Their presence, however, assured the King that a line of continuity 
with the past was being kept. While the other ministers did not have 
quite such imposing titles, they also came from the nobility. In the 
ministry of March, 1862, not a single person of burgher origin was to 
be found. The Berliners called the new crop the "little silent ex-
cellencies." One of Bismarck's first acts upon becoming Minister 
President was to hunt for a burgher to fill at least one ministry, pre-
ferably, of course, that of commerce. On similar grounds, Bismarck 
chose a Jew as his personal banker. 
The fact that most of the ministers from 1858 to early 1862 pro-
fessed to be liberal does not detract from the predominance of caste 
standards in the selection of the chief officials. In 1848 burghers of the 
highest ability had been found who were willing to assume the 
ministerial positions. They could have been selected in the New Era, 
and under a genuinely liberal king would no doubt have served; but 
since the King was appalled even at the mild liberalism of some of his 
appointments, von Patow and von Bonin, for example, it is clear that 
in his view Prussia should continue to be governed by its aristocracy. 
12 Freimund Gutsmuth, Patriotische Untersuchungen bezuglich preussischer 
Zustiinde (Hamburg, 1860), pp. 21-29. 
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He had no feeling for the kind of life out of which could have come 
a liberal burgher minister, able, aggressive and creative. 
Although according to the constitution of 1850 both the House of 
Lords and the Chamber of Deputies represented the people, the sense 
in which they did so reflected two different conceptions of representa-
tion, one that of the Old Regime, the other that of modern liberal 
society. Article 65 of the constitution fixed the membership of the 
House of Lords as follows: (a) the adult royal princes; (b) the heads 
of the former imperial families in Prussia and the heads of those 
families which by royal order were given the hereditary right for the 
first-born in direct line to have a seat and a vote in the Upper House; 
(c) such members as the King appointed for life, but their number 
might not be greater than one-tenth of those listed under (a) and (b); 
(d) ninety members chosen by those who paid the highest direct state 
taxes; (e) thirty members chosen by their colleagues from among the 
councillors in the larger towns and cities of the state.1S 
With fifty per cent of the members holding hereditary seats or life-
appointments, and ninety others elected by a small group of the highest 
taxpayers in the state, the House of Lords could hardly have been 
other than what the liberals called it, the essence of Junkerdom, the 
seat of reaction,14 In it were caste and privilege incarnate, with ideals 
and standards utterly antithetic to those of liberalism. This body was 
certain to block reforms in the direction of breaking down the old 
Prussia and creating a modern free state. Even when the king had 
been persuaded to accept some mild measure of social change, even 
when he strongly supported a reform, as in the case of the marriage 
law and the land tax, the House of Lords resisted. In only one case 
did the king force it to retreat. He needed to reform the land tax in 
order, he thought, to pay the increased cost of his beloved military 
reorganization, but the landowners in the Upper House did not feel 
sufficiently patriotic to make the necessary financial sacrifice. The 
King finally had to appoint twenty-nine additional peers to force the 
acceptance of this reform measure. He was not willing, however, to 
use such coercion for the sake of any other. The liberals saw one re-
form bill after the other wrecked in the House of Lords. It soon be-
come abundantly clear to the liberals that the preliminary to the 
achievement of any program of change was the transformation of the 
10 Von Roenne, op. cit. (1881), I. 203-16; Meitzen. op. cit., I. 541-42 . 
.. Berliner Borsen Zeitung, Dec. 12. 1861. 
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Upper House.15 They knew that this House did not represent the 
country as they did, that it rested mainly upon the feudal principle 
of representation without election, representation by the lord of his 
subjects, representation by virtue of the lord's superior social position 
and knowledge and responsibility for the welfare of his subordinates, 
in short, representation of a kind antithetic to that of liberalism. 
They learned from experience that such representation meant irrespon-
sibility to anyone or anything other than one's own interests or one's 
highly subjective conception of the general interest. When they 
pressed the issue upon the King, he absolutely refused to sanction any 
changes in the composition and power of the House of Lords. In fact, 
he came to regard it as the bulwark of royal authority against the ag-
gressive Chamber of Deputies. His devotion to the old Prussia and 
his determination to preserve as much of it as possible were most 
clearly evident in his unremitting defence of this stronghold of aristo-
cratic conservatism. 
Below the Landtag were to be found as representative bodies the 
provincial assembly and the county assembly. Each of them the 
nobility dominated completely. Privilege had in these assemblies a 
means not merely to obstruct liberal proposals but to utilize the ma-
chinery of government for its own purposes. The reason becomes evi-
dent from an analysis of the constitution of these bodies. 
The assemblies in the eight provinces had been restored in the 
1850s to their pre-revolutionary form. Each consisted of three or four 
estates, depending on the province, of which normally the first repre-
sented the nobility and the owners of aristocratic estates, the second 
the towns, and the third the peasants and frequently the large land-
owners of the burgher class. In case the assembly was composed of 
four estates, the nobility was organized into two units, the higher and 
the lower.16 These provincial bodies were assemblies of the Old 
Regime. The main difference lay in the facts that non-noble owners 
of aristocratic estates could be elected to the first estate and that the 
number of members of the first estate did not exceed that of the other 
two combined. Since the assemblies had been created only in the 
15 See as samples the expressions of the Danziger Zeitung, the Neue Stettiner 
Zeitung, the Magdeburger Zeitung, the Elberfelder Zeitung in March, 1861, and the 
speech by von Sybel in April, 1862. Tagesbericht, Nos. 58, 63, 65, 66, March 9-19, 
1861; Heyderholf, op. cit., I, 88 . 
.. See von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 366-72, 385 If. 
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l820s, the Conservative government had thought it wise not to im-
pose the usual numerical preponderance of the nobility.17 
Since the introduction of the constitution and the creation of the 
Landtag, the provincial assembly had lost much of its former im-
portance. The same cannot be said of the county assembly, the Kreis-
tag. It continued to be the most significant representative institution 
of local government and was more expressive of the institutional struc-
ture of Prussia than the new Landtag. 
Control of county government remained from the Old Regime in 
the hands of the local landholding nobility. The Kreistag was domi-
nated by this class, and the Landrat, the executive official in the 
county, held the key powers over the rural community and over all the 
towns in his county, unless the latter happened to be very large. The 
county government brought peasants and townsmen under the author-
ity of the nobility at a level of government close enough to the popula-
tion to be in daily relations with it but sufficiently removed to be able 
to exercise general control. This government established the nobility as 
the channel of contact and the agency of authority between the central 
government and the masses of the people. 
The county government in 1860 expressed an adjustment of the 
machinery prior to the Stein-Hardenberg reforms to the changed con-
ditions since those times. To understand it one must first become 
acquainted with its functioning in the Eighteenth Century. At that 
time it had been composed of owners of noble estates and of represen-
tatives of spiritual foundations, universities and towns which owned 
noble estates. Even though by royal consent an occasional burgher 
had been permitted to purchase a noble or knight's estate, he had 
been unable to sit in the Kreis tag. That privilege had been reserved 
for noble owners alone. The main functions of the assembly had been 
financial. Meeting twice a year, it had allocated the taxes and other 
duties which the county had to bear; it had exercised control over the 
county finances and participated in the administration of the dike, 
mortgage, fire insurance, poor relief and agricultural credit associations. 
It had expressed the local views and wishes about county affairs to the 
central government. Only the noble knights' estate owners had had 
the right to select the executive officer, the Landrat, from among their 
17 See the decree establishing the provincial estates for Brandenburg in 1823 in 
Dr. Wilhelm Altmann, Ausgewllhlte Urkunden %ur Brandenburgisch-Preussischen 
l1er/assungs-u. l1erwaltungsgeschichte (Berlin, 1897); see figures on the membership 
of these estates in Meitzen, op. cit., I, 534-36. 
30 / Prussia 1858-1864 
midst; the representatives of the towns and other organizations owning 
knights' estates had not been allowed to participate in this election. 
The selection had had to be approved by the King, and the new Land-
rat had devoted most of his time to state administrative affairs, the 
administration of taxes, the levying of recruits, control of a part of the 
rural police, and other administrative matters pertaining to the central 
governmen t. IS 
After the Stein-Harden berg reforms the Kreistags were re-establish-
ed, with a few concessions to the peasants and towns. These two 
groups were also permitted now to send deputies to the assembly, but 
in such small numbers in the Eastern provinces as to prevent them 
from exercising any influence. Although burgher owners of noble 
landed properties could sit in the first estate along with the Junkers, 
the number of them remained small and they were subject to the 
temptation of the parvenu of being more feudal in their behavior 
than the genuine aristocrat. In all other respects the functions of the 
Kreistag continued to be in 1860 about what they had been prior to 
the Stein-Hardenberg reform period. If anything, the power of the 
Landrat, who in the Eighteenth Century had been in the process of 
being transformed from a county official, primus inter pares, into a 
state official, diminished in the Nineteenth Century in favor of greater 
responsibility and initiative on the part of the Kreistag. That the 
nobility remained in control is evident from the continuing restriction 
of the office of Landrat in most counties to the owners of noble landed 
property and from the first estate's enormous numerical superiority in 
all counties over the estates of the towns and the peasants.19 
The disparity between the size of the first estate and that of the 
other two estates may be seen from a few figures. In 1859 some eighty 
Schulzes, or village mayors, and other village officials from fifty-three 
communities in Schlawe County stated in a petition to the Lower 
House that their Kreistag was composed of seventy-six owners of noble 
estates, six representatives of the peasants, and six of the towns. An-
other petition from ten owners of noble estates in County Deutsch-
Krone, all members of the first estate in the Kreistag, brought to the 
attention of the Lower House their situation. The county contained 
thirty-nine square miles of territory, 50,000 population, five towns, 
thirty-three noble estates, six demesne and larger estates held on a 
'8 Dr. Paul Schoen, Das Recht der Kommunalverbaende in Preussen (Leipzig, 
1897), pp. 363-64. 
'9 Von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 403·13. 
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hereditary rental basis, ninety-one villages and rural market places, 
some 1,355 peasant owners with a yoke of oxen, and 1,031 lesser peasant 
owners. The noble estates contained 91,489 Magdeburger Morgen of 
land, the peasant possessions, 246,000 Morgen. In the Kreistag the 
owners of noble estates held thirty-five seats, the towns five, and the 
rural communities only three or "at present perhaps six."20 
In Westphalia and the Rhineland the effects of the French Revolu-
tion and the temporary incorporation of those areas within France 
had prevented from occurring any such extreme disparity in the dis-
tribution of power. French law had been introduced and most of the 
large estates broken up. The Pruss ian government after 1815 had been 
unable to impose the full institutional organization of the Eastern 
provinces, since it could not find enough noblemen with noble estates. 
Instead of establishing the overwhelming predominance in the Kreis-
tag of the big landowners, it had varied the distribution of power ac-
cording to the county.21 In some, the first estate predominated, as in 
Dusseldorf, where the first estate had thirty-one, the second six, and 
the third eight; in others, one of the other two estates had most votes. 
The difference marked one of the most significant lines of contrast be-
tween the social and economic conditions in the Eastern and Western 
provinces: in the West, many towns, active commerce and industry, 
few aristocratic estates, in general a burgher culture reinforced by a 
vigorous peasantry; in the Eastern provinces, fewer towns, little in-
dustry except in special places like Berlin, large landed estates, diverse 
conditions of the peasantry, in some regions free, in others dependent 
-a predominantly rural culture. 
The existing form of county government received severe criticism 
from peasants, townsmen and numerous large landholders. From 
every side except the Conservative came the complaint of unfair repre-
sentation and unjust distribution of financial burdens. As the eighty 
Schulzes and village elders from Schlawe County said, the enormous 
disparity between the number of deputies in the first estate and in the 
other two was not justified by the size of the landholding of the first 
estate, by the amount of taxes paid, or by their percentage of the popu-
lation. The peasants, they asserted, paid more county taxes and bore 
more county burdens than the other two estates together. The 
petitioners claimed that they were entitled to request an increase in 
representation on the basis of population figures and amount of taxes 
I. Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1859, Vol. III, No. 108. pp. 5-9. 
n Ibid., St. B., 1863; Vol. V. No. 129. p. 1069. 
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paid.22 As this petition showed, the peasants and townsmen objected 
especially to the abuse by the first estate of the financial power of the 
Kreistag. The members of that estate used their control of assessment 
and collection to shift the burden of both state and local taxes upon 
the others. Since 1841-45 the county assemblies had had the right to 
levy taxes for county purposes such as road construction and reclama-
tion; and while some county assemblies had behaved fairly, many had 
approved local taxes for improvements of primary benefit to the large 
landowners in the first estate. One of the main complaints in the 
Revolution of 1848 had been directed against this abuse.23 
Domination over the county assembly assured the large landowners 
an additional economic advantage connected with the settlement of 
the differences between former lord and serf over the allocation of 
property. Growing out of peasant emancipation in the Stein-Harden-
berg period, this problem continued to cause trouble in the 1850s. The 
peasants were sure that the large landowners as members of the com-
missions set up in the localities to carry out the work were using their 
position in their own interest.24 The existence of over 5,600 contested 
cases in 1860 attested to peasant discontent25 
The question of reform resolved itself into one of just representa-
tion. The economic complaints would be taken care of, it was thought, 
if a just distribution of power in the Kreistag could be attained. The 
liberal Minister of Interior, Count von Schwerin, introduced in 1860 
into the Lower House a reform bill for the six Eastern provinces, which 
after lengthy consideration in commission was approved and sent to 
the House of Lords for action. The representative of the Minister of 
Interior declared that the nobility in the Eastern provinces had no 
legal rights and privileges entitling them to a special position in the 
Kreistag. Their position had been the natural expression of the con-
ditions of the time when peasants were serfs and towns had stood out-
side the county organization. In the Old Regime the nobles' rights 
had been balanced by duties. With the emancipation of the serfs and 
the creation of a landholding peasantry the conditions had changed, 
and the peasantry had come to demand its own adequate representa-
tion. As the towns had been incorporated in the county system of 
"Ibid., Drucksachen, 1859; Vol. Ill, No. 108, pp. 8-9 . 
• albid., 1860; Vol. VI, No. 265, p. 19 . 
.. See on this question von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol. II. Part 2. pp. 216-19; 
Jhb. fur die amtliche Statistik des Preuss. Staates (1863), p. 168 . 
•• See statement by government official to the Commission of the Lower House in 
1860. Abg. H .• Drucksachen, 1860; Vol. VI. No. 265. p. 40. 
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government, the official spokesman declared, they had likewise claimed 
their fair share of political authority. The government proposed to 
make the number of deputies in the first estate equal to the sum of 
those in the other two estates, to abolish the hereditary vote as con-
trary to Article Four of the constitution, and to enlarge the numerical 
basis of the first estate by having it represent not merely the owners 
of noble estates but those possessing land property producing an in-
come of 2,000 Reichsthalers a year. 
In advocating the retention of the existing system of three separate 
estates, the government expressed the views of almost every liberal. 
The liberal commission of the Lower House reported in 1860 that 
with the expansion of education and with the introduction of the free-
dom of land-sale and occupation since 1807, the old law on county 
government had lost its social and economic basis. The commission 
condemned the law as an assertion of caste principle and declared that 
with the elimination of this principle from the central representative 
assembly the system of county government should also be freed from 
this feudal vestige.26 Nonetheless, scarcely anyone thought of merging 
the three estates in the Kreistag into one. The disparity between town 
and country and between large landholdings and small ones remained 
so great, it was argued in the commission, that such a radical change 
of the present organization would be contrary to fact and create con-
fusion. Almost as unanimous was the view that the large landowners 
should serve as the leaders of the peasantry and that the reform was 
necessary to strengthen the political position of the large landlords to 
enable them better to act as rural leaders. 
The peasants, Minister Schwerin declared with the general assent of 
the liberal deputies, had not yet reached the degree of independence 
that would protect them against "the desire for unmotivated innova-
tions on the one hand and from centralized, bureaucratic guardianship 
on the other. The peasant needs the strong leadership of the large 
landholders as the natural sources of strength of agricultural interests." 
The minister proposed to make certain that the landlords retained the 
role of leaders of the peasantry by giving them the additional right to 
be chosen as deputies in the third estate and especially by making the 
first estate as large as the other two combined. He thought that the 
landlords had a well-founded right to such treatment by virtue of 
their political, social and economic position. As for the small number 
of representatives of the towns, the second estate, he declared that "the 
a·Ibid., pp. 6-8. 
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urban interests to be represented in the Kreistag are more uniform 
than those of the rural areas and therefore permit a numerically 
smaller representation." 
According to Schwerin, almost 2,000 large landholdings of size and 
value equal to a noble estate but lacking its legal status, should be 
given the same right of belonging to the first estate. At the same time, 
he continued, it would be unjust to the owners of noble estates which 
did not produce an income of 2,000 Reichsthalers a year to deprive 
them of that historic right. He rejected as too mechanical the standards 
of size of landholding, amount of taxes paid, or the number of popula-
tion as the basis of representation. The present inequality in taxation 
made it impossible to use the amount of taxes paid as a basis; to use 
the extent of land owned, the minister said, would be unfair to the 
towns and cities where value depended on commerce and industry 
rather than on the size of the area held; and to use population as the 
basis would benefit the urban centers at the expense of the rural. 
rural. 
The only major objection from the liberal deputies to the govern-
ment proposal on representation concerned the relative size of the first 
estate. They thought that the government was merely retaining the 
old feudal predominance under a new guise. The government denied 
the charge, stressing the reduction in relative size of the representation 
in most cases and the abolition of the hereditary vote attached to a 
knight's estate. It stressed the necessity for the wisdom and inde-
pendence of the large landowners to be present in the Kreistag and 
pointed out that the peasants would come to accept this fact and be-
cause of their common interests would elect the large estate-owners as 
deputies. 
It is feared that in the first years after the promulgation of 
the law the rural communities will be little inclined to seek their 
representatives among the owners of large estates, for unfortun-
ately the view is still widespread among the peasants that their 
interests are specifically different from those of the landlords, 
an opinion in which they have been strengthened by the experi-
ence with redemption and separation [he referred to the divi-
sion of land after peasant emancipation] in the recent decades 
and through the preservation of the strict division of estates in 
the county government. It is therefore not to be expected that in 
free election of county representatives the landlords in all coun-
ties will be assured of sufficient respect to assure their election 
by the rural communities. 
The government feared that if its proposal were weakened the ranks 
of the large landowners would in many counties be extraordinarily 
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thinned in the Kreistag and that in some counties, for example Erfurt, 
the landlords would not be represented at all. To allow the small 
landowners to obtain a predominance in the Kreistag, declared the 
liberal government spokesman, would endanger the interests of the 
county.27 
The liberal commission of the Lower House did not share the 
opinion of the government that the peasantry in the Eastern provinces 
needed the leadership of the large landowners. But, it continued in its 
report, "it did not fail to recognize how important and desirable it 
was that the peasantry, limited in education and judgment and often 
thinking only of its nearest interests, should not be personally repre· 
sented in the Kreistag in too large numbers." The commission wished 
that the peasant's interests would be looked after together with those 
of the entire county by "the intelligent, common-sensed landlords." 
It hoped that the rural communities would elect such men as Kreistag 
deputies and that thereby 
... not only would the relations between the estate owners and 
the rural communities improve, but the way would be opened to 
create a county representation which would be really unified in 
the effort to work for the welfare of the county and which would 
ignore the petty interests of the different election associations, 
render these associations superfluous and enable a better system, 
a general election without differentiation between town and 
country, between landed estates and rural communities, to be 
introduced.28 
The Commission rejected the government's proposal to allow fifty 
per cent of the votes in the Kreistag to the first estate. It recommend-
ed a somewhat complicated arrangement in the following terms: 
The entire number of Kreistag deputies shall be divided into 
three election associations according to the following principles: 
(1) The number of urban deputies is to be determined ac-
cording to the ratio of urban to rural population as established 
at the last general census. 
(2) The number of Kreistag deputies left after deducting the 
number for the towns is to be divided between the association 
of the large landed estates and the association of the rural com-
munities according to the amount of land belonging to each of 
these associations. 
After the promulgation of the land-tax equalization law the 
number of representatives of large and of small land holdings 
will be determined by the amount of land tax each pays. 
" Ibid., pp. 40. 52 . 
•• Ibid., p. 52. 
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The number of deputies of the towns will be allocated to the 
various towns according to the size of the population. 
This system would in most areas definitely have been to the ad-
vantage of the towns. Only in the rural counties, particularly in the 
Eastern provinces, would the rural districts have benefited, especially 
the large landholders who, though few in number, would have had 
the same representation as the peasants. Even in this case the proposal 
called for a sliding scale: the size of the representation in a county 
would vary with the size of the large landholdings. It certainly would 
have increased the political power of the towns and of the small land-
owners at the expense of the landed nobility far more than the govern-
ment planned to do. 
Count Schwerin was manifestly endeavoring to preserve as much 
of the landowning nobility's power as he could and still introduce a 
bill that would be considered liberal. His assertion that urban in-
terests were much more uniform than rural ones and therefore did 
not require such extensive representation had the genuine ring of the 
pre-industrial regime, of a landed magnate to whom live things like 
grain and livestock and peasants offered much more diversity of in-. 
terest and required much more attention than inanimate objects like 
iron and steel and machinery, factories and commerce. His bill was 
intended for a rural and small-town society.in which the large land-
owners predominated. It called for the elimination of the aristocratic 
monopoly by the inclusion of non-noble large owners in the first estate 
and in control of the county; otherwise it proposed in the name of 
realism to keep the distribution of political and social power nearly 
as it was. 
The liberals would have given much more authority to the towns-
men than would the government; but by and large the two agreed in 
fundamentals. Many liberals were large landowners, and in portray-
ing the ideal type of local leader and the ideal relations between him 
and the peasantry they were using themselves as models. They were 
actually trying to realize that ideal-to transform the peasantry into 
good citizens with more than local and personal interests. They aimed 
at preparing the peasantry for political equality and political leader-
ship by abolishing the vestiges of feudal privilege in the Kreistag. 
They were consistent in their ideals, even though they remained cau-
tiously within the existing institutional framework. To judge from 
the political behavior of numerous peasants in 1848 and in the period 
just beginning, the liberals were much too cautious in their estimate 
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of the peasants' ability. Nonetheless, prepared to advance farther 
than the ministry, they were pressing for additional concessions.29 
Not merely in the distribution of representation in the Kreistag 
but also in the selection of the Landrat did the liberals improve upon 
the plans of the ministry. The latter advocated the preservation of 
the existing method, whereby in most counties the Kreistag nominated 
three candidates from the owners of noble landed properties, one of 
whom the king usually, although not necessarily, chose to fill the office. 
The liberals regarded this article in the government bill as a retention 
of feudal privilege, and refused to accept it. Instead, they recommend-
ed that the stipulation about the candidate's being an owner of a noble 
estate be eliminated. They were applying generally the practice ex-
isting in a number of counties, pointing to that precedent in support 
of their proposal; otherwise, they were willing to retain the present 
system. The amendment meant the elimination of another means of 
control. 
The Conservatives regarded the reform of county government as a 
profound threat to the social order. Employing their usual argument 
against it, they approved reform in general and in time but held this 
particular reform unnecessary; the present system was working well; 
there were no major complaints against it; individual complaints about 
such matters as road construction did not justify a complete trans-
formation of the system such as the government proposed. In the 
Kreistag everyone was content, they maintained; there were no differ-
ences among the estates. The existing county estates had done much 
for the land, 
especially by virtue of the hereditary right of representation of 
the knights' estates, whose bearers have particularly looked after 
the poorer and more needy inhabitants of the county. The 
abolition of this hereditary right is an attack on well-earned 
rights, which could be justified only by most urgent reasons, and 
these do not exist. The important and beneficial influence of 
the large estate-owners, which must be preserved for the sake of 
the welfare of the state, depends to a large extent upon the 
fact that they are hereditary representatives of the county corpo-
ration. Through the introduction of elected representatives in 
•• On the distribution of representation in the three estates in the Kreistag in 
the Eastern provinces, see the figures according to the existing situation, the gov-
ernment proposal, and the proposal of the commission of the Lower House in 1860. 
Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1860; Vol. VI, No. 265, App. A. See the figures for the two 
Western provinces according to the existing situation and the proposal of the gov-
ernment in 1863. Abg. H., St. B., 1863, Vol. V, No. 129, pp. 1117 If. See also Meitzen, 
01'. cit., IV, 477 If. 
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place of the hereditary ones this influence would be substantially 
endangered. Also it is to be feared that these innovations will 
disturb the harmony in the Kreistag among the estates, and such 
a disturbance will in difficult times be bitterly rued. There is 
no definite principle in the new proposed county law, even 
though the latter is better than expected. Also there should be 
n?t one county law fo~ al.l six 'provinces, but one for each pro-
VInce, so that the provInCIal dIfferences could be taken into ac-
count.30 
These stock arguments, resting upon illusions supported by tradi-
tional power, bore some similarity to the views of the King. In his 
program of 1858 the ruler had declared that he favored the reform of 
local government; but "first," he had added in his wooden style, "we 
must preserve what has just been re-established in order not to arouse 
new uncertainty and unrest which would only be a grave matter." 
When Minister von Schwerin insisted on introducing a bill for the 
reform of county government, the King manifestly exerted his influence 
in favor of retaining the power of the large landholders, especially the 
nobles. How well the Conservatives gauged the King's attitude may 
be seen in the fact that the House of Lords rejected the bill out of 
hand. The King took no steps to push it through. A similar bill was 
submitted to the Lower House in 1862, and again a commission 
brought in a favorable report, with about the same modifications as 
its predecessor of 1860. In only one respect did the liberals amend 
the bill, and this change would no doubt have been acceptable to the 
Lower House of 1860. The amount of direct state taxes paid by each 
of the three estates should determine the number of deputies. The 
proposal was at least an improvement over the existing system and that 
offered in 1860; for it made financial support of the state the basis of 
representation and had the advantage of relative simplicity. The bill 
never received consideration in the Landtag, for the constitutional 
conflict monopolized attention. When Bismarck was made Minister 
President he buried the reform by referring it to the provincial Land-
tags for consideration. The possibility of renovating local govern-
ment at some future time depended upon the outcome of the battle 
against militarism and absolutism. 
The government of the rural communities in the six Eastern 
provinces remained in 1860 in the hands of the owners of large estates. 
These owners might be towns, in which case the magistrate of the town 
exercised the functions of lord; but in the overwhelming number of 
•• Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1860; Vol. VI, No. 265, pp. 3-4. 
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commumtIes the authority rested with the proprietor of the local 
estate. After hearing recommendations from the village community, 
the proprietor selected the village Schulze, or mayor, and his aides, 
except in cases where the position of Schulze devolved upon the owner 
of a certain piece of property; he supervised the village financial busi-
ness; he had general authority over the important decisions of the 
community; and he exercised the police power and in some respects 
the judicial power. His authority referred both to communities 
located on his own property and to those in the district of his estate. 
The responsibility came to him not as an official specifically appointed 
to this position but as owner of the estate: he had to assume it whether 
he wished to or not. 
Upon this system of government rested the domination over the 
peasantry by the noble and other landlords in the Eastern provinces. 
One may judge from its inclusiveness that is was effective. How far 
the rights of the landlords had been extended in the two decades prior 
to the Revolution of 1848 may be seen from the legislation about the 
patrimonial judicial power. In 1827 the clause in the general legal 
code for the state asserting that to exercise judicial authority a person 
must meet the judicial qualifications was declared inapplicable to 
landowners with patrimonial judicial responsibility. Bya law of 1838 
the latter were allowed, again as an exception to the general legal 
code, to judge certain cases in which they themselves were parties. By 
virtue of regulations of that same year and of 1846 they were permitted 
to appoint deputies to exercise their judicial and their police func-
tions.st 
Although the Revolution of 1848 abolished the rights of patri-
monial police and judicial power and proposed to reform local govern-
ment, the reforms either could not be carried out in the short period 
of liberal and democratic control or were in the main abolished as 
soon as the Conservative government was restored. A law of 1856 
re-established the prerevolutionary situation with a new far;ade. It 
stated that the patrimonial police power was "a right derived from 
the sovereign power of the King but as a rule united with the possession 
of a knight's or other landed estate." The government denied that 
this measure violated the existing law according to which all such 
rights belonged to the King. It asserted that the right still remained 
with the King but that it had been delegated by him to the estate-
owners under the general supervision of the state. The Conservative 
11 Von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol. I, Part A, pp. 284·88. 
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Commission of the Lower House appointed to consider the government 
bill at the time approved this line of argument, but gave it a twist in 
the feudal sense and toned down the emphasis on the authority of 
the soverign. It asserted 
that in the Eastern provinces the lord's power as a rule has been 
tied to the possession of a knight's or other landed estate, that it 
should remain so and that except in those cases foreseen in the 
law. it could be acquired by inheritance or purchase. This patri-
monial power of th~ estate-owner is not the result of an official 
position in the narrower sense which is conferred by the king, 
but rather the office of police administration as a rule is bound 
to the possession of an estate and in the first line is derived from 
the patrimonial position. On the other hand the right is not 
purely private, but is a minor right transferred from the state. 
The Conservative government had difficulty applying its own law. 
It struggled to preserve the patrimonial power of the landed nobility 
and the burgher large landowners; but what should it do in case the 
estate to which the patrimonial power was attached was broken up and 
sold, or acquired by peasants; or what if the lord did not wish the 
responsibility or fulfilled it poorly? In such cases the government 
stipulated in the law of 1856 that the patrimonial authority should 
be transferred to another landed estate, or preferably, that a large 
landowner should be selected to conduct the business as a state official; 
or that if no one would accept this as an honorary unpaid position 
the government might temporarily appoint an administrator with 
remuneration. If the person with patrimonial power could not per-
sonally carry out his functions, he had to appoint a deputy; and the 
law took care of cases in which an estate district or community district 
(Gutsbezirk or Gemeindebezirk) was changed in scope and size or in 
which a landed property should be given or deprived of the patri-
monial power. The law made a valiant attempt to preserve the sys-
tem in spite of changing conditions.32 
When the New Era began in 1858, the liberals in the ministry and 
in the Lower House set to work to reform the local rural government. 
They did not succeed in accomplishing their purpose, for the quarrel 
over the military reorganization and then the constitutional conflict 
destroyed any prospect of a change. The Minister of Interior, Count 
von Schwerin, early in 1862 did, however, introduce in the Lower 
House a bill which was considered in commission and afforded the 
occasion for liberal criticism of the present system. 
·'Ibid., pp. 298-307. 
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Fundamental was the question of the responsibility for police power 
in the rural communities. The law of 1856 had restored this power 
to the local landlords as it had existed before 1848. The government 
of the New Era criticized the law in the sharpest terms, asserting that 
it was bad 
... because it maintains an unfortunate crippling split in the 
state between the local institutions and the constitution of the 
central organization. The patrimonial police power is contrary 
to the spirit of the constitution. Resting on no delegation of 
authority, dependent upon no qualifications, bound by no oath, 
resulting purely from the possession of certain estates acquired 
in no matter what way, the patrimonial power over other prop-
erty and persons is not in agreement with the recognition that 
the executive power belongs to the King alone. It is not in 
agreement with the abolition of all caste privileges, with the 
equal right of all citizens to participate in the legislative authori-
ty, and so on. After the legislation of the past half century has 
severed all other political and economic connections between 
the former patrimonial estate and its subjects, after the estates 
have been freed for sale and for division, and finally after the 
new judicial constitution of 1849 has abolished the remains of 
the patrimonial judicial power, the source of the patrimonial 
police power, the retention of the latter has become an anomaly. 
In general one must say that the overwhelming majority of 
the landlords do not bother about their patrimonial position 
and do not satisfy even the most modest requirements of a local 
police administration. These requirements will increase with 
the growth of the population and the spread of culture. Indeed, 
the government has had to transfer a number of police responsi-
bilities of a local character to the nearest state official, the 
Landrat. Since the latter is already overburdened, the transfer 
means the slowing down of work. 
The government declared that if a reform was not put through legally 
it would have to extend its authority into these areas by decree, even 
at the risk of arousing bitter criticism about bureaucratic arbitrari-
ness. It wished to abolish the patrimonial police power and expand 
the area of responsibility of the rural communities. In this way alone 
it believed that the present red tape, indolence and indifference in the 
rural settlements could be overcome, a view which was fully shared 
by the liberal commission of the Lower House reporting on this mat-
ter.S3 
.. See Abg. H., St. B., 1862; Vol. II, No.3, pp. 8·11; No. 61, pp. 354-56; No. 62, 
pp. 355-60. Also, No.4, pp. 10-18, for a discussion of the need to abolish the insti-
tution of hereditary Schulze_ 
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The government refused to introduce a bill creating a uniform 
system of local rural government throughout the state. Count von 
Schwerin explained that the actual conditions of local government 
were at present too varied.34 He was referring to the basic difference 
between the situation in the six Eastern and the two Western pro-
vinces, a difference described in the Lower House in 1861 by the West-
phalian liberal aristocrat, FreiheIT von Vincke. In the Rhineland 
and Westphalia, the latter said, the land in noble estates amounted 
to only five or six per cent; in some Eastern provinces to sixty per cent. 
In the West a majority of the communities contained no noble estates 
at all; in the East this was rarely the case. 
We have never had a relation of the landlord to the corporation 
as such from which comes, for example, the right of the land-
owner to name the Schulze, to supervise the finances of the com-
munity, to pass on certain measures. We know only a private 
relation of the landlord to the individuals. Only in rare in-
stances have we had patrimonial judicial power such as is here 
almost universally the case. It seems almost impossible to in-
troduce here what is entirely acceptable in Westphalia and the 
Rhineland-to unite the landlord with the rural community 
which . . . in many places, in Pomerania for example, is com-
posed solely of persons, of day laborers, dependent upon the 
landlord. These dependent persons would be in a position to 
outvote the lord and to regulate all community affaIrs. 
Freiherr von Vincke was entirely correct about the Western pro-
vinces. The administration of the rural communities in the West, in-
cluding police and judicial power, lay in the hands of officials selected 
by the local residents and confirmed, not by a local aristocrat or large 
landowner, but by the state officials of higher instance. The Con-
servative government had tried to create a special position for the 
nobles and estate-owners, but the number of cases in which it had 
been possible was small. The government had been more successful in 
the next larger district, the Samtgemeinde or the Amt of Westphalia or 
Biirgermeisterei of the Rhineland, approximately the same institu-
tions. 
The difference between the organization in the East and in the 
West requires some elaboration. The Samtgemeinde or Amt was 
lacking in the Eastern provinces. There were two levels of rural 
local government below the county, the community which was com-
posed either of one village if sufficiently large or of several villages and 
"'Ibid., No. 15, pp. 102-3. 
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hamlets, and the estate district, Gutsbezirk, which included the large 
estate and the communities. The owner of the estate exercised govern-
ance over the rural communities and in most matters was placed be-
tween it and the county government. In the two Western provinces 
the organization of the Amt was more complicated and more efficient. 
The Amt occupied a position comparable to that of the Gutsbezirk, 
but its composition was entirely different. While a single large rural 
community might constitute an Amt, it was normal for several com-
munities of peasants and one or more noble estates to be members. In 
case the estate-owners were entitled to personal membership in the 
county assembly, they were also entitled to participate in person in the 
Amt assembly; and the office of Amtmann, or head of the district, was 
usually conferred upon a large landholder, if one were available and 
willing to accept it. In many instances the office was held by a paid 
official. Thus, whereas the lord ran the Gutsbezirk in the East and 
occupied a superior, authoritarian positIOn above the peasants, in the 
Western Amt or Biirgermeisterei the large landowners and the peasants 
cooperated in a common assembly in which the peasant representatives 
outnumbered the others. The Amt assembly elected its own chairman, 
and by virtue of the institution of common participation it was able 
to carry out tasks for the good of the district, like road building, the 
improvement of schools and of facilities for the poor, which the 
Gutsbezirk could not perform. It enabled a sense of politics and a 
capacity for leadership to develop among the peasants; it stimulated 
initiative; it reduced class hostility and encouraged the maintenance 
of mutual respect among the social groups. It created a liberal at-
mosphere instead of the authoritarian one to be found in most of the 
East. It gave to liberalism an institutional basis which made it no 
longer dependent upon the political attitude of liberal large estate-
owners. It was one of the basic factors in the great difference between 
the society in most of Eastern Prussia and that of Western Prussia.35 
It was not a democratic body; its members did not think or act in 
terms of social or political equality. But it was a free cooperative as-
sembly of self-respecting and mutually respecting personalities. It 
created a vastly different situation from that of a lord's calling together 
at will an array of dependent peasants. 
The Conservatives must have recognized that they were most vul-
nerable to criticism and aroused most hostility among the peasants 
•• See von Vincke's speech in Abg. H., St. B., 1861; III, 1338-40. On the Landge-
meindeordnung see von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol. I, Part A, pp. 284-88; Vol. II, 
Part I, pp. 236-37, 458-60; von Roenne, op. cit_ (I88l), I, 572 If. 
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by retaining the patrimonial police power and control over the selec-
tion of the village Schulze and aids. To obviate this criticism their 
representatives proposed a bill in the Landtag in 1862 which was a 
model of Conservative thinking. The bill called for a transfer of the 
existing power to the state which would in turn delegate the respon-
sibility back to the large landowners as state agents. The details of 
this proposal are worth studying as a revelation of the Conservative 
conception of reform. 
According to the bill the patrimonial power was to be abolished 
and the exercise of these functions transferred to the government. 
With respect to the police administration, each county excluding the 
towns should be divided into police districts. "As a rule each com-
munity will constitute a police district; nonetheless, if the situation or 
other conditions make it seem appropriate, several communities (vil-
lages, independent Gutsbezirke) might be united into a police district." 
In each police district the police would be administered as an honorary 
office. The police administrator would be chosen by the Kreistag from 
among the owners, renters or administrators of large estates in the 
district, and only in case these were lacking would other residents 
be considered. The appointment would be for life. The Landrat 
should supervise the entire police administration in the county and 
decide complaints against the police administrators. The police ad-
ministrator could punish offenders by a fine of not over five Thalers 
or by imprisonment of three days. The Schulze should act as his 
agent in the village. 
In communities which include a peasant village and one or 
several independent Gutsbezirke, the Schulze functions for the 
entire community; nonetheless it remains permissible for the 
owners of independent Gutsbezirke to assume the functions of 
the Schulze for their Gutsbezirke. 
In communities which consist only of an independent Guts-
bezirk, the owner of the same is to appoint a Schulze who has 
equal rights and duties with the other Schulzes. 
If a community contains several independent Gutsbezirke,. 
the right of appointing the Schulze rotates among the different 
landlords. 
So much for the patrimonial police and judicial power. In Article 
25 was stated the proposed change in the relation of the lord to the 
government of the rural community. 
The authority over communal administration which formed 
a part of the patrimonial power shall henceforth be exercised 
by a county committee. 
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The community heads (Schulze, judge, and so forth) , magis-
trates (court personnel, jurymen), and the representatives of 
not-qualified hereditary Schulzes shall be elected by the com-
munity from the number of resident landowners and after a 
previous expression of opinion by the police-administrator he 
shall be confirmed and sworn in by the Landrat. 
1£ the confirmation is refused and a second election is also 
not approved, the Landrat shall appoint an administrator of the 
position until the community selects a person who will be ap-
proved . 
. . . Until a new law on county government is promulgated, 
the functions imposed above on the county committee shall be 
transferred to the Landrat.36 
This piece of sleight-of-hand work would have preserved the status 
quo. The Gutsbezirk would have been preserved, with the owner 
now exercising his patrimonial police and judicial authority in the 
name of the state. The police districts would have been fitted to the 
existing administrative divisions so that each lord would have con-
tinued in his previous function. The selection of the officials for the 
peasant communities would have been made by the Landrat, a large 
landowner and usually a noble, after consultation with the police ad-
ministrator, the owner of the large estate and former head of the 
Gutsbezirk. In view of the number of peasant communities in which 
peasants were to be selected as local officials, one can well imagine that 
the advice of the administrative head of the Gutsbezirk would be fol-
lowed. 
The success of the whole plan from the standpoint of the Conserva-
tives depended upon the preservation of the existing form of county 
government. 1£ the nobles and big landowners had lost control of 
the Kreistag and of the office of Landrat, their proposed reform of 
community government and the patrimonial authority would have 
been too risky for them. There is no reason to believe that the Conserv-
atives would have accepted any major change in the structure of the 
Kreistag. They knew too well how important that body was for the 
preservation of their political and social power. 
Did the liberals make a mistake in their strategy? Should they 
have compromised on the military in return for concessions in the 
matter of local government? The question is debatable. 1£ they 
could have won an adequate reform of government in county, town 
and rural community and achieved the abolition of the manorial 
police and judicial authority in return for acceptance of the military 
•• Abg. R., St. B., 1862; Vol. II, No. 33, pp. 192-95. 
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reforms, they would have destroyed the institutional basis of Con-
servatism and Junkerdom in society.37 They might then in time have 
been able to shape the army to the liberal ideal as well, in so far lUi 
an army can be adapted to liberalism. The great question remains 
whether they could have achieved this compromise, and the evidence 
all points to a negative answer. The House of Lords flatly opposed 
any such measures; the King, being at most lukewarm, would have 
done nothing to break this opposition; and the liberals would have 
been left with the burden of a huge military expansion and nothing 
to show in the way of governmental reforms.3s 
87 On January 8, 1862, the Berliner Allgemeine Zeitung stated that the refonn of 
the county government was an absolute necessity for the development of the consti· 
tution, for the harmonizing of the social conflicts, for the reconciliation between no-
bility and burghers. When the county governmental refonn was really executed, the 
present angry party battles would cease. Summarized in Tagesbericht, No.6, Jan. 8, 
1862. 
a. On county government reform see Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1859; Vol. III, No. 
108. Ibid., 1860; Vol. III, No. 149; Vol. VI, No. 265. Abg. H. St. B., 1863; Vol. V, 
No. 129. 
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A PRU""N rorre'pondent wrow to the W;esbadenn 
Zeitung at the close of the year 1861 as follows: "Whoever lives in 
Prussia feels at every step that the military and police state encloses 
him in its net, that he as a burgher has fewer rights than the haughty 
nobility, that a powerful and truly officious bureaucracy may defy 
unpunished every right of a burgher. In this state the constitution 
has been planted like foreign rice."! 
The term "police state" was used at the time to refer to the all-
inclusive authority of a centralized bureaucracy. The police were 
responsible not merely for security against criminal acts but for the 
operation of the vast network of controls over civilian life which 
had survived from the period of mercantilism and absolutism. In 
practice the two kinds of function coalesced. The spirit of the police 
officials in charge of civilian affairs tended to be identical with that of 
the security police, namely, to regard any violator as a wilful criminal. 
Of the two, the officials responsible for the control of civilian activities 
exercised far more influence upon Prussian life. Together with the 
military they were the main instruments for the preservation of the 
authoritarian state and the habits of mind among the civilian popula-
tion of civic docility and a passionate regard for detail. 
Writing in 1873, the liberal lawyer and politician Eduard Lasker 
portrayed the process by which after the Reform Era the power of the 
judiciary in Prussia had been ever more restricted and administrative 
1 Togesbericht, No.3, Jan. 4, 1862. 
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decisions increasingly favored.2 The process, he said, culminated in 
the law of May 11, 1842, the main point of which was that complaints 
about police measures of any sort, even about whether they were legal, 
necessary or appropriate, had to be made solely to the superior ad-
ministrative officials. Only in case the plaintiff could show that a 
police order had violated a privilege or a contractual right could the 
case be brought before a judge. Reference to the general law, to per-
sonal rights, to property rights was not enough to carry the issue be-
fore a court. This, Lasker declared, supplied the legal basis of the 
police state. The administrative official ruled supreme. 
In a wider sense, Lasker stated, the police had under their authority 
all public relations and the larger and more important aspects of 
personal rights. If a person wished to move to another town he had 
to obtain the approval of the police in the proposed seat of domicile. 
Once he had moved, he required police permission for entering any 
one of a large number of occupations. The police power determined 
whether and how he might use his piece of land; it had to pass on 
plans to improve his dwelling; it decided whether he might build a 
factory and, if so, where and according to what plan; it passed on the 
installation of machinery. It could lay paths and roads, dig ditches 
and canals across his fields. It penetrated his home, checked on the 
upbringing of his children, their school attendance, their religious 
instruction. It watched over his activities in private associations. 
It determined the amount of school and church tax he had to pay. It 
entered his house as tax official or as security officer and searched the 
premises. 
All these powers of the local police and the Landrat could be exer-
cised without any adequate means of protection for the citizen, whose 
sole defence was to write a complaint, which could be sent, however, 
even as far as a minister. The procedure was bureaucratic; the official 
against whom the complaint was made would be ordered to report; 
and, except in a few recent cases, Lasker said, the plaintiff would not 
be again consulted. Everything had to be included in the original 
statement, even though the plaintiff might not have known the grounds 
for the objectionable action and the officials were not required to in-
form him. With few exceptions the hearing of witnesses and experts 
was not required, no one was put under oath, and public hearings 
were excluded. The deputies in the parliament could bring the mat-
• The discussion of this topic is based entirely upon Lasker's brilliant analysis 
in his book, Zur Verfassungsgeschichte Preussens (Leipzig, 1874), Ch. IV, pp. 179·213. 
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ter to the attention of a minister, but whether he took any action de-
pended on him alone and on the aggressiveness of the deputies-cer-
tainly a cumbersome way of bringing complaint against a minor 
official. 
If a citizen had suffered property damage through the action of an 
official, the plaintiff could bring the case before a judge only if the 
official's superior called the action "contrary to law" or "improper." 
Even after the case had gone to court, the central or the provincial 
administrative agency could intervene and force the transfer of the 
case to an agency known as the Court for Deciding Conflicts of Com-
petence. In case the appropriate minister approved the transfer, this 
court, dominated by administrative officials, could determine whether 
the case should be brought before a judge. If it decided in the nega-
tive, the plaintiff had no other course of legal action. 
This procedure, wrote Lasker, held for civil cases, but with slight 
variation it was equally valid for criminal action. The judge could 
immediately initiate a criminal investigation, but no action could be 
brought against the official without the approval of the state's attorney, 
another official. Once the state's attorney did initiate proceedings, 
the Court for Deciding Conflicts of Competence could intervene as in 
the case of civil actions. Thus an administrative body decided whether 
an official could be tried in a regular court for some act which had 
injured a citizen. The letter of the constitution may have been ad-
hered to, concluded Lasker, but not the spirit. The officials were 
allowed, as before 1848, to interpret the law as they and their ad-
ministrative colleagues pleased. 
Lasker showed that since the 1820s the important laws and even 
the constitution revealed the effects of this arbitrary practice. The 
laws guaranteeing the civil rights of the citizens, he wrote, lacked that 
which would have made them inviolable. They were vague, incom-
plete, capable of contrary interpretations, full of reservations; they re-
ferred to subsequent supplements which would be contradictory to 
the original terms. One could hardly tell what was the rule and what 
were exceptions, for anything might be interpreted as an exception. 
"In practice," Lasker concluded, "every opinion finds a basis, every 
interpretation its proof, and irreconcilable opponents simultaneously 
refer sometimes to the spirit, sometimes to the letter of the law to sup-
port contrary opinions. The system of incomplete laws has established 
itself in Prussia." 
With a view to changing this system Lasker called attention to two 
paragraphs in the law which seemed to him invaluable. In these para' 
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graphs it was asserted "that everyone is entitled to exercise his right 
within the limits of the law and that the laws allow to everyone to 
whom it gives a right the means to exercise that right."3 Lasker re-
garded this right as the foundation of the legal state, and deplored 
the fact that it no longer prevailed in Prussia_ Whenever a law con-
tradicted a police order, he said, the means to implement that law 
ceased to exist. He gave numerous examples. The law of December 
31, 1842, guaranteed freedom of movement to Prussians but allowed 
the police to check whether the newcomer into a community possessed 
the necessary property or the necessary physical strength to support 
himself and his dependents. In actuality, Lasker said, the police did 
not limit themselves to considering these conditions. Thousands of 
strong and well-to-do Prussians were forbidden to move to certain 
communities without having any means to defend themselves against 
this prohibition. The industry law of 1845 seemed to establish free-
dom of occupation, but the police decided whether a person was per-
mitted to carryon a particular occupation in a community. Freedom 
of property was the foundation of all state order and was so recognized 
in law. "But the police can prevent the owner's use of a piece of 
land, the construction of factories of certain kinds, and can destroy 
thereby the value of my property, even though I have evidence in hand 
that no other interest, either official or private, would suffer from my 
proposed activity." "Punishment shall be threatened or imposed only 
in accordance with the law," stated Article Eight of the constitution. 
Nonetheless, declared Lasker, a law of March 11, 1850, gave to the 
police the authority to issue prohibitions and commands within the 
limits of their official authority and in case of violations to threaten 
to impose penalties up to the sum of ten Thalers or in case of penury 
a term of imprisonment up to fourteen days. Only in case the order 
concerned affairs of the agricultural police was the approval of the 
community representatives required; otherwise the latter could merely 
express an opinion. This form of "petty legislation," Lasker stated, 
could be applied to any action falling in anyone of nine categories. The 
inclusiveness of the list supplies the full flavor of the police state: 
(1) Protection of persons and property; 
(2) Order, security and ease of traffic on public roads, paths, 
squares, bridges, banks and waters; 
(3) Markets and the public sale of foodstuffs; 
(4) Order and legality in the public assembly of a large num-
ber of persons; 
• The quotation is from Lasker, not from the original text of the laws. 
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(5) The public interest with respect to the reception and 
housing of strangers; the wine, beer and coffee houses 
and other establishments for the dispensing of food and 
drink; 
(6) Care for life and health; 
(7) Precautions against the danger of fire in construction 
work as well as against actions, undertakings and events 
in general which are injurious to and dangerous for the 
common welfare; 
(8) Protection of fields, meadows, forests, orchards, vine-
yards, and so forth; 
(9) Anything else which must be ordered in the special interest 
of the community and its inhabitants by the police.4 
It would be difficult, declared Lasker, to think of any action which 
could not be regarded as falling into at least one of these categories. 
Nonetheless, he added, two sentences in the Prussian private law gave 
the police even greater power. Of them Lasker wrote: 
Whoever commits an illegal act is suspected of having caused by 
his own fault any damage resulting from this act. Whoever ig-
nores or neglects to abide by a police law is responsible for all 
damages which could have been avoided by the observance of 
the law, just as if the damage had arisen directly out of his ac-
tion. The violation of a police order therefore often threatens 
to entail in addition to the direct punishment a far greater 
responsibility to compensate for damages. And a single police 
official almost to the lowest level can be the source of such legal 
effects. 
Lasker drew the manifest conclusion from these conditions. 
The most important laws, which should be the foundation of a 
good economy and of freedom, are reduced to instructions for 
administrative officials. The execution or neglect of these laws 
has become an inner affair of the administrative agencies. How 
the official handles the Jaw is in last analysis a matter to be 
answered before his conscience and his superior, and in case he 
has no superior, before his conscience alone. 
This, Lasker stated, was the situation which during the Manteuffel 
regime in the 1850s had made legality a matter of administrative 
arbitrariness in the interest of the small but powerful Conservative 
party. It was a situation which liberals wished to correct. 
The exercise of authoritarianism required the existence of a system 
of state and local government that could be controlled from the center. 
Since the Pruss ian bureaucracy had developed in the regime of abso-
• The list is quoted by Lasker from the police law of March 11, 1850. 
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lutism, an analysis of the hierarchy of control over the state will show 
how thoroughly the Hohenzollerns had shaped the instruments of 
administration in their own mold. 
The question of the governmental structure, from the province 
through the county to the town and the rural community, received 
more attention from the ministry and Lower House of the New Era 
than any other single item of reform, except, of course, the military. 
The ministry submitted bills on each of these governmental units, 
which the Lower House considered, especially in commission, at great 
length. The King mistrusted the proposed reforms and the Upper 
House hated them. In his program of 1858 William had recognized 
the need for improving local government but had rejected any thought 
of introducing self-government. He expressed the intention of pre-
serving the existing system in order to prevent a repetition of the 
troubles of 1848. He had not even mentioned those bulwarks of con-
servatism, county and provincial governments; apparently he con-
sidered them to be satisfactorily organized. In view of the King's 
attitude, the Conservative Upper House felt entirely free adamantly to 
oppose the liberal reforms. After the Lower House became engrossed 
in the conflict with the government over the military reorganization, 
the entire plan was neglected. Upon becoming Minister President 
Bismarck likewise introduced bills on the questions; but again the 
constitutional conflict prevented their being acted upon. The struc-
ture of government remained unchanged until several years after the 
Reich was established. Even then the legislation actually preserved 
the substance of Conservative power. A thorough reform had to wait 
until the revolution of 1918. 
The chain of command began with the Minister of Interior who 
with the King's approval appointed the president of the government 
in each province and the director of each regional office under him. 
Below this director came (a) the county in which the Landrat, as we 
have seen, was appointed by the King, that is by the Minister of In-
terior, in most cases after receiving the recommendation of three can-
didates from the county assembly, or (b) the cities and towns, in which 
the election by the city council of the burgomaster and all other officials 
had to be confirmed by the government. In the Eastern provinces, 
with certain exceptions in Posen,5 the next lower official, in charge 
• In the province of Posen with its large Polish population, which the Prussian 
government did not trust, the rural community police power was administered by 
district commissioners directly under the Landrat. Von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol. 
II, Part I, pp. 235·40. 
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of the district (Gutsbezirk), obtained his office by virtue of his owner-
ship of a piece of property to which this right or responsibility was 
attached. In the Western provinces the Amtmann, or burgomaster, in 
charge of the district was, after consultation with the regional and 
provincial heads, appointed in the King's name by the Minister of 
Interior. The head of the rural community, the Schulze, and the other 
local officials were recommended by the community assembly and ap-
pointed, not necessarily from among those recommended, by the dis-
trict head. In the Western provinces the appointment was subject 
to confirmation by the Landrat. Exceptions occurred where the office 
of Schulze was, like that of the head of the district, attached to a 
particular piece of property. Apart from these two instances of 
hereditary authority, the power of appointment or confirmation of the 
administrative officials extended without a break from top to bottom 
and provided the central government with full control. Officials were 
appointed who were amenable to the government and who, as long as 
the latter remained Conservative, would with rare exceptions be Con-
servative or, as the Conservatives loved to say, non-political. 
The kind of personnel chosen for the administrative positions made 
the control doubly firm. The lower positions were usually filled by 
former noncommissioned officers or persons well drilled in the 
bureaucracy, the higher positions by individuals with the same general 
civil or military experience at an appropriate higher level. The ap-
pointments were not entirely of Conservatives, and many administra-
tive officials believed in liberalism. Nonetheless, the relatively small 
number who were publicly active in support of this way of life 
shows that the system of control was on the whole effective.6 
The existence of assemblies at the provincial, county, and district 
or local levels did not diminish the concentration of power. In each 
instance the decisions of the assemblies on all important matters like 
the budget, the criteria for the assessment of taxes and other financial 
matters, and often on unimportant questions, had to be approved by 
the administrative official at that level and by his superior. If the 
administrative official regarded an act of the assembly as going be-
yond its authority, he had the power to suspend the act and appeal 
to his superior for a decision. In some cases matters considered by 
the rural community, the town council, or the district assemblies had 
to be submitted even to the ministry itself for approval. For example, 
• See statements by Waldeck, Kaiser and von Vincke in the Lower House, St. B., 
1861; III, 1333-40. 
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if the assembly or council proposed to sell a piece of public property 
or contract a debt, it had to secure authorization from a higher ad-
ministrative official. It would be difficult to find any action of con-
sequence which the assemblies at any level were allowed to decide on 
their own responsibility. In case an assembly refused to pass a budget, 
the administrative official could impose one to cover necessary ex-
penditures. The assemblies were convened by the administrative 
official at their level and were usually restricted to the agenda which 
he proposed. The amount of paper work involved in this meticulous 
control was enormous. In spite of the existence of the assemblies, any-
thing like self-government was completely eliminated.7 
With the New Era the reform of county government became an 
acute issue. Under the existing system the first or noble estate in the 
county assemblies in the Eastern provinces was entirely Conservative, 
and the second and third estates were carefully preserved for trust-
worthy persons of the same inclination. The Conservative government 
before 1848 had limited the eligibility for election in the second estate, 
that for towns, to present town officials, members of the magistracy 
and of the town representative council; and election in the third estate 
was confined to present incumbents in the community government. 
The liberal Minister of Interior von Schwerin proposed in 1860 to 
enlarge eligibility to include past officials; but the liberal commission 
of the Lower House disapproved such a slight extent and recom-
mended that not merely the officials but anyone eligible to vote in the 
community or town elections should be eligible. The commission 
argued in favor of the greatest possible increase in voting power, as-
serting that thereby public interest in county government would be 
stimulated. It saw no reason to restrict the eligibility for voting with 
respect to the county assembly more sharply than that for balloting 
for deputies to the Lower House of the Landtag, and it expressed con-
fidence in the ability of the voters to select able representatives. It 
regarded the government's proposal as excluding persons who might 
make excellent deputies, and it accused the government of wishing to 
preserve the present system of patriarchal ism. Since the magistrates in 
the towns and the Schulze and other officials in the rural communities 
had to be confirmed in their positions by the government, it said, the 
latter would be able to exert pressure upon them to do its bidding in 
the Kreistag. Count von Schwerin denied any such intention, but 
• See von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol. II. Part I, pp. 441-50, 458·66; Abg. R., 
Drucksachen, 1860; Vol. VI, No. 265. 
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the liberals clung to their recommendation for expanding eligibility. 
In the commission of the Lower House the question of whether 
the Landrat should have the right to preside over the county assembly 
was discussed at some length. A liberal deputy pointed out that in 
the Western provinces it was not compulsory for the Landrat, or the 
Amtmann, to preside over the district assembly and that the system 
worked well. The case in the towns was .also brought up in support 
of this view, as was that of representative bodies under constitutional 
government. The government spokesman countered these arguments 
by an analysis of the position of the Landrat which revealed the 
ministry's concern to maintain the prestige of that official and to 
change the distribution of power as little as possible. Aiming merely 
at some minor reforms in the system of county government, the 
ministry denied that the practices in the Western provinces could be 
applied in the East. It rejected any parallel between the county ad-
ministration an<;l the town administration, arguing that the town 
magistracy and the town council were separate organizations, whereas 
the Landrat could be a member of the county assembly. 
Even if the Landrats are also state officials and organs of the 
state administration experience shows that they are not prevent-
ed thereby from representing before the state government the in-
terests of their counties with vigor and courage, and it can cer-
tainly not be asserted that the Landrats feel themselves to be too 
dependent upon the central administration. The double posi-
tion of the Landrat which gives him in his capacity as organ of 
the county corporation an independent position toward the state 
government offers an important basis and condition for the 
successful activity of the Landrat. 
The government feared that if the position of presiding officer over the 
Kreistag were denied him, the Landrat would lose prestige in the 
county and would be forced increasingly into the role merely of an 
administrative official of the central authority. Even worse, it argued, 
would be to subject him to competition by making the position of pre-
siding officer elective; for in that case a failure to elect him would be 
considered a vote of no confidence and a tense relation would develop 
between him and the Kreistag which would hurt the entire county 
governmental system. The minister urged that the present power of 
the Landrat be preserved and that the parliament not try to introduce 
parliamentary procedures into local government, where, he said, they 
did not belong.s 
• Abg. R., Drucksachen, 1860; Vol. II, No. 265, pp. 59-60. 
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The question scarcely deserved the attention it received; more im-
portant was the government's plan to create an executive committee 
composed of the Landrat and at least six members of the Kreistag to 
work with him and in some respects to control him. Selected by the 
county assembly these persons would not merely advise the Landrat 
as before but would have actual responsibility in assisting him to 
prepare recommendations for the assembly, in planning the execution 
of decisions and in supporting him in his work. They would not 
participate in actual administration but would constitute a check on 
the Landrat's actions. In this way the government hoped to improve 
the quality of the preparation of matters laid before the Kreistag. 
It took its cue from the procedure in the province of Posen, where all 
proposals were criticised by a committee before being submitted to 
the full assembly. The Landrat needed the advice of men having 
the confidence of the assembly, argued the government official, for his 
duties had greatly expanded in kind and in number . .The government 
would also find it useful at times to check the Landrat's recommenda-
tions by consulting the executive committee, and it hoped by this in-
stitution to reduce bureaucratic influence. 
The liberal deputies in the Lower House showed as little confidence 
in freedom in county government as the ministry. They proposed that 
the central government keep its present authority. It was even sug-
gested from the liberal side in the commission of the Lower House 
that central control be strengthened by empowering the King to ap-
point all Landrats without prior recommendation from the county as-
sembly. In this way, the argument ran, the government would with-
out introducing a spoils system be able to eliminate Landrats who were 
politically objectionable. The liberals had in mind the dismissal of 
the overwhelming majority of Landrats, who were Conservative and 
completely out of sympathy with the New Era. Others defended the 
right of recommendation of candidates for the position as an act of 
local self-government. The commission voted for the present system; 
but in either case the result would have been to maintain the central 
authority over the Landrat. 
The limitations imposed upon Prussian liberalism by respect for 
tradition were seen with equal clarity in the reaction to the question 
of whether the county assembly and the town government should have 
the power of petition to the King on matters other than those pertain-
ing exclusively to the county. The government proposed to retain 
the existing restriction. To the accusation in the commission that 
this stipulation violated Article 32 of the constitution allowing all 
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prussians the right of petition, it countered by asserting that the re-
striction was undoubtedly justified and not unconstitutional. The 
argument in this instance pertained to the county assembly but ex-
pressed the views equally about the town governments. The govern-
ment spokesman asserted that "the personality of a corporation is 
based upon and also limited by the purpose for which it was estab-
lished. The county corporation is thus only in so far a person as it 
pursues the purposes of its constitution. If it goes beyond that point 
it exceeds its competence, and this would be the case if the Kreistag 
should petition about general political affairs not directly concerning 
the county." The overwhelming majority of the liberal commission 
of the Lower House agreed with the government's view. It added 
"that the Kreistag deputies were elected because of their qualifications 
to represent the interests of the county corporation, that one could not 
conclude therefrom that they were all equally qualified to judge 
general political affairs, that, moreover, the basis is lacking on which 
the Kreistag deputies who were present could commit to their decisions 
those who were absent and finally that the~right of petition in political 
affairs would cause discord in the Kreistag and that to the disadvantage 
of county affairs the political parties would become more sharply 
prominent than ever."9 
Most complaints about bureaucratic control came to the ministry 
and the Lower House from the towns. The Rhinelanders were so 
angry over regulation from above that Minister von Schwerin acknow-
ledged the justice of their argument.10 Conditions were actually no 
worse in the Western provinces, however, than they were in the six 
Eastern ones. In the latter the towns had a tradition of freedom 
established by Stein's reform law of 1808. The restoration after 1815 
had steadily whittled away these free rights, and after the Revolution 
of 1848 the Conservative government had passed in 1853 a law which 
imposed upon the towns in the Eastern provinces nearly the same 
control as over those in the West. As soon as the New Era began, the 
townsmen became loudly critical and demanded reform. They ob-
jected to the power of the government to confirm the selection of the 
burgomaster and their other paid officials. They disliked having to 
refer to the regional government for settlement of all disputes between 
the magistracy and the town council. The towns of 10,000 population 
or less protested the authority of the Landrat by virtue of his police 
• Ibid., pp. 64·65. 
10 See also Deputy Contzen's statement, Abg. H., St. B., May 2, 1861; II, 1027. 
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power to interfere in purely town affairs like street lighting. Even the 
larger towns, although not large enough for each to constitute a county 
by itself, disliked the Landrat's exercising the same kind of authority 
over them. It caused bad relations between the Landrat and the town 
magistracy, they said, by leading to decisions based on ignorance, to an 
unnecessary increase in bureaucratic work and to delay. It diminished 
the prestige of the town and the burgomaster relative to the feudal, 
landowning, usually aristocratic Landrat. The towns objected to the 
government's exercising so much police power in their midst, asserting 
that most of these matters were of a local nature, had nothing to 
do with security, were mainly economic and social in content, and 
should be left to the local population to handle.H In the Eastern 
provinces the petitioners were practically unanimous in condemning 
the introduction of the open ballot and the three-class system of voting 
and requested the return to the method of voting under the town law 
of 1808, the equal and secret ballot. The towns in the two Western 
provinces were accustomed to the three-class system and, not having 
known the other, were less critical; but they also wished the secret 
ballot. 
Although the Minister of Interior of the New Era and the liberal 
Lower House differed somewhat in details about the reform of town 
government, they agreed usually about fundamentals. They all ac-
cepted the basic principle "that in all cases where higher interests of 
the state do not require interference from above, self-government of 
the towns through their constitutional organs is to be permitted free-
dom of action."12 They agreed that town government should be uni-
form throughout the state. With respect to the government's power 
to approve the selection by the town council of the local officials they 
agreed that in spite of abuses under the Manteuffel government this 
power should be kept. The minister wished it to cover all paid officials; 
11 The Nurnberger Korrespondent published in January, 1861, the following 
statement. "Whoever wishes to see how police tutelage makes a large city incapable 
of self-government needs only to visit the capital and residence of the monarchy, 
Berlin. Scarcely a large city in Europe is less well paved and lighted, scarcely a city 
in Germany where in snowy weather passage is more endangered. The Berlin cab 
and omnibus service, which is controlled by the entirely bureaucratic police admin-
istration, is distinguished by foolish regulations. Therefore the cabs are worse, the 
horses lamer, the drivers lazier than in any other city. The people are arbitrarily 
ruled and taxed by a pasha and have in their magistracy and town council a repre-
sentative body which is only forced every two years to bother about the city. If 
Prussia is to cease to be a police state, Berlin must first be given self-government." 
Tagesbericht, No.4, Jan. 5, 1861. 
12 Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1861; Vol. V, No. 160, p. 2. 
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the commisson of the Lower House restricted it solely to the burgo-
master and his assistants. They agreed that the burgomaster should re-
tain a suspensory veto over the acts of the town council and of his col-
leagues in the magistracy which he considered illegal or contrary to the 
welfare of the state, and that the issue should be appealed for settle-
ment to the regional official of the bureaucracy. They preferred that 
in certain cases of disagreement over matters of purely local interest 
the action not be appealed and that it be postponed until the parties 
could harmonize their views. They retained the existing practice of 
requiring governmental approval of the local tax system, the contract-
ing of town debts, the disposal of cultural articles of historical im-
portance, and other predominantly economic matters. In case of 
the sale of town property the town government was to have a free 
hand, but it should notify the regional authority of its intention in 
time for this bureaucratic agent to interfere and block the sale if he 
saw fit.13 
The proposed retention of the burgomaster's veto power in the 
towns showed that the liberals were caught in a dilemma. Although 
they believed firmly in living in a state of law, they knew that in the 
smaller towns especially no one except the legally-trained burgomaster 
would know what the laws were. For the sake of assuring that the 
law would obtain, they placed the executive in a position to veto the 
decisions of the popularly elected representative legislature. They re-
tained in the town government the relation of the absolute monarch 
to the Landtag, with the one exception that the burgomaster's veto 
was limited by the right of appeal to a higher bureaucratic authority. 
In the name of the legal state they proposed to preserve a large degree 
of authoritarianism in town government. 
An especially bad situation was to be found in the towns of Western 
Pomerania and Riigen. In proposing reform in 1862 the Minister of 
Interior described the conditions as follows: The magistracy co-opted 
new members and served for life. It was a lordship in its own right, 
able to dismiss burgher officials at will. The citizen body had either 
no right to elect officials or the very limited one of selecting them from 
among a number of candidates presented to it. A codified town law 
did not exist; and where the commission was endeavoring to collect 
the recent town ordinances, agreement had not been reached or the 
work concluded. "As a consequence such uncertainty about the law 
13 On the reform of town government see Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1859; Vol. III, 
No. 108. Ibid., 1860; Vol. VI, No. 262. Ibid., 1861, Vol. V, No. 160. Also the lengthy 
discussion in Abg. R., St. B., 1861; Vol. II. Ibid., 1862; Vol. II, No. 15. 
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exists in these towns that now and then even today the town council 
and burgher assembly must first be informed by the commission what 
according to custom and according to sources accessible only to legal 
scholars are to be considered norms and rules of town administra-
tion."14 The minister proposed to bring the government of these towns 
into line with that in the rest of Prussia. 
The commission disagreed with the Minister of Interior on one 
major question, that of the system of voting. The minister strongly 
recommended the retention of the three·class system of voting and the 
open ballot. He argued that the three-class system worked well, that 
it was not to blame for the decline in the number of actual voters, and 
that a better one had not yet been found. He manifestly liked the 
division of voters into three classes, with the political power allocated 
~ccording to wealth, as a means of assuring the rule of the upper social 
groups .. He defended open voting by the usual arguments: it stimu-
lated and required civic courage and prevented corruption and hypo-
crisy. The liberals replied that the three-class system artificially 
divided at election time the burghers who otherwise were not aware 
of any such distinctions among themselves. It publically emphasized 
differences in wealth, again to the detriment of civic cooperation. They 
utterly condemned the open voting: 
When it is a question in a town not of political elections but 
of the representation of town interests, factors are emphasized 
which in other cases are entirely without influence. It is much 
easier in political elections, in which profound convictions can 
be made to have great influence, to keep free from entangle-
ments of kinship, friendship and neighborhood, than in cases 
where in the main nothing but ability to achieve objectives 
which are the same for all comes into question. It is much easier 
to say that neighbor, relative, friend or customer has political 
views which one does not share than to say: he is a man weak in 
head and heart. Open voting also often disturbs the relation 
between community government and the citizen body. Many 
petitions point to the influence which under the present system 
of voting the burgomaster and the commissioners of the magis-
tracy are able to exert on the voters, an influence which is the 
easier to exert because the commissioners face not a united body 
of voters but each voter singly.15 
In spite of these arguments, Count von Schwerin held to his view; but 
by the beginning of the next year, 1862, he had come to agree to the 
H Abg. H., St. B., 1862; Vol. II, No. 15 . 
.. Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1861; Vol. V, No. 160, pp. 16-17; St. B., 1861; especially 
the debates on May 2 and 16. 
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secret ballot. He accepted the commission's argument as valid, and 
this time he buttressed his change of attitude by the historical fact 
that the town laws of 1808, 1831 and 1845 had all required the secret 
ballot and that the system of open voting owed its present force to the 
legislation of the Manteuffel era.16 Further experience with Con-
servative ability to exert political pressure in case of open voting had 
won him over. 
On one question the liberals found themselves in agreement even 
with the Conservatives. They all advocated the abolition of the tax 
on entry into the towns. Under the present law each town levied a 
fee upon anyone seeking to settle there and carryon an occupation. 
The restriction was opposed in the Eastern provinces but even more 
so in the Western. With the rise of industrialism, freedom of move-
ment throughout the state had become urgent.17 The industrial 
population of the Rhineland was especially angry about the limita-
tion, and since industry was spreading into the rural districts it wished 
the entry fee to be completely abolished in these communities as well 
as in the towns proper. "If the small communities close themselves 
off from one another by this entry tax," declared Deputy Lette in the 
Lower House in 1861, "then labor will be more expensive for the 
factories, and the market for labor will be curtailed." The restriction 
was so disliked that even the House of Lords favored its repeaJ.18 
Although the liberal ideal called for local self-government, the 
evidence supplied by the discussion of the reform of county, town and 
rural community government shows that neither the liberal Minister 
of Interior nor the liberal deputies had any intention of reducing 
sharply the control exercised by the central government. They lacked 
confidence in the ability of the peasants and townsmen, except in the 
largest cities, to run their own affairs, and were so devoted to ad-
ministrative efficiency that they limited the freedom of the townsmen 
to learn by making mistakes. They denied to a representative body 
of the leading persons in the county the right to discuss and pass reso-
lutions on matters of state-wide interest. These should be dealt with 
by another representative body, the Landtag, possibly composed of 
many of the same persons and certainly representing the same people. 
So well drilled had all Prussians been in bureaucratic specialization 
that the most progressive of them were unable to perceive the incon-
sistency of this opinion with their belief in liberalism. They did not 
.. Abg. H., St. B., 1862, Vol. II, No. 15, p. 104. 
11 See Ibid., 1861; I, 479. 
1. Ibid., March 12, 1861; I, 478. 
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comprehend the nature and function of politics as a way of solving 
public problems whether at the national, state or local level. They 
thought of politics as reserved only to those high and noble affairs of 
state interest, at a plane of action far above the local. They did not 
see that politics should permeate an entire people, that otherwise the 
political activity at the top had no support down the line. They 
were inclined toward political snobbishness; they did not perceive how 
enormously important it was for them in the Landtag to have the 
organized aid of liberal elements in every popular assembly at every 
level throughout the state. With such support publicly expressed and 
aggressively supplied the liberal majority in the Lower House might 
have forced the king to retreat and might have won the constitutional 
conflict and established parliamentary government. Without this co-
operation it allowed the government to retain ultimate power by 
means of the army and the bureaucracy. It played into the Con-
servatives' hands, allowing them to divide and rule, to force major 
groups to keep silent on public, state-wide issues. The liberals might 
not have succeeded in any case in putting through the House of Lords 
their reform plans for county and town government; by their attitude 
toward the right of petition in the county and town assemblies they 
betrayed the decided shortcomings of their own conception of self-
government and of politics and created the major source of weakness 
in their combat with absolutism and Conservatism. Their thinking 
in governmental affairs remained to a large extent patterned after the 
existing institutions and practices of authoritarian bureaucracy. 
Deputy Wagener spoke on behalf of the Conservative party against 
the liberal proposals. The Conservatives, he said, believed in auto-
nomy and self-government of the corporate bodies, but by corporations 
they meant the castes of the Old Regime, plus such economic units as 
guilds. They wished in the name of self-government to restore the 
conditions prior to the Stein-Hardenberg reforms. They regarded it 
as an illusion to try to decentralize a bureaucratic state. They dis-
avowed what they called the practice of arbitrarily selecting some 
member of the state organism, giving it a special constitution different 
from that of the rest of the organs in the bureaucratic state, and call-
ing it self-government. "What you will achieve thereby," stated Deputy 
Wagener in the Lower House in 1861, "is not autonomy but dishar-
mony, anarchy and disorder." He advocated the restoration of de-
centralized government as it had formerly existed, and he predicted 
that "as long as you do not have this either the upper bureaucratic 
agency will destroy the so-called autonomy or the so-called autonomy 
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will destroy order and will force an increase in government from above, 
in other words the application of imperialism." He was thinking of the 
career of N apleon III. 
The Conservatives opposed both the three-class system of voting 
and equal suffrage. They disliked the arbitrary and materialistic 
basis of the one, the equalitarianism of the other. In place of these, 
they proposed that each person receive voting power according to his 
social and political position. They meant thereby to allocate voting 
power to the social groups of a fully restored Old Regime. Of course 
they had no use for the secret ballot, dismissing it with the assertion 
that "in all which one understands, one is conservative," and implying 
that open voting was necessary so that the Conservatives could be sure 
that one did understand, that is, understand to be and vote Con-
servative or suffer the consequences. 
The extraordinary criss-crossing of views of Conservatives and 
liberals on local self-government came out in the discussion of the 
government's right of confirmation of town officials and control of 
town affairs. The Conservatives were ready to support the liberals 
in restricting this right to the burgomaster and the town councillors, 
"because we are of the opinion," stated Wagener, "that the government 
has much vexation and little benefit and even less gratitude from doing 
so and because we do not wish to have it inferred that authority de-
rives solely from the Crown." The Conservatives were willing to limit 
the 'control of the government over town affairs even more than the 
liberals proposed. "When one stretches the right of approval of the 
government so far that it has the right not merely to suspend those 
acts which are contrary to law but also those which are opposed to 
the welfare of the state and the interests of the community," argued 
Wagener, "then one takes away with one hand the autonomy that one 
has given with the other."ll1 Although differing fundamentally from 
the liberals in their conception of local self-government, the Conserva. 
tives supported those liberal measures which were consistent with their 
own ideal. That they had no use at all for most liberal policies on 
local, county and provincial government may be seen from their in-
transigent opposition to the passage of the reform bills. 
Examples of the kind of laws against which Lasker inveighed were 
to be found in every field; but some of these had special significance 
for politics, among them the press law, the law concerning the right 
"'Ibid., 1861; II, 1024-25. 
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of association and assembly, and the law defining the authority of the 
state's attorney. 
The constitution stipulated in Article 27 that "every Prussian has 
the right to express his views freely in word, writing, print, and pic-
ture. Censorship may not be introduced." Then was added the catch 
clause of a reactionary government: "Every other restriction upon free-
dom of the press shall be made only by way of legislation." Which part 
of the clause should prevail, the part guaranteeing freedom of speech 
and forbidding censorship, or that allowing the limitations of freedom 
of press by law? It was a case of double meaning, a device which the 
Conservatives took as the second best to what had existed prior to the 
Revolution of 1848, a substitute for conditions which they had not 
quite dared openly to restore. 
The Conservative government had passed a press law, May 12, 
1851, which suited their needs. This law remained in force through 
the New Era and the constitutional conflict; and while the ministers 
of the New Era either interpreted it in a liberal sense or ignored it, 
Bismarck used it as the basis for ruthless action. The main terms 
must be explained. Any person proposing to establish a printing 
shop, a book or art shop, a lending library, a reading room, a shop 
to sell newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and pictures had to receive 
the permission of the regional administration. Booksellers and 
printers had to pass an examination on their ability to handle those 
trades. They and all those in the other businesses listed had to be 
persons of "irreproachable character." What this term meant was 
disputed. The liberals interpreted it as implying that the individual 
must merely be in full possession of his rights as citizen. The Manteuf-
fel government and subsequently Bismarck used it to annul the right 
to carryon the occupation "if the person abused it to undermine the 
principles of religion and morality as well as the foundations of the 
state and of society." 
The law required editors of newspapers and periodicals to place 
a security sum with the police to assure good behavior. They had to 
present a copy of each issue to the police and obtain a receipt. The 
papers could not be sold or posted or even given away without the 
vendor's or poster's or donor's having a police permit. Only technical 
and similar periodical publications which did not discuss political and 
social issues were excepted from the terms. Suits over the violation 
of the press law were by a law of 1854 no longer to be tried before 
a jury, and public solicitation of funds to pay the fine of a violator 
was forbidden. By these measures the Conservatives in the 1850s 
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had hoped to preserve the freedom of the press, and the government 
of the New Era did not take the time to change the law before it was 
forced out of office in favor of Bismarck.20 
Even more circumstantial than the press law was that of 1850 con-
cerning the right of association and of assembly. The constitution 
contained two articles about this right. Article 29 stated that "all 
Prussians have the right without previous governmental permission 
peacefully and without weapons to assemble in closed buildings., This 
provision does not apply to assemblies in the open air, which in respect 
to the receipt of previous police permission are also subject to the dis-
position of the law." Article 30 declared that "all Prussians have the 
right to organize societies for purposes which do not violate the law. 
The law regulates, especially for the preservation of public safety, the 
exercise of the right guaranteed in this and in the preceding article. 
Political associations may be subjected by legislation to restrictions 
and temporary prohibitions." Such were the articles of the constitu-
tion. They guaranteed freedom of association and assembly, subject 
to the law; and the reactionary government after the Revolution of 
1848 immediately set to work legally to destroy the rights which the 
constitution supposedly guaranteed. The pertinent law of March 11, 
1850, is so revealing of the domination over public life exercised by 
the police that it must be analyzed in detail. 
The terms of the law of 1850 were as follows: A police permit 
had to be obtained at least twenty-four hours in advance for holding 
any assembly in which public affairs would be discussed. If the as-
sembly opened an hour late or if it was adjourned for longer than an 
hour, the sponsors lost the right to hold it and had to seek a new 
permit. The chairmen of an association which aimed to influence 
public affairs had to supply to the police within three days after the 
founding of the association a copy of the statutes and a list of mem-
bers and to report within the same length of time any changes sub-
sequently made in either. They had also to supply any other in-
formation about the association which the police requested. If an as-
sociation met regularly at a particular time and place, it required a 
police permit only for the first meeting. The police were empowered 
to have one or two police officials present in uniform at each assembly. 
These officials were to be given suitable places and upon demand were 
to be supplied by the chairman with information about the speakers. 
The police officials had the authority to close the meeting at any time 
•• Von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 89-112. 
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if proposals were made which incited or encouraged illegal acts or if 
armed persons appeared whom the chairman was unable to send away. 
The meeting had to close upon orders of the police present, even if 
the orders were without justification; the police could use arms to en-
force their command. 
Associations which held meetings for political discussion were sub-
ject to additional restrictions. Women, children of school age and 
apprentices could not be members or attend the meetings. The as-
sociations could not enter into agreement with other associations for 
common objectives; they could nQt form common committees or central 
organizations or make any similar arrangements or carry on cor-
respondence for that purpose. If the police closed a political associa-
tion, they had to report the case to the state's attorney, who then 
decided whether to prosecute it in court. 
Outdoor public meetings of all kinds had to receive approval by the 
police at least forty-eight hours beforehand. A permit could be refused 
if the police regarded the meeting as dangerous to public safety and 
order. The same conditions attached to staging a parade.21 
Each violation of the law was subject to a penalty of fine or im-
prisonment, and the accused was not entitled to trial by jury. 
The law remained in effect during the New Era, when it was en-
forced in a liberal sense, and during the constitutional conflict. In the 
latter years it performed valuable service for Bismarck's government 
and, like the press law, was invoked to an extent that would have 
aroused the admiration of its creators.22 It placed all public meetings 
under the arbitrary authority of the local police, and by its prohibition 
of common organization among political associations it practically 
prohibited the rise of well-organized state-wide political parties. In-
tended as an instrument for preserving the social and political status 
quo by obstructing public discussion, it well suited the purpose. 
As Lasker showed, the state's attorney held a key position in the 
organization of state control over the Prussian people. According to 
a law of 1849 this official had the power, with a few exceptions of no 
consequence in this connection, to decide whether an investigation 
and legal proceedings should be instituted against a person. The 
courts could not take action before this official introduced the case. 
21 After the Landtag electioJ;ls in 1862 four workers with large signs were placed 
in front of the Elberfeld town hall. The signs read: "Hurrah for the Constitution! 
Hurrah for the Law! Von der Heydt Gloriously Defeated! Long Live the King!" The 
police immediately arrested the workers.J101ks%eitung, May 9, 1862 . 
•• Von Roenne, op. cit. (1864). Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 149·53. 
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He had the right to decide whether or not a case should be tried; and 
in an authoritarian regime one can imagine how this power would be 
used. The political supporters of the government would not be tried 
for violations of the press law, the assembly law, and so on; the op-
ponents of the government would be tried. The office lent itself to 
even greater abuse by virtue of the fact that the state's attorney did 
not belong to the judiciary and enjoy the independence of that body, 
but. was a member of the civil administration, subject to the pressure 
and disciplinary action which could be applied to that branch of the 
government. We shall see later how Bismarck exploited this instru-
ment of domination.23 
The Breslau Chamber of Commerce wrote in its annual report for 
the year 1863 that "our economy has reached that degree of self-de-
pendence which makes police paternalism no longer necessary. In 
view of the cultural condition of our people it is sufficient for the 
state police to restrict its activity to supervision or control in so far 
as these appear to be absolutely necessary for the general welfare."24 
The liberals considered the question of freedom of economic 
activity (Gewerbefreiheit) not necessarily of first importance, but 
basic. In principle and practice economic freedom had been intro-
duced into Prussia by the Stein-Hardenberg reforms, and in spite of 
some recession it had since then retained its prestige. The industry 
law of 1845 had reaffirmed Prussia's acceptance of the principle,26 
which not even the reactionary government in the 1850s had dared to 
repudiate. Nonetheless, the liberals of the New Era were thoroughly 
dissatisfied with the law of 1845, as well as with the reactionary amend-
ments introduced after the Revolution of 1848. They demanded re-
form. Too many exceptions had been made to the general application 
of the principle; too much authority remained with the government 
to control business. The liberals wanted freedom of enterprise, with 
control exercised not by government but through competition. They 
were doubtful about applying their favorite principle to professions 
of law, medicine, pharmacy and other medical lines: some favored re-
taining state authorization, while others wished as complete freedom of 
practice in these professions as in any other. For all other occupa-
tions they agreed with the resolutions expressed in September, 1860, 
by the Congress of German Economists, in which they were heavily 
represented: 
··Ibid., Vol II, Part 1, pp. 264-65 • 
•• Preussisches Handelsarchiv, 1864 (Berlin, 1865), ]ahresberichte, p. 423 . 
•• Von Roenne, op. cit. (1884), IV, 418, 438 If. 
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The right to carryon an occupation shall not depend upon 
proof of personal ability. 
The Congress is of the opinion that ... the existing system 
of licensing has proved to be incompatible with the funda-
. 'mentals of a healthy economic life; that concern about endanger-
ing and burdening the public in particular businesses makes 
necessary not the restriction of entry into the occupations but the 
fulfillment of legal conditions in the exercise of them; that part 
. from the stipulations of criminal law the transgression of mere 
economic legal directives should merely be punished but should 
not affect the right to carryon the occupation.26 
One major source of liberal discontent was to be found in the exist-
ing system of government concessions so roundly condemned by the 
Congress of Gennan. Economists. A commission of the Lower House 
of the Landtag presented a report in 1861 in which the following 
examples were given.27 Each proprietor of a shop serving food or 
drink, of a tobacco shop or of a billiard hall had to renew his license 
every year. The liberal commission objected to the requirement of 
annual renewal as a major source of trouble. Under the Manteuffel 
system it had been used as a political weapon.28 It was conducive to 
corruption, to chicanery and to the demoralization of the proprietor 
trying to earn an honest living. It created an enormous amount of 
unnecessary bureaucratic business, particularly since in the over-
whelming number of cases the licenses were renewed without any 
question of the proprietor's good character. While not opposed to 
licensing, the commission recommended that requirement of annual 
renewal be dropped. 
Similar difficulties confronted book publishers, book and art 
dealers, antiquarians, proprietors of lending libraries and reading 
rooms, and sellers of newspapers, pamphlets and pictures. In order 
to open one of these businesses a person had to obtain permission from 
the regional administration. He had to be of good character, and 
especially in the case of book publishers and book dealers he had to 
pass an examination before a commission showing his competence. 
The liberal commission of the Lower House recommended that these 
restrictions be abolished in favor of freedom of enterprise. As in the 
case of the proprietors of restaurants and other public houses, the 
•• Bremer Handelsblatt, No. 467, Sept. 22, 1860, p. 359 . 
•• See also von Roenne, op. cit. (1884), IV, 463-65; Lasker, op. cit., pp. 179-213. 
The chamber of commerce of the counties of Arnsberg, Meschede and Brilon in-
cluded in their report for 1857 a long indictment of this system. Preuss. Handels-
archiv 1858; II, 527-29 . 
• s As it was to be again by the Conservative governments of 1862. 
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governmental control had in the name of morality been the means of 
so much political and church abuse that the liberals wanted to abolish 
the entire system.29 
In some localities where the handworkers remained economically 
powerful and the influence of factories had not yet been strongly felt, 
the liberals tended in the New Era to be wary of making the question 
of freedom of occupation a political issue.3o The Conservatives had 
since 1848 attempted to keep the handicraftsmen on their side, form-
ing, as the liberals declared, a coalition of Junkerdom and guildism. 
The government in 1849 had issued an ordinance restoring some of 
the former authority of the guilds. In a campaign pamphlet in 1861 
issued by the Progressive party, Schu1ze-Delitzsch described the results 
of this ordinance as follows: 
According to Paragraph 31 of the industrial law of 1849 any 
factory owner can employ handicraft journeymen of all kinds 
for factory purposes, while according to Paragraph 47 a master 
handicraftsman is restricted to apprentices and journeymen of 
his own craft. According to Paragraph 30 no industrialist has to 
pass an examination, and according to Paragraph 32 such an 
unexamined industrialist may carryon any industry similar in 
purpose to that of a handicraft with the sole limitation that he 
employ no journeymen outside his factory, something the owner 
of a large factory will not do anyway. And other than size, no 
indication of a factory-organized handicraft exists.31 
Schulze-Delitzsch concluded that the law of 1849 had imposed restric-
tions solely upon the small handworkers and not upon the factories; 
and he scoffed at the Conservatives' claim thereby to have prevented 
economic anarchy. 
Liberal ire had been aroused by the fact that the law of 1849 had 
restored in part the conditions prevailing prior to the Stein-Hardenberg 
reforms. The law had created the institute of economic councillors, 
made it necessary in almost all handicrafts for a handworker to pass an 
examination and belong to a guild, limited the right to carryon the 
crafts, re-established the statutes of apprentice and journeyman and set 
up special financial sources for the aid of guildsmen.32 It had imposed 
restrictions even upon marketing the wares, all for the supposed pro-
2. Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1861; Vol. IV, No. 126 . 
•• Bremer Handelsblatt, No. 534, Dec. 28, 1861. 
., Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch, Schriften und Reden, Hrsg. von F. Thorwart (Ber-
lin, 1910), II, 396-97. 
·'Von Roenne, op. cit. (1884), IV, 419, 440. 
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tection of the craftsmen, and had placed the latter under the special 
protection of the state. 
The conflict between autocratic mercantilism and the rising capital-
istic industrialism was equally evident in other and economically more 
important areas, those of insurance and mining. These two branches 
of the economy already had a history, for each had contributed a con-
siderable share to the economy of the Old Regime; but their role as 
molding influences in the entire economy lay in the future. Curbed 
and dominated by governmental regulations expressing the spirit of 
mercantilism, they stood at the beginning of their greatness. Their 
struggle for emancipation can only be understood in the light of the 
restrictions against which they fought. 
A law of 1853 had stated that the establishment of an insurance 
business of any kind had to receive the approval of the administration 
of the region in which it was to be domiciled, and that approval should 
be granted only in case the government was convinced of the reliability 
and integrity of the entrepreneurs.33 The way in which the system 
worked was thoroughly condemned by chambers of commerce over 
the state as expensive, cumbersome and obstructive of private intitia-
tive.34 The chambers of commerce of the counties of Arnsberg, Me-
schede and Brilon complained about the difficulties of starting and 
conducting an insurance business. The state had extended its control 
so far, the chamber said, that the establishment of even a small com-
munity insurance society for cattle had to receive prior approval. Every 
agent of an insurance company had to convince the government that 
he was reliable and honorable. One would think, said the chamber 
of commerce, that the insurance company could be trusted to employ 
persons of character. The law did not allow it such responsibility. 
In consequence, the chamber calculated that even after the criterion 
of political reliability used in the Manteuffel period was no longer 
applied, it required at least two weeks' time to go through the formality 
of clearing the person. If one multiplied two weeks by the 166 agents 
to be found in Prussia, the chamber stated, one arrived at the sum of 
seven years of time wasted.s5 
The Berliner Borsen-Zeitung in 1861 stated that there were twenty-
seven different regulations for insurance companies in Prussia-four 
for the province of Brandenburg, four for Pomerania, three for Silesia, 
five for Saxony, eight for the province of Prussia and one each for 
83 Ibid., 476 . 
•• See Bremer Handelsblatt, Aug. 13. 1859, May 12. 1860. 
3' Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1860; I, 744-45. 
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Westphalia, the Rhineland, and Posen. It wished them unified for 
the entire state.36 The same business journal complained about 
government restrictions upon the activity of fire insurance companies 
in provinces where local societies for that purpose had been established 
under government auspices for the special benefit of the Junkers.37 
The story revealed the conflict between the two Prussias: 
It undeniably belonged to the political program of the 
Manteuffel-Westphalen system in Prussia, now a thing of the 
past, to preserve the antiquated feudal Institute of Provincial 
Fire Insurance Societies and to aid them against the competi-
tion of the rapidly expanding private insurance companies. 
The latter were a thorn in the eye of all enemies of progress be-
cause they were independent of feudal paternalism. So it is 
natural that the regulations of provincial societies issued during 
the reaction period should bear the marks of the system and that 
the communal Landtags endeavored to make the private com-
panies dependent upon the control of the feudal societies and 
by all kinds of handicaps to turn the public away from them. 
Since these regulations still remain in force and since the 
management of the provincial societies in view of the inevitable 
decline of their irrationally conducted institute has recently 
sought to increase the inequality of rights and to obtain from the 
ministry further privileges, it appears advisable ... to analyze 
one or another of these regulations .... 
The writer chose as an example the revised regulation of the fire 
insurance society for the Mark of Brandenburg, the Margravate Nieder-
Lausitz and the districts Jiiterbogk and Belzig of January 15, 1855. 
Although according to Paragraph 2 of this regulation the society was 
to insure only buildings, under the pressure of its officials it expanded 
into the field of insuring movable property. The business of the 
society was administered by county directors under the leadership of 
a general director and the supervision and control of the communal 
Landtag. Only Landrats and owners of knights' estates who were 
members of the society were eligible as county directors; they were 
elected by the Kreistag, with the Landrat usually being preferred. 
The stipulations for insuring immovable property were as follows: 
Through Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the law of May 8, 1837, and the 
cabinet order of May 30, 1841, it was forbidden in Prussia for agents 
and societies to give an insurance policy to a customer before local 
police had inspected the request for insurance and an official declara-
tion had been made that the police had no objections against the 
•• Berliner Borsen Zeitung, May 17, 1861 • 
•• Ibid., Jan. 11, Feb. 22, 1861. 
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transaction. This police control, intended to prevent excessive in-
surance, was not regarded as sufficient in the case of the insurance of 
buildings, for Paragraph 27 of the regulation of 1855 stated that the 
county director of the Society had also to approve the transaction. 
According to Paragraph 1 of their special instructions the county 
directors might not grant this permission until they were convinced 
of the accuracy of the proposed amount of the insurance (seven-eighths 
of the tax value of the buildings). In case of need they had personally 
to inspect the buildings or have a building commission do so. If the 
necessary report on the proposed insurance with a private company 
was not made to the county director, the insured person had to pay a 
fine of fifty Reichsthalers to the Society. In case a building which 
had been insured above seven-eights of its worth burned before the 
policy had received the approval of the county director, according to 
Paragraph 29 of the regulation the insured person lost all claim to 
insurance from the private company and the latter had to pay the 
insurance sum to the Society. 
These stipulations offered convenient means for the officials to 
curb and reduce the competition offered to the Society by the private 
companies. The county director learned about any intention to in-
sure with a private company. He had the power to use his official 
influence as Landrat to persuade the applicant either to remain in 
or to join the Society. Recent cases were known of attempts of this 
sort, of one in Westphalia even to revive a defunct society. Without 
a time limit the county director could at his leisure investigate the 
policy with a private company. If a person proposed to withdraw 
from the Society and purchase insurance from a private company, he 
might find himself not covered by insurance while the county director 
investigated the validity of the new policy, but in case the person pro-
posed to insure with the Society, the county director had to pass on 
the policy within eight days. The condition that a new building 
could be insured up to seven-eights of its tax value held only for in-
surance taken with a private company. In the case of the provincial 
Society the building could be insured to the extent of its full tax value. 
The author of the article denounced as a scandal the provision 
that the antiquated and decadent provincial Societies should have 
such power over the private companies, such government support in 
defending themselves against competition. He was particularly angry 
over the stipulation that fines and even in some cases the entire insur-
ance sum would have to be paid to the provincial society, and he be-
lieved that no judge in Prussia would allow such abuse of justice. 
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That the writer expressed the opinions of the private insurance world 
was evident from the numerous similar complaints of the time. 
The government of the New Era with von der Heydt, a holdover 
from the Manteuffel era, still in power as Minister of Commerce made 
a few minor reforms between 1859 and 1861, such as that of abolishing 
the necessity for an insurance company to prove the need for its entry 
into business and for appointing agents in a district.3s In the main 
the old paternalistic controls were preserved, and in 1863 the Breslau 
Chamber of Commerce was still complaining about the same govern-
ment obstructions to the insurance business as before. The private 
insurance business remained subject to police control of the sale of 
each policy, an interference, declared the Breslau Chamber of Com-
merce, which contradicted the fundamental principles of government 
and economic teachings. The private companies still objected to 
government aid to their competitors, the public insurance companies. 
Police officials in charge of fire prevention in the towns were still per-
mitted to become members of the boards of directors of the public 
insurance companies, and Schulzes and other officials in the villages 
acted as agents of these companies. The private insurance business 
considered this preferential treament to be utterly unfair. It wished 
a free market in insurance and requested that police supervision be 
kept at the minimum essential for the general welfare. It defended 
insurance as a means of education in individual thinking and action 
and as a basis of moral self-help. Its proponents were declared to be 
fighting not merely for economic profit but for a moral cause.39 
The business interests denounced Minister of Commerce von der 
Heydt, himself a businessman, for clinging to autocratic power over 
the economy and failing to recognize the need for a change in attitude 
and policy. They asserted that industrialism, particularly in the field 
of transportation, was creating problems which could not be handled 
by a government devoted to a mercantilist policy of paternalism in-
herited from a purely agrarian Old Regime. Business demanded help 
in both a negative and a positive sense. The government should cease 
exercising such rigid control over business that it blocked enterprise; 
but it should also perform for business those essential services of which 
it alone was capable. It should reshape its entire policy with respect 
to the economy and adjust to the conditions of a growing industrial 
society. 
I. Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1861, Jahresberichte, pp. 260-61. 
s. Ibid., 1864, Jahresberichte, pp. 425-26, 581. 
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At the meeting of the Congress of German Economists in 1863 the 
following statement was made: 
Railroads are transforming entire Europe and in entire 
Europe the position and significance of individual towns and 
cities. They organize an entire state in the way that formerly a 
single town was organized. We still find in the old towns a 
Tanner street where all the tanners live, a Dyers' street where 
all the dyers live. In the same way we find today a Sheffield, a 
Birmingham, a Leeds, a Wolverhampton where this or that 
branch of industry is alone carried on in the entire state.40 
Every town and region of Prussia was ardently demanding that a 
line connect it with the rest of the world. The Konigsberg Hartung-
sche Zeitung complained, August 4, 1861, that the Province of Prussia 
was the most neglected of any in railroad construction and therefore 
suffered from a severe economic handicap. Citizens of towns in other 
provinces expressed themselves in even more vigorous terms. Nieder-
Lausitz had to have railroad connections, declared a correspondent to 
the National Zeitung in Berlin in 1861, or its industry and trade 
would be ruined. A railroad along the right bank of the Oder was a 
matter of life or death for Silesia. Each town or region was fighting 
to develop with the times. Each saw opportunities for expansion and 
wealth if it could only obtain transportation facilities. Each realized 
that without a railroad it was doomed to remain static.41 These were 
crucial years in which the fate of a town would be decided for decades 
by whether or not it received a railroad connection. 
The annual report of every chamber of commerce was full of 
denunciations of the government's policy with respect to railroad con-
struction. Criticism of Minister of Commerce von der Heydt was bitter. 
The minister was accused of retarding construction. Capital had not 
been willing to invest in railroads which would not pay for themselves, 
and the minister was reluctant to provide government subsidies. The 
Berliner Borsen Zeitung complained that whereas between 1844 and 
1850 some 263 miles of railroads had been built in Prussia with the 
participation of private capital, in the years 1850-57 only seventy-four 
miles were built with the aid of private resources, the first at a cost 
of 1I3,000,000 Thalers, the second of 56,000,000.42 In 1858 only 
thirteen miles in toto were built. 
4. Vierteljahrschrift filr Volkswirtschaft und Kulturgeschichte (1863), III, 267-68. 
01 See for example National Zeitung, Jan. 24, 1861; Tagesbericht, No. 64, March 16, 
1861, citing article in Schlesische Zeitung, No. 125. 
"Berliner Borsen Zeituflg, Sept. 13, 11159. 
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In 1862 Prussia had 745.5 miles of railroads. (See Appendix B.) 
The critics argued that this amount was too small. The government 
was accused of devoting money to military purposes which should have· 
been put to economic ends. It was denounced for influencing the 
capital market to deny private loans for railroad construction. ""While 
it is no secret," wrote the Berliner Borsen Zeitung on February 18, 
1859, "that the government is firmly determined, partly out of con-
sideration of the bad state of the money market, to be most reserved 
in the near future about concessioning railroads, the number of re-
quests for concessions increases in the Lower House to a vast degree." 
With the outbreak of the Italian War in 1859 the government was 
accused of continuing this policy in order to have funds available for 
state use in case of Prussia's becoming involved in international diffi-
culty; and as the American Civil 'Var and other international com-
plications followed immediately after, the accusations continued. The 
liberals were angry over what they called the use of public funds for 
unproductive purposes instead of for the development of an economy 
which could support such burdens. 
Liberal business interests denounced the government for following a 
policy of mercantilism with respect to railroads. The Berliner Borsen 
Zeitung for September 10, 1861, drew a significant parallel: 
The efforts to bring the entire railroad system under the rule 
of the state spring from the same spirit that formerly brought the 
police administration of the towns in the hands of the state. Just 
as in the latter case it was intended to destroy communal in-
dependence and make the police administration into a machine 
controlled by one power, the Ministry of Interior, so it is now 
intended to put lead strings on independent economic activity 
and give it a nurse maid who will listen to the directions of one 
power, the Ministry of Commerce. 
From Beuthen in Silesia came a dispatch to the Berliner Borsen 
Zeitung43 rebuking the Ministry of Commerce for being unwilling to 
discuss and attend to the complaints of the citizens. Especially was 
this the case with the monopolistic and exploitive policy of the rail-
roads in the province of Silesia. Complaints had reached such a state, 
the paper said, that in all localities "a feeling of bitterness and open 
indignation predominates." 
The coal and iron industries were especially angry. After the eco-
nomic crisis of 1857 they had suffered from lack of markets and feared 
English competition. When the Franco-Prussian commercial treaty 
•• Tagesbcricht, No. 25, Jan. 30. 1862. 
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of 1862 lowered the duty on these items, the producers intensified their 
demand for lower costs of distribution and more efficient handling of 
their products by railroads and waterways. They were thankful for 
the grant made in 1860 of the one-penny freight rate for coal on the 
railroads, but they wished the low rate to be applied also to iron. 
They condemned the railroad companies for many acts of commission 
and omission and sought aid from the government. Coal and iron, 
asserted the industrialists, constituted the foundation for the economy 
and should be given every assistance. When they prospered, the en-
tire economy benefited. Instead of being assisted, said the Conference 
of the Executive Committee of the Association of Mining Interests in 
Dortmund, the railroads treated the industry as "a fat cow, which was 
there to be milked by the railroads with the least possible understand-
ing and the most bureaucratic, Pasha-like satisfaction." Service was 
wretched, the industrialists said; cars were utterly inadequate in num-
ber; trains were too few; service was too irregular; stations were closed 
at night with consequent lengthening of the time required for service; 
the different railroad companies would not carry each other's cars; 
mines had to be shut down for lack of cars to ship away the coal; the 
number of lines was too small. According to the industrialists the 
entire service suffered from the fact that the government would not 
allow competing lines to be built and the canal service to be expanded, 
and would not press the railroads to keep up with the industrial de-
velopment. The entire business world was angry and vociferous about 
the need for reform.44 
The discussion showed that the rising industrialism was creating 
difficulties for its general line of economic laissez-faire. It was learning 
that laissez-faire was beneficial to some interests but not to others. 
The first big source of trouble came from the railroads. In addition 
to charging too high freight rates, they were imposing differential 
rates; that is, they charged less in proportion for carrying goods over 
long distances than over short stretches. The inland towns which were 
centers of wholesale trade, the old distribution points, and the smaller 
towns with hopes of economic progress were especially angry. They 
wished the government to interfere and either to permit competing 
lines to be built or to force the railroads to change their methods.45 
Nor did the requests stop at railroads. All-weather roads were like-
wise wanted, though they were of secondary importance. The towns, 
.. See as examples Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1861, Jahresberichte, p. 259; Berliner 
Borsen Zeitung, Feb. 16, Nov. 20, Dec. 12-13, 1861. 
•• See, for example, Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1861, Jahresberichte, pp. 376-77. 
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particularly those of the Western provinces, asked for more canals and 
the improvement of existing ones and of the other waterways. The 
canal system, they stated, had not expanded since the days of Frederick 
the Great. They wished above all that the Rhine, the Weser and the 
Elbe should be connected. Thereby iron and steel, as well as other 
bulk articles such as agricultural products, would greatly benefit from 
freight rates lower than railroads could charge. The railroads would 
be subject to competition from another kind of carrier and would 
have to keep their rates at a minimum. In Silesia the economic in-
terests, except the railroads, urged the government to make the Oder 
River navigable at all times of the year so that their commerce would 
have cheap means of reaching the outside world. The Cologne Cham-
ber of Commerce envisaged a unified system of water transport joining 
the Danube and its tributaries, the Rhine, the Weser, the Elbe, the 
Oder and the Vistula, a water system covering the whole of Central 
Europe.46 
All in all, the liberals had a large program of requests to put before 
the government for economic assistance in developing the country. They 
realized that each improvement in the means of transportation and 
communication meant opening up an area to their liberal ideals and 
methods. 
The retention of the law against usury struck the liberals as a sur-
vival of medievalism. Its years if not its days were numbered, they 
thought, even though as late as 1864 the law was still in force.47 When 
the government of the New Era endeavored to repeal the law, the 
Lower House of the Landtag passed the necessary bill, but the Upper 
House consistently refused to follow suit. The strength of the Upper 
House's opposition may be seen from the vote in 1860 of 93 to 8 against 
the governmental bilUs The Upper House was determined to main-
tain the legal limit upon the interest rate, five per cent for customary 
loans and six per cent for commercial loans. The members made the 
issue one of morality, of Christianity, as well as of economics. The 
liberals considered it equally a moral issue, a touchstone as to whether 
Prussia would accept the changes occurring in all enterprising coun-
•• Preuss. Handelarchiv, 1861; Jahresberichte, p. 377. The board of directors of 
the Upper Silesian Railroad recognized the need of connecting the Oder with the 
railroad, but refused to agree unconditionally to it for fear Of losing the trade in 
transporting zinc, iron and grain and other ballast materials. Berliner Biirsen Zeitung, 
March I, 1861. 
•• Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1864; Jahresberichte, p. 118. 
n Ibid., 1860; I, 453. 
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tries or whether it would remain subject to the rigid standards of a 
historic caste. The Conservatives believed that they were protecting 
the ability of the landowners and handworkers to borrow money 
cheaply, indeed to afford to borrow it at all. The liberals denounced 
their opponents' stand as selfish and economically unsound. While 
apparantly not greatly hindered in their economy by the presence of 
the usury law, the liberals condemned it as an embarrassing symbol 
of the dominant forces in Prussian society. 
When the government of the New Era introduced a bill in 1860 
to repeal the usury law, it explained in considerable detail its motives. 
The usury law, it stated, did not accomplish its purpose. Instead of 
inclining or forcing the capitalists to lend money at low rates, the law 
actually drove funds out of the lending market into enterprises that 
offered a larger return. Or, the government stated, the lenders well 
understood how to circumvent the law and obtain the equivalent of 
a high rate of interest without running any danger of prosecution. 
Cases under the law almost never came before the courts; when they 
did, they usually involved lenders who had not been acquainted with 
the methods of gaining their ends without penalty. 
Far from making loan capital more plentiful, the government 
argued, the usury law reduced the amount available for personal loans 
and hurt the small handworker or the landowner who already had a 
large mortgage on his property and suddenly needed more money. A 
reliable and honest lender would not take the risk for a return of five 
or six per cent, whereas he might for a larger one. The borrower was 
therefore driven into the hands of a real usurer. The law stimulated 
the growth of those conditions which it was intended to prevent. The 
situation became even worse in time of economic crisis, the govern-
ment asserted, when, as conditions in 1857 had already shown, the usury 
law might have to be suspended. 
The government denied flatly that the repeal of the usury law 
"Would "shock the sense of justice of the people," but argued that an 
improvement of a law would hardly hurt the public sense of justice. 
"The existence or non-existence of a legal prohibition offers no proper 
measure for judging the morality of an action; rather, it is the duty 
of the law-maker to adapt the laws to the real significance of the act." 
The real usurer, the government said, would be subject to punishment 
by law under any circumstances. Moreover, it was impossible to define 
numerically what was usury, for under some circumstances charging 
any interest at all might hurt the borrower much worse than charging 
him ten per cent at other times. Even the state in case of need paid 
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more than the legal limit for loans. The government concluded that 
the usury law no longer stood in harmony with the sense of justice of 
the people and ought to be eliminated. 
The ministry countered the expression of fear of high rates on land 
mortgages and a fall in value of the present mortgages by citing the 
example of England, Oldenburg and other countries. In the case of 
good securities, it stated, the interest rate even at the present time did 
not reach the maximum. It was not the height of the legal interest 
rate but the actual relation of demand to supply that regulated the 
price of mortgages, and no usury law would in bad times assure to the 
landowners cheap money. Nor did the government accept the view 
that the usury law should remain in operation for non-commercial 
and non-landowning classes even though it might be abolished for the 
rest of the population. It denied that such a division was either en-
forceable or advantageous to the lower classes whom it was intended 
to protect, and it adhered to the principle that a law should as far as 
possible have general validity.49 
In the area of mining law Prussia was entering the period of modern 
industrialism with legal conditions mainly of the Old Regime. The 
only region with even the semblance of a modern law was the left 
bank of the Rhine, where the Napoleonic Code had done away with 
the mercantile system. The confusion of mining codes in the rest 
of the state expressed the diverse historic origin of the separate parts. 
Except for the core of Frederick the Great's Prussia, where that ruler 
had between 1766 and 1772 reduced the number of mining districts to 
three, each with its code, the territorial accretions had been allowed to 
retain their particular mining regulations, with new ordinances passed 
from time to time with respect to them. After the Napoleonic era the 
situation was so chaotic that the government in 1825 had begun to work 
on a common code for the entire state. The leisurely attitude with 
which the old Prussia approached such problems may be seen from the 
fact that the new proposal was not worked out and submitted to the 
interested parties until 1862 and did not become law until three years 
later.50 
The response of the Chamber of Commerce of Essen, Werden and 
Kettwig to the terms of the law proposed by the government in 1862 
expressed the opinion of all the parties most interested. The chamber 
thoroughly approved the government's action in basing the bill upon 
the following principles: "abolition of the mining royalty, emancipa-
•• Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1860; I, 49-53. 
10 See von Roenne, op. cit. (1884), IV, 399 ff. 
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tion of mining from state paternalism, placing of mining on an equal 
basis with all other branches of industry, permitting the free, in-
dependent exercise of acquired mining rights, abolition of cumber-
some formalities which obstruct freedom of action, above all unifica-
tion of mining law for the entire state." The chamber missed the 
application of one major principle, "the granting of the character of 
a juridical person to the mining companies and the free sale of the 
mining shares." The reforms cleared away the procedural regulations 
which had been imposed and enforced by the state mining administra-
tion and in general, to the extent that its particular nature would al-
low, placed mining under the rules of civil law like other business 
enterprises. The bill, and subsequent law, did not permit the com-
plete freedom which the mining operators wished, but it marked one 
of the most liberal measures taken by the government. Both liberals 
and many Conservatives, including the Bismarckian government, par-
ticipated in putting through the reform.'51 
The first part of the 1850s witnessed the founding of new private 
banks to provide the financial facilities for the rapid expansion of 
transportation and industry. The Disconto-Gesellschaft in Berlin was 
the most famous of these, but in every fairly large town which had not 
developed banks in the 1840s or earlier private interests now estab-
lished new ones. The government was chary about this movement 
and curbed the rights of these banks as much as possible. It caused 
them great trouble by restricting sharply their right to issue bank notes. 
The credit shortage during the economic crisis of 1857 was prolonged 
by the international political complications evoked by the Italian War 
in 1859-60; and often in desperate need of funds during these troubles 
the business interests besieged the government with complaints. Early 
in 1859 the Berliner Borsen Zeitung52 declared that the monopoly of 
the Pruss ian State Bank to issue bank notes had to cease, that the pri-
vate banks had to be given this right as well. These private banks, it 
said, were leading only a sham existence and business was suffering for 
lack of capital. 
The protests of the private banks made no impression upon the 
Prussian government. The cost of military reforms and the mobiliza-
tion of the army in 1859, the impact of the international crisis upon 
61 See Preuss. Handelsarchiv. 1862; Jahresberichte, pp. 457-58; "Die Bergwerks-
Hutten- und Salinen-VerwaItung in Preussen wlihrend 1849-1863," Vierteljahrschrift 
fur Volkswirtschaft und Kulturgeschichte (1865), I, 90; von Roenne, op. cit. (1884), 
IV, 404 . 
• 0 Berliner Borsen Zeitung, Feb. 15, 1859. 
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the budget and a strong desire to keep state control over credit facilities 
at all times made certain that the government would not relax its 
restrictions upon the issuance of bank notes. In August, 1864, the 
banks were still lamenting. At the meeting of the Congress of German 
Economists at that time, the banker Sonnemann of Frankfurt am Main 
reported that in Prussia the monopoly of the state bank continued, 
that the private banks whose concessions would expire in a short time 
were seriously debating whether in case of the persistance of the pre-
sent restrictions they should not close down. The banks earned so 
little profit on their capital as a result of these restrictions, said Sonne-
mann, that the returns were out of proportion to the risk. He advised 
them to seek to obtain from the government the right to take unlimited, 
interest-bearing deposits, and he thought that they might succeed. If 
they failed to obtain this right, he recommended to them to close their 
doors; "for a banking business that in ten years' time cannot pay higher 
than four to five per cent interest is not worth the trouble."53 Bankers 
were as dissatisfied as other business men with the vestiges of ab-
solutistic mercantilism. 
Passing from the particular to the general, the chambers of com-
merce expressed the wish for reform of the system of chartering 
corporations. The existing procedure had been fixe<1 in a law of 
April 22, 1845. A request was to be considered as appropriate only 
when the proposed corporation satisfied three conditions: first, the 
operations of the corporation had to extend beyond one locality; 
second, the enterprise should be useful from a general point of view 
and deserve special favor in the interest of the common welfare; third, 
it had to be of such a nature that the corporate form was necessary 
and that no other form of organization would suffice. In all cases, 
stated the law, it was essential to make certain that in the process of 
being created the corporation give adequate security against deceiving 
and harming the public. Each request for the right to establish a 
corporation had to be individually approved by the government.54 
Under the terms of the law of 1845 an authoritarian bureaucracy 
c;ould easily obstruct the economic development of the country. It 
could grant or withhold permission as it saw fit; it might delay with 
its answer until the entrepreneurs became disgusted and gave up, or 
•• See Joseph Hansen, Gustav von Mevissen, Ein rheinisches Lebensbild, 1815-
1899 (Berlin, 1906), II, 551-53; Vierteljahrschrift filr Volkswirtschaft und Kulturge-
schichte (1864), IV, 198; also a criticism of the banks in Bremer Handelsblatt, Jan. 7, 
1860, p. 7 . 
.. Richard Passow, Die Aktiengesellschaft (jena, 1922), pp. 63-64. 
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until a favorable economic situation had passed. A group of entre-
preneurs might see an excellent opportunity, it might have the promise 
of the necessary funds, it might have settled all details: if it could not 
persuade the government of the value of the project, it would be un-
able to execute its plan. The government might react with some favor 
to projects for the construction of railroads which were also of military 
value; but other branches of the economy might not fare so well. One 
example may suffice. In 1863 the National Zeitung reported that the 
Prussian Mortgage Insurance Corporation had had to wait four years 
before receiving approval. A main objection of the government against 
the mortgage banks, the article stated, had been the fear that their 
mortgages would offer powerful competition on the market to the 
Pruss ian state bonds. This was a strange view, the article added, "for 
the credit of the state rests on the labor of the people."o5 
What the businessmen desired was the introduction of the English 
system, the free right to incorporate a business in accordance with 
certain legal forms,06 a right open to anyone and exercisable with a 
minimum of bureaucratic circumstaIl£e in an objective, normal way. 
They did not gain that right until 1870. 
The existing, unreformed procedure indicated mistrust and even 
disapproval of these growing corporations on the part of autocracy, a 
jealous fear that the government might in time be unable to direct the 
economy of the state and might have to concede increased power to 
private organizations. A reactionary government run by Junkers and 
mercantilists disliked the whole conception of a modern corporation, 
for its implied the shift from the old forms of wealth which constituted 
the basis of their power to new forms conducive to the capitalistic 
bourgeoisie and to liberalism. The Conservatives thought that they 
could control an economy of agriculture and handicrafts; they knew 
that they would not be able to control one of industry. They claimed 
that they represented the ideals of morality and justice, that their way 
of life alone was advantageous to the state. They accused the liberals 
of seeking to further selfish economic interests. One of their members, 
Deputy Hahn, declared in 1861 to the Lower House: "The big in-
dustrialists wish nothing else than for their capital ... and their eco-
nomic knowledge to prevail. They wish to expand the market for 
capital and industry by elevating the handicrafts to factories or by 
absorbing them." Another, the indispensable Deputy Wagener, as-
serted to the same body: "Weare entirely accustomed to being ac-
os National Zeitung, Berlin, March 7, 1863 . 
•• Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1860; I, 743·44. 
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cused of pursuing special interests when something is advocated from 
our side, but when something is originated by the representatives of 
industrialism and capital these gentlemen naturally never have any 
other objective in mind than the welfare of their fellow-men and 
especially of the poorest class."51 The assertions of these Conservative 
leaders showed a total lack of understanding of liberalism, a total 
aversion to a society of freedom which could expand the economy and 
create opportuntities for new achievements along all lines. The 
Conservatives were struggling to use the full power of an authoritarian 
government, a police state, to prevent a change from the society of the 
Old Regime to that of modern industrialism. The conflict over the 
form of government involved that over the nature of the society. 
Unfortunately the government even of the New Era was not very 
responsive to economic needs. The key Ministry of Commerce re-
mained in the hands of von der Heydt, a businessman, but a hold-
over from the Manteuffel ministry, with a definitely mercantilist point 
of view. Back of him stood the King, whose understanding of eco-
nomics may be judged from the statement in his program of 1858. 
"Trade, industry and the closely related means of communication have 
expanded to an unimagined extent," he had written; "nonetheless we 
must here also be moderate in the objective so that the spirit of fraud 
does not wound us. Significant funds must continue to be placed at 
the disposal of the means of communications; but they must be 
measured in consideration of all state needs, and we must keep within 
the budget." The King manifested little enthusiasm for the progress 
of trade and commerce. The two points of emphasis in his remarks 
had to do with preventing "the spirit of fraud" from "wounding us" 
and with assuring that public funds were not devoted to the con-
struction of roads and railroads to such an extent that, for example, 
his army would suffer from lack of nourishment. He did not mention 
the fact that commerce and industry were making his state more 
powerful than ever before, and he failed to perceive that even though 
the construction of modern means of communication required a large 
initial outlay of money, the advantages to the state and society would 
be immediate and out of all proportion to the cost. He sacrificed eco-
nomic aid for business to the financial needs of his program of military 
reforms; and both von der Heydt, although in the end under protest, 
and Bismarck acquiesced in his policy. The economic expansion of 
these years occurred in spite of the government's indifference . 
•• Abg. H., St. B., May 6, 1861; II, 1096·97. Ibid., May 7, 1861; II, 1l07-08. 
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I N hi, ,c/onn p"'gum of Novembe>-, 1858, the Princ. 
Regent included a paragraph about the conditions of the military 
service which was so veiled in meaning as to be scarcely noticed. 
The army created Prussia's greatness and battled success· 
fully for its growth. The neglect of the army brought about 
a catastrophe for it and the state, which was gloriously effaced by 
the appropriate reorganization of the army, as the victories of 
War of Liberation revealed. Forty years' experience and two 
short wars have now made us note that much which has not 
proved satisfactory needs to be changed. For that work we need 
calm, peaceful conditions and money, and it would be a criminal 
mistake if one should display a cheap army organization which 
for this reason in a decisive moment did not live up to expecta-
tions. Prussia's army must be powerful and respected in order 
when necessary to be a grave political weight in the scales.1 
The implementation of the idea in this paragraph led to the appoint-
ment of General von Roon as Minister of War and of Bismarck as 
Minister President; it brought about the constitutional conflict, the 
crushing defeat of liberalism and the victory of militarism and Con· 
servatism in Prussia and Germany. 
The plans for military reform were completed in the next year, 
1859, and their execution was initiated with the mobilization for the 
Italian war that year. In 1860 the government proposed a bill to the 
Landtag to legalize the entire reform, justifying the action by the fact 
that the army should be adapted to the changes in population and 
society which had occurred since the passage of the basic military law 
1 Horst Kohl, op. cit., p. 5. 
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of 1814. The government called attention to the fact that the size of 
the army remained the same as in 1814, in spite of the fact that the 
population had increased from ten million to eighteen million and 
that the stipulation for compulsory universal military service in the 
law of 1814 was not being carried out. It proposed to increase the 
number actually called for military service from twenty-six per cent 
to forty per cent of those subject to military duty. The number of 
annual recruits would be increased from 40,000 to 63,000 men. The 
bill aimed to require military service of three years in the regular 
army for the infantry and four years for the cavalry. The three-year 
term had been stipulated in the law of 1814, but had actually not been 
enforced from 1833 to 1853, when the two-year term had been sub-
stituted. Since 1853 the longer term had been restored and the bill 
proposed to make it permanent. The Landwehr or reserve was to be 
reorganized, with the three youngest year groups incorporated in the 
regular army and the older ones used merely within the country for 
garrison and similar duties. The term of service in the army would 
last from the twentieth to the thirty-sixth year, that is, three years less 
than at present. Of these sixteen years, seven were to be spent in the 
regular army, three in active service and four in the reserve. The rest 
of the term, from the twenty-eighth to the thirty-sixth year, would be 
served in the Landwehr. The reform made it possible to leave the 
older men, usually fathers of families, at home in case of mobilization 
of the troops of the line; previously those who were in the first Land-
wehr (Erstes Angebot) had to be called at every mobilization for the 
army to have enough men. An appropriate number of new regiments 
was created to take care of the increased size of the standing army. 
With the levying of more recruits and the alignment of the younger 
years of the reserve with the standing army, the government expected 
to keep the size of the army about the same as before but to have much 
younger regular troops and to bring them under the efficient control 
of regular army officers. 
The Prince Regent regarded the military reform as his own special 
task. He was from the start determined to stand or fall with it. He 
declared many times that he would renounce the throne rather than 
accept any modifications in fundamentals. He believed firmly that an 
improvement in the military efficiency and strength of the state re-
quired increased conscription with intensive training of recruits for 
a period of three years by regular army officers and the subordination 
of the Landwehr for the first three years to the authority of the regular 
officers. The integral combination in his thinking of military, social 
and political arguments becomes clear from his numerous memoranda 
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and speeches in the military commission. He constantly declared that 
one could teach a peasant the necessary drills in a few months, but that 
"to produce the soldierly character in its totality" three years' service 
was too little. "For two years the recruit will be completely over-
powered by drill and instruction; only in the third year will he learn 
to feel himself a soldier and acquire respect for the uniform, for the 
seriousness of his profession; and then he will be filled with the spirit 
of the caste without which an army cannot exist." The Prince nursed 
a deep distrust of the Landwehr, which von Roon and many regular 
army officers shared. The Prince related how, when a Landwehr troop 
had acted so badly in a review before the late Czar Nicholas I, he had 
been sent ahead by the King to the next review place to prevent a 
similar disgrace. In the streets one heard at that time the remark, 
"There goes the dirty Landwehr man." The Prince had been particu-
larly impressed by the fact that in the Baden campaign of 1849 the 
Landwehr troops had had to be driven back into battle by a regiment 
of the line. When the Landwehr troops hastened to the colors in the 
mobilization of 1859, he remarked dryly that since then their over 
estimation of themselves had given way to a healthy humility. Con-
sequently, he regarded three years of training as indispensable, argu-
ing in 1859 as follows: 
Why did all Landwehr battalions of the Guard hold loyally 
to their oath of service? [He was referring to the events of 1848-
49.] Because the three-year period of service remained in force 
in the Guard corps without interruption. Infantry regiments of 
the line wavered .... But of all the cavalry regiments of the line 
not a single one for even a moment became uncertain in its 
loyalty I Why? Because they also had preserved the three-year 
period of service. 
With such quantitative explanations was his simple military mind 
content.2 
Minister of War von Roon concurred in the Prince's low opinion 
of the Landwehr. He regarded it as "a false and weak military in-
stitution," lacking the "genuine, correct, firm soldier's spirit and the 
secure disciplinary control." He objected that the Landwehr man 
felt not like a professional soldier but like a civilian, that all this think-
ing was directed toward civilian ends, that although he knew some-
thing about handling weapons "his soul clung to his farm, his chisel, 
• See the Prince Regent's memorandum of December, 1859, in Briefe, Reden und 
Schriften, I, 461-78; Egmont Zechlin, Bismarck und die Grundlegung der deutschen 
Grossmacht (Stuttgart und Berlin, 1930), pp. 176-77. 
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his work at his home, not to the flag." One had to appeal to his good 
will and at times even to his "supposed patriotic sentiment." To 
clinch his point, von Roon related the incident in 1849 of a despairing 
commander who had had to buy beer for his Landwehr men to entice 
them on. A preferable inducement, von Roon thought, was "the 
restorative of the iron screws of military discipline." He believed that 
times of general popular enthusiasm would come again, but he 
thought it foolish to rely upon such means to accomplish indispensable 
results. He preferred to depend upon "a good and sound organiza-
tion" to use and augment the enthusiasm if present, or to achieve 
objectives if absent. Corps spirit, love of honor, loyalty to the war-
lord were, he said, moral forces which were found in all great armies; 
the basis of this spirit was to be had in the common deeds, dangers 
and suffering of military discipline. This foundation, he declared, 
was lacking in the Prussian Landwehr. He regarded the present Land-
wehr as a bad political institution, for with it the government could 
lot be master in its own house and had constantly to think of the 
:ffect of its action in both internal and foreign affairs upon the armed 
part of its people, the Landwehr. This was especially the case, he 
said, since the introduction of constitutional government, for now each 
Landwehr man could use not only his arm but his tongue. To a cer-
tain extent he could check the government. This influence made the 
government weak where in the interest of the country it should be 
strong, indecisive and hesitant where it should be positive and swift. 
Von Roon emphasized the value of the principle "The armed force 
does not deliberate, it executes."3 
This frank statement of Prussian militarism could scarcely have 
been improved upon. The country existed to support the army; the 
constitution had unfortunately weakened the morale of the army; that 
weakness caused by the soldier's being also a voter could be over-
come solely by exposing him to three years of intensive drill in the 
military spirit by professional army officers; a civilian as soldier was 
not to be trusted since he thought too much about those things which 
he was defending; every eligible male in the state should be forced to 
undergo this training so that he would be a loyal and obedient sub-
ject. One may judge from von Roon's remarks that the military re-
forms were the means by which the ruler and his Conservative army 
officers of the nobility hoped to block the constitution's implications 
• Zechlin. op. cit., pp. 177-79; Denkwilrdigkeiten aus dem Leben des General-
Feldmarschalls Kriegsminister Grafen von Roan. (Breslau, 1892). I, 522-24. 
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for freedom and a new society and to preserve the old order of caste 
and absolutism under a constitutional cover. 
The liberals understood the significance of the military reforms 
from the start. They were appalled at the cost. The central com-
mittee of the German Progressive Party issued a broadsheet in which 
it roundly denounced the reforms.4 The peacetime army for 1862, it 
said, called for a minimum of 205,000 men, a maximum of 215,000. If 
one chose the median figure of 210,000, it would mean that Prussia 
would have twelve soldiers to every 1,000 inhabitants. This figure 
should be compared with that of ten per 1,000 in Austria, eight in 
Russia and ten in France. Military expenses crippled Austrian and 
Russian power to such an extent, the committee argued, that when war 
finally came the two countries had plenty of soldiers but lacked the 
means to use them successfully. Even France, which was much richer 
than Prussia, had had to curtail its military expenditures. 
In 1850, the broadsheet continued, Prussia had had an army of 
131,000 men and now it was adding 80,000 more. In 1850 the army 
had cost 26,000,000 Thalers; at present it cost 40,000,000, or 14,000,000 
more. This meant that with 3,500,000 taxpayers in the state, the army 
cost each taxpayer annually four Thalers more. In addition, the 
country was deprived of the labor power of these 80,000 men, or if one 
reckoned the value of the work of each at one hundred Thalers a 
year, the country lost a sum of 8,000,000 Thalers' worth of productive 
work every year. Thus the army cost the country 22,000,000 Thalers 
more than in 1850. This was not all, declared the committee of 
liberals. One must add 3,000,000 Thalers to cover cost of new con-
struction and maintenance of fortifications, barracks and hospitals, 
of construction of railroads for purely military purposes, of horses, 
munitions and so on. Moreover, the soldier lived on the meagerest 
possible terms. His pay of two and a half silver Groschen and one and 
a half pounds of bread daily was not enough to maintain him. His 
family, already deprived of his productive services, had to send him 
food and money. The amount paid by the state for quartering troops 
was utterly inadequate to cover costs and the burden was unfairly dis-
tributed. Nor was the reorganization of the army as yet completed. 
One could expect fairly soon that the sum of 7,000,000 Thalers would 
have to be added to the 22,000,000 or 23,000,000. And the navy had 
not even been mentioned; it needed much more money than it had 
• Spart im Frieden, dass lhr Stark im Kriege Seid. See also National Zeitung, 
Jan. 26, 1861, and the debates in Abg. H., St. B., May 27-28, 1861; III, 1399 If. 
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been recelvmg. The broadsheet estimated that sooner or later the 
army reform would cost the country some 32.000,000 Thalers more 
than in 1850, or nine Thalers for each h,ead of a family. 
In calculating the size of the force available for immediate mobili-
zation, the liberal broadsheet stated that the reorganization provided 
only 353,000 men, whereas the army prior to 1860 could muster 344,000 
men for immediate service. It concluded that the reform was not worth 
the effort. 
The liberals on the one side and the ruler and his military advisers 
on the other had entirely different conceptions of defence. The former 
believed that a country was strong in defence if it was economically 
prosperous. They feared that the military reforms would wreck the 
economy and expose the country in time of war to extreme danger. 
They believed in the intelligent loyalty of each citizen to the country 
and his willingness and ability to fight in a crisis. They disliked in-
tensely the sense of social inequality which was preserved in the army. 
The King and his military entourage emphasized the necessity of drill 
and more drill for the inculcation of social and political obedience, 
not to say docility. They stressed the organizational aspects of de-
fence and tended to belittle the spiritual; and they had little or no 
understanding for the economic factors. Two different views of life 
were here opposed to each other, that of the growing industrial, liberal 
society and that of the Old Regime. 
Numerous complaints, especially in the Western provinces but also 
in the Eastern, were levelled against the cost of quartering the troops. 
Since the old system of requiring the locality to pay the cost still pre-
vailed, those towns that had the misfortune to be selected for either 
temporary or permanent quartering found themselves burdened with 
excessive expenses, and they petitioned the Lower House to change 
the system and relieve them of this load. Dusseldorf, for example, had 
in former years paid 6,000 Reichsthalers, but in 1859 it had had to pay 
out 50,000. The compensation provided by the government was re-
garded as much too low; the unfortunate towns had to make up the 
difference to enable the soldiers to live. From Thorn came the 
criticism that quartering cost one and a half to two Thalers, whereas 
the government in summer paid for quarters only eight silver Groschen 
and five Pfennig and in winter fourteen silver Groschen and one 
Pfennig. (One Thaler = 30 Groschen; 1 Groschen = 8 Pfennig.) The 
presence of the troops benefited only the tavern and the shopkeeper, 
ran the criticism, and was a disadvantage to everyone else because of 
the increased price of the usual necessities of life and increased wages. 
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In the West a lively town did not want a garrison to be stationed in 
its midst. In the Eastern provinces, however, the degree of economic 
and cultural activity in many towns may be judged from the fact that 
some of them actually petitioned for garrisons. The presence of 
soldiers meant to them the stir of life. Nonetheless there was general 
approval of the recommendation made in June, 1861, by the Com-
mercial and Industrial Association of the Rhineland and Westphalia 
that the cost of quartering troops be regarded as a state and not a 
local expense and that it be absorbed by the state budget.1i 
Strenuous objection was raised to increasing the size of the army. 
The shortage of labor due to mobilization, it was said, would become 
chronic. Manpower would be wasted; all those months of military 
service would be devoted to non-productive purposes. Trades could 
not be learned; idleness and ignorance would result. From Trier 
came reports in 1862 that persons were emigrating to escape higher 
taxes and the long military service. At Stettin Doctor Wolff, a leading 
liberal, stated in August, 1864, that young men in the Baltic towns 
were prevented by military duty from visiting foreign commercial cen-
ters and establishing connections, and that commerce was hurt more 
by military conscription than any other branch of the economy.6 
Representatives of the other branches raised similar objections. Ex-
cept among the few Conservatives military service was universally dis-
liked. 
The government argued that even with the increase in the size of 
the standing army the percentage of the population in service remained 
less than that in any year between 1816 and 1822. In 1816 Prussia 
had had a population of 10,349,031 and an army of 130,000 men, or 
1.25 per cent. The percentage had steadily declined until in 1857 it 
had reached 0.80 per cent of a population of 17,560,886. The new 
organization of the army in 1861 put some 205,000 men in the army out 
of a population of 18,246,760 (1.12 per cent). The government com-
pared these figures, which included both land and sea power, with 
those for Great Britain (0.75 per cent), France (1.13 per cent), Austt:ia 
(1.25 per cent) , and Russia (1.33 per cent)-to the manifest advantage 
• Berliner Borsen Zeitung, Dec. 28. 1859. June 12. 1861. Abg. B .• St. B., May 29. 
1861; 111.1500. Ibid., Feb. II. 1861; I. 197-200. Ibid., May 28-29. 1861; III. 14~8. 150~. 
Xolnuche Zeitung, March 9. 1862. 
• See chamber of commerce reports of 1860-62; Xolnische Zeitung, April 27. 1862; 
Vierterjahrschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Xulturgeschichte (1864). III. 2~. 
Militarism / 91 
of the government's claim for more manpower to keep up with the 
others.7 
The liberals replied with other figures, which included. the number 
not merely of the standing army but of all the troops in service, and 
came to the conclusion that Prussia had an army of 430,000 men, or 
almost 2.5 per cent of its population, and that if garrison troops and 
Landwehr were considered the percentage would reach about four. II 
The views about the period of service necessary were equally op-
posed. Claiming that three years were essential to train a soldier, the 
government contrasted the short term of service in Prussia with the 
length of it elsewhere. In Russia, it stated, the soldier served from the 
ages of twenty to thirty-two, in Austria from twenty to twenty-eight, 
in France from twenty-one to twenty-seven, in Prussia from twenty to 
twenty-three. If one added the service in the reserve the terms were: 
in Russia from the age of twenty to that of thirty-five, in Austria from 
twenty to thirty, in France from twenty-one to twenty-eight, in Prussia 
from twenty to twenty-seven. The government pointed out that all 
military obligation in Prussia ceased with the thirty-sixth year, whereas 
it continued in Bavaria to the sixtieth year and in Russia to the fifty-
fifth. It added that it would not be necessary to call to service even in 
time of war the personnel above thirty-two years of age and concluded 
that in Prussia the admitted burdens of compulsory military service 
were held to a minimum.9 
Severe protests were registered against the government for spending 
so little for cultural or productive purposes. The Zeitung fur Nord-
deutschland remarked in January, 1861, that the present Prussian 
government was "not all too human" in its support of literature and 
art, that it was employing no artist of significance. It compared this 
attitude with that in Bavaria, where recently the King had again given 
large commissions to German artists. It reported that the artists in 
Berlin feared the cessation of architectural and other artistic work 
already in progress there_10 The Volkszeitung Gune 14, 1862) re-
ported that newspapers were again expressing the need for a new par-
liament building. "They forget," this liberal paper commented, "that 
we still need so and so many barracks for the new regiments_ First 
• Die lnnere Politik der Preussischen Regierung von 1862 bis 1866. S4mmlung 
der amtlichen Kundgebungen und halb4mtlichen A'usserungen (Berlin, 1866), pp. 
lI5,55-56. 
• Bremer Handelsblatt, July 6, 1861. 
• Die Inn ere Politik, pp. 75-76. 
1& T4gesbericht, No.4, Jan. 5, 1861. 
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business and then pleasure. Barracks come first." The Kolnische 
Zeitung (March 31, 1862) stated that "the world-famous University of 
Berlin has no chemical laboratory!" and that apart from the Industrial 
Institute in Berlin, Prussia had no polytechnic institute. Prussian 
students had to go to Hanover, Karlsruhe or elsewhere to study engi-
neering. Prussia had money only for the army. Most complaints, as 
we have seen, were registered about the failure of the government to 
devote larger sums to the construction of railroads and good roads 
and to the improvement of canals. The papers and the reports of 
chambers of commerce were full of such expressions. At the Berlin 
meeting of the Prussian Commercial Association in March, 1860, the 
chairman, David Hansemann, an ultra right-wing liberal, declared: 
In one sense the convention has expressd itself with un-
animity; in several votes it has given to understand with absolute 
clarity that the state has great cause to devote more public funds 
to productive purposes (navigable waterways, and so forth). It 
has been stated that in this respect our fatherland has remained 
behind other countries. If the same system of saving and devot-
ing state money to other than productive purposes continues in 
the present degree, as appears likely, Prussia will in the progress 
of its welfare remain significantly behind other countries. I be-
lieve that these unanimous opinions should carry some weight, 
for they are expressed by an assembly which is composed largely 
of people who pay no small amount of taxes and who have a 
great interest in the preservation of state credit and of a good 
rate for state bonds.ll 
The government tried to refute the charges of excessive burden. In 
the Lower House Finance Minister von Patow admitted on May 28, 
1861, that military costs had cut into expenditures for other purposes 
but added that the budget for that year contained about the same 
amount for productive expenditures that it had allotted for the past 
decade.12 The semi-official Stern-Zeitung in a series of articles in 1862 
argued that Prussia had borne similar burdens before and could do so 
again. It declared that the present high cost was necessary because 
of failure to keep up the army in past years and that even with the re-
form Prussia had scarcely attained its former military strength with 
respect to other countries.13 
The government claimed that the cost of the military after the re-
organization constituted a lower percentage of the total public ex-
11 Bremer Handelsblatt, March 10, 1860, p. 93. 
11 Abg. H., St. B., May 28. 1861; III. 1446-47. 
13 Die lnnere Politik, p. 33. 
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penditure than at any time between 1820 and 1849. It offered the 
following figures as evidence: In 1820 the total public expenditure had 
been 72,818,848 Thalers, of which the sum of 27,472,223 Thalers, or 
37.73 per cent, had been devoted to the army. In 1847, the figures had 
been 89,563,361 Thalers, 28,305,615 Thalers, and 31.6 per cent. In 
1859 they had been 131,137,859 Thalers, 32,315,877 Thalers, and 24.64 
per cent. And in 1861 they were 138,585,051 Thalers, 40,361,104 
Thalers, and 29.12 per cent. The government further argued, with 
statistics, that the cost of the army was less in proportion to size of 
population and army than that in any of the large European states 
except Russia.14 
The government's defence did not convince the liberals, who ob-
jected to the military budget not so much on grounds of the money"s 
being used wastefully but rather because so much was allocated to the 
army at all. The justice of the liberals' criticism was acknowledged 
even within the ministry. In March, 1862, Minister von der Heydt 
wrote to his colleague von Roon a confidential letter which through 
some slip appeared in the press. In it he urged a reduction in taxes 
and in expenses. 
That the larger part [of the reduction in revenue] can occur 
only in case of a reduction in military expenditures ... hardly 
needs to be shown further, for it is sufficiently known to you that 
expenditures in all other administrative branches have been cur-
tailed for years in order to reduce the deficit caused by the in-
creased needs of the military administration while maintaining 
the appearance of fulfilling repeated governmental promises. 
The result has been that the needs postponed from year to year 
because of lack of funds have become increasingly apparent. It 
will no longer be possible without disadvantage to the country 
further to ignore these and to decline those many requests for 
increased expenditures made in the Landtag during considera-
tion of the budget by pointing to the lack of funds. 10 
In the Lower House Deputy von Ammon, who had served in the 
War of Liberation against Napoleon, attacked the preferential financial 
and social position of the military officers. He denounced the amount 
of their salaries as proposed in the budget as "enormous" and "out of 
all proportion to those of civil officials." The five hundred majors, 
for example, he said, had far larger salaries than any civilian councillor 
U Ibid., pp. 39-40,48-74_ 
15 The letter is to be found in the Volkszeitung, April 6, 1862. It was reprinted 
in other papers, but was given a modest summary in Bergengriin, Staatsminister 
August Freiherr von der Heydt (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 288-89. 
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of comparable rank could hope to obtain. In addition the officers 
received extra assistance, service, and rations, which augmented their 
income. While subaltern officers' salaries were not large, these young 
men were rapidly promoted. 
Compare the long and expensive theoretical and practical 
preparation which every other state official has to go through. 
When one considers that, for example, our assessors must wait 
ten to twelve years for fees or a fixed salary and become gray, 
while the subaltern officer who entered service at an earlier year 
will have already in this period of time become a captain, you 
will find in that situation no similarity. 
When a position is to be filled in the civil bureaucracy there 
is often no money available. The pension which a retiring 
official is to receive can mostly be paid only out of the salary of 
the position become vacant. In the case of the military, on the 
other hand, everything is richly provided. Every position that 
becomes vacant is immediately filled. Pensions are easily ob-
tained, and in most cases are larger than those that can be 
claimed by civil officials of comparable rank. 
Von Ammon objected to the military as an "exclusive special caste, the 
first estate in the country." 
This prejudice is furthered ... by the undeniable preference 
for nobles, by the autonomy of regiments [in selecting their own 
officer personnel] which do not even accept what the highest war 
lord gives them, ... by a policy, which, in spite of the view that 
the soldier should not engage in politics, is characterized by op-
position to all liberal progress,16 
Von Ammon's criticism was approved by Freiherr von Hoverbeck, 
who expressed the conviction that at the present scale of pay the com-
mon soldier was starving, unless he had the good fortune to receive 
outside support or was able to work on the side,17 The Berlin cor-
respondent of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung contrasted the scale of 
financial support of the army with that of teachers, which was 
notoriously low. IS 
The main objection which the liberals had against the military 
reform grew out of social conditions. Deputy Bramer did not criticize 
"the corps spirit" as an evil but he denounced "the caste spirit which 
is formed."19 Aristocratic caste and privilege dominated the army, he 
.. Abg. H., St. B., May 27, 1861; III, 1398·99 . 
• 7 Ibid., May 27, 1861; III, 1399·1400. Also Ludolf Parisius, Leopold Freiherr von 
Haverbeclr. (Berlin, 1897·98), I, 196; II, 200 If . 
•• Tagesberichte, No. 16, Jan. 20, 1862. 
It Abg. H., St. B., 1861; III, 1468. 
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said, and served as the basic support for the Old Regime throughout 
the state. The nobility enjoyed almost a monopoly of the higher 
officers' posts in the army and by far a majority of all the positions. 
The only branch in which the nobles did not like to serve was the 
artillery, where the necessarily strict training in mathematics did not 
appeal to them.20 A contemporary stated in 1860 that ninety per cent 
of the officers in the cavalry were nobles, about seventy per cent in 
the infantry, and around thirty per cent in the artillery. The higher 
in rank one went, the larger became the percentage of nobles; over 
ninety per cent of all generals in all branches of service were nobles. 
A continuing supply of noble officers was assured by the fact that over 
seventy per cent of the students in the cadet schools, the military train-
ing centers for officers, belonged to the aristocracy.21 
The guard regiments and others of special social prestige were ex-
clusively officered by nobles. The cadet schools served as training 
centers of indigent young sons of the numerous military nobility, 
whose only inheritance, said Minister von Roon, was their sword. 
While a fourth or a third of the pupils were of bourgeois origin, the 
schools succeeded in excluding bourgeois influence and in training the 
authoritarian officer, acutely aware of his superiority over everyone 
else in the state. General von Roon offered in his own person an 
example of what the schools produced. He had found in one of them 
about the only home he had ever known.22 Their reputation was 
shown in a secret police report in Breslau, June 25, 1860. An actor 
in a local theater had asked on the stage: "What is a Cadet house?" 
He had answered, "A school in which it is made certain that not even 
by mistake a burgher will become a general." Shouts of laughter and 
enthusiastic approval, continued the police report, greeted this state-
ment. The police officer added that he had taken steps to investigate, 
and he was later able to report that the actor had been punished.23 
The most startling evidence of the caste spirit among the military 
was offered by the duel in 1861 between General von Manteuffel, the 
King's military adjutant, and the liberal deputy, Karl Twesten. The 
2. See also speeches of Deputies Hermann, Immermann and Bramer, in Abg. H., 
St. B., 1861; III, 1465·68. Also von Bernhardi, op. cit., III, 284 . 
.. Gutsmuth. op. cit., I. 11·17. Minister von Roon in general gave similar figures 
for the percentage of noble officers. See his speech in Abg. H., St. B., May 29. 1861; 
III. 1459. 1462 . 
•• On the cadet schools see the remarks by Deputies Fliegel and Bramer in Abg. 
H .• St. B .• 1861; III. 1461·62. 1468. Also by von Roon, Ibid., III. 1459. 1462 . 
•• Polizei-Bericht, Breslau. June 25. 1860. These police reports were used in the 
Prussian State Archives in Berlin-Dahlem. 
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latter had published a pamphlet entitled What Can Still Save Us, in 
which he had discussed the condition of Prussia and Germany and had 
proposed solutions to essential problems. In the course of the analysis 
he had called General von Manteuffel "a harmful man in a harmful 
position."24 The general took personal offence at the remark and 
challenged the author to a duel. The latter replied that he had not 
meant to question Manteuffel's personal honor, but as the general in-
sisted on a duel Twesten accepted. The fight took place, ending with 
Manteuffel unhurt and Twesten wounded in the arm. "Even after 
Twesten shot, Manteuffel is said to have demanded that he take back 
his words," wrote Deputy von Ammon to Heinrich Kruse of the 
KOlnische Zeitung, "whereupon Twesten is said to have answered 
that he could not understand how one could make such a demand of 
him. Moreover, it is said that Manteuffel did not immediately fire but 
calmlyaimed."25 
The liberals unanimously condemned the duel. To Twesten it 
meant that no one of any consequence could attack the military. The 
National Zeitung added that the duel made perfectly clear the military 
nobility's claim to be an unapproachable caste. The liberal journal 
saw in this fact the existence of a "disastrous split" in the nation. 
Deputy von Ammon expressed to his friend Kruse the expectation that 
the Ko/nische Zeitung would do its share "for the eradication of this 
barbaric vestige of a medieval ordeal."26 
The King reacted in a personal way. "To have to do without 
Manteuffel's service at this time," he wrote von Roon somewhat in-
coherently, "the triumph of democracy in having driven him out of 
my presence, the scandal which this event must make in my closest 
circle, these are matters which almost rob me of my senses because it 
puts upon my government another unfortunate stigmal! What will 
Heaven do with me?"27 Not a word about Twesten, not a word about 
the illegality of the event, nothing except concern for his military, 
his nobility, his government, his own prestige! 
The official handling of the duel proved equally revealing. Twes-
ten, the burgher, was suspended from office during the investigation. 
He was hauled before the court; the three judges found him guilty of 
having insulted Manteuffel but regarded his acceptance of the chal-
lenge as necessary in order not to lose the respect of his peers. Man-
2. The actual word used was "unheilvoll." Heyderhoff, op. cit., I, 63 . 
•• Ibid., I, 65 . 
•• Ibid., I, 64, 65. 
27 Briefe, Reden und Schriften, II, 15. 
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teuffel continued to confer daily with the King, who could not bear 
to part with him. In commenting on: the disparity of treatment Deputy 
von Ammon called it "injustice," an example of prejudice, and wished 
the Kiilnische Zeitung to emphasize that "truth cannot be refuted by 
a pistol." The National Zeitung remarked: "It is already a scandal 
that a preferred caste can in violation of the law force its duelling 
code upon the great majority of citizens which in our century is too 
enlightened to defend itself with weapons against words; but what if 
the state measures the illegal action of the parties by different standards 
because they belong to different occupational classes?" 
The reaction of the general public may be gauged from the response 
to a speech which Twesten made in Berlin in April of the next year 
as candidate for re-election to the Lower House. He closed his ad-
dress by asserting: "As for me I hope that I am worthy of the belief 
that I do not spare my person and that I shall risk more than office and 
salary before I retreat from political activity so long as I may believe 
myself able in any way to serve my country." The entire audience of 
1,500 people rose and responded by "long-continuing stormy ap-
plause."28 
The difference between the liberal and the Conservative mentality 
may be seen in the subsequent behavior of the two participants in the 
duel. Twesten continued to be a courageous and independent political 
leader. Within a few months of the speech cited above he came to the 
conclusion that the military reforms had been actually executed to 
such an extent that the Lower House could not block or fundamentally 
change them. He held no grudge against the military because of the 
duel; he served not his hatred but his country. Upon defending his 
changed opinion, he was thrown out of the Progressive party and in 
the next year he failed to be re-elected from Berlin; but he clung to 
his beliefs. Manteuffel remained an egotist, a reactionary, an intriguer. 
Both von Roon and Bismarck had trouble with him. His were per-
sonal characteristics, not necessarily those of Conservatism; but the 
rigidity of Manteuffel's thinking and acting exemplified the traits of 
the society in which he moved, and that society included the King. 
Within the course of the next two years von Roon and Bismarck were 
both to challenge liberal critics in the Lower House to duels. The 
affairs were never carried out; but they indicated that the Conservative 
technique of employing physical force to subdue an opponent was to 
invade even the legislative chamber of a culturally advanced society . 
•• Heyderhoff, op. cit., 1,66, 87. 
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The liberals were divided in their conception of what the military 
force should be. A few favored a militia like that in Switzerland; some, 
especially in the Western provinces, advocated the right of persons 
called to service to supply substitutes; some varied this proposal with 
one in favor of having mercenaries; some wished a nucleus of a pro-
fessional army, supplemented by a youth trained in sports, gymnastics 
and shooting. The vast majority of liberals, however, favored the 
military system erected by General von Boyen in 1814, the system which 
the King was determined to change. They favored at most a two-year 
term of active military service for all, and the retention of the Land-
wehr in its old form.21I 
General von Boyen had organized the Landwehr in two reserves: 
the second was composed of older men on call in emergency; the first 
consisted of the personnel which had served its term in the army of the 
line. The Landwehr was sharply separated from the latter and had 
its own officers, usually persons who had volunteered for one year, 
received the necessary training and passed the necessary examinations. 
The Landwehr battalions of the first reserve formed part of the army 
of the line; on mobilization they were called to duty, but they pre-
served their own identity from the regular troops. In this way von 
Boyen had hoped to associate the people with the regular army, to 
make the army a people's army, and to prevent a caste feeling from de-
veloping among the regular officers, which would once more. as in the 
Eighteenth Century, weaken the military strength of the state by 
dividing the civilian and the military population. Von Boyen had 
drawn these lessons from the experience of the Prussian army since its 
collapse in 1806 at Jena. Above all, the army should remain a 
popular force, and the Landwehr was contituted with this intention. 
Even though by the 1850s the nobility had acquired major control of 
the higher positions in the Landwehr. the officers of the reserve con-
tinued to come in the main from the middle class.so 
The retention of the Landwehr in the form created by von Boyen 
meant to the liberals the preservation of the military system that had 
defeated Napoleon. It signified the system in which militarism had 
been checked by associating the army with the popular forces of the 
•• For the report of the discussion at the Seventh Congress of German Economists, 
see Kolnische Zeitung, May 6. 1862; Tagesbericht, No. 18. Jan. 22, 1862. citing the 
Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 20. Jan. 20; Vierteljahrschrift filr Volkswirtschaft und 
Kulturgeschichte (1864), III. 220-224. 
a. Gutsmuth. op. cit., I. 18. In 1853 some 64 per cent of the staff officers of the 
Landwehr were nobles. but only 37 per cent of the first lieutenants and 23 per cent 
of the second lieutenants. 
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people. It institutionalized the ideals of the great period of social 
and political reform and of military devotion to the fatherland. The 
liberals accused the regular army officers of having deliberately 
weakened the Landwehr since 1814 by neglecting to train the officers 
and by failing to assist it in maintaining efficiency.31 They believed 
that the regular army sought to create an excuse to destroy the Land-
wehr as a separate organization and to bring the reserve troops directly 
under its control. The King's reform program meant to the liberals 
the culmination of this strategy; and they opposed it as an expression 
of Junker militarism certain to cause once again a split between the 
army and the people and to weaken the defences of the state. Only if 
the Landwehr were rejuvenated and treated as an equal, they thought, 
would defence be strengthened. The liberals were not opposd to ex-
panding the numbers called to military service. In fact, they favored it, 
but they did object on military, social and political grounds to the 
destruction of the Boyen type of army. They felt that the King in-
tended thereby to preserve his absolutism, that the conflict over the 
military summed up the conflict along the entire front between liberal-
ism and absolutism. "We have only one conflict and only one question 
of life or death," wrote Deputy von Hoverbeck in January 1862, "upon 
which everything is concentrated, the military question." Deputy 
Fischel had already stated in private in April, 1860, that if the Lower 
House should approve the military bill proposed by the government, 
"the liberal party would be ruined in the country."32 
In the course of the conflict over the military reorganization the 
difference of views about the position of the Landwehr became less im-
portant than that concerning the length of the term of service. Should 
it be three years, or should it be restricted to two? The liberals con-
centrated on this issue as their major means of blocking the drive for 
control by Junker militarism. They did not even make an issue of the 
fact that the army took an oath of allegiance not to the constitution 
but to the King. Although this question would undoubtedly haye 
come up in time, the liberals had for the present enough difficulty in 
trying to win on the simplest and clearest of issues, two years' service 
or three. 
In January, 1862, the semi-official Stern-Zeitung issued the following 
warning: "The alternative that confronts us is absolutely clear: if the 
.. See, among others, Parisius, von Hover beck, I, 173 . 
•• See Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 5. Abg. H., St. B., 1861; III, 1405-06. Von 
Bernhardi, op. cit., III, lIIS. 
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Landtag passes the military budget, our constitutional system triumphs; 
if the opposite occurs it is lost:'33 The liberals paid little heed to this 
warning. They maintained that the King should follow the will of 
the nation as expressed in the reaction of the representatives in the 
Lower House of the Landtag. The state of mind of the vast majority 
of the liberals was reflected in an article in the W ochenschrift des 
National Vereins published soon after Bismarck took office.a! 
The three-year term of service is apparently a dogma to the 
King and in consequence the orthodox and sanctimonious 
, spiritual fathers call any opposition to the reorganization and 
the three-year service "a rebellion against the order of God," 
preach the immaculate sanctity of the new battalions and the 
new officers' positions and proclaim amidst hosannas the satis-
faction of the heavenly armies with the constant increase of the 
earthly ones. Out of the dogma about the three-year service and 
out of the horrible picture of revolution this party [the Con-
servative] has woven the threads with which it knows cleverly 
and brazenly how to guide the King. 
, In another address originating among pastors it even says: 
"the Pruss ian people will ever more clearly respect and feel 
under Your Royal scepter that God sits in the regiment and 
guides all to the best." Thus instead of the usual view of absolu-
tism about divine inspiration God now sits in person in the 
government, and the rule of the King by means of the Bismarck 
ministry is frankly identified with God and rule of the universe! 
Servility was assuredly not pushed farther even under Domitian, 
and such blasphemy is reported as "heartwarming exaggeration" 
and causes no offense at all. 
The question of military reorganization led to complete antagonism 
in the relations between the King and his government on the one hand 
and the Lower House of the Landtag on the other. Faulty handling 
of, the problem on both sides accentuated a fundamental difference 
and brought the issue to a head. After the King had used the mobili-
zation of 1859 caused by the Austro-Italian war as the occasion for be-
ginning the military reform, his ministry submitted a budget the next 
year for continuing the work and promised that a bill on the mili-
tary organi;z:ation would be placed before the Lower House. In 1860 
a bill to that effect was introduced, but consideration of it required 
so much time that the Lower House did not complete its investigation 
and once more passed a provisional military budget while making 
clear that it had not yet decided pro or con about the military re-
.3 Tagesbericht, No. 13, Jan. 16, .1862 . 
.. Nov. 28, 1862, pp. 1132-33. 
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forms as such. The King and his Minister of War continued the re-
organization as if it were to be permanent. Having seen the hostility 
of the Lower House to the military proposal, the government in 1861 
changed its tactics and stated that a new law on military reorganization 
was unnecessary, claiming authority under the law of 1814.35 None-
theless, the disinclination to oppose the liberals in the ministry caused 
the Lower House to approve the funds in the extraordinary budget 
by a very small majority obtained by the votes of all the ministers. 
Once more the House made clear that the approval of funds was pro-
visional and should not be interpreted as final acceptance of the re-
organization. Early in 1862 the ministry was again ready to submit 
a military bill, but as soon as the liberal ministers were ousted von 
Roon declared that a change in the law of 1814 was not necessary. 
The ministry was certainly not straightforward in its dealings with 
the Lower House. It knew that the King was determined to re-
organize the army and to maintain the reform once it had been ac-
complished; but instead of saying so and taking at the beginning a 
legal stand one way or the other and adhering consistently to it, the 
Minister of War tried first one way of assuring the permanence of the 
reforms and then another_ He proposed a new law; but when he saw 
that he could not put it through, he declared the reforms enacted on 
the basis of a law of 1814 to be legal anyway. The Lower House re-
acted with equal lack of courage and consistency. Twice to grant 
funds on a provisional basis for a reform which was becoming per-
manent under its own eyes and about which it knew the King's inten-
tions, and then suddenly to deny those funds and demand reform on 
its own terms, was hardly good politics or even, for that matter, quite 
fair to the King. The two sides muddled into the conflict. 
Early in 1862 the government once more asked for funds in the 
regular budget but without a bill on the military reorganization. By 
this time the House was suspicious and angry, and as the government 
again declared that the law of 1814 gave the King the power to re-
organize and expand the army and that a new law was unnecessary, the 
liberals accused the ministry of violating its promise to submit legisla-
S'The law of 1814 stated in Paragraph Fifteen that "in war time troops may 
be attached to or severed from the parts of the army according to need and all 
units called to service may he enlarged from the ones that remained at home or 
from those growing up:' Die Inn ere' Politik, p. 91. The government also referred 
to the third paragraph of that law which stated that "the size of the standing army 
and of the Landwehr will be determined by the situation of the state at the time." 
Rudolf von Gneist, Die Militiirvorlage von 1892 und der preussische Verfassungskon-
ftikt von 1862 bis 1866 (Berlin, 1893), p. 34. 
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tion on the question and of trying to deprive the Landtag of its share 
of control of military affairs. They planned to refuse to grant the 
extra funds for the military reform and by breaking the budget down 
into smaller units than at present to ~ighten the legislative control 
over military expenditures. They thereby sought to prevent the 
government from being able to retain the reforms by covering the 
cost from concealed items in the budget or from funds transferred from 
one category to another. They aimed to use their constitutional right 
to pass the budget each year as a means of controlling the size of the 
army. This action led the King to dissolve the Lower House and call 
for new elections, the results of which were even more liberal than 
before. 
The liberals were aware of the fact that they were opposing the 
King on the military question, for the latter had made widely known 
his determination to stand or fall by the military reorganization. They 
knew that he regarded the reorganization as entirely within his com-
petence. For a time during the regency the liberal deputy Gneist had 
been a member of a small group which the Regent had invited each 
week to the palace. Later he wrote: 
I gained the impression that the Regent recognized without 
any doubt that personal military duty could be introduced only 
by a formal law, that namely a three-year term of service could 
be changed into a four-year term (as was proposed for a time for 
the cavalry) by a law. But he understood the word organization 
in the sense that had become firmly established among the ad-
ministrative officials, as compassing any change within the 
framework of an administrative branch, thus for example the 
increase in the number of army cadres. In view of Paragraph 
Three of the law of September 3, 1814, he had no doubt about 
his authority to determine annually the peace-time strength of 
the army.a6 
To many people, including liberals, the ruler had asserted that he 
would abdicate rather than recede on this question. He openly ex-
pressed his anger at the Lower House for holding up the final approval 
of the reforms. As early as 1860 he was accusing the deputies in the 
Lower House of lack of patriotism because they would not accept his 
military program. On learning in March of that year that the Lower 
House was still debating over the length of the term of military ser-
vice, William "raised his hands in unwilling amazement" and ex-
claimed, " ... if only the people would not talk about matters which 
•• Von Gneist, op. cit., pp. 83-84. 
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they do not understand." A month later he said to some officers that 
"as long as I live I will never agree to the two-year service," and he was 
already threatening to abdicate. By June, 1860, he regarded all who 
opposed the military reforms as "enemies or revolutionaries, . . . 
because they were seeking to limit the highest attribute of royalty, the 
war command."37 And in June, 1861, Deputy von Ammon wrote his 
friend Kruse of the Kolnische Zeitung, "The King thinks and dreams 
of nothing but soldiers and the day before yesterday said to some 
deputies that the approval of funds for the military in the extra-
ordinary budget is entirely unacceptable. 'What is, remains; the army 
organization should become definitive; that is what I wish and it must 
be done, otherwise I go!' "38 
The liberals knew that personages at court, especially the King's 
reactionary brother, Prince Friedrich Karl, and the military adjutants, 
were stirring the royal anger by conjuring the threat of revolution. 
In March, 1862, detailed reports were published in liberal newspapers 
about the military precautions taken during the winter against the 
possibility of revolution. The liberals had also read the King's state-
ment to the generals of the army at the coronation in the autumn of 
1861. 
The crown has descended upon me from God's hands, and 
when I take it from His holy altar and place it upon my head, I 
receive His blessing that it be preserved for me! The army has 
the duty to defend it, and Prussia's kings have never seen the 
army waver in its loyalty. It has been that which has recently 
saved the King and the Fatherland in most calamitous storms 
and has made him secure. I also count on this loyalty and devo-
tion if I have to call upon it against enemies from whatever side 
they may come. 
The implication for the liberals was clear: "from whatever side they 
may come" included internal as well as external enemies of both the 
crown and the fatherland.39 
The conflict over the military reorganization reached a crisis in 
September, 1862. A commission of the Lower House had for several 
months been deliberating upon the budget for the military and in 
September brought in its report. It recommended striking all funds 
for the reorganization and restoring the budget for the pre-reformed 
army. The House debated the report extensively. A handful of 
.. Von Bernhardi, op. cit., III, 272-317 passim; IV,5. 
8. Heyderholf, op. cit., I, 66. 
I. Horst Kohl, 01'. cit., p. 29. On the liberals' knowledge of the K.ing'. attitude, 
see Parisius, von Hoverbeck, I, 176, II, 8, 65 If; Philippson, 01'. cit., pp. 52,57.59,87. 
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liberals, among them Twesten, von Sybel and von Stavenhagen, ex-
pressed concern over the fact that the conflict about the military 
reorganization was involving the person of the King. These liberals 
argued that the military had actually been reorganized, the new regi-
ments had been created, new officers appointed, the Landwehr broken 
up. They concluded that the work could not be undone. They 
stated further that the King had personally committed himself com-
pletely to these reforms and that the Landtag could not afford to affront 
him by forcing the government to restore the status quo ante. They 
wished to reach a compromise with the government by which in re-
turn for approval of the reorganization the two-year term of service 
would be restored. Von Roon intimated that the compromise might 
be accepted; but the King remained adamant and once more threaten-
ed to abdicate. Since the ministers were always susceptible to pressure 
by this kind of emotional outburst, von Roon rejected the proposed 
compromise. In consequence, the House passed by an overwhelming 
vote the recommendation of the commission, refusing funds for the 
reorganization. If abided by, that resolution would have forced the 
King to restore the army to its earlier form.40 
The Lower House would undoubtedly have accepted a compromise 
on the terms proposed by Twesten and his few colleagues. The actual 
fact was that the funds for 1862 about which the House was voting 
at this late date had in the main already been spent. To have been 
forced to undo the military reform would have weakened Prussia and 
been an affront to the King. The liberals knew that the King had 
blocked the acceptance of the compromise, just as they knew that he 
had been mainly responsible all along for the military program. They 
were determined to defend the rights of the Lower House even at the 
risk, or the certainty, of a break with the crown.41 
The liberals could not comprehend why anyone should be so 
adamant on the question of the three-year term of service when the 
evidence was so largely in favor of the two-year period. They cited the 
fact that from 1833 to 1853 the shorter period had obtained, that two 
kings plus their generals had regarded it as satisfactory. Even if that 
had not been the case, they argued, 
We know very well that of the brave soldiers with whom our 
generals so thoroughly defeated in 1813, 1814 and 1815 a general 
O. On this crisis see Zechlin, pp. 277 If, and the literature which he cites. 
U "It is said that not merely von der Heydt but also von Roon is willing to give 
in, I;mt. that yesterday the King rejected evrything." Twesten to Lipke, Sept. 18, 
1862. Hc::yderhoff •. op. cit., l, 116; see also Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 8,47, 78. 
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like Napoleon and an army like the French scarcely a single one 
had served in peace time longer than a year. The Landwehr 
men had at most been drilled a couple of months and many 
only a couple of weeks_ Now we have no more generals who 
have actually served in war; nonetheless they think themselves 
much wiser than Scharnhorst and BlUcher ever were. So wise 
are these gentlemen that they do not doubt for a moment that a 
seventeen-year-old cadet can enter the line as officer and that the 
former junior in high school can easily be trained to be a re-
serve and Landwehr officer in one year's time. All other young 
people are so awkward and stupid that they must be drilled and 
maneuvered and must stand watch at least three years before 
they can be used as soldiers in the field. Let anyone under-
stand that who can!42 
Neither von Roon nor Bismarck had any particular conviction 
about the term of service. As early as 1859 von Roon had been willing 
to accept the shorter perio?, and in the September crisis of 1862 he 
proposed to accede on this point in return for liberal concessions on 
others. As for Bismarck, as soon as he became Minister President he 
frankly told liberal leaders that in time he would win the King to 
accept the two-year term of service, that with a corresponding number 
of re-enlisted soldiers he thought it militarily preferable. The atti-
tude of both, however, can be summed up in Bismarck's assertion that 
he would support the King even if the latter wished a ten-year term of 
service.43 They were frankly carrying out the King's orders, no matter 
what, until they were able to win him to their way of thinking. 
As for the Conservatives, they were jubilant over the proposals for 
military reform. Early in 1860 their leaders handed the ruler a 
memorandum expressing their loyalty, approving the military reforms 
and offering to put them through for him, and saying that one could 
not govern with liberals. They saw an opportunity to regain power, 
and they were undoubtedly growing in influence. By January, 1861, 
a Berlin correspondent to the Zeitung fur N orddeutschland noted that 
"the military party has won such overwhelming influence at court that 
retreat is out of the question."44 
Under the circumstances, prospects of cooling off the King and 
persuading him to accept anything short of a fight to the finish seemed 
remote. The height of his temperature may be gauged by a letter 
which he wrote in August, 1862, to an old liberal acquaintance, von 
•• spart im Frieden. See also Gneist, op. cit., pp. 40-41; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, 
II, 61. . 
•• Zechlin, pp. 278-80, 291, 325, 334, 354 . 
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Saucken-J ulienfelde, who tried to bring him to comprehend the posi-
tion of the Lower House on the military question. The King refused to 
listen to him and replied with the following letter, in which one can 
still hear the pen stab the paper and the ink explode. 
Who started the conflict? Have I not laid the reorganiza-
tion of the army before the Landtag with the completest possible 
frankness, a reorganization which has occurred in an entirely 
legal and constitutional way? Does the constitution prescribe 
the number of battalions and the number of annual recruits and 
horses? Does it prescribe the number of officers and under-
officers? No! What does it prescribe? The term of service and 
the division of the recruits into the line and the reserve. For this 
division the legal change has already been laid before the Land-
tag in the session of 1859-60, and in addition the constitutional 
approval of the money for the reorganization was requested. 
What has the Second Chamber done? It has attacked and 
changed the reorganization through persons who understood 
nothing of the matter; and when the House ran into a cul de sac 
it only granted the funds for the reorganization provisionally. 
In the following year the House took a similar course and again 
finally approved the funds in an extraordinary budget. During 
two years the revolutionary and democratic press has not ceased 
to scatter lie after lie about the reorganization and· the financial 
situation until the people at last believed that we were on the 
point of bankruptcy and had an unbearable budget. This had 
to precede the new plan of operations of the democrats, namely 
to deny the funds. In order to meet a justified complaint I can-
celled almost four millions [Thalers], the excess tax, a conces-
sion which very harmfully affected the army even if it was only 
to be temporary and only on this account acceptable. But even 
though this concession threw the opposition forces off the track 
for a moment, it only spurred them on to be ever more shameless 
and unreasonable in their action against me and my creation, 
so that we have now reached a turning point. 
Then, continued the King, since the ministry was in full agreement 
with him, since the reorganization was approved "by all thinking 
military, by all unprejudiced thinking men," and since the funds were 
available without any undue burden on the land, why did the op-
position continue? Why did it demand concessions? 
For absolutely no other reasons than that the desired con-
cessions had to extend to objects which are intended to destroy 
the striking power, the military spirit and the training of the 
army. War to the death against the monarch and his standing 
army has been vowed, and in order to reach that goal the Pro-
gressivists and democrats and ultra liberals scorn no means, and 
indeed with rare consequence and deep conviction. . . . The 
shortening of the term of service is demanded so that firm, well 
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disciplined military training, the effects of which will hold dur-
ing the long period of leave, shall not be given the soldier. The 
under-officers shall become officers, not as everyone could in 
Prussia since 1808 by passing one and the same examination, but 
without proving this equality of cultural level, so that a schism 
will develop in the officers' corps and dissatisfaction will slowly 
creep into them and the democrats will be able to develop an 
officers' caste of their own which because they are neither train-
ed nor steeled in their views to stand loyally by the throne are 
to be won for the revolution. Since loyalty and self-sacrifice for 
King and throne are to be expected from the present officers and 
through them to be transferred to the troops, therefore the 
officers' class is slandered in every possible way, and then one 
wonders that the officers are angry? And even censures them 
for this II 
"A peoples' army back of Parliament." That is the solution 
revealed since Frankfurt am Main [he referred to a speech by 
Schulze-Delitzsch] to which I counter with the watchword: 
"A disciplined army that is also the people in arms, back of 
the King and war lord." 
Between these two watchwords no agreement is possible. 
The Lower House opposition had burned its bridges in refusing 
the military funds, the King said, and he had done likewise; he 
would make no more concessions. They would be beneath the dignity 
of the crown. He warned von Saucken-J ulienfelde and his friends to 
keep watch or they would be drawn in tow by the revolution.45 
The King was convinced that in fighting for his military reforms 
he was defending his position as monarch. He identified the main-
tenance of his military authority with the welfare of his country. He 
put the struggle on a moral and a patriotic plane: he and persons 
who agreed with him were right, all others were revolutionaries. He 
misinterpreted a speech by Schulze-Delitzsch out of all reason, finding 
in it convincing evidence that the Lower House planned to take the 
army away from him, ruin it, and transform it into an instrument of 
parliament. He had such strange conceptions of how the conflict over 
the military arose and of who had made concessions that one can-
not imagine the possibility of straightening him out on facts. He 
claimed the dropping of the extra tax as a concession from him; 
actually, the tax expired and the Landtag did not renew it. The 
military budget was somewhat reduced in 1862, but the fact was that 
the Lower House had not passed any budget at all. The King as-
sumed that the military reorganization was legal; the Lower House 
to Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 65-68; see a letter of similar content to Vincke-
Olbendorf in January, 1863, in Briefe, Reden und Schriften, II, 43-45. 
108 / Prussia 1858-1864 
disputed the point. The King assumed that the military reform was 
permanent; the Lower House denied the statement. The King re-
garded the existing organization of society as a model and the army 
as the expression of that society; the liberals denounced the feudal 
caste structure and wished to transform it into a free society. The 
King thought of a people's army as one commanded by an absolute 
monarch, with officers chosen from the upper classes, especially the 
nobility, and trained to be a military caste. The liberals wanted a 
people's army devoid of caste and representative of a free society. The 
King had a feeling, not unwarranted, that this liberalism was endanger-
ing his authority, and he clung to the old-style army as his main sup-
port. Behind the conflict over the military reforms was a social con-
flict between two different sets of cultural values. The liberals tried, 
as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, to gloss over this fact, and 
the King undoubtedly misinterpreted events and exaggerated the 
danger; but, in last analysis, being sensitive to the threat to his posi-
tion, he correctly recognized the ultimate danger to absolutism from 
parliamentary control over military affairs. The issues were all to 
come to a head in the course of the constitutional conflict. 
Agreement about the military reforms could well have been 
reached even on the King's terms if the government had offered an 
adequate quid pro quo. The liberals were particularly angry be-
cause the military sacrifices demanded by the government were not 
counter-balanced by liberal reforms. "Not even the communal and 
the county governments have been reformed," declared Deputy Wal-
deck, "and as long as we have the feudal vestiges in these regions I 
shall never be able to reconcile it with my conscience to help strengthen 
these feudal remains by strengthening the caste of officers in the 
standing army without Landwehr and Landwehr officers." The 
Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung and the National Zeitung reacted 
in the same way. If the government wanted military reform, let it 
assure the public that it was not aiming thereby merely to strengthen 
the Old Regime; let it prove by deeds that it was interested also in de-
veloping the economic and social resources of the land and in de-
veloping the constitution in a liberal sense. Let it reform the House of 
Lords so that liberal legislation could be passed. "If a thorough re-
form of the House of Lords is not allowed, or if some prospect for a 
quick forward action in the German question is not initiated, the 
Lower House will not impose this burden [the military reform] upon 
th~ country," wrote a Berlin correspondent to the Grenzboten; and 
Deputy von Carlowitz in May, 1861, openly stated in the Lower House 
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that if the Prussian government would take the initiative expected of 
it in unifying Germany, he would vote in favor of the item in the 
military budget which he was the opposing. Indeed he would vote 
for other items; indeed "I would approve still more." For the present 
policy, he declared, our present army is sufficient.46 The liberals 
could have been won to support the military reforms if the King had 
been willing to initiate action and achieve results. With the King's 
slow and cautious approach to things, postponing action to some time 
in the future, and with liberal ministers urging upon their supporters, 
"Do not press," the liberal representatives of a people eager for state 
and national reforms could hardly be expected to add the huge burden 
of what seemed to them useless military expense. Bismarck was to 
try the other method in the question of national unification, that of 
action; and he was ultimately to succeed. 
To the Prince Regent the problem of financing the military re-
organization seemed simple. "In a monarchy like ours," he wrote to 
Minister von Bonin on November 24, 1859, "the military point of 
view should never be curtailed by financial or political-economic ones; 
for the European position of the state upon which so much else de-
pends is based upon it."47 An increase of nearly 8,000,000 Thalers in 
the military budget seemed to him a matter about which there should 
be no controversy. The phrase "the European position of the state" 
justified any sacrifice. William's ideal of civic virtue remained that 
of the War of Liberation, when every person and every interest in 
Prussia was subordinated to the purpose of military defence. 
The government took the position that the increase in military 
funds could be supplied without undue sacrifice and pointed to the 
excellent condition of Prussian state finances as evidence. It claimed 
that the state had a smaller tax burden than Austria and Spain and a 
decidedly smaller one than Great Britain, France, Netherlands, and 
Belgium. It showed that the total state expenditures per head were 
lower than in any of the other countries except Russia and Portugal 
and that Prussia covered these expenditures by its income, whereas the 
majority of the other states did so in part by loans. It claimed that the 
cost of raising the state funds was lower, that the percentage of funds 
for other genuine state administration was higher than in the other 
states, and that even after the reorganization the military cost absorbed 
•• Abg. R., St. B., May 27, 1861; III, 1405-06. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, 
Dec. 4, 1861, Sept. II, 1862. National Zeitung, Feb. I, 1861. Berliner Biirsen Zeitung, 
Jan. 28, 1861. Tagesbericht, No.5, Jan. 7, 1862. Abg., R., St. B., 1861, III, 1476 . 
•• Erich Marcks, Kaiser Wilhelm 1. (Munich and Leipzig, 1918), p. 179. 
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a smaller part of the net funds than in any of the other great powers.iS 
Therefore, the government concluded, Prussia could well afford the 
reform of the army. 
The ministry recognized that some tax reform would be necessary 
to cover the additional military costs, and it concentrated attention 
upon the land tax.49 It justified the reform of the tax with arguments 
which showed a better historic than prophetic sense. 
The land tax has been proposed especially as a source of in-
come for war needs, for in case of war the burden must be over-
whelmingly laid on the landowner. The indirect taxes, out of 
which the state at present derives a large share of its income, dry 
up in war, the industrial activity declines, capital is cautious, 
and there remains finally the return from the land which can be 
tapped. This was, alas, clearly revealed in the unfortunate year 
1807, when the losses which had to be made up by deliveries in 
transport livestock, grain and other war needs solely in the pro-
vince of Prussia amounted to 150,000,000 Thalers. In order to 
avoid such calamities and to establish a military organization 
which can prevent similar unfortunate events it is desirable to 
do what is necessary in time and for that purpose to draw 
especially upon the land in order to prevent the landowners 
from being exposed in the future to similar spoliation. 
To regard a land tax as the main financial reliance for military 
purposes in a country which was rapidly becoming industrialized may 
seem out of focus; but the King wholeheartedly supported the tax 
reform, and solely through his pressure it became law. He needed for 
his military reforms the 10,000,000 Thalers a year which it was to bring 
in. While the bill passed the Lower House, with opposition from some 
liberals as well as from the Conservatives, it was overwhelmingly reject-
ed by the Conservative Upper House. In order to put it through that 
body in 1861, the King had to use his personal pressure. Because of 
the necessity for new assessments the tax could not be levied before 
1865. 
In 1860, that is, before the reform, the land tax preserved the char-
acteristics of its historic past. It was unevenly assessed among the 
provinces as well as within a single province. Many large estates and 
peasant holdings were exempt from it or paid only a small sum, where-
as others were taxed in varying amounts. The difference in treatment 
depended upon whether the piece of land preserved a historic legal 
•• Die lnnere Politik, p. 71. See also statements in the Lower House by Finance 
Minister von Patow. Abg. H., St. B., Jan. 21, May 27, 1861; I, 26, III, 1409 . 
•• Die lnnere Politik, pp. 81-82. 
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right to exemption from this tax, often also upon whether the owner 
had succeeded in having his property dropped from the tax records. 
The state administered some twenty main systems of land taxation, 
more than one hundred forms of land tax, and so many kinds of build-
ings tax that one could scarcely count them. The provincial differ-
ences were evident from the fact that of the net tax return the land 
tax produced the following percentages: province of Prussia, 6.14; 
Posen, 4.93; Pomerania, 6.21; Silesia, 10.53; Brandenburg, 7.75; Saxony, 
8.97; Westphalia, 10.0; and the Rhineland, 8.69. The provinces of 
Silesia, Saxony, Westphalia and the Rhineland had to make up for 
the low returns from the others. If one added the taxation of the 
towns, the disparity would have been even more pronounced. Differ-
ences among counties were extreme, for many of them had been 
exempt from the land tax. Thus the county of Lauenburg paid in 
land and buildings taxes after the reform 403.2 per cent more, the 
county of Landeshut 41.2 per cent less, than before. Fifty-five counties 
had to pay 100 per cent more after the reform, whereas ninety had to 
return less. 50 
The principle of equalization of the land tax throughout the state 
had been included in the financial edict of October 27, 1810, under 
pressure of the military defeat by Napoleon. As soon as Prussia had 
recovered after 1815, the land-owning nobility had made certain that 
the principle was ignored. It was reasserted in the revolutionary 
period of 1849-49 but again succumbed to Conservative domination 
in the 1850s. Military need, this time during peace, once more brought 
up the question in 1859; and a half century after the principle had 
first been legally established, it became a reality. The difference in 
outcome lay solely in the fact that the King needed the money for 
military reforms. The Conservatives could not enjoy both the expan-
sion of the military and low, privileged taxation. Universal military 
service entailed the elimination of tax privilege in favor of equaliza-
tion of financial responsibility to support the state. Those with a 
historic legal claim to tax privilege should be compensated, according 
to the bill of 1859, for the abolition of this right; but they should 
henceforth pay their due shares of taxes like everyone else. 
The Conservatives condemned the land tax from the standpoint 
of national economy as the worst tax one could have. It measured 
movable and immovable capital and land property, they said, by the 
same standard; it taxed a single object of property; it imposed a 
~ Meitzen, op. cit., I, 20. 
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special burden upon a single class for the support of a general need; 
it used in the present the resources of land property which should be 
regarded as the real state treasury, the reserve for cases of state calamity; 
it amounted to a tax on capital, and could be called a form of con-
fiscation. The tax would cripple many peasants, always an object of 
special concern for the Conservatives, and ruin many landowners. 
The Conservatives feared that administrative difficulties would be in-
surmountable. The difficulties of assessment particularly alarmed 
them, for they apprehended that this work might become subject to 
politics and might arouse much bad feeling among the natives in 
the Eastern provinces, above all between peasants and large estate 
owners. The old and favored argument of "Let well enough alone" 
was once more advanced.51 
The government bill contained a proposal to indemnify the large 
landowners, but not the peasants, who would bear a major loss from 
the new tax. The Conservative leader Wagener opposed this clause 
as unfair to the peasants and likely or even sure to cause hostility be-
tween peasants and large estate-owners. Nonetheless, as the commis-
sion reporter in the Lower House correctly stated, the House of Lords 
would not accept the bill without the clause. The gentlemen pre-
ferred cash to preserving the appearance of equality of treatment. 
They did not believe in equality anyway, certainly not at the expense 
of their pocket books. The liberal deputy Schulze-Delitzsch used the 
opportunity to state that the approval of compensation by the Con-
servatives was no way to preserve the moral position in society of the 
nobility. "A political party" (like the Conservative), he said, "which 
has always participated in the development of our institutions solely 
in order to defend its caste privileges and prejudices at the expense 
of the common welfare is naturally inclined to attribute similar mo-
tives to other parties because it itself is not aware of any others."52 
That the criticism made by Schulze-Delitzsch was felt by others to 
be justified was evident from the argument given by the very right-wing 
member of the Constitutional party, Bethmann-Hollweg. "Higher 
political considerations cause me," he said in the Lower House in 
March, 1861, "to overlook in this matter special doubts which I have 
raised against the land tax bill. The higher political consideration is 
that I regard the land tax legislation as the first prerequisite for restor-
ing to the large landowners their position in the country, particularly 
.. Tagesbericht, No. 70, March 23, 1861. Abg. H., St. B., March 5, 6, 9, 1861; I, 
335-37, 357, 443. 
"Ibid., March 5, 9, 1861; I, 335-37, 439, 443. Ibid., May 28, 1861; III, 1425. 
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with respect to the small landowners [the peasantry]. I regard this 
restoration as necessary so that the large landowners will in the future 
be equal to the political responsibility without which I regard a satis-
factory development of our municipal and county constitutions, and 
with these the entire political life of our nation, as impossible."53 The 
remarks had the stately dignity of a true aristocrat. They continued 
the finest ideal of true nonpartisan conservatism, the desire to be a 
leader not for the defence of egoistic interests but for the general good. 
While the Conservatives were totally against the land tax reform, 
the liberals were somewhat divided between those in the heavily taxed 
provinces favoring reform and those in the lightly taxed ones disliking 
or even openly opposing the government proposal. Deputy Behrend 
wished the matter settled once and for all so that the liberals could 
join forces wholeheartedly and one of the provincial differences be-
tween East and West could be overcome. 54 Actually the question did 
not cause as much trouble between the two main branches of the 
liberal movement as Behrend implied. The land tax differential was 
merely symptomatic of the wider range of cultural distinctions between 
Eastern and Western Prussia, and some of the areas of strongest sup-
port of the reform lay in the East. The argument put forth by Deputy 
Gneist in favor of the measure had more weight with the liberals. 
It is a question of giving our state, which still shows traces 
of being a conglomerate of former pieces, the character of a 
definitely unified state. This will be achieved first by means of 
the unified land tax. In a time in which an incompletely im-
plemented constitution has loosened so much in the state, it is a 
question of establishing our unity on a firm material foundation, 
in order now to give Prussia a consistent position in Germany 
around which new forces can crystallize without danger. 55 
The issue of tax reform showed the interdependence of the parts 
of the liberal program. The government bill stipulated that the 
assessment commissions for the new land and buildings tax should be 
chosen by the provincial and county assemblies. Since these assemblies 
were at present overwhelmingly dominated by owners of large landed 
estates, espcially of noble estates, the liberals had to be assured before-
hand that the government intended to introduce a bill to reform these 
assemblies.56 
·'Ibid., March 9, 1861; I, 439 . 
• 4 Abg. R., St. B., March 6, 1861; I, 355·56. 
··Ibid., March 8, 1861; I, 423-24. 
O. See Ibid., March 6, 1861; I, 355. Ibid., March 9, 1861; I, 435·36. 
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The fact that the Conservatives were enthusiastic about military 
reforms, more military discipline, more officers' positions for the 
nobility, but decidedly averse to paying taxes for the support of these 
services aroused deep resentment among the liberals. The latter 
realized that in this attitude the Conservatives were manifesting scorn 
for the so-called vulgarity of commercial life. The liberals knew that 
they were paying largely for the maintenance of a social and political 
regime which blocked freedom and progress. In the last half century 
taxes had increased heavily on townsmen but not on the land. As 
Deputy Riedel asserted in the Lower House in 1861, 
Since the introduction of the land tax over the course of cen· 
turies the entire weight of the public burden has gradually been 
shifted more and more from landowners to the other classes of 
the people. In recent times not a decade has passed in which 
new taxes and increases of the old taxes have not been imposed 
on the non.landowning elements of the people. Most of these 
taxes are so well laid out that they have enjoyed a natural 
increase in returns with the increase in population, economic 
activity, income and property, and have become even more pro-
ductive for the government. The land tax alone has not been 
changed in fifty years, in other regions in one hundred, in still 
others in one hundred and fifty and in many regions in two 
hundred years and longer, and it has been left so untouched that 
the gentlemen have the illusion that it is not even a tax but 
merely a rent. 
Deputy Riedel regarded tax reform not as primarily an economic but 
as a moral issue.57 He and other liberals showed anger especially over 
the existing discrimination. A writer in the Frankfurter Journal in 
1861 asserted that in Hagen a poor laborer who formerly paid one 
Thaler in tax now had to pay three. The refusal of the nobility in 
the old provinces to pay taxes, the writer said, sounded to him like 
scorn and offered no proof of patriotism and no sense of justice.1I8 
The heavy tax burden weighed particularly on the supporters of 
liberalism. Angry protests came to the Landtag from all parts of Prus-
sia and from all groups of the population, except those still enjoying 
the privileged position of the Old Regime. Chamber of commerce 
reports loudly denounced the tax burden and prophesied ruin. 
Salaried employees and the lower middle·class blamed the tax pressure 
for depriving them of the opportunity to save for their old age or for 
investment which might improve their economic situation. Industry 
.. Ibid., March 5, 1861; I, 34l1 . 
•• Tagesbericht, No. 64, March 16, 1861. 
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wanted tax reduction to lower costs of production and to improve its 
competitIve positIOn. These were all well-known arguments against 
taxation at any time. The significant fact was the unanimity and the 
intensity of feeling.IID 
What added insult to injury for the liberals was the way in which 
the Conservative Junkers were able to avoid paying the share of the 
taxes for which they were already responsible. In the first place the 
Prussians paid nearly twice as much in indirect as in direct taxes, a fact 
that imposed a major burden upon the poor.60 In the second place, 
the class and income taxes were so allocated as to strike the lower in-
come groups, and the government kept raising the percentage paid. 
In the third place, and above all, the method of assessment enabled 
the Conservatives to transfer much of the tax burden to others. The 
system showed again the advantage to the Junkers of controlling the 
Kreistag and the office of Landrat. 
A tax commission was created annually in each county and in each 
town not belonging to a county for the purpose of assessing the class 
and income taxes. The commission was presided over by the Landrat 
or by a commissioner specially appointed by the regional administra-
tion. In the counties the commission was composed of representatives 
of the Kreistag. In the towns not belonging to a county it was made 
up of representatives of the citizens; but, since most of the towns were 
incorporated within the county government, the system of assessment 
in the counties was by far the more important. The Junkers used their 
power in the Kreistag to select a tax-assessment commission which 
shifted the burden to peasants and townsmen. One can understand 
why the issue of reform of county government was regarded as crucia1.61 
The results of the assessment were evident from a circular issued in 
1860 by the Minister of Finance. The rural areas paid relatively less 
tax than the townspeople. For the current year, of an income tax of 
3,645,000 Thalers the rural districts paid one-third, although they had 
more than two-thirds of the population. One person in 157 in the rural 
areas paid income tax, whereas one in thirty-one did so in the towns. 
(Income tax began on incomes of 1,000 Thalers). The circular stated 
that the greater number of wealthy persons in the towns was in part 
•• References are so numerous in contemporary newspapers, chamber of com-
merce reports, Landtag speeches, etc., that it is superfluous to document them here. 
e. See Berliner Borsen Zeitung, July 27, 1861. It was estimated in that paper 
that the Prussians paid 9 florins, 25 kronen per capita. of which 3 florins. 2 kronen 
came from direct taxes and 5 florins. 12 kronen from indirect. 
01 See the petition from Cologne as reported in the Ko/nische Zeitung, April 4. 
1861. 
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responsible for this difference; but it added that many peasants were 
put under the class tax who should be placed in the lower brackets of 
the income tax, and that the big landowners "by and large are assessed 
relatively and in part considerably lower . . . than the peasant 
proprietors in the higher brackets of the class tax." The circular 
further asserted 
... that in the estimation of the taxable income of the large 
landowners that which the owners use from their own economy 
for their families, as well as the value of free dwelling, and that 
which is applied from the estate to permanent improvements and 
therefore to increasing its capital value have not been considered 
at all or at only their partial value. How unjust such a pro-
cedure is becomes clearest by a comparison with town dwellers 
who pay income tax. They have to cover all expenses of living, 
including house rent, out of their income; but although they 
cannot use a part of their income for these purposes and have to 
save capital, they are not allowed to deduct these sums in esti-
mating their income tax. In some assessment districts for the 
current year the assessment for income tax has declined in com-
parison with that of last year, and the reason is to be found not 
in the removal or death of payers of large taxes, but in a 
thorough going tax reduction especially for the landowners for 
which the highly unfavorable crop is given as justification.62 
The criticism was equally applicable to any country in which agri-
culture paid an income, or,at the lower level, a class tax; but in Prussia 
the inequality was particularly felt. When in 1868 Hamburg came to 
consider joining the North German Confederation, a commission was 
appointed by the Senate and the Citizens Assembly to consider eco-
nomic and financial questions in connection therewith. It reported 
that iQ comparison with Hamburg in Prussia the higher income 
classes were by virtue of the assessment procedure less burdened, that 
the middle and lower income classes were much more burdened and 
that far wider circles were made to pay taxes. Prussia retained the 
class system of taxation of an autocratic government just emerging 
from the Old Regime.63 
The government proposed in 1861 to increase the business tax in 
certain instances and to change it in others. The details do not need 
to be described; the effect, as stated by government officials in defend-
ing the proposal, was to increase the tax burden on commercial under-
8. See c. J. Bergius, "Die Personal -, Vermogens-, und Einkommensteuer in 
Preussen," Vierteljahrschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Kulturgeschichte (1870), pp. 
62-73; Meitzen, op. cit., III, 39 . 
• s Bergius, op. cit., pp. 72-73. 
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takings. The plan caused an outburst of lamentation. The proper 
title for this law, declared Deputy Scholler, should have been "Authori-
ty for the Finance Minister to Raise Several Millions more than Pre-
viously according to Need or according to Arbitrary Wish." The 
bill passed by a vote of 153 to 104, with many prominent liberals voting 
against it. The Conservatives enjoyed the show. Deputy Wagener 
remarked: "I believe that we must help you obtain this law; because 
you so kindly helped us gain the land tax my friends and I will vote 
for this law."64 
Objections were raised, although not to the same extent, against 
the twenty-five per cent increase imposed in 1859 on the milling and 
slaughter tax. This tax was levied in those towns which were not 
subject to the income tax, and while the number of towns falling in 
that category had declined from 132 in 1820 when the tax was im-
posed to seventy-seven in 1862, the list of those still paying it included 
almost all the large cities. The tax was unpopular under any cir-
cumstances and was retained solely because of the difficulty of finding 
an alternative. It obstructed commerce, placed an especially heavy 
burden upon the poorer classes, and was conducive to smuggling and 
other forms of illegality.65 That unpopular military reforms should 
require a twenty-five per cent increase in an unpopular tax just as the 
depression of 1857 was ebbing did not make either of them attractive 
to the liberal public. 
The government made a few concessions with respect to taxes. 
After three years, in 1862, it agreed to abolish as no longer needed 
the twenty-five per cent increase in the milling and slaughter tax. In 
1861, 1862 and 1863 it put through legislation, readily accepted by the 
liberals, reducing and rendering uniform throughout the state the 
taxes on mining, removing iron mining from a special tax and placing 
it under the terms of the general business tax. These changes brought 
financial relief to the mine owners and equalized the competitive tax 
position of mining in the various parts of the state. While the mining 
interests expressed great pleasure over each law, the relief came so 
slowly that they continued to be hostile to the government.66 None-
•• See the discussion in Abg. H., St. B., April 9, 10, 11, 1861, Vol. III. For a sum· 
mary of the business tax system see von Roenne, op. cit. (1884), IV, 812 If., and 
Meitzen, op. cit., III, 30-33 . 
•• Meitzen, op. cit., III, 34-35 . 
•• Von Roenne, op. cit. (1884), IV, 818 If.; see the discussion, especially by von 
Beughem, in the Lower House on March 18, 1861, St. B., Vol. I; on the tax situation 
see also articles in Berliner Borsen Zeitung, Feb. 12, Feb. 20, March 5, 1861, and in 
Bremer Handelsblatt, March 9, 1861. 
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theless, the trend in taxation was definitely upward. The reductions 
were of minor significance, except in the case of mining. With land 
taxes increased. even though more equitably levied, with business taxes 
higher for many lines, with class and income taxes increased, the 
liberals were angry at the cost of government and blamed it on the 
military. 
How much weight should be given the complaints is difficult to say. 
The liberal Minister of Finance von Patow denied that the tax burden 
was excessive.67 Certainly the extraordinary economic development 
of the years after the crisis of 1857 cast doubt on the validity of the 
complaints. The economy was so flourishing that in the constitutional 
conflict the liberals defeated themselves. By making so much money 
and turning in so much revenue to the state, they enabled the govern-
ment to carryon in spite of the resistance of the Lower House and to 
cover even the excessive expenditures entailed by two highly un-
popular wars. 
The irony of the situation arose from the fact that the liberal 
deputies were being asked for increased taxes while being unable to 
put through any reforms to counter balance the effect. Certainly it 
was an anomalous position for deputies enthusiastically elected for the 
purpose of liberalizing the entire state to have to face the public again 
without having accomplished a single popular constructive reform, 
with having to their credit the dubious achievement of approving, 
even though provisionally, an unpopular military reform directed by 
its sponsors against liberalism, and with having sanctioned increased 
taxes to pay for his military reform. One can understand the mood 
with which the deputies returned to their constituencies. One can 
perceive why the voters in the elections of 1861 and 1862 eliminated 
the right-wing conciliatory liberals in favor of more aggresliive and 
determined leaders . 
•• Abg. H., St. B., May 27, 1861; III, 1409. 
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IN 1860 the pwblem of national unification W"'. in i" 
modern phase, over a half-century old. In 1848 it had been subjected 
to a serious attempt at solution. The beginning of the New Era 
aroused the Prussian liberals to renewed hope for the achievement of 
the goal, and the Italian unification in 1859-60 revived their belief 
that within the foreseeable future a similar success should be possible 
for their own nation. The liberals took the initiative in pressing this 
issue upon their own state and joined forces with colleagues in the 
other German states for the struggle. They made the issue an integral 
part of their program of remaking Prussian and German culture in 
the pattern of freedom and compelled the indifferent, lukewarm, 
theoretically interested and hostile elements to respond in one way or 
another. Four separate social forces interested in the question need 
to be considered: the King, the liberals, the Conservatives and Bis-
marck. The reaction of each will be considered in this chapter. 
The Political Interest 
In theory the King approved of German unity at some time in the 
future, but he never expected to live long enough to see it. In his 
program of November, 1858, he had written: 
Prussia must stand in friendly relations with all great powers 
without giving itself over to foreign influences and without bind-
ing its hands too early by treaties. Friendly relations with all 
other powers are equally offered. In Germany Prussia must 
make moral conquests by wise legislation of its own, by elevating 
all moral elements and by adopting elements of unification like 
the Zollverein, which nevertheless must be subjected to reform. 
The world must know that Prussia is ready everywhere to pro-
tect right. A firm, consequent, and, when it must be, energetic 
119 
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demeanor in politics combined with wisdom and circumspection 
must create for Prussia the political prestige and the position of 
power which it is unable to attain by its material power alone. 
In the formulation of that statement the King seemed to approve 
the general idea of moral conquest in Germany. That he compre-
hended the import of his assertion appears in the light of subsequent 
events extremely doubtful. His promise that "Prussia is ready to de-
fend right everywhere" is rather inclusive; but since he also called for 
coupling "energetic demeanor," when it was necessary, with "wisdom 
and circumspection" and since he refused to bind his hands by treaty 
too early, one could anticipate that in the German question very little 
if anything would be accomplished on his initiative. 
During the entire New Era vague statements and timid action con-
tinued to characterize the King's policy toward German unity. At 
the opening of the Landtag in 1860 the ruler declared that "the wish for 
reform of the Constitution of the German Confederation has recently 
been expressed again. Prussia will always regard itself as the natural 
exponent of the objective to raise and bind together the glories of the 
nation by appropriate institutions and in general effectively to further 
the totality of German interests by measures of truly practicalsignific-
ance." Such self-satisfied assertions committed him to nothing more 
than "measures of truly practical significance"; and since each of the 
three words, "truly," "practical," and "significance" is capable of 
diverse interpretation, an ardent advocate of national unification could 
derive from this speech the assurance of nothing. 
At the beginning of the Landtag session in January, 1861, the King 
announced that he had been endeavoring to bring about a revision of 
the military organization of the German confederation and expressed 
confidence in the outcome, "since all German governments and all 
German tribes recognize unanimous cooperation as the most urgent 
need of our entire fatherland." -When the Landtag opened in January, 
1862, the King was still talking in generalities, of greater vagueness 
even than those of his predecessors. He reported "to my regret" that 
his proposals for reform of the military organization of the Confedera-
tion had not reached "a satisfactory conclusion." He was therefore 
trying to improve conditions by agreements among the separate states 
for "a greater similarity in military matters" and announced that an 
agreement had been made with the little state of Saxony-Coburg-Gotha. 
The King added, 
The need of a general reform of the German constitution 
has recently been expressly recognized in circles of the German 
governments. True to the national traditions of Prussia my 
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government will endeavor constantly to work in favor of such 
reforms which by corresponding to the real power relations will 
unite more energetically the forces of the German people and 
place Prussia in the position to further with increased pressure 
the interests of the entire fatherland.1 
The King did not compose these addresses himself, but they had 
to suit him. It can be assumed that the assertions expressed his own 
thinking, especially on the vital question of national unity. From 
the statement of 1862, again one must have inferred, and correctly so, 
that the King would do nothing. His reference to Prussia as a nation 
must have implied indifference to the hopes of the German nation. 
Derived from the Eighteenth Century or earlier, it showed complete 
ignorance of the ideals and aspirations of German nationalism. To 
speak of his country's traditional policy of working for reform of the 
German confederation promised even less, when one recalled the 
names of the ancestors to whom he was most devoted, Frederick the 
Great and that arch-particularist and conservative, Frederick William 
III. When he posed "the real power relations" as the standard for 
reorganization among the German states, he opened the way either to 
endless negotiations or to the exercise of superior authority by Prussia; 
and since the second policy could be ruled out, one could assume that 
the first would be followed. The King's wish to set Prussia in a posi-
tion to "further the interests of the entire fatherland with increased 
emphasis" can scarcely have evoked an enthusistic response from those 
states that had refused to make any agreement even for improving the 
Confederation's military defence. 
The statement by Foreign Minister von Bernstorff in the Lower 
House in February, 1862, may be taken as confirmation of the in-
active attitude. The Foreign Minister spoke of the desirability of 
forming a smaller union of German states (by "smaller" he meant 
the exclusion of Austria), with an executive which would exercise the 
supreme military command, would conduct foreign affairs, and would 
have a parliament composed of representatives from the individual 
states. These reforms were considered desirable. The minister ignor-
ed the need for economic unity and for a central authority to further 
national economic interests. Nor did he offer any assurance of a 
popular national parliament representing not merely the German 
states but the German people. The lack of precision about the way 
in which the representatives were to be selected left doubt as to 
whether they should be diplomatic representatives, as was the case 
1 For the ruler's statements see Horst Kohl, op. cit., pp. 5-6, 12, 22, 33·34. 
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already with the despised Bundestag of the Confederation, or should 
be selected from the state parliaments by the deputies themselves in co-
operation with the governments, or should be specially elected by the 
people of the separate states. The minister's remarks left matter once 
more in the air, a condition for which the King had a special affinity. 
In one respect William was prepared to act. He was willing at any 
favorable opportunity to continue one of the traditions of his house, 
that of absorbing small German states. In speaking to the liberal von 
Bernhardi in 1860, the ruler was decidedly of the view that "the small 
German states must be absorbed in Prussia; he scorned the petty rulers," 
so von Bernhardi reported, "and thought that they would gain in their 
personal position by becoming subordinate to a big state."2 He 
would have treated them in the same manner that his father and 
brother had treated those who had been fortunate enough to be ab-
sorbed into Prussia in 1815. The princes would have been given a 
privileged place in the governmental assemblies and allowed to serve 
in the Hohenzollern army and bureaucracy. 
The King particularly despised one of his princely colleagues, the 
ruler of Kurhesse. This ruler had violated the constitution of 1831 
and restored absolute rule. His mistreatment of his subjects was 
notorious; Kurhesse compared favorably in that respect with the Man-
teuffel regime in Prussia which in 1858 the King had ousted. William 
fumed at this colleague, negotiated with and about him, tried to stir the 
Diet of the Confederation to action against him, and accomplished 
nothing. The indignity of having to back down before the adamant 
ruler of Kurhesse was augmented by the fact that the little state 
separated the Eastern and the Western parts of Prussia at the narrowest 
place. A Hohenzollern was eager to absorbe this petty principality. 
When the King become involved in conflict over military reform 
with the liberals in his own Lower House, he turned against not merely 
their domestic program for Prussia but their hope and plan of national 
unification. The debates in the first informal and unofficial meeting 
of deputies from the parliaments of the various German states in 
September, 1862, aroused his ire. The assembly of deputies did not 
mention Prussia's mission to unify Germany, though liberals were ac-
customed to stress this point. Instead it demanded the creation of a 
national parliament composed of deputies elected by the people with-
out interference by the states. The King, who was visiting the Grand 
Duke of Baden at the time of this assembly, broke into such a storm 
• Von Bemhardi, op. cit., III, 300; also Parisius, von HOVf'Tbeck, II, 8. 
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of anger "that one could even hear his immoderate words in the 
street," wrote the Grand Duke to an acquaintance. He became so 
hostile to the movement for unification that he subsequently caused 
Bismarck great difficulty.3 In January, 1871, he was still averse to ac-
cepting the title of emperor, and declared, "My son is with his entire 
soul in the new state of affairs, while it means nothing at all to me. 
I hold only to Prussia."4 He tolerated national unification, but he 
would never have personally pushed it through to completion. That 
honor belonged to the liberals and especially to Bismarck. 
When the liberals spoke of the need for German unification, their 
justification was based upon the belief that the German people requir-
ed a larger area of activity than was theirs at present in the separate 
states. The question of size bore significance in respect both to the 
German people's role among the nations and to the character of life 
within the German nation. These formed two facets of an identical 
problem, the international and the internal; each conditioned the other 
and could not be understood in isolation. 
The German Diet was composed of diplomats representing the 
practically independent German states, which treated each other as 
foreign powers. With the possible exception of Prussia and Austria 
no one of these thirty-three states possessed the necessary resources in 
land mass, population and wealth to protect itself against foreign ag-
gressors. The medium-sized and small states maintained armies and 
other services which they could not well afford and which absorbed 
funds needed for other purposes. They preserved their independence 
solely under the protection of the principle of the balance of power: 
the large states of Europe would object to any foreign state seizing one 
or more of them. 
The Prussian liberals recognized that even their own state suffered 
from the same handicap. In addition to being much smaller in size, 
population and resources than the other great powers, Prussia was 
separated into two geographic areas by several German states. It had 
tried to overcome this fundamental weakness by devoting a larger 
amount of its energy to the military than did other great powers and 
by maintaining in absolutism the form of leadership regarded as most 
efficient and economical for quick action. As the liberal deputy von 
Forckenbeck said, Prussia could not be liberalized without German 
3 Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 338-39. 
• Quoted in Parisius, von Hoverbeck, I, 218. 
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unity.5 The greater resources of a unified Germany would relieve 
Prussia of the excessive burden of her military power and render 
absolutism no longer justifiable on military grounds. Bigness would 
enable the new German state to be an authentic great power, self-
confident because of its reserve force without the necessity of constant 
military tension. 
The size of a unified Germany, ran the nationalist argument, would 
assure the German people independence and security. No great power 
would then dare attack the country with intentions of conquest. Ger-
mans could feel self-respect among the peoples of the world and com-
mand respect from them. Like other nations long since politically 
unified, they would achieve the form enabling them to fulfill their his-
toric destiny. German honor required that the people win the na-
tional unity, independence and security which other nations had 
gained. 
Honor, self-respect and the respect of others, the liberal nationalists 
believed, had to be acquired at home, within Germany. This cardinal 
point among the advocates of national unification involved the rela-
tionship of liberalism and nationalism. By honor and self-respect the 
liberals referred not merely to relations with other countries; they 
were speaking not merely of the German nation; they were speaking 
of the relations of German individuals and social groups with other 
Germans. They were concerned with the attitude of the nobility to-
ward the middle class and the peasantry, of the military Junkers to-
ward everyone else. They were upholding the liberal principles of 
social freedom and the dignity of man against caste and privilege. 
They wanted their own governments to honor and respect not merely 
those of the upper class but all citizens, and for that purpose they 
wished a life freed from the tyranny of German rulers, petty or other-
wise. They maintained that a nation had the right to develop the 
forms of public life which it needed and wished, that irrespective of 
existing legality it had the right to replace the legal and institutional 
structure of particularism by that of national unity. The ideals of 
liberalism were employed to justify a people in asserting the right of 
self-determination within the limits of its own nation. 
The major enemy of both liberalism and national unity was par-
ticularism, the independent existence of each German state ruled by 
its own sovereign, usually still in fact an absolute monarch. These 
• Parisius, von Hoverbeck, I. 164-65; Philippson, op. cit., p. 43; von Saucken in 
the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Aug. 2. 1862. 
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rulers were, like King William I of Prussia, intent upon maintaining 
their position as autocratic sovereigns of independent states. They 
had no more inclination to become mediatized than to become figure-
heads over parliamentary governments. The liberals were actually 
aware of the fact that the princes would never give up enough of 
their power to unify Germany unless they were compelled to do so. 
The liberals firmly believed that the cabinets, as they called the 
governments of these rulers, would not unify Germany, that if the 
German people did not perform that work it would never be executed. 
To the liberals particularism meant moral, intellectual and ma-
terial stagnation. It deprived the people of the opportunities to realize 
their potentialities. It prevented "German character in its universality" 
from realizing itself. Especially in the small states the people found 
themselves dependent upon the will of the petty ruler. Restricted 
within the narrow boundary of one of these states, they had too few 
opportunities to try to accomplish what they wished to do. The ruler 
was able to keep them under control; the current of life in the large 
states and in the outside world passed these people by, leaving them 
frustrated, listless, devoid of the sense of honor and self-respect that 
comes from personal initiative and achievement. In a small par-
ticularistic state, the liberals maintained, man tended to vegetate; the 
horizon was so close that he was scarcely aware of opportunities be-
yond his reach. Occupations were few in number because of the 
small size of the population and tended to serve almost entirely the 
local court or the local people. Society was in-bred. Cultural facilities 
depended in the main upon the will of the ruler as the only per-
son with wealth. Political activity and understanding were confined 
to the small items of local significance and were too concerned with the 
interests of the ruler to be other than trivial. International affairs 
and problems of constitutional governance scarcely aroused interest; 
they lacked reality. 
Although the criticism of the effects of particularism was directed 
mainly at the small or medium-sized states rather than at the large 
ones, the Prussian liberals recognized that in some respects it applied 
to their own country as well. Their ruler still thought about his sub-
jects in much the same way as his fellow-sovereigns in the lesser states; 
the people were subjects, therefore with limited comprehension of 
affairs; the constitution should be interpreted according to the theory 
of the divine right of kings; military affairs and foreign relations 
should be the exclusive province of the ruler; the social structure 
should remain essentially that of the Old Regime, with the nobility 
126 / Pmssia 1858-1864 
at the top helping the King rule the state; the particular state, not the 
nation, should be the first object of the subject's devotion. Economical-
ly, the state also continued to restrict private activities too much for 
the liberals. Mercantilist control was comparable to that in the other 
states. It prevented Prussian economic organizations, insurance com-
panies, banks, industries, tradesmen, craftsmen, from freely carrying 
on business in the other states, and vice versa. Because of particularism 
modern means of transportation and communication were not being 
developed quickly or widely enough. The market, even in Prussia, 
was too small to satisfy the needs of the big corporations and in-
dustrial facilities being created. Prussians suffered not to the same 
extent but in the same way as businessmen in the lesser states. They 
wanted freedom of movement and domicile and occupation on a na-
tional scale. No German state was sufficiently large to provide the 
necessary area for the exercise of these rights. The German working 
man, the German industrialist, any German should have the right to 
earn a living in his nation wherever he chose. Questions of personal 
honor and self-respect were involved, questions of the dignity of a 
member of the German nation. Each German was or should be con-
cerned, for the issues affected the life of each individual. Over against 
his status as a subject of a small state were set his rights as a member 
of the German nation. 
The klein-deutsch liberals of north and central Germany, among 
them the Prussians, worked out a plan for the unification of the coun-
try.6 The essence of it was incorporated in the program of the German 
Progressive party, a wholly Pruss ian party whose title indicated its ob-
jective. The plan, published in 1861, read as follows: 
The existence and greatness of Prussia depend upon a firm 
unification of Germany, which cannot be conceived without a 
strong central power in the hands of Prussia and without a repre-
sentation of its people .... 
Thus we believe that Prussia has the right and the duty to 
support with pressure the endeavor of the German people to 
achieve unity within and power without and wherever the rights 
of the people are violated as in Kurhesse and in Schleswig-Hol-
stein to restore them again by active aid. 
Prussia should never lose from sight its task of winning the 
approval of the other German tribes for its domestic organiza-
tion and work. Strict and consistent achievement of the con-
stitutional, legal state, stimulation of all the forces of the peo-
• By klein-deutsch is meant the plan for unifying Germany with the exclusion 
of Austria. The gross-deutsch proponents wished to include Austria. 
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pIe to useful activity, careful treatment and preservation of these 
forces by wise economy in state expenditures are therefore the 
indispensable bases of our political objective.7 
The program was accepted by all klein·deutsch liberals, irrespective 
of party affiliation. They all believed in Prussia's taking the lead, in 
the moral conquest of the rest of Germany by liberal reforms within 
Prussia, in having a national government composed of an executive 
and a popularly elected representative assembly of the nation with 
authority over military and commercial affairs and foreign relations.s 
The left-wing and the right-wing liberals differed only over ques-
tions of strategy in timing and over distribution of emphasis on the 
various points of the national program. The Progressive party wished 
to advance quickly to action. The other liberal groups advised a 
slower pace; the farther to the right they were the more slowly they 
were inclined to proceed. The groups differed somewhat in the pro-
posed treatment of the rulers. The Progressive party held most of 
these rulers in such contempt that it wished to force reforms upon 
them. The liberals of the right wing advocated respecting the authority 
of the princes. They stood close to William's own vague idea of uni-
fication at some distant time, unification with and by the rulers in such 
a way as to satisfy everyone. They wished to preserve "the inner in-
dependence of the individual states, with Prussian leadership in na-
tional, military, diplomatic and commercial affairs."9 It would have 
been possible to preserve this inner independence and at the same time 
unify Germany, depending on one's understanding of these phrases; 
but the mental reservation behind the statement becomes clear when 
it is contrasted with ones by the Progessivist Schulze-Delitzsch or his 
colleague Freiherr von Hoverbeck. At the conference of riflemen in 
Frankfurt am Main in July, 1862, von Hoverbeck made a speech in 
which he extended greetings from the majority in the Prussian Lower 
House and declared "that this majority recognizes no other than the 
German interests, and that if in some way the so-called Prussian 
interests should conflict with the German interests, we prefer the 
German interests!" Schulze-Delitzsch was even blunter. "We work 
for no one dynasty in Germany, neither for the Hohenzollern nor for 
7 Quoted from Ludolph Parisius, Deutschlands politische Parteien und das 
Ministerium Bismarck (Berlin, 1878), pp. 33 If. 
8 See the joint resolution of the liberals in the Lower House early in 1862. 
Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 13-14. 
• Parisius, Politische Parteien, p. 55. 
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the Hapsburg, when we wish to establish German unity. We work 
for ourselves, for the German peoplel"lo 
The difference between the right-wing or Old Liberals (Consti-
tutionals, as they were called) and the Progressives was one of degree 
rather than of kind. Each recognized the need for instruments mak-
ing national unity a reality; but the former preferred federalism with 
the central government having just sufficient authority to function as 
the head of the national state. Since the Old Liberals were few in 
number in Prussia and lost out almost completely as a political force 
in favor of the Progressive party and the almost equally aggressive 
Left-Center liberal party, one may assume that on questions of national 
unity all Prussian liberals, apart from a small handful of Gross-
Deutsche, shared common objectives. 
The plan of the liberals for unifying the nation conformed with 
their own social and political ideals. Since they had no confidence in 
the ability or the willingness of the princes to unify the country, they 
had to devise means for achieving the objective in spite of these per-
sons. The plan called for the progressive transfer of authority from 
the rulers to the representatives of the people in each state-not all 
authority, not parliamentary control of government, but enough to 
push the rulers into national unity. Liberal reforms were essential 
in each state so that the people would perceive the value of unification 
for them. The more economic and social progress, the more freedom 
and cultural reform, the more awake and active the population would 
be in furthering its own interests. The stronghold of particularism 
lay in the King and his bureaucracy: liberalism aimed to reduce the 
authority of both these powers. The freedom for action achieved 
thereby would benefit economic and other kinds of activity, which 
would expand the area of life and the range of problems requiring 
political and economic attention and administrative machinery on a 
national scale. The liberals saw that there must be real interests of a 
national scope or there would be no institutional force behind the 
movement of unification. Each factory builder, each large-scale mer-
chant, each free organization of the professions or other occupational 
and social groups, each victory for freedom of movement, domicile and 
occupation, each victory for freedom of speech, press, and assembly, 
each gain of political power by the representatives of the people meant 
an increased concern with public affairs and aggressiveness in push-
ing these interests. Each one meant a greater sense of all Germans 
10 Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 56; Schulze-Delitzsch, op. cit., III, 191·92. 
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belonging in one country and a greater confidence in one's ability to 
work for this goal. When, if he wished, the Prussian could freely live 
and work in Bavaria, when he could run his own government, when 
he could manage his own business of German-wide range, when he 
could read in the papers about conditions in every German state and 
plans for improving them, then he would be serving and expressing 
both liberalism and the desire for national unification. 
Some machinery was necessary for organizing the liberal-sponsored 
activity on a national scale, some legal method for focusing the dis-
parate action within each state upon the national objective. The 
liberals worked out a plan for solving this most complicated problem. 
In 1859 they organized the National Verein, a kind of holding company 
for liberal and national activity in each state. It was directed by 
leading liberals from all over Germany and published a weekly journal. 
In each state a German progressive party was to be organized to repre-
sent and further the interests of liberal and national reform. The 
choice of name did not matter, although that of German Progessive 
party was recommended. More important was the unity of purpose 
among the patries. In each state the liberal party would press its 
program and at the same time keep in close touch with its colleagues 
in other states. As these parties grew in influence, they would bring 
their state governments actively to strive for national unity. The 
liberal deputies from the various states would work out common 
policies not merely in the National Verein but in national conferences 
of parliamentary deputies. The necessary coordination and coopera-
tion would be assured for the pursuit of a common goal. Simultaneous 
pressure would be applied on all German governments to realize a 
common plan for national unity. 
Prussia was to assume the lead because it was the largest state and 
could withstand Austria. If it set an example, the lesser states would 
fall into line, for Prussia had so many political and economic means 
of pressure upon the lesser states that they would have to follow suit. 
The closing of the Prussian market, the refusal of a loan, the breaking 
of diplomatic relations, the release of a press campaign of criticism, 
these and many other instruments of influence were at Prussia's dis-
posal, not to speak of the sheer power of its army. Prussia held the 
key to the entire plan. If it became liberal, so would Germany; if it 
did not, the liberal plan for national unification would fail. 
The liberals expected their method of unification to succeed with-
out international intervention and a foreign war. Not even France, 
the enemy, would dare interfere in a country where the people were 
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wholeheartedly supporting the national movement. Unification would 
be carried on so calmly, so peacefully, with such devotion and har-
mony, apart from the objections of a few rulers and aristocrats, that 
France would have no occasion to interfere. Unity would be achieved 
so gradually that France would scarcely realize what was occurring be-
fore it was too late to act. Enormous expenditures for a Pruss ian army 
and vast military reforms would not be necessary. In fact they were a 
detriment, said the liberals, for they made the non-Prussians think that 
Pruss ian militarism was on the aggressive and that the Junkers might 
be able to destroy liberalism. The King's reform program for the army 
had to be opposed as a danger to the liberal plan of unification. The 
funds resulting from the economy of the liberal method, the saving on 
militaTY expenditure, would be devoted to constructive activity, 
schools, railroads, and the like, which would further Prussia's moral 
conquest of the rest of Germany. If an army were needed, Schulze-
Delitzsch said in July, 1862, it should be a people's army supporting a 
people's parliament, not, he inferred, a standing army of an absolute 
sovereign led by Junkers. The liberals encouraged the activity of the 
riflemen's clubs, gymnastic societies and other associations building up 
the defensive power, they said, of the German people; but they placed 
most emphasis on maintaining the popular character of the Prussian 
army as established in 1814. To keep the army popular, to hold down 
expenses, to abolish Junker militarism, all were parts of the plan to 
unify Germany by peaceful means. 
The liberals realized that the execution of their program would 
take time. They believed that the course of history law with them and 
that they were sure to win. Even though they knew that they had to 
be active and to labor for their cause, they derived great assurance 
from their belief that time worked, not for absolutism, Junkers, and 
particularism, but for liberalism and national unity. 
The liberals could not readily be extreme nationalists, like the 
National Socialists of a later date, when the main obstacle to the 
popular conception of national unification lay in the rivalry of two 
German powers, one, Prussia, which was almost entirely German in 
population and certainly German in leadership, the other, Austria, 
which was dominated by the German elements of the population. The 
situation did not lend itself to extreme nationalist agitation. Gross-
deutsch and klein-deutsch advocates were equally in favor of German 
unity, even though they differed over their conception of unity_ The 
klein-deutsch advocates aimed to exclude Austria from the German 
state, mainly on two counts: it contained too many non-German peo-
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pIes, and it was too big either to be absorbed as it was into a unified 
Germany or to be broken up and the German population incorporated 
in the new national state. The liberals wished to tie Austria to the 
new state by an alliance of an especially close character, different from 
the ordinary foreign alliance in that it rested upon not merely poli-
tical interest but common nationality. They emphasized the practical 
and feasible aspects of the klein-deutsch solution and did not overem-
phasize German nationality. They were actually not concerned with 
the entire German nation, but with only a part of it. A few were 
gross-deutsch, but certainly in Prussia the liberals adhered overwhelm-
ingly to the klein-deutsch solution. The reasonable and practical char-
acter of it appealed to these liberals in the same way that constitutional 
government, freedom of occupation, freedom of press and assembly, 
and other liberal ideals appealed to them. 
Extreme nationalism did not seize hold of the Prussians, for Ger-
many was not endangered from abroad and was prospering within. 
The only possible danger would come from France, which in 1859 be-
came involved in the Italian affair. While many Germans, especially 
liberals, feared a French attack at the time, their fears soon proved to 
be unjustified. The movement for national unity owed its drive not 
to outside threats but to the process of internal transformation under 
way in Germany society with the development of industrialism and the 
middle class. It was not merely economic in character; it was cultural; 
it involved the change from the Old Regime to the free society of 
modern industrialism. Under these conditions nationalism had little 
in common with the emotionalism of Fichte and Arndt suffering from 
the humiliation of the Pruss ian collapse and the Napoleonic control of 
Germany. It had nothing in common with Hitlerism. It intended to 
provide a solid basis of adequate size for the new industrial culture, 
which should operate in a world still employing power politics but 
which was essentially peaceful in its international relations. The fact 
that the liberal movement for national unity coincided with the liberal 
movement for free trade made this attitude doubly evident. The 
Fichtean closed commercial state had no significance for these liberals. 
They rejected economic autarchy and urged expansion of international 
trade, just as they pressed for trade among the German people within 
a unified Germany. They sought to consolidate Germany without war 
either among the Germans or against foreign powers. They chose the 
nation as the object of their desires because it provided the next largest 
body for which they could find a justification for political unity. 
The liberals hated no one abroad. Their special enemies were Ger-
man particularists and conservatives who opposed freedom and na-
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tional unification. They mistrusted France, but not to any excessive 
degree. Their criteria of behavior were not the amount of physical 
power but the degree of moral and rational justification one had, the 
number of persons supporting one's views and the efficiency and char-
acter of those persons as shown, not in the accident of their social 
position obtained by birth, but in their intellectual and material ac-
complishment and in their moral standards. On these grounds they 
disliked the exclusiveness of castes, the sense of superiority of the aristo-
cracy, and monopolistic absolutism more than they did the French or 
any other foreign people. Their feeling of middle-class solidarity 
made them akin to the French, English and any other middle class. 
They were very much aware of the greatness of the German people, 
who they thought were striding toward the achievement of a free cul-
ture; but they also recognized that the English in particular were ahead 
of them, not merely in the fact of national unity but in the fact of the 
achievement of a progressive economy and a free society and govern-
ment. They did not envy or hate the French, English or anyone else 
on that account, for they were too busy and optimistic to succumb to 
that attitude. The Germans were doing well; they had hopes; they 
were progressing; they saw the possibility of achieving all their objec-
tives by themselves. Why should they envy or hate anyone else and 
compensate for their own backwardness by exalting the German nation 
into a messianic role? They did not believe that they were especially 
backward any more than that they were in the vanguard. They knew 
that their nation contained backward forces; but they thought that 
they could overcome these and accomplish their objectives by them-
selves.ll 
As on all other questions, with respect to national unification the 
Conservatives were forced to action by the initiative of the liberals. 
When they organized for fighting the election campaign in 1861, they 
called their instrument the Prussian Volksverein, in deliberate op-
position to the liberals' National Verein, and stated that it should be 
the center of Conservative action in Prussia and "offer its hand to col-
leagues of like mind in the rest of the German fatherland." The first 
point of the program of this Prussian Union laid down the position on 
national unity. "Unity of our German fatherland, not in the manner 
of the Italian kingdom by blood and fire but in the unity of its princes 
and peoples and in the firm preservation of authority and law. No 
11 The position of the liberals on national unification is to be found in so many 
well·known publications that bibliographical data are superfluous. The Landtag 
debates and the contemporary newspapers and magazines are particularly valuable. 
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repudiation of our Prussian fatherland and its glorious history; no 
perishing in the filth of a German republic; no robbery of the crown 
and nationality swindle."12 
Although the Conservatives were still reacting to the Revolution of 
1848, not to the existing situation, they showed complete hostility to 
the liberal conception of national unity. They did so because it was 
liberal and because it was national. To Wagener, the nationality 
theory of the liberals was not merely "false" but of such weak character 
that "you [the liberals] appear to recognize a German as a fellow 
countryman only in his party uniform." Deputy von Blanckenburg 
expressed the same thought in blunter form, "Gentlemen, for us 
national union is ridiculous."13 
The degree of clarity in the proposal of the Conservatives for 
achieving national unity may be gathered from an election appeal of 
October, 1863. The statement revealed that they were much more con-
cerned about preserving the King's power and through it the present 
structure of social and political power than they were about unifying 
the Germans. The latter objective was used as a sort of extra argument 
in favor of the former. The government, the Conservatives declared 
in this call for popular support, had given two reasons for dissolving 
the Lower House and asking for new elections: the question of the role 
of the monarchy in Prussia and the question of the role of Prussia in 
Germany. The Conservatives accepted these as the main issues in the 
election: 
The monarchy alone is able to bring our domestic confusion 
to a healthy conclusion; a strong monarchy alone is able also to 
preserve and to strengthen Prussia's position in Germany. Let 
us hold firmly to all which His Majesty the King has guarded 
and held to firmly as his hereditary and constitutional preroga-
tives, especially his position as supreme war lord of his people. 
Let us hold firmly to Prussia's position of power in Germany .... 
Let us hold firmly to the strength and prestige of our army, 
which is Germany's sword and Prussia's iron wall. Let us hold 
firmly to right within and without, and let us enter the election 
campaign with the slogan to prove to friends and to foes that we 
have recently celebrated the memory of the great deeds of our 
ancestors not merely in appearance alone. Since the days of 
Frederick the Great Prussia can never more be the second but 
always one of the two first powers in Germany.14 
U Parisius, Politische Parteien, p. 42; see also the statement by the Conservative 
Committee in Konigsberg in Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 3, 18(H. 
13 Abg. H., St. B., March 2, 1861; 1,308. Ibid., March 28, 1861; III, 1432. 
u Hugo 1\Hiller, Der Pretlssische Volks-Verein (Berlin, 1914), pp. 130-31; also in 
Kreuzzeitung. Oct. 18, 1863. 
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Wagener worked out a plan for national unification for the Volks-
verein which, in so far as the Conservatives had any idea of how to ac-
complish that objective, may be considered as the party's proposal. Its 
import may be quickly judged from the details. "The Volksverein 
demands not plans of fantastic alliance and conquest but the energetic 
and conscious initiative of the Pruss ian government in all critical ques-
tions of our time, an independent political action on the bas¥; of 
which one can claim to be recognized and respected as the protection 
and shield of right and of the legitimacy of the princes and the peo-
ples." The plan recommended not the abolition but the development 
of the Confederation constitution "by clear and energetic initiative 
on the part of Prussia" in order finally to bring about "the necessary 
and desirable reform" of the Confederation by means of "serious nego-
tiations with the German princes and in cooperation with the conserva-
tive elements of the individual states." Wagener spoke of the general 
mistrust of Prussia as a main obstacle to its position in Germany and 
to its action in the Confederation and deplored the absence of a Ger-
man prince who would be regarded with confidence from all sides as 
the true shield of right and legitimacy. It would not be long, he 
declared, before all peoples would readily place in such a prince the 
faith which he needed in order to be their shield and defence. If a 
state would simply fulfill its duty and administer justice, influence 
would come to it automatically. As for the Diet of the Confederation, 
Wagener declared that when, instead of ministers, princes placed them-
selves personally at the head of the German nation, that body would 
lose its unpopularity. "If the princes wish to remain what they are," 
Wagener declared, "or if they wish to remain at all, it is high time 
they came to the front in person."15 
The election appeal showed that the Conservatives really had no 
policy for unifying Germany. They wished to maintain the status quo, 
with power left in the hands of the ruling princes and with the Prus-
sian and Austrian monarchs cooperating as equals to keep out foreign 
enemies and to keep down internal liberalism. In so far as any changes 
were to be made in the existing constitution for Germany, they had to 
be achieved by common agreement among all the rulers; otherwise 
legal rights and therefore morality would be violated, the door opened 
to further inroads upon the status quo, to liberalism and nationalism. 
Conservatism revived its policy of the Metternich era of using inter-
national relations as a justification for not reforming at home and as a 
'. Miiller, op. cit., pp. 93·94. 
National Unification / 135 
means of preventing any reform. Just how the German nation would 
come out of its existing impasse did not bother the Conservatives. 
Many of them preferred to concentrate merely upon Prussia, as one 
election propoganda sheet put out by the Konigsberg election commit-
tee said, "With God for King and Fatherland,"16 and by Fatherland 
they meant Prussia. 
The Conservatives were necessarily opposed to change. Their 
emotional response toward opponents varied from indifference to hate, 
depending upon the degree of danger to them from these forces. They 
hated the liberals within Germany and they hated Louis Napoleon and 
the French. They regarded these two forces alike as their greatest 
enemies. They condemned Louis Napoleon for having established 
the kind of absolutistic, bureaucratic, centralized government which, 
they thought, was as contrary to their views and interests as liberalism. 
For the latter they felt scorn; for Louis Napoleon and his accomplish-
ments they felt fear-fear of imitation in Prussia, fear of Louis Na-
poleon's using the military power gained by his absolutism to attack 
Prussia. They maintained the standards of power politics of the Old 
Regime in international as well as internal relations, and attributing 
the same standards to Louis Napoleon, they mistrusted him deeply 
and freely vented their antagonism in words of intense aversion. They 
were far from being nationalists; but believing in the game of inter-
national politics as played by Frederick the Great, they were constantly 
on the lookout for foreign enemies. Rather ignorant of conditions in 
other countries, they were not aware of any community of interest 
with the nobility and other conservatives in other European countries. 
They were not conservative internationalists; they were conservative 
Prussians. The extent of their interest in conservatism abroad was 
limited to Germany and German-speaking Austria. While they were 
theoretically willing to cooperate with these German and Austrian-
German conservatives against the liberal advocates of national unity, 
they did not bestir themselves to do more than put the idea into words, 
and they left the initiative and responsibility for action to the con-
servative governments. They concentrated on preserving their posi-
tion in Prussia, and for that purpose they supported the King's power. 
The institutional structure of their society was restricted to Prussia; 
they had no interest in or occasion for exploiting German nationalism 
for their own gain as they had after Germany became unified. The 
new Reich created new institutions of control which they could use 
.. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 16, 1861. 
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for the preservation of conservatism and gave a new set of institutions 
to conserve. After the radical act of national unification the Con-
servatives could and did accustom themselves to maintaining the con-
servative character of these institutions; and since the institutions were 
on a national basis, the Conservatives became nationalists for the sake 
of their way of life. In the period under consideration, however, the 
area of their interest remained Prussia, their major enemy not France 
or any foreign power so much as the liberals and democrats who wished 
to reform Prussia and to unify Germany. They associated nationalism 
with liberalism and both with revolutionary destruction of the Old 
Regime. 
When Bismarck became Minister President in September, 1862, 
he had already cast aside his stock Prussianism of 1849 and recognized 
the necessity for German unity. He had clarified in his own mind 
the outlines of the desired organization of a unified Germany and a 
plan for accomplishing the objective. He had weighed the forces 
which would oppose unification and those which would support it, 
and he arrived at a policy which incorporated elements from the liberal 
program and from the Hohenzollern tradition of power politics. He 
was to be unable to execute in toto the plan which he had worked out; 
nonetheless, he returned to it after the war of 1866 and built the 
essentials into the structure of a unified Germany. 
Bismarck approached the problem of national unification from the 
standpoint of Pruss ian state interests. Whatever accrued to Prussia·s 
advantage should be furthered. He learned from experience as repre-
sentative at the Diet in Frankfurt am Main in the 1850s that Prussia 
lacked the resources of the other great powers and needed German sup-
port. He recognized that Prussia's position in the geographic center 
of Europe would force it to become involved in every European affair, 
that it could not remain passive and in peace, that it must be either 
hammer or anvil. "We shall appear relatively weak in every connec-
tion with other great powers," he wrote in 1857, "as long as we are not 
stronger than we now are." In the next year he added, "There is noth-
ing more German than the development of properly understood Prus-
sian particularist interests."17 Bismarck discovered the German nation 
in his search for means of strengthening Prussia as an international 
power . 
.. Hans Rothfels (ed.), Otto von Bismarck. Deutscher Staat. Ausgewiihlte Doku-
mente (Munich, 1925), pp. 129, 127, 192. 
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Under the existing constitution of the German confederation Prus-
sia would be unable to improve upon its position. Bismarck's criticism 
of that organization, based on his own experience, had much in com-
mon with the condemnatory views of the liberals, but it was put in 
terms of power rather than in expressions of cultural ideals for the 
German people. He had concluded that the exercise of the veto 
by each of the thirty-three or so members of the Diet prevented any-
thing from being accomplished. He expressed to Prince William in 
March, 1858, his belief that the particularism of the majority of the 
smaller German governments and the tendencies of the Austrian poli-
des were both un-German, that the Confederation was being exploited 
to preserve the domestic and foreign security of its members and that it 
would in time break apart. He condemned Prussian policy for being 
enthusiastic about "the small state sovereignty created by Napoleon 
and sanctioned by Metternich," and called this policy one of "blind-
ness toward all dangers with which Prussia and Germany's independ-
ence are threatened in the future as long as the nonsense of the present 
Confederation constitution exists, which is nothing more than a hot-
house and conservatory of dangerous and revolutionary particularist 
activities."18 
From his experience at the German Diet Bismarck had acquired a 
profound mistrust of Austria. Again his comments resembled those 
of the liberals, but again with the difference that they were based on 
standards of power politics. Austria would act as an independent great 
power, he said, and exploit its German connections for selfish purposes. 
The twenty per cent German population in Austria, Bismarck declared, 
offered no assurance whatever that Austria would follow a policy of 
advantage to Germany or cooperate with Prussia to that effect. On 
the contrary, he wrote Prince William, in its relations with Prussia 
Austria would pursue its own interests, "to combat and reduce Prus-
sia's prestige and influence in Germany as much as possible, but in 
case of war and against the manifold dangers surrounding Austria to 
seek to be able to count on the support of Prussia's complete power."19 
Like most of his liberal opponents Bismarck was klein-deutsch; in his 
thinking, the presence of two great powers, Austria and Prussia, 
created a situation of dualism and rivalry which would have to be 
eliminated. 
The disadvantage and danger of the dualism to Prussia became clear 
to Bismarck from the behavior of the so-called middle states, the larger 
18 Ibid., pp. 192, 204-05. 
10 Ibid., pp. 131, 193-94. 
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of the German states, especially Saxony, Bavaria and Wiirttemberg. 
These, he said, were too small to act like international powers and too 
large to be conscious of their own intrinsic weakness. Bismarck 
diagnosed their policy as one of maintaining themselves by playing be-
tween Prussia and Austria. 
The belief in the possibility of a unanimous action of both 
powers has nowhere sunk lower than in Germany itself. The 
middle states know the situation best, for they are the ones which 
fan the rivalry of the great powers. Their simple means for do-
ing so is to support every unjust claim of Austria against Prussia. 
The office of arbitrator between the two powers in peacetime 
and a plausible excuse in wartime to be able to leave the Con-
federation in the lurch because of the disunity of Prussia and 
Austria are the fruits of their policy. 
The middle and small states were normally pro-Austrian out of fear of 
Prussia, Bismarck asserted in 1859; but if Austria became aggressive 
and Prussia quiescent, they would flock to Prussia's standard. Their 
policy was "the natural and necessary result of their situation in the 
Confederation and was not to be expected to change." "We have no 
means," he concluded, "to come to an enduring and satisfactory ar-
rangement with this policy within the existing constitution of the 
Confederation."20 
Bismarck rarely restricted his thinking to negative criticism. Along 
with the analysis of the defects in the German constitution he de-
veloped ideas about reorganization. Nor did he stop merely with a 
description of what should be introduced in place of the existing struc-
ture. As a person concerned with action he considered how the plans 
would be implemented. 
The key to Bismarck's national policy was contained in a letter of 
criticism of the political program put forth by the Conservative party 
in 1861. "Our government is liberal in Prussia; but legitimist in 
foreign policy," he wrote. He proposed that the policy be made not 
liberal but consistent. Liberal ideas should be used in handling the 
question of German unity. "In the national sphere," he said, "very 
modest concessions have been greeted as valuable. One could create 
quite a conservative national representation and still gain the gratitude 
of the liberals for it." He thought it possible to achieve a liberal ob-
jective with liberal support, to do so under Conservative control and 
with the preservation of the Conservative political and social structure, 
•• Ibid., pp. 194·95, 198. 
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making possible the assumption and retention of political power by 
a Bismarck.21 
In setting the ultimate objective of German unity, Bismarck did not 
at this time (1861) go as far along the road toward centralization as the 
liberals. He had written in 1857 that military, political and commer-
cial authority would be most useful for the Confederation, that "under 
unified direction the Confederation would accomplish entirely other 
things in war and peace than at present and in case of war would be 
really tenable."22 He was then thinking about the ideal, and he had 
no intention of subordinating Prussia to such political control. His 
usual statement omitted the political factor and called for the transfer 
to a central government solely of military, customs and commercial 
authority. "We need a tighter consolidation of German military power 
as much as bread itself," he wrote in September, 1861. "We need a new 
organization in customs affairs and a number of common institutions 
in ~rder to protect the material interests against the disadvantages 
which grow out of the unnatural configuration of the inner German 
state boundaries."23 He did not expand his conception of what powers 
the German government would need until in 1866 and 1867 he actually 
had to face the issue. One must conclude that his Prussian Conserva-
tive standards prevented him from working out an adequate answer 
to this problem until the crisis, and that the liberals had both a much 
earlier and a much clearer understanding of it than he had. When 
the North German Confederation was created in 1867 the character 
of the central authority bore much more the stamp of the liberals than 
of Bismarck; but he had the statemanship to accept the additions as 
useful in achieving the common objective of national unity. 
From practical experience Bismarck came to incorporate in his plans 
the creation of a national parliament to represent the people. The 
ideal was related in his mind with that of moral conquest in Germany 
by Prussia and showed extraordinary similarity to the liberals' think-
ing. Early in 1858 he wrote Prince William in eloquent terms. 
The leading position which Prussia had before 1848 in the 
Confederation rested not upon the favor of the middle states and 
the Confederation assembly but upon the fact that Prussia was 
in the vanguard in all lines of state development, that all that 
was specifically Prussian was recognized in the other states of the 
Confederation as model and according to ability was imitated. 
The precipitancy of this line of development in the revolution-
ary period and the resulting mistrust aroused in the German 
!1 Ibid., pp. 204.05. 
'2 I bid., p. 42. 
23 Ibid., pp. 204-05. 
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governments have necessarily caused a decided setback to the 
advance of Prussian influence. The weakening of the powerful 
influence of public opinon since 1848 resulting from the reaction 
to that movement and the novelty of Austria's coming forth as 
competitor make it difficult at present to regain the grou~d 
which Prussia has lost. Nonetheless, this is the only way to WIn 
the position which Prussia needs for the fulfillment of its state 
tasks, and its superior means in this area are in comparison with 
Austria and the other German states still significant. The as-
surance that His Majesty the King of Prussia would still remain 
king in his country if the entire standing army were drawn out 
of it is shared with Prussia by no other continental state and no 
German one. On this fact rests the possibility for developing 
public life to satisfy the demands of the present time more near-
ly than any other states are able to do. The degree of free move-
ment which is permissible without hurting the authority of the 
government is much greater in Prussia than in the rest of Ger-
many. Prussia is able to allow its representative body and its 
press even with respect to political questions more freedom of 
action than before. It knew how to gain and preserve the posi-
tion of the intellectual leader of Germany before 1848 under an 
almost absolute government, and would irrespective of its pre-
sent constitution be able to do the same at present. For that 
end it is only necessary that its domestic conditions be such that 
they do not disturb the impression abroad of unified coopera-
tion of all organs and forces of the country and that they actually 
further this cooperation. If the present Prussian constitution is 
a definitive institution, then the firm unity of the governmental 
organs and their harmony with the representative assembly 
should reach such a degree that the force of Prussia is not in 
part broken by controversies within between mutually hostile 
currents. Otherwise Prussia cannot exercise abroad, at least dur-
ing peace, the predominant moral influence on Germany which 
is assured it if its power is not weakened. The royal authority 
rests in Prussia upon such a secure basis that the government can 
create for itself without danger very effective means of action 
toward German conditions by more vigorous activity of the 
representative assembly. It is worth noting what an impression 
upon entire Germany was recently made by the discussion in the 
Saxon parliament of the Confederation policy and the position 
of Saxony toward the Confederation. How much more powerful 
would the impression have been if a similar discussion had occur-
red in the Prussian parliament. If Prussia should openly dis-
cuss the German policy, its position toward the Confederation, 
the difficulties which it has to overcome, the endeavors of its 
opponents, perhaps a few sessions of the Prussian Landtag would 
suffice to put an end to the presumption of the majority in the 
Confederation.24 
"Ibid., pp. 196·98. 
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Although the picture of Prussian conditions was too idyllic and that 
of other states, German and non-German, much too black, the urgent 
advocacy of harmony between the government and the Landtag in 
Prussia and of full discussion of the German question in the latter as 
powerful means of winning support among the other Germans reads 
like a plea by the liberals. 
The idea was in keeping with Bismarck's proposal to establish a 
German national parliament. In each case, in Prussia and in Ger-
many, the people should cooperate in affairs of government, and Bis-
marck severely condemned the Conservative party's election program 
of 1861 for its negative attitude toward parliaments. "I do not under-
stand," he wrote in September of that year to a leading Conservative, 
"why we recoil so prudishly before the idea of popular representation, 
either in the Confederation or in a customs union parliament. We 
cannot combat an institution as revolutionary which is legitimately 
accepted in every German state, which we Conservatives would not 
like to do without even in Prussia!. .. One could create a conservative 
national assembly and nonetheless gain thanks from the liberals for it." 
Bismarck supported the idea of a national parliament as an integral 
part of the central government in order to establish a unifying force 
as a counterbalance against "the diverging tendencies of dynastic 
special policies." He wished the parliament to exercise wide powers 
so that it could adequately perform its function, and he wished it to 
represent, not the governments of the separate states, but the German 
people. In 1863 he explained his reasons: 
Only such a representation will assure Prussia that it makes 
no sacrifice which does not accrue to the good of entire Germany. 
No organization of Confederation agencies, however artistically 
thought out, can eliminate the play and counter-play of dynastic 
and particularist interests. These must find a counterweight and 
corrective in the national representation. In an assembly which 
is chosen for all Germany according to the principle of numbers 
by direct elections the center of gravity will never be found out-
side Germany or in anyone state which is trying to separate it-
self from the rest. Therefore Prussia can enter the assembly 
with assurance. The interests and needs of the Prussian people 
are basically and inseparably identical with those of the German 
people. Where this force achieves its real significance Prussia 
need never have any fear of being drawn into a policy contrary 
to its own interests-a fear which would be doubly justified if, 
in addition to having an organization in which the center of 
gravity would lie outside Prussia, the mutually hostile particular-
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istic elements would be on principle the basis for the formation 
of the popular representative body.25 
History was to show that Prussian interests did not always coincide 
with German interests, except by Pruss ian definition; but that Bis-
marck was so clearly aware of the need for the people to participate 
directly in the governance of the future Germany revealed how far he 
had travelled from his stock Prussianism of a decade earlier. 
Bismarck saw in the creation of a German national assembly the 
advantage for the political training of the people. He had as sharp 
an eye as the liberals for the depressing effect of particularism upon 
political understanding, and like them he wished to change it. "Such 
a representative assembly for entire Germany," he stated, "should with 
some certainty also bring it about that the deplorable tendency of most 
German Landtags to devote themselves predominantly to petty con-
troversies with their own government may be beneficially diverted to 
broader and more generally useful paths, and the insignificant con-
flicts of the estates give way to a more statesmanlike handling of in-
terests of German scope."26 Bigness appeared as essential for the 
development of political talent as for economic expansion. Bismarck 
and the liberals alike hoped and expected that it would lift politics 
out of local pettiness to the plane of major issues. They were to find 
that the handling of problems on a national scale did at times elevate 
the character of German politics. It gave political life a seriousness 
and scope which had been present, if at all, only in the larger states. 
But if one may judge from this remark alone, Bismarck, like the 
liberals, was much too optimistic. Other statements show that he was 
aware of that fact and that he was here mainly expressing a hope in the 
days of the liberal New Era (July, 1861). He was answering one of 
the constant Conservative arguments against parliamentary life. 
The question of how national representation could be created 
under present circumstances with adequate powers to be effective in 
achieving unification concerned Bismarck just as it did the liberals. 
Like them, he thought of developing that kind of assembly in con-
nection with the Zollverein. In writing to the King in 1861 about the 
forthcoming renewal of the Zollverein he expressed the wish to dis-
continue that organization in its present form because the veto power of 
each member prevented any development of commercial legislation. 
He proposed that a two-thirds majority be given the power to legislate, 
and he recommended further 
·'Ibid., pp. 201, 205, 207-09. 
··Ibid., p. 202. 
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... that committees of larger or smaller numbers of members 
from the parliaments of the individual states come together and 
seek to harmonize through their discussion and conclusions the 
differences in opinions of the governments. Such a customs 
parliament can under circumstances and with clever guidance 
become the organ for initiating agreements in other spheres, in 
which German states would be inclined all the more readily to 
participate if they were always to remain able to withdraw. The 
first beginnings of customs unification with Darmstadt were 
scarcely more important than in its way the military convention 
with Coburg-Gotha and other similarly disposed small states 
would be. The influence of existing parliamentary bodies offers 
prospects at the present time of faster progress in national en-
deavors than thirty years ago, and foreign events can exert a 
favorable influence. Common military organization should be 
kept in mind as an ultimate, realizable goal, for which the com-
mon income from customs and related taxes would serve as a 
budget and supplement a common legislation for trade and 
transportation, all on a terminable treaty basis with the coopera-
tion of a popular representative body chosen out of the Land-
tags.27 
Bismarck recognized the need of having the German people par-
ticipate in the political unification of their nation. He even spoke of 
using revolution if it would help to achieve the objective of national 
unity.28 The irony of this remark lies in the fact that he actually uni-
fied the country in the face of public hostility. To him popular par-
ticipation was only one of three major instruments for unifying Ger-
many; the other two, diplomacy and war, carried much more weight 
in his estimation than the nationalist public. 
As soon as Bismarck became Minister President in September, 1862, 
he openly announced to the Budget Commission of the Lower House 
his standards of action. "Germany does not look to Prussia's liberalism 
but to its power. Bavaria, Wiirttemberg and Baden may indulge in 
liberalism; therefore no one would atrribute to them Prussia's role. 
Prussia must concentrate its power for the favorable moment which 
already has several times been missed. Prussia's frontiers as set by the 
Vienna treaties are not favorable to a sound statehood. The great 
questions of our time will be decided not by speeches and majority 
decisions-that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849-but by iron 
and blood."29 Bismarck praised the National Verein as having achieved 
.7 Ibid., pp. 202-03. 
·"Ibid., p. 132. 
'9 Ibid., p. 206. This is a summary of his extemporaneous remarks. He had ex-
pressed the same belief in August, 1849. Ibid., p. 183. 
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recogmtlOn "because of the justice of its demands"; but he utterly 
condemned "the chase after the phantom 'popularity' " in Germany, 
and he poured scorn upon the idea of relying upon the support of the 
democratic associations in the lesser states.30 At the time of the 
Schleswig-Holstein crisis in December, 1863, he wrote the Prussian 
diplomat Count von der Goltz as follows: 
1£ we turn our back now on the great powers and throw our-
selves in the arms of the policy of the small states, a policy 
caught in the net of the democracy of private societies, the 
monarchy would be in the worst situation within the state and 
toward the outside world of which it is possible to conceive. 
Instead of pushing we should be pushed. We should depend 
upon elements which we do not control and which are neces-
sarily hostile to us, but to which we should have to surrender 
unconditionally. You believe that in "German public opinion," 
parliaments, newspapers, and so forth, there is something which 
could help and support us in a policy of union or hegemony. 
I hold that to be a grave mistake, a figment of the imagination. 
Our strength cannot arise out of parliaments and press politics 
but solely out of militarily strong, great power politics, and we 
do not have enough reserve to waste it on a false front and in 
words .... 
In this letter Bismarck was exaggerating somewhat in order to stress 
his major point, just as he had overemphasized in his letter to the King 
the importance of moral conquest. He wished to use all these forces 
according to need and possibility; but there can be no doubt that 
diplomacy and war conducted by Prussia as a great power represented 
to him the main means for accomplishing his objectives. Germany 
could be unified solely within the framework provided by international 
power politics, and he referred to the liberals' proposed solution as 
that of "professors, county judges and small-town chatter-boxes."31 
Bismarck was willing to use whatever means were at his disposal-
the Zollverein, other princes, military might, diplomacy. While hold-
ing to his objective, he was a thorough opportunist in selecting his 
means and in timing his action. He worked out the main lines of that 
objective, and he was gifted with the ability to learn from the clarify-
ing experience of action what those main lines should be. In adhering 
firmly to his basic policies, he was quite willing to compromise on 
details, in fact, not merely to compromise but frankly to accept changes 
that seemed to be sensible. 
O. Ibid., p. 206 . 
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The liberals, on the other hand, never had the chance to learn the 
ways of statesmanship by practical experience in the responsibility of 
government. Necessarily, they seem dogmatic. Some of them were, 
but many of them possessed the potential qualities of statesmen. While 
Bismarck damned the constitution of the Co~federation as useless, he 
played with the idea that the Zollverein might be developed into the 
organization for a unified Germany. The liberals never had any 
illusions about either. They recognized that the fundamental issue 
was political and would ultimately have to be faced on the political 
plane. They may have overestimated the power of public opinion; 
but we know today from experience with the attempts to unify Europe 
that the liberal proposal was far from being foolish. When the liberals 
lost faith in the willingness of the Pnissian ruler to lead in the crea-
tion of the new Germany, they advocated the reintroduction of the 
German constitution of 1849. They had a reasonable, concrete ob-
jective and a feasible method of attaining it. 
The fundamental divergence between the liberals and Bismarck 
may be seen most clearly in their respective estimate of the relative 
importance of internal and foreign affairs. To the liberals with their 
belief in rationality and peaceful discussion as means for solving prob-
lems, internal matters took priority. Germany could be unified by ac-
tion within the country. In a statement to the Lower House in 
February, 1866, Bismarck expressed the contrary belief. Deputy 
Twesten, he said, had surmised that he, Bismarck, used foreign policy 
only as a means for furthering the domestic struggle against parlia-
mentary claims. He denied the accusation absolutely. "For me 
foreign affairs are ends in themselves and are superior to the others 
[that is, internal affairs]. And you," he said to the liberals, "should 
also think so, for under some future liberal ministry you could very 
quickly regain in foreign affairs the ground which you may have lost in 
domestic affairs."32 
It may be doubted whether Bismarck, pressed to do so in an ex-
tensive debate, could have defended the position which he took, in fact 
whether he even fully believed his own words. Once again he was 
exaggerating to support his main idea. It is even more doubtful 
whether he could have maintained the proposition as one of general 
application. Questions of internal and of foreign affairs are so inter-
connected that one can hardly gauge exactly the significance of one as 
over against the other. Certainly in the case of German unification 
"Ibid" pp. 137-3ft 
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the problem was created not by foreign affairs but by internal develop-
ments. Diplomacy responded to this change in German society and 
fulfilled the popular desire for national unity. While Prussian ad-
vantage as a power-state coincided with this popular movement, the 
latter force initiated the situation in which the former could act. 
The validity of Bismarck's estimate arises from the fact that a least 
temporarily and on the surface he made it valid. He did unify Ger-
many by way of foreign affairs, diplomacy and war, and in spite of the 
hostility of the public. He did correctly recognize that at the time 
Austria's aversion to German unity could be overcome solely by war. 
He accurately estimated the weakness of the other German states and 
predicted correctly that once Prussia showed determination, the govern-
ments of those states would adjust themselves to the inevitability of 
German unity under Prussian leadership.ss He misjudged the value 
and strength of the internal forces in this work, just as the liberals 
may have underrated the significance of the international aspect of 
national unification. The liberals had no concrete and dearly 
enunciated method to offer for the ultimate ousting of Austria as a 
German power. They had no force to oppose to it, and unless broken 
up by nationalism, Austria would not have acquiesced without com-
pulsion in the klein-deutsch solution. If they erred in the case of 
Austria, they were more likely correct with respect to France. By 
their method of unification war with France could probably have 
been avoided. It is quite thinkable that in time the liberals might 
have unified the non-Austrian states by peaceful means, and that 
neither Austria nor France would have dared to interfere. By flouting 
liberal popular support for so long and so flagrantly, Bismarck had to 
recover the support of the German people by some dramatic events like 
the wars against Austria and France and thereby arouse the public to 
press their particularistic rulers and governments into accepting na-
tional unification. Even apart from that fact he had chosen the method 
of power politics and involved himself in a system which practically 
assured a war with both countries. In the case of Bismarck and the 
liberals, internal and international affairs were inextricably inter-
connected, and neglect of one needed to be counterbalanced by an ac-
centuation of the other. The liberals' weakness-too great a con-
centration on the internal factors-was never proved because of lack 
of opportunity for action; but Bismarck's exaggeration of the role of 
"Ibid., pp. 192-93. 
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international diplomacy and war had results which were permanently 
harmful to German life. 
It was unfortunate that Bismarck inherited the constitutional con-
flict and felt compell~d to fight the liberals. He himself regretted the 
fact,34 for actually he and the liberals agreed in their fundamental con-
ception of German unity, and each needed the abilities of the other. 
The King's stubborness had created a situation which prevented Bis-
marck from utilizing one of the three means of unification which he 
had recognized. He had to forego popular support and to rely upon 
diplomacy and war to a much greater extent than he had anticipated. 
The effects were bad upon him as well, in that he henceforth tended 
to belittle internal affairs and to look for solutions- of these problems 
in the play of international power politics. Nonetheless, he kept in 
mind his plan of 1858, and as soon as the Austro-Prussian war was won, 
he again, and this time successfully, endeavored to associate the people 
with his work of unification. The German constitution bears the 
evidence of the cooperation. A figure of less stature might have en-
deavored to impose a constitution upon Germany which would have 
excluded popular participation in a representative assembly. Bis-
marck recognized that national unity made no sense and would have 
no permanence without the cooperation of the nation. 
What did each of the four forces, the King, the liberals, the Con-
servatives, and Bismarck, know about the plans of the others for 
~national unification? The ideas of the liberals and the Conservatives 
were well known. These parties depended upon public discussion for 
the effectiveness of their programs. The King's attitude was also pub-
lic. Stories of such incidents as the following went the rounds of the 
liberals and, together with their knowledge of the tame and in-
effective course of the current Foreign Minister's German policy, made 
the liberal public pessimistic about the King's willingness to take any 
significant measures toward unity. Von Hoverbeck related the in-
cident in a private letter of January, 1862: 
Today at twelve o'clock there took place in the Opera House 
[in Berlin] a concert for the navy. The Berlin choral society 
had brought together 1,500 singers for it. The remaining seats 
in the Opera House with the exception of the first row of boxes 
were fairly well filled; this row, however, was intentionally emp-
ty, for practically not a single army officer was present. The 
King and Queen were present. Next to the last song was one 
about Old Bliicher, "The Armies Remain on the Rhine," and 
could be regarded as- a threat to France. The King listened to i,t 
.. Zechlin, op. cit., p. 324; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 102. 
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with great satisfaction, and then left quickly, immediately before 
the first notes of "The German's Fatherland." But the public 
here has good sense and knows in its turn how to demonstrate. 
As soon as the King left the box and the first four notes of "The 
German's Fatherland" were sung, the audience interrupted the 
song by energetic applause in the middle of the first line, an 
unprecedented event. The song was rendered by the 1,500 
voices with much love and joy and received stormy applause. 
About the fact itself there is nothing further to say than "Our 
poor country."35 
With respect to Bismarck, the liberals knew about his ideas, that 
he favored Prussia's taking the intitiative for klein-deutsch unification, 
that he wished the German central authority to have power over mili-
tary and commercial affairs, and that he advocated the creation of a 
national assembly as part of that government. They were appalled 
at Bismark's assertions about "blood and iron," and about legality'S 
being that which force makes valid.36 Such assertions ran utterly 
counter to their moral sense. They were even more repelled by his 
behavior in the constitutional conflict and refused to believe that a 
person could follow a liberal policy in German unification while seek-
ing to destroy, as they thought, the constitution in his own state. As 
Deputy von Sybel said in the Lower House, January 29,1863: "How one 
can expect that one can question the entire legal power of the Prussian 
parliament and at the same time interest the German people in a Ger-
man parliament under the same auspices? This is something that goes 
beyond the limits of my limited understanding as a subject (beschriink-
ter Untertanenverstanll)."37 The liberals felt such mistrust of Bismarck 
that they refused to support him in his program of national unifica-
tion, a program of the same general content as their own.3S 
The Economic 1nterest 
The Bremer Handelsblatt served as a leading organ of expression 
for liberalism and for national unification. Its editor had close con-
tacts with others of like mind all over Germany. As much as any 
other, this journal can be considered a spokesman for ,the Prussian 
liberals. The personnel worked together in the National Verein, the 
Congress of German Economists, and the other important associations . 
• 6 Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 8. 
a. Rothfels, op. cit., p .. 133. 
3. A dress-De batte, p. 228 . 
• 8 On liberals' knowledge of Bismarck's plans, see Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 324-25; 
Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 87-88, 102; Heinrich von Poschinger (ed.), Erinnerungen 
aus dem Leben von Hans Viktor von Unruh (Stuttgart, 1895), pp. 207-09, 216·17. 
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The Handelsblatt reported all the economic activities of the time and 
supported all those making for national unity along liberal principles. 
The following article, published on July 11, 1857, may be read as the 
expression of its views as well those of its Pruss ian colleagues. 
Whoever in Germany could write about the economy and the 
commercial policy without touching politics would make himself 
extremely beloved in the highest circles and would not be un-
welcome even among burghers [the article here used the word to 
refer to citizens]. The governments would easily give a patent 
to anyone who knew how to isolate the entire economic area as 
a contented idyll in which land and people would quietly and 
obediently carryon their material progress and would bear in 
their hearts exclusively the political feeling of gratitude toward 
the high officials, the furtherers of their fortune. ,Many a good 
burgher agrees with the boldest national economic liberalism 
but lets his voice noticeably drop at every approach to the really 
political aspect. Such views, high and low, prove most clearly 
that we in Germany are in both respects still in the beginning of 
our development. Whoever looks at the situation without pre-
judice and fear will recognize immediately the intimate connec-
tion especially in Germany of the national economic with the na-
tional political problem, this Alpha and Omega of German poli-
tics. The commerce and transportation of a country have in spite 
of the egoism among individuals a common aspect. They demand 
one law, one legislation, one defence abroad. This need has 
been satisfied in all other countries which we may mention, but 
not in Germany. A common code of commercial law is now slow-
ly struggling to life; a common legislation is a pious wish, and 
abroad we all enjoy the same right, defencelessness. Now there 
are people who like, for example, the Geestemiinde trade in its 
Geestemiinde particularity as something specifically Hanoverian, 
and are able to close their eyes to the fact of its undeniable Weser 
nature. There are others who judge the transit tolls solely by 
whether their preservation is more advantageous to Stettin or 
their abolition more favorable to Hamburg. With people of 
such exceptional gifts and views we have nothing to do. The 
Bremer Handelsblatt has sought to represent the interests of 
German commerce and still seeks to do so. But we have some-
thing to say to and about such people. 
The great evil of German disunity is denied by no one, but 
we have grown accustomed to bear it. To throw it off seems 
to us too bold a hope. Petty sufferings, on the other hand, anger, 
excite, make wild. Since they do not burden us continuously, 
sensitive trade has not yet blunted itself against them. We have 
recently discussed these daily vexations. We have called atten-
tion to a supreme railroad committee, have shaken the transit. 
tolls, have sought with the idea of an econoinic congress to 
arouse continuing, all-sided agitation. We may twist and turn as 
we will: a solution of this and all other related questions is 
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possible only within the realm of national politics. To avoid 
this area in the discussion of these questions is inconceivable. 
For where do these needs and demands lead to? To the one de-
mand of impartial justice, unified representation of common 
interests prior to and above particular ones. That is nothing 
else than another expression for the demands of national politics. 
Four years later, on May 31, 1861, another organ for advancing the 
views of Prussian liberals and nationalists, the W ochenschrift des 
NationaFVereins, was assertive and specific about the relation between 
economics and politics. 
We suffer everywhere in the most important nerve for the entire 
economy, namely, in confidence iI?- our o~ state po~er, which 
is so necessary for all trade and 10dustrIal undertak1Ogs. We 
lack the protection and support for enterprise and speculation 
which develop with an international poliucal position of states 
which command respect. Instead, we enjoy the doubtful benefit 
of paternalism, of a system of much governance, which hinders 
us 10 the development of our tr.ade and in?l!stry. . 
Capital has no confidence 10 the stabIlity and durauon of a 
confederation which rests solely upon common dynastic inter-
ests and has never done or even wished to do anything beneficial 
for the material interests of the people. The capitalists there-
fore seek opportunity for advantageous outlay of money on the 
stock exchange rather than in national production. Therefore, 
one has on the average to use much less money in industrial 
enterprises in Germany than in other industrial states. The 
German industrialist is also seldom in a position to exploit a 
favorable situation on the world market, but is always exposed 
disadvantageously to such situations. The larger capital sum in-
vested in industry is assured of its interest and can more easily 
save funds because it has the advantages of large-scale operations. 
The smaller industrial capital must save on wages, on the 
quality of the raw materials or of the products themselves. The 
results have become very perceptible in many branches of Ger-
man industry. The low wages in Germany have driven the good 
workers abroad, and the poor-quality wares have ruined the 
market. 
The complaints of the W ochenschrift represented a refinement 
upon the more basic ones expressed by the other journal. Both criti-
cisms were justified; those of the Handelsblatt were much more fre-
quent. If they were taken care of, the others would be met auto-
matically. Public opinion concentrated upon overcoming institu-
tional deficiencies. The acceptance of a common German economic 
legal code, the reorganization of the Zollverein to give it body and 
authority to act, the establishment of common citizenship and of the 
right of freedom of movement and domicile and occupation, the crea-
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tion of a unified transportation and communication system, the forma-
tion of a German consular service abroad and of organs of power at 
home able to protect and further German economic interests abroad, 
the introduction of a uniform system of weights, measures and coinage 
-these constituted the main economic desires, and all implied the 
organization of national political unity. As the Bremer Handelsblatt 
had declared, politics and economics were inseparable; the furtherance 
of economic interests in Germany required political unification. 
The intimate relation between liberalism and nationalism was evi-
dent in every line of desired reform. The life of the German states, 
declared the Bremer Handelsblatt, was becoming increasingly inter-
dependent. 
It is not possible that Oldenburg and Bremen should for long ex-
perience the advantages of free interest rates while Hanover 
continues to believe the church fathers rather than science. It 
is not possible for Bavaria and Hanover to preserve guilds, to 
which Saxony and Wiirttemberg have given the deathblow. For 
good or evil, Prussia must soon introduce the economic reforms 
in which Austria and the middle states have taken the lead. 
And as soon as Prussia raises its foot for this forward march, its 
freedom of movement, its ... freedom of occupation will be ir-
resistibly contagious. . . . The economic reform movement in 
the end conquers reaction, for it attracts the more teachable 
members of this party and victoriously drives the others off the 
field.39 
This line of thinking led the liberals and nationalists to believe that 
in the economic sphere of life as well as the political, they had the 
forces of history on their side. It offeI:ed a source of great confidence 
in the outcome. 
Of basic importance among the demands for economic reform was 
the question of freedom of movement throughout Germany. The 
resolution passed by the Congress of German Economists in 1863 will 
indicate the nature of the problem. The resolution read in major part 
as follows: 
1. Everyone, irrespective of the community, state or nation to 
which he may belong, shall be permitted to live in any place 
where he wishes, to carryon any occupation which is permitted, 
to marry and establish a family, to acquire property in land. 
2. This right shall not be limited to natives or be dependent 
upon reciprocity or the payment of immigration tax or upon 
other burdensome and restricting conditions . 
•• Feb. 23. 1861. 
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3. The right to domicile does not include automatically the 
right of citizenship and community membership. Nonetheless, 
the latter right should be attainable if one has maintain~d his 
domicile continuously in a community for three years wIthout 
becoming a public charge .... 
5. The right to carryon an occupation is included in that of 
domicile and may not be made dependent upon the previous 
acquisition of state or community citizenship. 
6. The permission to marry shall depend solely upon the 
terms of the general civil law, and shall not depend upon the 
permission of the community of residence or citizenship, or upon 
a preliminary examination and approval by a state or other 
police bureau, or upon evidence of a livelihood or upon other 
burdensome and restricting conditions. 
7. The acquisition of state and community citizenship is to be 
made as easy as possible; if membership in the community also 
includes legal property requirements, an admission fee cor-
responding to the latter may be raised.40 
Nothing is as revealing of the practical import of the resolution as 
contemporary descriptions of actual conditions. The press constantly 
supplied evidence of the most condemnatory sort. An article in the 
National Zeitung of October 10, 1863, reproduced the feeling of 
exasperation as well as any. 
When in a great land inhabited by one people the thousands 
of communities which it contains shut themselves off one against 
the other, not in respect to material goods and capital but in 
respect to the most important good and the most valuable capital 
there is, namely, the movement of human beings; when in this 
people that has one language, more or less extensive groups of 
communities are united in states and these states in relation to 
the movement of persons close their frontiers against one another 
through new restrictions and seek as far as possible to keep out 
any immigrant from another group as a "foreigner" or as the 
ancients called him, a "barbarian": can one wonder that this 
land and people are disunited and lack the common feeling 
which is indispensable for national cooperation? If we look at 
the lands where national feeling and national cooperation have 
developed, freedom of movement obtains everywhere not merely 
within the nation but also for entry from other nations; for the 
foreigners which a people attracts and absorbs serve, so one be-
lieves there with justice, to augment economic strength and 
political significance. In Germany alone there survive from out-
worn times obsolete conditions where each state and each town 
encloses itself by a police wall and a swampy communal moat 
so that no one will think of moving there and increasing the 
.0 Vierteljahrschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Kulturgeschichte (1863), III, 261-62. 
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capital, the division of labor and the tax resources. And i~ these 
abiding conditions of inner defence from which d~mestIc hos-
tility is bound to follow, we wonder why national umty does not 
progress! One longs for conventions of delegates, reform of the 
confederation, Kaiser and Reich; but if we acquired Kaiser and 
Reich and continued to shut ourselves off one from another, 
Kaiser and Reich would be just. as powerless as before. 'For 
without the moral and economic basis of a unified consciousness 
unified constitutions remain dead forms. We see liberal town 
councils today jubilantly unfold the black, red and gold flag: 
and tomorrow they stick their heads together in secret session 
and discuss long and carefully whether they should allow a Hes-
sian or a Saxon to regard his district as part of the fatherland. 
Is that a fatherland which turns away from the door its son who 
does not want to steal or to be given his bread, who wishes to 
earn his bread by ability and hard work? Is that a fatherland 
which shuts him up in the village where he was born? Can a 
people become conscious of its unity when unity is not allowed 
for the utilization of its forces and the winning of its material 
existence? Unified government by one army can bring together 
or break up the nations according to the interests of the ruler. 
What holds them securely together is one fatherland. So long as 
we in Germany do not have that one fatherland, unified rule will 
rest on a weak foundation. If we have one fatherland, political 
unity will come of itself; for a people which has become inter-
dependent in its material conditions of life cannot be politically 
divided. 
Man has the need of a fatherland. No guild, no magistrate or 
senate can disprove that fact. And the more railroads and 
telegraphs we build, the more industry and commerce we carry 
on, just so much more grows the need for a fatherland. For 
with the cheapness and ease of transportation, the human being 
develops. He develops in himself the need for movement; the 
area which he needs for his activity expands. Man is not a plant, 
which is rooted to the soil; he is more than an animal, which is 
distinguished from the plant by its movement. If you degrade 
him in his own land below the animal to the condition of a 
plant, which cannot move from the spot where chance sowed it, 
then he will seek a fatherland abroad which you deny him at 
home. He will go beyond the Rhine or the Channel or the 
ocean. These are the best persons, those who have the irresisti-
ble urge for a fatherland of free participation. They are the 
best forces, the most courageous, which move to uncertain lands 
and most easily separate themselves from the home community. 
Is that a useful institution which invests valuable capital in the 
workers only to have it exported without compensation at home, 
which makes the workers skilled and then drives them out be-
cause their skill might lay hands on the old pigtails [the sur-
vivals of the Old Regime]? 
And as for those who stay at home ... how much devotion to 
the old fatherland do you expect from them when in it only a 
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poor local district is open for their endeavors and every other 
door is closed and barricaded, when from youth they are accus-
tomed to long for the foreign land where uncle and godfather 
made their fortune, because there a big fatherland in all com-
munities gladly opened up even to the adopted sons, while for 
those at home every fatherland was taken away by the chaos of 
irrational legislation ... ? 
We will first of all create for the Germans by freedom of 
movement the conditions which are most desired, a fatherland. 
Thereby we shall retain the strength and ability which grow so 
richly in our soil and shall attract strength and ability from 
other nations which are willing to work with us for our wel-
fare, honor and power. By freedom of movement we create a 
common spirit and national feeling, welfare and contentment. 
And to create this high, national benefit, we need no complicated 
negotiation between large and small sovereignties; no position of 
power, great or small, will be endangered; no freedom, no right 
restricted. We need nothing at all other than that people be 
reasonable. And whatever government, whatever popular repre-
sentative assembly first opens its land to full freedom of move-
ment will immediately enjoy the advantage of a rising standard 
of living. And in the competition among the states that exists 
in Germany the example of advantage will stimulate imitation. 
It is a relatively easy task and in relation to the effort the results 
are infinitely rewarding. Therefore, let everyone work in his 
circle, in his tribe and in his land, everyone who is honorably 
concerned over the German problem, whether he be gross-
deutsch or klein-deutsch, that economically speaking, a father-
land be given the Germansl 
The editor of the Bremer Handelsblatt correctly asserted in 1863 
that "the German actually enjoys in England, France, America and 
other states more rights than in his own fatherland, for as soon as he 
puts foot upon those countries he can freely settle, freely work, freely 
acquire land, and without any official difficulty marry as he pleases. 
Millions of Germans have much more interest in these material rights 
than in the more ideal political rights."41 
Equally fundamental appeared to these liberals the issue of free-
dom of occupation. It was so closely related to that of freedom of 
movement that the two were usually treated together. "No economic 
question in Germany is at present so burning and so urgently in need 
of a speedy solution," stated the Bremer Handelsblatt, "as that of free-
dom of occupation." Bremen, for example, had in 1858 guild restric-
tions upon shoemaking, but freedom in clothing production; the 
making of bread was restricted to guilds, but that of cakes was free; 
U Ibid., p. 84. 
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beer-brewing was restricted, but the preparation of other spiritous 
drinks, for example champagne, was free. Offenbach had enjoyed full 
freedom of occupation since 1819 and had flourished. It had in-
creased two-and-a-half fold in population since then, from 6,000 to 
15,000, and had 5,000 factory workers. Many states forbade or restFict-
ed the import of furniture in order to protect the local guilds. Among 
these were Saxony, Altenburg, Dessau, Oldenburg, Bremen and Han-
over, but not Prussia. Many of them placed obstacles in the way of 
the sale of men's clothes for the same reason. The Berlin Merchants' 
Association objected to these prohibitions, but under the conditions of 
particularism it could do nothing except protest and agitate for na-
tional unity.42 
The question of freedom of occupation affected far more lines of 
activity than those of the handworkers. In terms of economics alone 
the handicrafts could hardly be placed in the same class of importance 
with, for instance, another line of activity which was equally curbed, 
the insurance business. Because of the character of this enterprise it 
suffered greatly from the lack of national economic unity. The 
strength of an insurance company usually varied with its size. Once 
it established headquarters in one state, it wished to send agents into 
other states. Since its business depended upon the number and 
efficiency of these agents, it needed to open the entire national market 
for its activity and might suffer irreparable hardship if restricted to 
one or a few states, no one of which with the possible exception of 
Prussia was large enough to support it. The meetings of the Congress 
of German Economists and of the German Chamber of Commerce 
resounded with the lamentations of insurance ~xecutives, whose descrip-
tions of the legal conditions under which their business operated in 
the various states offered revealing insight into the economic effects of 
particularism upon a developing capitalistic business. 
The report to the Congress of German Economists by a Prussian 
insurance executive may be used as an example.43 The insurance 
business, the author stated, was subject to both public and private 
law. Since thirty-four sovereign states would as yet allow no such 
thing as a common code of public law to be introduced, he restricted 
his remarks to private law aspects. He emphasized that the inmrance 
.. Bremer Handelsblatt, April 3, 1858; Der Arbeitgeber (ed. Max Wirth). Oct. 13. 
1858. No. 107. Supplement; Bremer Handelsblatt, Sept. 25. 1858. Aug. 20. 1859 . 
• 8 The following details are taken from the report made by Richter of Magde-
burg to the Congress of German Economists in September. 1865. The histories of 
insurance companies are also worth reading. 
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business depended upon magnitude to fulfill its purpose. The larger 
.the coverage, the greater was the risk spread; and he scoffed at the 
official insurance companies of some of the small states which had an 
insurance sum of, for example, from 4.7 million Thalers (Lippe-
Schaumburg) to 16 million (Lippe-Detmold). He contrasted these 
amounts with the lowest, namely, 70 or 80 million, for each of the 
private insurance corporations, and concluded that in the case of fire 
iI;lsurance the loss on a single major policy for one of the small public 
companies would use up its premium payments for months. Worse 
than this petty playing at economic sovereignty, he said, were the 
obstacles to business. Laws, regulations, administrative whim, all 
scourged the insurance companies. Prussia had cleared out much of 
this array of controls but in. the other st;lles it remained triumphant. 
The reporter cited the case of Saxony. After the passage of an in-
surance law in 1863 the administration had issued a regulation for fire 
insurance 'of eighty-three paragraphs, some of them a foot long. Then 
it ordered the companies to submit their insurance terms to be checked 
against the regulation. After a year's time even the bureaucrats gave 
up, said that they could not judge whether the terms were in agreement 
with the regulation or not, and ordered the companies to include in 
their contracts a statement to the effect that "in so far as the following 
general insurance terms do not correspond to the laws and regulations 
in the Kingdom of Saxony, the legal conditions are to replace them in 
any insurance contract in Saxony." The companies refused to accept 
this proposed solution, and in 1865 the dispute was still being nego-
tiated with no prospect of settlement. 
In the case of fire insurance, the reporter continued, every state in 
the Confederation except Schleswig-Holstein and the four free cities, 
that is, twenty-nine states in all, required official concession for doing 
business. In many cases other insurance lines were subject to similar 
restrIctIOn. Insurance agents, for example, in many states were not 
allowed to solicit business. Yet how could an insurance company be 
expected to have an agent in each village or to rely upon a local peasant 
to make out policies? In Bavaria, in consequence, the peasants re-
mained unprotected in case of fire, and numerous begging letters were 
circulated on behalf of peasants who had been burned out. The num-
ber became so large that the government, responsible for the ban on 
soliciting fire insurance business, had instructed its officials to inform 
the peasants about fire insurance and to advise the latter to take out 
policies. The reporter remarked that a simpler and more economical 
method would have been to remove the restrictions on the activity of 
insurance agents. 
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Twenty-two states had public monopolies in fire insurance, no one 
of which was large enough to provide adequate security. Private com-
panies could compete with these, but were subject to numerous ad-
ministrative restrictions. The reporter was irate over the fact that, de-
pending upon the scope of its activity, a fire insurance company might 
have to know all the terms of regulations pertaining to its business in 
each of twenty-nine states, all of them different. First, the company 
had to obtain the concession to do business in the state; for that pur-
pose it had to pay. Then its concession could be cancelled arbitrarily 
at any moment for any cause which the government might find. In 
order to prevent itself from falling into the bad graces of the local 
government, the bureaucrats as well as the ruler, the company had to 
be very careful in the selection of its agents. It dared not appoint a 
person who was politically objectionable to the local authorities. The 
company and each agent in some states had to give to each government 
a surety for good behavior, in Schwarzburg-Sondershausen a sum 
amounting to 1,000 Thaler for each agent. Then came the taxes. 
Some states demanded half the profits. Some imposed a host of petty 
taxes, which they would commute for an annual percentage or lump 
sum. One little state demanded a percentage of the insurance sum so 
that in case of need it could help those who had not insured their 
property, a stipulation which particularly angered the reporter. An-
other petty state wrote the companies that they would have to com-
mute the small state fees for a definite sum or, the threat was implied, 
their concession would be cancelled. "One could hardly say more 
elegantly in German bureaucratic style," remarked the reporter, " 'your 
purse or your life!' " 
The state governments claimed that they used the funds obtained 
from the taxes and other financial imposts upon the insurance com-
panies "for purposes of general welfare." The reporter had investi-
gated the nature of these "purposes" in the state of Hesse-Darmstadt 
and had found that most of the money went to support the military. 
Then it became clear to him why the ministers of war usually pro-
tested against changing the present system of concessions. The funds 
squeezed from out-of-state insurance companies run by liberals and 
nationalists were being devoted to the preservation of absolutism, 
militarism, and particularism in the middle-sized and small German 
states. Since most of the big insurance companies had their head-
quarters in Prussia, the ardent devotion of this branch of business to 
national unification and to economic freedom is understandable. 
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The Congress of German Economists summed up the demands for 
freedom of economic opportunity for the insurance business as follows: 
1. The formation of insurance companies is to be dependent 
upon the approval of t~e state only to the extent that ~t is 
necessary in order to obtam the character of a legal personalIty. 
2. The insurance companies do not need a police permit or a 
concession to do business in any German state. 
3. The requirement of insurance purchase~s .to use exclusivel'y 
a state (provincial or communal) or other pnvIleged company IS 
abolished. 
4. It is not permissible to grant the state and other pri-
vileged companies release from the payment of general fees and 
burdens levied by law. 
5. It is not permissible to impose upon private companies 
special taxes and burdens; they should be subject only to the 
general ones. 
6. State action with respect to the conduct of the insurance 
business should be restricted to supervision in the wider sense of 
the word. 
To carry out that program meant a revolution in social structure and 
in the purpose and character of government, and that was precisely 
what these liberals and nationalists sought. 
The banks had to contend with a situation equally chaotic. During 
the 1850s many new banks had been establlshed in Prussia and in the 
other states. Those in the smaller states had almost no clientele for 
their services within their home territories and were founded for the 
specific purpose of exploiting the urgent demand for capital in the 
large states, especially Prussia. These banks put out large amounts of 
paper money and expected to profit from the business. Understanding 
their intention, the Prussian government in 1858 prohibited the circu-
lation of non-Prussian bank notes within its territory, to the dismay 
of the outside banks and to the bitter disappointment of Prussian busi-
ness men, liberals and nationalists. The Prussian economic leaders, 
eager for funds to invest in the expanding industrial and transportation 
systems, accused the government of retarding this development in the 
name of an antiquated autocratic mercantilism. The prohibition, 
they declared, made Prussia extremely unpopular in the rest of Ger-
many; it was a source of "genuine pain to every patriot .... No 
measure of recent times has antagonized opinion in Germany against 
the Prussian government to the same great extent as this one has .... 
It has called forth and will continue to call forth reprisals from other 
states against Prussia. It is likewise preventing Prussian industry from 
obtaining money which it urgently needs in the present crisis [1859]; 
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probably 30 millions [Thalers] have been kept from it by this act."44 
To the liberals the act resembled closely the policy of the reactionary 
Manteuffel government, which a few years earlier had requested the 
Berlin banks not to participate in the founding of foreign, that is non-
Pruss ian, economic institutions.45 
Even as careful and thorough a business man as Gustav Mevissen, 
the leader in the economic development of the Rhineland, roundly 
condemned the Prussian and other governments for such prohibitions 
and asked for reform. In a memorandum of 1859 he wrote that this 
and similar prohibitions in other states violated the purpose of the 
Zollverein to create a nationwide market and the aim of Prussia to 
make moral conquests in the rest of German. He urged that the banks 
be free to issue paper money and that this money be free to circulate 
in all German states. A clearing house could be established in Berlin, 
he said, in which the money could be exchanged, and no state would 
suffer from a flood of extra-state paper. He paid a strong tribute to the 
good judgment of the bankers, citing the fact that under their guidance 
the present banks had survived two crises and concluding that they 
were worthy of trust in the future.46 The numerous remarks of other 
private bankers made clear that Mevissen spoke for practically all; with 
very minor exceptions they recognized the relation between banking 
prosperity on the one hand and freedom and national unity on the 
other. 
The cry among liberals and nationalists for a common system of 
weights, measures and coinage could be heard all over Germany. Ir-
respective of differences over the proposals for unifying the nation 
politically, those millions of individuals who had dealings with persons 
in other German states sought the abolition of the current chaos and 
the introduction of common standards of measurement. 
The extent of the confusion may be seen from a contemporary 
example. On May II, 1861, the Bremer Handelsblatt published a list 
showing that, exclusive of Holstein and Luxemburg-Limburg, eight 
different monetary systems were used in Germany. Some states used 
the Thaler unit, some the Gulden, some the Mark. Stories were told 
of the difficulties with the coinage systems which a housemaid en-
countered in purchasing food supplies in the market: she had to be a 
mathematical expert to make correct change. Problems of book-
keeping for firms were even more forbidding . 
.. Berliner B6rsen Zeitung, Jan. 7, Feb. 12, 1859 . 
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The situation was improved by the declaration in 1857 that the one-
Thaler coin should be regarded as standard in the Zollverein alongside 
the double-Thaler coin already used since 1838_ Particularly after 
1857 the amount minted in this Zollverein currency greatly increased 
in proportion to that coined in the state currencies. It has been esti-
mated that between 1838 and 1857 a little more than 50 million Thalers 
were minted in the form of Zollverein coins (the double-Thaler), while 
80 million Thalers were struck in the form of South German currency. 
Between 1857 and 1871, some 229 million Thalers were put out in the 
Zollverein currency (one- and two-Thaler pieces) and coins struck in 
the form of territorial currencies amounted to only 6.33 million 
Thalers.47 Nonetheless, as late as May, 1870, Ludwig Bamberger de-
scribed the situation to the Customs Parliament as follows: 
I have here a so-called "bordereau," namely, a table setting 
forth specifically the types of money which a trader enclosed 
with a draft to his bankers. The "bordereau" is dated the 19th 
December 1869. It relates to a sum of 15,834 gulden. I have 
extracted it from the correspondence of a bank. It contains the 
coins of which these 15,834 gulden were composed, and in order 
that you might understand its true meaning, I must add that the 
draft came from a small town in the province of Rhenish Hes-
sen. The town is small, 3,000 to 4,000 inhabitants, and has but 
a single inn-not sufficiently attractive to be frequented by 
strangers. It is a payment composed of receipts from rents, pur-
chase agreements, and from sales of wheat, barley, fruit, and 
similar products, brought from the various surrounding villages 
into this small town to be sold through the agency of a merchant. 
What was thus collected from the pockets of the peasants is as 
follows: The sum of 15,834 gulden consisted of double talers, 
crown talers, pieces of 2Y2 gulden, of 2 gulden, 1 gulden, Y2 
gulden, 'lj, Y6 and 1I12 Imperial talers, 5-franc pieces, 2-franc 
pieces, I-franc pieces, then we have gold coins such as pis toles, 
double and single Friedrichsdor, half-sovereigns, Russian Im-
perials, dollars, Napoleons, Dutch Wilhelmsdor, Austrian and 
Wiirttemberg ducats, Hessian 10-gulden pieces, and last of all a 
piece of Danish gold.48 
To supply comparable examples in weights and measures seems 
superfluous. Since the situation was as chaotic in this field as in cur-
rency, the Congress of German Economists and the German Com-
mercial Association zealously passed resolutions in favor of unity. 
Nationalism had become a practical problem of persuading the states 
to accept as the basic units meter, liter, and thaler, and these two 
.. Karl Helfferich, Money (New York, 1927). I, 150-51. 
··Ibid., I, 147-48. 
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prominent associations took the lead for the liberals and nationalists 
in pressing the reform.49 
Particularism manifested itself in one of its most irritating and 
embarrassing forms in the levying of river and transit tolls. These tolls 
were historical vestiges, bearable in a predominantly agricultural and 
localistic society, anathema to an economy of expanding commerce 
and developing industry. Questions of cost of distribution and 
ability to compete were intimately involved with those of national 
pride. 
The tolls collected on goods in transit across German territory to 
other countries were in the main abolished in 1860 by general agree-
ment among the Zollverein members. The states decided that it was 
more profitable to keep the trade to Russia and Austria, for example, 
using the Zollverein ports and railways and waterways than it was to 
see this trade shifted respectively to Russian Baltic and to Adriatic 
ports. One international transit toll continued to be raised and to 
evoke severe criticism on the part of those suffering from it. That was 
the toll imposed by Baden upon goods shipped from German ports 
to Switzerland. Since the negotiations about it were involved with the 
other question of the tolls on the Rhine river, the two problems may 
be treated together. 
Attempts had previously been made to lower the tolls on the Rhine 
and to persuade the riparian states to improve the stream bed. Two 
states in particular, Hesse and Nassau, had refused to make any con-
cessions. They derived large revenues from the tolls, which they need-
ed in maintaining their armies and paying other government expenses. 
Since the sums came in regularly, the governments were, to the extent 
of these funds, independent of financial control by the local legisla-
tures, a fact which enhanced the liberal's wrath. 
Baden made its abolition of the transit tolls dependent upon the 
abolition of the Rhine tolls. The Bremer Handelsblatt published 
Oanuary 28, 1860) the following figures on the amount of revenue 
which each Rhenish state would lose by the elimination of the river 
tolls: 
Prussia 
Nassau 
Hesse 
Bavaria 
Baden 
398,200 Francs (approx.) 
176,969 
157,600 
6,585 
5,957 
Pn 1,000 inhabitants 
21.99 Francs 
406.10 
182.62 
1.42 
4.46 
•• See the resolutions in 1861 and 1865 of the German Commercial Association 
in Bremer Handelsblatt, May 25, 1861, Sept. 30, 1865. 
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In view of these figures, the journal commented, one can appreciate 
why Nassau and Hesse should oppose the complete abolition of the 
Rhine tolls and Baden should favor it. At the time of this article, 
Prussia, Nassau and Hesse were willing to lower the tolls by one-sixth 
if Baden would abolish the transit tolls, but Baden refused. 
The Bremer Handelsblatt was vigorously hostile to Baden's position, 
calling it an "un-German particularist policy." "According to the re-
cently published agreement between Baden and the French Eastern 
Railway," it said, "Baden obligates itself to turn international trade 
to the French railways. The constantly declining returns from transit 
tolls show that the low sea-freight rates of the German North Sea ports 
are unable to provide the German railways with a large amount of 
work in the transport of raw materials to Switzerland and Austria as 
long as that unfortunate toll remains."50 "For the paltry toll income 
of 400,000 Thalers a year," it stated, "Germany is losing out to France 
in the transit trade," trade which for Switzerland alone in 1858 amount-
ed to 272 million francs. The paper damned the transit toll as "a 
betrayal of the most sacred interests of our nation when one thinks 
that that sum of which Germany each year is made poorer accrues to 
the same country [France] which threatens the greatest danger to our 
independence and safety."51 
Baden's determined stand and especially the development of rail-
roads as competitive means of transportation created conditions which 
inclined even Hesse and Nassau to consider a substantial reduction 
of Rhine tolls. The toll income of these states was declining; traffic 
on the Rhine threatened to cease; the representative assemblies in the 
two states disliked having their states bla~ed for this misfortune; the 
governments showed some willingness to negotiate. Baden invited the 
riparian states to a conference, where in December, 1860, agreement 
was reached. The river tolls were substantially reduced and in return 
Baden agreed to abolish its transit tolL52 Nonetheless, the agreement 
did not solve the problem. Four years later the Cologne Chamber of 
Commerce reported that tolls were still too high and that in conse-
quence the river traffic was decidedly declining. Competition from 
railroads, it prophesied, would ruin the river traffic unless these tolls 
were eliminated. "It is one of the blackest spots in the public condi-
tions of Germany," stated the chamber in its annual report for 1864, 
50 Ibid., Jan. 7, 1860. 
"Ibid., March 10, 17, 1860 . 
•• See Rudolf von Delbriick, Lebenserinnemngen (Leipzig, 1905). II, 191. 
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"that our most important stream, which if we did not have it as a gift 
of nature could not be built for hundreds of millions of Thalers, is 
headed for disuse and desertion because of these excessive and unjust 
tolls."li3 
The freeing of the Elbe river from tolls proved to be equally diffi-
cult. According to Article III of the Treaty of Vienna, both rivers, 
the Elbe and the Rhine, were to have such tolls as would "encourage 
commerce and facilitate navigation," and the agreement of the same 
time with respect to navigation on the Elbe had contained in Article 
30 a stipulation that the Elbe Commission should "consider arrange-
ments and measures which according to recent experience could facili-
tate commerce and shipping."54 Nonetheless, the riparian states had 
been unable to agree on any improvement. Austria, Saxony and the 
other states on the upper Elbe, Hamburg, and especially Prussia had 
endeavored to persuade the Elbe Commission to reduce tolls, but the 
three states near the mouth of the river, Hanover, Lauenburg, and 
Mecklenburg, depended upon the tolls to provide them with a con-
siderable part of their public revenue and up to 1860 had refused to 
budge. The illegality of their action was disputed or ignored by these 
three sovereign states, and unlike Hesse and Nassau they also owned 
the potentially competing railroads to the North Sea ports. Mecklen-
burg charged a high transit toll on the railroad, and both it and Han-
over profited from the freight charges on commodities going to Prussia, 
Austria, Saxony and elsewhere south and southeast. 
The first breach in the tight system of Elbe tolls occurred in 1860 
when Great Britain forced Hanover to abolish the Stade toll in return 
for a single lump payment. The Hanoverian foreign minister, Count 
Platen, was "deeply aroused" over this act and lamented that "from 
all sides one is storming Hanover and claiming financial sacrifices."55 
The Chamber of Commerce in Magdeburg, in its annual report for 
1861, reacted in a different manner. 
It is depressing and embarrassing for national feeling when 
one hears of plans to turn to foreign governments with com-
plaints about the Elbe tolls. To be sure, the history of the Stade 
toll teaches that this way is more practical than that of sending 
tedious and futile complaints to the native governments. The 
.3 Preuss. Handeisarchiv, 1864, Jahresberichte, pp. 524-26 . 
•• Ibid., 1859; I, 241. 
•• The formulation is Delbriick's. Delbriick conducted the negotiations for Prussia 
at the Elbe Conference in 1861. See Delbriick, op. cit., II, 190-95, for the story of 
the negotiations and the agreement of 1863. 
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intervention of America gave the impetus to abolishing the 
Sound tolls; the intervention of England moved Hanover to re-
treat from its excessive demands in return for regulating the 
Stade toll and to be satisfied with an indemnity which offered 
only half of its previous income. If such results are attainable by 
the intervention of a foreign government with respect to the 
Stade toll, which is based on an entirely different legal right, why 
should it not be effective in the case of the Elbe tolls, which con-
trary to all agreements serve as a financial aid and as a specific 
means for the Hanover state railways systematically to suppress 
certain branches of Elbe traffic? If Prussia would decide to pro-
ceed energetically in this affair and finally break with the 
method of fruitless conferences, it would assuredly gain the 
moral support of all civilized nations and would on at least one 
occasion show by action its supremacy in Germany and especially 
toward states which continually place petty obstacles in the way 
of the free, national and economic development of Prussia and 
Germany.56 
The goods transported on the Elbe were divided into seven cate-
gories, each of which paid a different toll. The Mecklenburg govern-
ment had arbitrarily introduced another classification, goods that were 
qualified for transportation by water and those that were not. The 
former included bulky commodities like coal on which the toll was 
not very high. The latter included coffee, tobacco, wine and spiritous 
drinks, yarns, spices, sugar, rags, zinc and so on, goods which were put 
in the highest class for tolls and could not have afforded water trans-
portation at all if Austria, Saxony and Prussia had not renounced their 
share of the toll. These latter three states had to do so, a semi-official 
writer in the Preussisches Handelsarchiv said bitterly (March 11, 1859), 
in order to keep any traffic on the Elbe. He showed by statistics how 
great the decline in freight on the river had been between 1845 and 
1858 in the two highest toll classes and how large the increase in goods 
carried by rail. 
Goods in the highest toll category 1845 
1857 
Loss of 
Goods in the second toll category 1852 
1857 
Loss of 
•• Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1861, Jahresberichte, p. 257. 
2,489,032 Centners 
131,357 
2,357,675 
436,504 
162,936 
273,568 
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Goods carried on railroad 
Increase of 
1851 
1857 
Amount of these subject to highest two 
categories of tolls 1853 
1857 
Increase of 
2,613,000 
7,007,000 
4,394,000 
1,991,000 
2,702,000 
711,000 
Mecklenburg was forcing the higher-priced goods to use the Berlin-
Hamburg railroad. The state manifestly derived more from transit 
tolls and freight charges than it did from river tolls; and in Hanover 
the state railway administration was even more opposed to reducing 
the Elbe tolls than the state toll administration.57 Both states were 
squeezing all the money possible out of the traffic. Since Mecklenburg 
was an almost feudal agrarian state it could scarcely be affected by 
reprisals; and Hanover, although more advanced economically and 
in every other way, enjoyed about equal immunity. Statistical proof 
of how one could derive more revenue from an increase in volume 
through lower toll rates did not seem to interest these states.58 
In 1861 the pressure upon the three obstructive states, Mecklen-
burg, Hanover and Lauenburg, became too strong to resist. The Ger-
man Commercial Association at its meeting in that year passed a strong 
resolution condemning the Mecklenburg transit toll on the railway 
and the Elbe tolls, and the agreement on the reduction of the Rhine 
tolls proved to be the turning point. Since the Elbe remained the 
only river in Germany heavily burdened by tolls, the offending states 
had to give in to the pressure of public opinion. At a conference of 
the Elbe states called in November, 1861, agreement was reached which 
decidedly lightened the burden. The agreement concentrated the pay-
ment of tolls at one place, Wittenberge; it cut the number of the classes 
of goods from seven to three and greatly reduced the amount of toll 
to be paid. It reallocated the proceeds from the tolls so that Hanover, 
Mecklenburg, Lauenburg and Anhalt received half and the other states 
received half; the others agreed to contribute 132,000 Thalers an-
nually to the four states making the greater sacrifice. 59 Although Han-
over and the other obstructionists lamented, they signed. 
G'Delbriick, op. cit., II, 193. 
O. See Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1859; I, 22, 241-44. 
O. Delbriick. op. cit., II, 194-95. 
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The Elbe agreement was generally approved by the business pub-
lic,60 just as the comparable one on the Rhine had been. It did not, 
however, solve the problem of the transit toll collected by Mecklenburg 
on the Berlin-Hamburg railway line. This was not eliminated until 
the latter joined the Zollverein in 1868; and the last of the river tolls 
succumbed only to the unification of the country in 1870-71.61 
Problems relating to the German railways were so complicated that 
the economic interests were divided and often confused in dealing 
with them. The one which stirred up most wrath was that of the 
differential freight rates. The seaport towns and developing big in-
dustry, especially coal, iron and steel, supported the existing practice 
of the railways of giving lower rates to traffic between major terminals 
wide distances apart. They did so on grounds of lower cost achieved 
by less handling of the goods en route and of the necessity to meet 
foreign competition. The large inland towns, Breslau, Magdeburg, 
Cologne and others which had for centuries served as distributing 
centers, thought that their traditional function was being menaced.62 
The matter was brought before the German Commercial Associa-
tion at its first meeting in 1861 and remained on the agenda for the 
rest of the decade. The conference of 1865 was largely devoted to dis-
cussion of it, during which the two sides came to understand each 
other's position and a third group appeared which tried to mediate. 
The Commercial Association resolution of that year and again of 1868 
actually straddled the issue. 
A second question that troubled the business world had to do with 
the multiplicity of freight rates, "the height and the frequent and 
sudden changes in freight rates." At the end of 1860 the German 
railways showed 5,223.5 kilometers of state-owned lines, 1,344.8 kilo-
meters of privately owned lines under state administration and 5,064.4 
kilometers of privately owned and administered lines. The criticism 
applied particularly to the railroads in Prussia, where by the law of 
1838 the government had allowed freedom to the roads to set their own 
charges. Besides seven state companies some sixteen private ones 
had almost unlimited authority to do so. In recent years the govern-
ment had recognized its blunder, and had written into the contract 
for each new railroad company a stipulation for close government 
control over rates. The fact remained that rates on not merely the 
Prussian but also the non-Prussian lines were a source of constant 
.0 Der Deutsche Handelstag 1861-1911 (Berlin, 1913), II, 345 . 
.. Ibid., II, 345 . 
•• See, for example, Bremer Handelsblatt, April 13, 1861. 
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CrItlciSm by those who had to pay them. Goods were divided into 
seven classes for purposes of imposing freight charges; nonetheless, 
the differences in charges for the same commodity were large, and the 
major companies had developed agreements on rates among themselves 
which increased the financial troubles of the sender.63 
Complaints about inadequate service and lack of locomotives and 
of freight cars in sufficient numbers and at the proper time were 
numerous and led to further criticism about the absence of coopera-
tion among the railway companies. The latter, so ran the argument, 
were extremely reluctant to use cars belonging to other companies and 
to send cars over other lines even when it was cheaper and faster to do 
so. The delay and extra cost were at the expense of the customer, not 
of the railroad. Connections between lines of different companies con-
tinued to be poorly developed, with additional cost frequently invol-
ved in the transfer of goods from one line to another; and the railroads 
were haphazard in protecting the freight from loss or damage. New 
railway lines which were badly needed could not be constructed for 
years because some small state refused to cooperate. The most notori-
ous case was that of Hanover's holding up the building of the railway 
from Hamburg to Paris. A private company wished to build the line; 
but since the Hanoverian government insisted on state ownership of the 
section within its territory, the German part of the project was blocked, 
to the utter disgust of the liberals.64 
Businessmen were divided in their opinion about remedial mea-
sures. The liberals opposed government interference in business; but 
they disliked freight rates which were high and arbitrarily subject to 
change. The temptation to appeal to the government for help against 
the railroads was strong. The liberals debated the issues back and 
forth, some favoring government ownership or control and others op-
posing it. In its meeting in 1865 the German Commercial Associa-
tion passed a resolution on the subject which tried to compromise 
among the conflicting interests and opinions by including all points. 
It laid down for the railroads the ideal not of making the largest pos-
sible profit but of serving the entire economy. It sought to furt4er 
the standard of competition in an economic field in which monopoly 
was almost inevitable. It straddled the issue of public ownership or 
control versus private ownership and the question of differential rates. 
8. Der Deutsche Handelstag 1861·1911, II, 106 . 
•• See report of the negotiations of the 7th Congress of German Economists in 
1864 in Vierteljahrschrift filr Volkswirtschaftund Kulturgeschichte (1864), III, 
207·10. 
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The last part of the resolution was most characteristic, the indication 
of intention carefully to watch the railway matters on an ad hoc basis. fl5 
All liberals agreed that, although their principles might have to be 
compromised in favor of some state control or even of state ownership 
of railways, national political unification would greatly simplify the 
problems of transportation. With unification, single states could no 
longer block essential needs, a common railway system and a common 
railroad law could be developed. A merchant or industrialist in any 
state in Germany would then know that he could ship goods anywhere 
in the nation without having to worry about the policy and practice 
of this little state or that. While much was being accomplished in 
this direction even under existing conditions many basic problems 
remained which could be solved easily and speedily by national uni-
fication. If the political question could be settled, the railways con-
stituted the essential means of unification of the economy and society. 
In the meantime, they pushed the political issue to the fore. 
The question of unifying the economic organization of Germany 
came to be vigorously discussed as a practical possibility in connection 
with Prussia's negotiation of a commercial treaty with France. The 
treaty itself was signed in 1862, but negotiations had been under way 
for several years beforehand and everyone in Germany and Austria 
knew that they were taking place. The treaty precipitated a crisis in 
the Zollverein and in the relations between it and Austria, a crisis in-
volving both economics and politics in major proportions. It proved 
to be the most important event in the efforts for national unity during 
the years immediately prior to Bismarck's wars; and an analysis of the 
factors involved throws light upon the question whether the German 
nation could have been unified without war. 
When the Zollverein had last been renewed in 1853, Austria had 
had sufficient strength to force Prussia to include a clause looking to-
ward Austria's joining that organization. Prussia had subsequently 
succeeded in preventing the clause from being carried out; but the 
issue came up again when in the late 1850s discussions for a renewal 
of the Zollverein began. Although in varying degrees of intensity 
criticism of the existing organization of the Zollverein arose from all 
quarters and reached a climax in connection with the publication of 
the Franco-Prussian commercial treaty. The most thorough and in-
telligent public analysis occurred at the meeting of the German Com-
•• The best summary of this discussion is found in Der Deutsche Handelstag 
1861-1911, II, 106-26. 
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mercial Association in Munich in 1862, where all sides were fully 
represented and prepared to defend their position.66 
Businessmen and statesmen in all the Zollverein states, in Austria 
and even in some of the other states not belonging to the Zollverein 
agreed that the customs union was valuable and should be continued. 
They agreed that commercial relations between the Zollverein states 
and Austria should be close and should be expanded. They all recog-
nized that the Zollverein needed to be reformed and most of them 
thought that its tariff rates should be reduced. They differed sharply, 
however, in their views about the constitution. 
The Zollverein was composed of sovereign states, each one able to 
block by its veto power any proposal for reform. Since the discus-
sions by the delegates to the Zollverein conferences, all of them officials, 
were held in secret, the public was not informed about the negotiations 
and was unable to exert pressure upon the governments with respect 
to specific issues. The customs schedule badly needed to be revised; 
yet nothing could be done from one date of renewal of the Zollverein 
to the next, twelve years hence. As critics said, the Zollverein had be-
come an obstacle to reform; an international, certainly an inter-state, 
diplomatic crisis was required every twelve years to try to bring about 
urgently needed changes. 
The Pruss ian government had decided to force the issue by nego-
tiating the commercial treaty with France. That treaty called for a 
sharp reduction in Prussian tariff rates, and in Article 31 it accepted 
the most-favored-nations clause with respect to all other states. It was 
understood between Prussia and France that the treaty was expected 
to be approved by the other Zollverein states. Prussia's strategy in 
the negotiations had definitely aimed at excluding Austria from future 
membership in the Zollverein. Prussia wanted no major competitor 
in that organization. 
The reactions of the business world represented at the conference 
of the German Commercial Association in Munich may be roughly 
divided into three major groups, the pro-Austrians, the pro-Prussians, 
and the middle party. Politics and economics could hardly be 
separated. The pro-Austrians denounced the Franco-Prussian treaty 
as a violation of the Zollverein agreement of 1853. The new treaty, 
they said, abolished Austria's favored position with respect to Zoll-
verein trade and relegated that German country to the status of every 
non-German country. The tariff schedule of the new commercial 
00 See Der Deutsche Handelstag 1861-1911, II, 357. 
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treaty had been set so low, they bitterly complained, that Austrian in-
dustry could not possibly accept it without risking bankruptcy. A 
large trade between Austria and South Germany in particular had 
developed under the differential system of 1853, which in case the 
Franco-Prussian treaty were accepted would have to be modified or 
reduced. The question of preserving special relations with Austria, 
declared Hanle of Munich, was for the South Germans one of "life or 
death."67 
Spitzer of Neuhaus and others stated that the Austrian market 
had far more value for Germany than the French. Germany would be 
unable to compete in the French market with industrial products and 
would have to export to it raw materials. In Austria, on the other 
hand, German industry would enjoy a vast market for its manu-
factured products. South German, Saxon, and even some Silesian 
industry in Prussia itself was eager to retain the Austrian market. 
The advocates of this position pleaded for a treaty to be made with 
Austria first; then one could be negotiated with France. 
The opponents of the treaty correctly attributed political motives 
to Prussia, and showed the anger of the small states at such cavalier 
treatment. Spitzer asserted that by making the agreement with France 
Prussia aimed to strengthen its power over the other members of the 
Zollverein. The delegate Karmarsch from Hanover agreed with him 
and asked, "Who will guarantee that Prussia will not wish other 
changes and will sooner or later say, 'Agree to them or we shall push 
you out the door.''' The issue of sovereignty became involved in the 
issue of tariff rates and the method of negotiating a tariff agreement. 
Prussia had anticipated this well known reaction and had discounted 
it in advance. 
The novel aspect at this time was furnished by the attitude of the 
most powerful industrial association in Austria, that of Vienna, which 
in October, 1862, after a two-days' session approved in theory the idea 
of union with the Zollverein but wished the fulfillment postponed to 
some future time. Vienna industry had no inclination to subject itself 
to the competition of German industry even to gain political advantage 
for the country. It was willing to make sacrifices, it said, for the sake 
of union; but it could not afford to sacrifice so much without under-
going the threat of economic ruin. The advocates of Austria's joining 
.7 For data on the discussion of the Zollverein see Verhandlungen des II. deutschen 
Handelstages zu Munchen, 14-18 Okt. 1862; Der Deutsche Handebtag 1861-
1911, II; also Eugen Franz, Der Entscheidungskarnp! urn die wirtschaftspolitische 
Fuhrung Deutschlands (1856-1867), (Munich, 19!1!1), pp. 246 If. 
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the Zollverein had lost economic support even in Austria itself. The 
question had in that state become one merely of politics.68 
A middle group, including such influential figures as David Han-
semann, certainly one of the most prominent economic statesmen in 
Germany, and H. H. Meier, the head of the Nordeutscher Lloyd in 
Bremen and one of the ablest economic leaders in North Germany, 
wished to retain both the Franco-Prussian treaty and the close com-
mercial relations with Austria.60 This group would have liked to ex-
clude Austria from the application of the most-favored-nations clause. 
It wished preferential relations with that country, although not at 
the sacrifice of the Franco-Prussian treaty. While this group recog-
nized the interdependence of the political and economic factors in the 
conflict, it sought to reduce political hostility by stressing the economic 
advantages of close cooperation.70 
The pro-Prussian group took the aggressive. It fully supported 
the changes that the Pruss ian government had introduced into the 
Zollverein. First of all, it asserted that the Austrian market could not 
compare in value with that of Western Europe which the treaty would 
open. In Austria, declared one speaker, only about nine million peo-
ple came into consideration as a market; the others, the non-Germans, 
were culturally too backward to be able to afford Western goods. In 
the region of Aachen, declared von Beckerath, one would smile at an 
assertion of the superior value of the Austrian over the West European 
market. For Silesia, said Weigel of Breslau, the Franco-Belgian market 
was far more important than the Austrian. 
The entire European transportation system, indeed that of the 
world, declared Braun, was being changed by the development of rail-
roads. Western Europe was beginning to unite into a free commercial 
system. Germany had to join this great system, he said, or it would 
be forced back upon the East European market, which was not so cap-
able of consuming goods, or upon the uncertainty of the overseas 
market. His views were supported by Michaelis of the National 
Zeitung in Berlin, who stressed the importance of a diversified market 
as protection against economic crises. The National Zeitung, like 
numerous other North German papers, strongly supported the re-
duction in tariffs which the Franco-Prussian treaty specified. It ad-
vocated free trade not merely for economic but for political reasons. 
Protective tariffs were regarded as a basic support of autocracy and 
•• See Der Deutsche Handelstag 1861-1911, II, 361·62 . 
•• See Meier's report on the meeting, Bremer Handelsblatt, Nov. I, 1862. 
TO Bremer Handelsblatt, Sept. 12, Oct. 14·18, 1862. 
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particularism; free trade seemed to hold out the assurance of liberalism 
and nationalism.71 
Weigel of Breslau staunchly defended the method which Prussia 
had used to reform the tariff schedule. He admitted that it "tasted 
like compulsion"; but he argued that the reform could not have been 
achieved by a general tariff conference. "The times have rendered our 
institutions, out of date .... We lack an organization to decide this 
great and weighty question." Action had to be taken by the leading 
state, namely Prussia, and the other members would have to accept 
the results en bloc. There was no other way. 
The Austrians rejoined that trade had nothing to do with the 
nationality question. They sought to justify thereby the inclusion of 
the non-German as well as the German peoples of the Hapsburg em-
pire in the Zollverein. Weigel of Breslau agreed with them, and added 
that political sympathy did not incline him to approve the Franco-
Pruss ian treaty but that economic interest did. Political antipathy 
toward Austria, he continued, did not determine his position: "We 
have first of all to choose between two customers," and he preferred 
France.72 His colleague Braun of Wins en disagreed with him com-
pletely on the question of Austrian nationalities. He considered a 
trade agreement acceptable, but he objected to having as a member of 
the Zollverein an Austria of "Magyars, Croats, Slovenes, Rumanians, 
Ruthenians, and so forth" who as a potential majority in the Austrian 
parliament might gain the right of passing on Zollverein affairs. 
The pro-Prussians were even more critical of the political and 
economic conditions within Austria and said that these rendered any 
customs union impossible. The instability of the Austrian monetary 
system, the constitutional troubles, the differences in taxation as seen 
in the Austrian tobacco monopoly, the differences in organization of 
customs collection and the slowness and unreliability of the Austrian 
system-these and other factors turned the klein-deutsch group away 
from any notion of a customs union with that country. Von Beckerath 
of Crefeld, another of the most distinguished older liberals of Prussia, 
denied that he and his friends were opponents of Austria; they merely 
disliked the idea of having that country as a member of the Zollverein. 
"We recognize," he said, "that the power and greatness of Austria is 
not alone a European but in an eminent sense a German need, that 
German Austria must draw strength out of Germany in order to be 
71 National Zeitung, Sept. 26, 1863. 
72 T'erilalldlllngen, p. 77. 
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the leading race in Austria. "But," he asked the delegates from 
Austria, "do you believe that you can derive this strength from a 
Germany which is restricted in its development, which does not pro-
gress in the economic field? Well, the entrance of Austria into the 
Zollverein would have just these results," for Austria could enter only 
if the present constitution of the Zollverein with the liberum veto 
should be retained. He objected to Austria's entry for two major 
reasons: first, that its entry under present circumstances would transfer 
to the Zollverein the conditions that made the Diet of the Confedera-
tion an unworkable body, namely, the presence of two great powers, 
each with the liberum veto; second, that by bringing the non-German 
peoples of Austria into the Zollverein the right of each nationality to 
its own free self-determination would be violated. "German customs 
union and only German customs union is what we all wish," said 
Michaelis. 
The German Commercial Association passed by a vote of 138 to 55 
a resolution in favor of preserving the independence of the two cus-
toms areas, that of the Zollverein and that of Austria, but equally in 
favor of eliminating customs duties and facilitating commerce be-
tween the two areas. The latter half of the resolution may be termed 
an expression of good intentions and of kind feelings toward Austria. 
More important was a further resolution urging the reform of the 
constitution of the Zollverein in accordance with the following prin-
ciples: 
In the renewal of the Zollverein it should be taken into con-
sideration that the legislative functions of the Zollverein should 
be transferred jointly to representatives of the governments on 
the one hand and to those of the people of the union states on 
the other. Common agreements by majority vote of these two 
bodies are to be introduced as final law in the entire customs 
area. 
In the composition of these two representative bodies due 
consideration will be given the size of population of the member 
states.7S 
7. The resolution had originally been passed at the meeting in 1861. It was 
reaffirmed in 1862. See a similar resolution passed by the Congress of German Econ· 
omists in 1862. Bremer Handelsblatt, Sept. 13, 1862. The resolution did not satisfy 
David Hansemann and his friends, who condemned it as too vague to be of any 
value. Hansemann and a colleague, Hurtzig, offered to the Handelstag an extensive 
and detailed memorandum on the future constitution of the Zollverein. Hansemann's 
proposal never carried much weight. The German Commercial Association merely 
called the attention of the public to it, but did not subject it to any discussion. 
The Bremer Handelsblatt in the issues of Sept. 13 and Nov. I, 1862, criticized it 
sharply. 
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While the liberals and nationalists discussed the reorganization of 
the Zollverein as a means of furthering German unity, they under-
stood the limitations of this approach. The fact was, as von Beckerath, 
Michaelis and all the Pruss ian klein-deutsch liberals agreed, that eco-
nomic unity could be gained only by way of political unity. In their 
opinion the major weaknesses of the Zollverein were the terminability 
of the agreement, the liberum veto and the one-sided power of state 
ministries, each of which was not an economic but a political ques-
tion.74 While they pressed for strengthening the organization of the 
Zollverein, they had no illusions about the necessity of an inclusive 
institutional framework for a unified German nation. "We shall 
not have this customs union for our advantage and for our prosperous 
development," said Michaelis, "until we also have a German Reich 
authority and a German parliament." 
That the liberal nationalists were interested most of all in political 
unification is seen in the fact that after the outburst of conflicting views 
in 1862 about the constitution of the Zollverein, the subject seems to 
have lost popular interest. The stir of political life caused by the 
war of Italian unification, the constitutional controversy in Prussia, 
and the outbreak of the Danish war turned attention away from eco-
nomic to political action. Bismarck and the Prussian government 
were so hated by liberals that the Bremer Handelsblatt wrote on 
December 19, 1863, as follows: 
. . . As long as the Pruss ian people do not succeed in trans-
ferring the administration of the Pruss ian state into other hands, 
one does not know whether one should even wish a renewal of 
the Zollverein treaty at all. For at the price of strengthening 
the political influence of a Bismarck ministry in the Zollverein 
the material advantages of a continuing free internal trade are 
bought too dearly, and not much good is to be expected from the 
leadership in commercial policy of a ministry which allies itself 
with the Petersburg and Vienna governments in order to obtain 
a basis for a foreign policy hostile to the Confederation and to 
support absolutism in Germany. 
When the German Commercial Association met in 1865 it could 
look back on a number of accomplishments toward which it had aimed 
three years ago at the crucial meeting in Munich, as well as some major 
setbacks. The Franco-Prussian commercial treaty had been ratified 
and come into force; Austria and the Zollverein had reached a new 
agreement which in no way infringed upon the independence of the 
.. Bremer Handelsblatt, Nov. 1. 1862. 
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latter; the Zollverein was assured of renewal. The German commercial 
law code, prepared in the late 1850s, had been approved by most of 
the German states. Nonetheless, the constitution of the Zollverein 
had not been reformed; the liberum veto in that body had not been 
abolished or a national economic legislative body created. At its 
meeting in 1865 the German Commercial Association without discus-
sion unanimously approved a declaration which summed up once 
more the existing grievances. It criticized the slowness in making com-
mercial treaties, regretted the failure to create a unified consular system, 
condemned the persistence of governmental abuses in dealing with 
insurance business and transportation facilities, denounced the failure 
to achieve freedom of occupation, and urged once more the reform 
of the Zollverein constitution as a prerequisite for achieving the other 
reforms. 
After this outcry the German private economic interests took no 
further steps toward economic unification of the nation before Bis-
marck imposed political unity and simultaneously solved the economic 
problems. The success of Bismarck's policy of blood and iron seemed 
to discourage them from further efforts comparable in vigor and in-
cisiveness to those of the years 1861 to 1863. Politics won over eco-
nomics as the decisive factor in gaining the objectives of national unity 
and the concomitant economic reforms for which the economic leaders 
had striven. 
6 / The Constitution 
T HE ,"mtitution. introduced in 1849-50 into a Pro"ia 
which had been governed for several centuries by absolute rulers, was 
found to be the object of much dispute. It had to be interpreted and 
adjusted to a society in which major elements looked toward the past 
for their models, while others judged conditions by a liberal ideal 
yet to be realized. Differing objectives were set for the development 
of the constitution according to differing social ideals. On the one 
side were lined the King and the Conservatives, including Bismarck. 
They all sought, although in varying degree, to preserve under the 
regime of constitutional government the royal rights of the past. 
Since the sovereign had sworn allegiance to the constitution, he toler-
ated it unwillingly but, according to his view, loyally. He interpreted 
it in the light of absolutism and the divine right of kings. The Con-
servatives, including the key Minister of War General von Roon, dis-
liked the constitution intensely and wished to abolish it; but they 
stood by the King, who they hoped might continue to rule by divine 
right. To Bismarck the constitution provided a useful means of 
government under a monarch whose power was not greatly restricted 
by that document. It should not be allowed to develop into a system 
where parliament exercised final authority over the other organs of 
government. Opposed to the royal group were the liberals, who 
interpreted the constitution as promising free government, responsive 
to the will of the people and assuring the public a powerful role in the 
conduct of state affairs. In the absence of a willingness to compromise, 
these differences of views about the constitution led to a constitutional 
conflict. 
176 
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King William believed as much as any of his ancestors in kingship 
by divine right. He accepted the constitution as a historic fact, and he 
intended loyally to uphold it; but his mental limitations made it pos-
sible for him to reconcile the divine-right theory and constitutional 
government. The confusion in his thinking is evident from two of 
his addresses, one entitled "To My People," issued on his becoming 
King, the second at the ceremony of his coronation in January, 1861. 
With free royal hand he [Frederick William IV] gave the 
country institutions in the development of which its hopes 
should be fulfilled. When an unfortunate movement of spirits 
had shaken all foundations of law [he referred to the Revolution 
of 1848], my brother knew how to bring the confusion to an 
end, by a new political creation to renew our unbroken develop-
ment and to direct its advance into fixed channels [he meant the 
introduction of the constitution]. 
I will loyally preserve the high heritage of my ancestors, 
which with constant care they founded and augmented by their 
best efforts at the risk of their lives. Proudly I see myself sur-
rounded by such a loyal and brave people, by such a glorious 
army. 
My hand shall watch over the welfare and the right of all in 
all classes of the population; it shall rule over this rich life, 
protecting and furthering it. It is not Prussia's mission to live 
in the enjoyment of its earnings. In the exercise of its spiritual 
and moral forces, in the seriousness and uprightness of its re-
ligious thinking, in the union of obedience and freedom, in the 
strengthening of its military force lie the conditions of its power. 
Only in this way is it able to maintain its position among the 
states of Europe. 
I hold firmly to the traditions of my house when I set myself 
the task of elevating and strengthening the patriotic spirit of my 
people. I will make firm and develop the right of the state ac-
cording to its historical significance, and will uphold the in-
stitutions which King Frederick William IV called into being. 
Faithful to the oath with which I assumed the regency, I will 
protect the constitution and the laws of the kingdom. 
At his coronation the King declared: "By the ceremony of corona-
tion in the presence of the members of both Houses of the Landtag 
and of other witnesses summoned to us from all provinces of our 
kingdom, we wish to give witness to the hallowed and eternal rights 
of the throne to which by the grace of God we have been called and 
to affirm anew the bond strengthened by glorious history between 
Our House and the people of Prussia."! 
1 Horst Kohl, op. cit., pp. 18-19, 2R. 
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William promised to hold firmly to the traditions of his house and 
loyally to abide by the constitution. An intimation of how he might 
resolve this contradiction lay in the assertion that his brother had 
granted the constitution "with free royal hand." One might infer 
that as a free royal gift the constitution might have to agree with the 
will of the giver, or the latter might change his mind and freely give 
the country something else. The necessity of concentrating power in 
the King was strongly emphasized along with that of the continued 
cultivation of Spartan virtues associated with Prussianism, so that the 
state could continue to play a major role in international affairs. 
Power meant to William the political and military power of a monarch 
by divine right. Prussia dared not run the international risk of 
weakening itself by introducing parliamentry government, that is, 
ministerial responsibility to a parliament. The King soon blamed 
the Lower House for his troubles with his fellow sovereigns in the 
other German states. "When one sees," he asked, "that I can exercise 
no command at all in my own house, who will trust me?"2 
The King regarded the constitution as a means of associating the 
public in the affairs of government, but he expected it to assure public 
approval of all measures which he particularly advocated. In case of 
conflict parliament should acquiesce in the King's will. Liberals 
noted that in his coronation address he did not mention the constitu-
tion or the rights of the people and of their representatives.s How 
little the King esteemed the parliament, especially the Lower House, 
was evident in many ways. When the Lower House in February, 1861, 
sent him an address stating its wishes as to legislation, he replied: "I 
am relying firmly upon the representative assembly's standing by my 
side in the execution of my aims in the sense of the undiminished 
preservation of the power of my Crown; this is necessary for the true 
welfare of the Fatherland. With respect to the questions of domestic 
and foreign policy which are touched upon in your address, my govern-
ment has clearly emphasized the points of view which accord with my 
intentions for it and to which it will adhere. I expect the Lower 
House to support these by its approval. ... I know that my people 
stand at my side in unswerving loyalty in good and bad times."4 The 
Lower House should pass the legislation which he approved. 
The royal conception of the legislative process was equally simple 
and clear. When the liberal ministers pressed him in 1861 to initiate 
• Von Bemhardi, op. cit., IV, 127. 
• Parisius, von Hoverbeck, I, 215. 
• Horst Kohl, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
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legislation against his will, he reacted as follows: "His Majesty remark-
ed that he also wished this development of our domestic legislation 
[which Minister Count Schwerin had declared once more to be as much 
'desired as expected'], but that it is not necessary for certain re-sub-
mitted bills to be accepted without change. The highest officials of 
the Crown were called to submit to the soverign their proposed laws; 
the Crown has to consider them and in case of disagreement to seek a 
compromise and a rapprochement of views. One will and one view 
must in the end be decisive and this is the King's. Whoever among 
the ministers is unable for reasons of conscience to accept His decision 
must resign."6 The ministers should propose legislation, the King 
should decide what should be done; the parliament should perform its 
part in making the decisions effective. "A wise reciprocal action of 
relaxing and tightening the reins of power," expressed the King's 
formula of rule, and he compared the art of ruling with the regula-
tion of the flow of a stream.6 
When the liberals in the Lower House criticized and opposed the 
military reforms, the King began to lose confidence in that body. By 
March, 1861, he had come to consider the liberal ministers a failure 
and condemned the entire constitutional system. He regarded every 
new desire of the liberal ministry, trying to appease the Lower House, 
as a new "concession" from him, and he opposed it on the suspicion 
that this process would continue forever. "The ambition of these 
persons is," he declared in April, "for themselves to rule! ... The 
King shall not rule; they want to rule! ... But that cannot and dare 
not be the case in Prussia." As early as March, he was alarmed at the 
rise of the "democrats," a word connoting the worst excesses of 1848; 
and he thought that a revolt in Berlin was not impossible. His mis-
trust and anger were so great that one of the liberal von Sauckens, 
who knew William well, described the relations with the King as 
"rotten, super-rotten!"7 
In 1861 the elections took place which shifted the strength in the 
Lower House from the Old Liberals to the Progressive party and re-
turned several persons like Waldeck and Schulze-Delitzsch, whose 
names were associated in the minds of Conservatives with 1848. They 
were "democrats." "Our enemies are very active," said the King in 
January, 1862, referring not merely to these few so-called democrats 
• Von Roon, op. cit., II, 50-51. 
• Briefe, Reden und Schriften, I, 496-97; II, 16, 22. 
• Von Bernhardi. op. cit., IV, 100-01, 107, 118, 137. 
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but to liberal opponents in general.s He spoke in public of even 
criminals being elected,9 and when von Saucken advised him to open 
the Landtag in person, William became excited, placed his hand over 
his heart and declared that he could not personally face people like 
Waldeck (a former high judicial official and a staunch democrat who 
had been very active in 1848-49). Von Saucken reminded the King 
that a ruler stood above parties, and William finally agreed to the 
request. When Deputy Behrend, a member of the Progressive party, 
was invited to a concert at court because of his position as vice-presi-
dent of the newly convened Lower House and was introduced to the 
King, the latter asked, "The Vice-president?" Behrend: "At your 
service, your Majesty." The King: "Aha!" Thereafter, his liberal 
colleagues threatened to rename Behrend "Aha!"lO 
In the statement of his program of rule made in 1858 the King 
had spoken about the question of whether and in how far the consti-
tution should be developed. His remarks could have been considered 
promising only by the most willful optimist. There could be no talk 
of breaking with the past, he declared. "Only the careful and im-
proving hand shall be applied where something arbitrary or contrary 
to the needs of the time appears. You all recognize that the welfare 
of the Crown and of the country is inseparable, that the welfare of 
both rests on a sound, powerful, conservative basis. To recognize these 
needs correctly, to weigh them and call them into life, that is the 
secret of state wisdom, wherein all extremes are to be avoided. Our 
task will in this respect not be light, for recently a movement has 
appeared in public life which if partly understandable already shows 
on the other hand traces of intentionally exaggerated ideas which we 
must oppose by our calm and legal and energetic action. One must 
hold true to promises without refusing to improve on them wherever 
necessary; but one must courageously obstruct that which has not been 
promised. Above all, I warn against stereotyped statements, such as 
that the government will let itself be continuously pushed into develop-
ing liberal ideas which would in any case advance by themselves."ll 
• Ibid., 182. 
• He was referring to Becker, a leader in the Revolution of 1848 who had been 
unjustly sentenced to several years in prison for his activity then and had served 
his term. He was a good democratic subject, whose radicalism may be judged by 
the fact that he subsequently served for many years as Oberbiirgermeister of Cologne. 
Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 1. 
1OVon Bernhardi, op. cit., IV, 198-99; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 6. 
11 Horst Kohl, op_ cit., p. 3. 
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With this condemnation of liberalism and the warning that he 
would not change fundamentals in the state, the King, at that time 
Prince Regent, inaugurated his reign. During the next years, he clung 
resolutely to this statement of principles in spite of pressure from his 
liberal ministers. Not until early in 1862 were his New Era ministers 
able to persuade him to agree in general to a few very mild structural 
reforms, especially ones on ministerial responsibility and local govern-
ment. Within a few months, however, he was able to dismiss these 
ministers, whom months ago he had ceased to trust, and to drop the 
reform proposals. After he became involved in the constitutional COIl-
flict with the Lower House, he remained steadfast, a favorite word with 
him, in the defence of his policies. In October, 1863, he wrote to 
one of his officials: "I feel the heavy burden of the battle, which God 
has laid upon us, but I also know that lowe it to my people and to 
the Crown inherited by me to fight it out with determination. What-
ever may come, I shall persist in that which I know to be necessary for 
the welfare and the independence of the Fatherland. I shall not de-
viate from the path that I have taken .... "12 
Two ministers were mainly responsible for enabling the King to 
continue his adamant attitude in the conflict with the liberal Lower 
House. The one, von Roon, headed the powerful military group 
which knew no other way of life than that of ultra conservatism; the 
other, the civilian Bismarck, employed every force-King, Conserva-
tives, military, bureaucracy, even the liberals-to fulfill a selection of 
ideals of his own choosing which proved acceptable in varying degrees 
to all of them and preserved the authority of Conservatism in Germany 
far beyond its useful life. 
The Junker von Roon was made Minister of War in 1859, replacing 
the liberal General von Bonin who was lukewarm toward the Regent's 
military reform proposals and popular with the liberal public. Von 
Roon was brought in to put through these reforms; he was accepted 
by his liberal colleagues as a non-political specialist in office for a 
specific task. The new minister was gleeful over the fact that his 
colleagues made no attempt to commit him to their liberal program. 
He openly stated his ideas of government, writing to his friend Perthes 
at the time of his appointment as follows: 
I have curtsied after I had frankly declared that I never had 
any use for the whole constitutional business, but that as a true 
conservative subject I would bow to the completed deed, that I 
to Brie/e, Reden und Schri/ten, II, 73. 
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shall remain "a fool on my own responsibility" but think that I 
can nonetheless be a minister-expert if one can use me as I am 
for that purpose. My assertion seemed to surprise no one; they 
had apparently expected worse from me. 
After expressing his aversion to the kind of life he would have to lead 
as minister, he continued: 
A human being of my kind cannot do other than with God's 
help tackle the most difficult and dangerous assignments when 
it is a question, as it is here, of the most important and the high-
est affairs in a man's life work, namely, the political health of 
his fatherland. Should a soldier, in cowardly fashion, turn his 
back on his war lord when the latter calls, "Come and support 
me" -merely because his lord's other helpers do not please him? 
Never! That which is called political honor I conceive other-
wise, for I am a soldier .... According to my conception of poli-
tical honor, it is my honorable duty to say: "Yes, Lord, I will; 
but do not wish something which you may at some time perhaps 
regret. See, I am otherwise than you may think and, in view of 
your other supporters, you may wish. Think over whether you 
cannot find a more suitable pillar which would less disturb the 
harmony of your building." When one has said this and similar 
things with feeling and frankness and the desire remains un-
changed, then in my opinion an honest man has done his duty, 
and it is extraordinary that one replied to him, "If I had and 
knew a better man, I should not have chosen yoU."13 
In spite of this show of modesty von Roon had eagerly sought to 
obtain the appointment. He took a keen interest in politics, and 
from the beginning of his service as minister he actively pursued the 
political side of his task.14 It would have been impossible for him to 
keep out of politics, for the military reform became almost im-
mediately the dominant political issue with the ministry, the Landtag 
and the public. That von Roon would be on the Conservative side 
was evident from the first. His close relative, Moritz von Blancken-
burg, was a Conservative party leader and his circle of friends belonged 
to the same tradition. Like the Prince Regent, he had been brought 
up exclusively in the army. While this training did not necessarily 
make a person a Conservative, it tended to throw the full weight of 
the military institutions and traditions on that side, and liberal 
officers continued to be exceptions. 
The Regent immediately trusted von Roon more than anyone else 
in the ministry, and the latter encouraged him in every way to do so. 
18 Von Roon, op. cit., I, 372·73, 375, 378·80. 
10 Ibid., II, 18-19. 
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As soon as the new Minister of War took over his position he began 
to plot how he could oust the liberals in the ministry. With Bismarck 
and Moritz von Blanckenburg he had long discussions of this prob-
lem;15 for von Roon was determined to bring in Bismarck as minister 
and to do so required breaking the bond between the King and his 
liberal advisers. In a letter of June 18, 1861, to his friend Perthes, 
Roon described his strategy: 
The members of the ministry, except the Kultusminister 
[Bethmann-Hollweg] and, under certain conditions, myself, wish 
decidedly not to resign and regard their resignation as ruinous 
for the state and their loss as irreparable. With the best inten-
tions, that is, in blind devotion to constitutional doctrines, they 
wish to make the King and the state un-Prussian, and with full 
sails they continue to steer toward a parliamentary regime. 
Since they should and must be eliminated, because their con-
tinuation would according to Prussian-conservative views be 
ruinous for the state, they must be eliminated as soon as possible. 
"Whoever plays with the devil is accursed," says Wallenstein, 
and in reference to the present case I should appear to myself 
to be a fool, a stupid fool, if I did not use today the opportunity 
to seize the rudder of state from the hands of these men caught 
in dangerous errors and intentions merely because this could be 
done more advantageously at a later moment .... In my opinion 
nothing would be worse for Prussia than to succumb to a doc-
trinaire swindle. It can arise with new strength out of the mud 
bath of a revolution; in the filth of doctrinaire liberalism it will 
irretrievably rot. 
In the next paragraph of the letter to Perthes, von Roon showed 
his insight into the personality of the sovereign. 
Do not consider me fanatical. I know my terrain and the 
persons acting on it; I know with what difficulty decisions are to 
be reached, particularly when they involve acknowledgement of 
a previous mistake. [That is, the King would have to admit his 
blunder in appointing liberals as ministers and in making any 
concessions to their doctrines.] You will admit that on concrete 
questions (like the swearing of allegiance at the coronation) 
decisions are easier than in the discussion of abstract theories. 
Von Roon knew that the King's intellectual limitations made any 
ideological discussion useless as a means of overthrowing the liberals 
and that one had to concentrate on specific acts, like that of the swear-
ing of allegiance, in which ideas were actually in conflict, even though 
the King explicitly did not recognize the fact. Von Roon planned to 
"Ibid., II, 19, 22. 
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work from one concrete act to another, without ever bringing up 
questions of principle. Thereby he expected to save the King's fare 
about having to dismiss liberal ministers whom he had appointed and 
to bring the ruler back to Pruss ian conservatism without his being 
aware of his own inconsistency. The letter to Perthes continued: 
Do not regard me as a deceiver. I made my challenge openly 
but no one dared openly to accept it. [For good reason, since tI;te 
King supported him wholeheartedly]. But for reasons of WIS-
dom, I have not yet come forth with the declaration, that is, with 
the formal, clearly and sharply emphasized declaration, "They or 
I," although it lies implicit in the situati0l!-. The gen~lemen 
certainly know that, but they say the OpposIte as ostenSIbly as 
possible. 
You see I aim at no so-called "change of system" but only 
at the repudiation of the liberal interpretation of the November 
program [of 1858]. I entered office with a conservative interpre-
tation of it; I can, will and must hold firmly to it, but I also wish 
and endeavor to achieve that this interpretation, which is actually 
that of the King, becomes recognized as official. If this public 
profession should not protect us against red elections, a result 
of which I do not yet despair, then let the battle for existence 
be fought. I am confident that it will end victoriously and will 
lead to health and recovery, and indeed not by a reactionary 
recipe but by an honorable, open and courageous use of con-
stitutional means. God will not forsake us if we do not for-
sake Him. The reorganization [of the army] has shown that 
our supreme person is capable of courageous, decisive and de-
termined rule. Unity of views between the ruler and his 
ministers strengthens and gives wings to all governmental 
activity; the prevailing disunity has weakened and crippled it. 
That was unavoidable. Everything depends therefore on the 
choice of persons! The world belongs to the courageousP6 
Von Roon regarded all liberals, democrats, and communists as 
belonging in the same category of "reds." He preferred a civil war 
to a liberal regime. He claimed to have God on his side. He had a 
plan for changing completely the policies of government without the 
King's being aware of his royal inconsistency. Von Roon expected a 
Conservative government to apply in all cases the methods being used 
in the execution of the military reorganization: Once the King de-
cided on a matter the ministers should carry out his orders with 
parliamentary approval of just enough of the program for them to 
go ahead with the whole plan. Then parliament would have to give 
in or the conflict would be brought to a crisis, and the sooner the 
to Ibid., II, 22.25. 
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better. If parliament would not approve the proposals, the ministers 
should follow the King's orders anyway. A group of courageous 
ministers was needed, and of the possible candidates Von Roon con-
sidered Bismarck the ablest and bravest. With Bismarck in the 
ministry, so he thought, liberals would not be tolerated, the King 
would once more be strong and firm, and Prussia would be governed 
in accordance with its tradition. 
Von Roon followed his plan in full. On many questions he sided 
with the King against all the other ministers, and he made certain that 
the King knew about his stand. He wished to strengthen his sovereign, 
to give the latter confidence in pressing his policies. When in February, 
1861, the liberal ministers wrung from a very unwilling King consent 
to introduce bills for the development of the constitution in a liberal 
sense, for example a bill on ministerial responsibility, von Roon im-
mediately wrote the King a long letter which was a masterpiece in the 
way it undermined his colleagues and their whole program. Cut to 
the personality of the ruler, the letter proved as effective as its author 
could have wished,l7 
Still deeply shaken by the outcome of yesterday's meeting of 
the ministry, I have been struggling to regain the composure 
which I recognize as necessary in order to speak to Your Majesty 
about the present situation with some prospects of success. I 
dare to do this, I must do this, for Your Majesty chose me as an 
adviser. But I must also do this because after Your statement 
of yesterday, I belong to a ministry which has forced Your 
Majesty to approve a measure which is most decidedly contrary 
to Your conviction, to Your conscience. 
I was deeply hurt thereby, for my Prussian soldier's heart can-
not bear the thought that my King and Lord should place an-
other will above His own. But I hope confidently that Your 
Majesty will clear me of the suspcion of solidarity with those 
who put pressure upon You. 
At the present time it is a question on the one hand of the 
approval of certain things which the Crown expects from the 
Landtag [the military organization] and on the other hand of 
certain concessions which the Lower House expects from the 
Crown [liberal reforms]. 
The first-named approvals relate to indispensable needs, the 
satisfaction of which is urgently demanded by the first of all 
natural duties, that of self-preservation. The concessions desired 
in exchange are supposed to complete our constitution, after we 
have already lived and prospered for a number of years in con-
stitutional conditions without this completion. These concessions 
are far from having been won by other and great countries. 
17 Ibid., II, 35 If. 
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The approvals are absolutely necessary; the concessions are 
from a certain standpoint merely desirable. The values which 
are here to be exchanged are therefore unequal. 
. Nonetheless, it would be conceivable that performance and 
counter-performance considered from the standpoint of legality 
might be balanced, that the government is legally committed to 
make the concessions in question because thereby certain prom-
ises in the constitutional document should be fulfilled. 
But our constitution was given by the King alone. It is not 
a contract the immediate fulfillment of which can be uncondi-
tionally claimed by the contracting party without further ado. 
Our Prussian Monarchy is not newly created by constitutional 
agreement, as for example the former bourgeois kingship [of 
Louis Philippe in France] or as the Belgian; it is far more one 
created by our great rulers, one which was not abolished but 
only modified by the constitution granted by free Royal decision. 
As a product of the free will of a King of Prussia our constitution 
... will be honestly interpreted and faithfully followed. In ac-
cordance therewith, the promises of the constitution are also to 
be fulfilled, not as contractual obligations which cannot be de-
ferred but much more as a freely assumed obligation for the 
future, the actual fulfillment of which is dependent upon future 
free Royal decisions .... Mere external considerations of the con-
victions of others, if they should serve as motives for Royal de-
cisions, would create the worst conditions. In other constitu-
tional states the assertion of the will of a ministry against the 
King is conceivable, but not in Prussia! For, as its entire his-
tory shows, Prussia needs for its salvation an absolutely un-
divided Royal will which is limited only by itself and by the in-
born respect for the law of the family of Hohenzollern. 
Von Roon's conservative, military constitutional theory may be 
translated as advising the King as follows: The monarchy gave the 
state the constitution out of its own free will; it has to abide by its 
own freely-given constitution, but it can expand that instrument or 
otherwise change it freely, and it is subject to no legal or institutional 
restraints in doing so; there exists and may exist in Prussia no power 
above or conditioning that of the King, for Prussia's history proves 
that this state cannot afford to weaken itself by any such limitation. 
In substance, von Roon told the King that this was his constitution, 
that he should of course abide by it, but that he could do with it· as 
he pleased. Von Roon's letter continued: 
This conception, the only one which preserves the interest of 
the Crown, offers the greatest security for the continuation of its 
rthe Crown's] undiminished brilliance. It does not exclude 
further delegation of authority; still less does it designate such as 
absolutely harmful; but it unconditionally demands that all fur-
ther delegation of power must in truth be made freely with the 
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deepest convICtIon. [Von Roon thought correctly that under 
these conditions no sovereign would ever give up any more 
power. He also know that the kind of minister serving the King 
under such a conception of the constitution would not advise 
him to transfer any of his power to others.] Such a conception is 
therefore to be held to and represented in all matters by the 
King's first servants, the ministers. If they are unable to do so, 
either because they have doctrinaire views about the binding na-
ture of the constitutional promises or because they lack courage 
to face with assurance the consequences of that conception, then 
acting like honorable men they will request the King to seek 
other advisers and representatives of his prerogatives. [In these 
statements von Roon by implication took care of his liberal col-
leagues in the ministry; they were doctrinaires and cowards and 
were clinging to their jobs; they were not men of honor, for 
otherwise they would have resigned]. 
If on the other hand, in conflict with his interests and his 
innermost convictions about that which benefits the country they 
attempt to move the King to act against his own views, then they 
act in the interest of expanding the parliamentary power, and 
Prussia demands a strong individual authority! 
And I hope that Your Majesty shares all my conceptions. 
But if Your Majesty should ever again have the experience 
that Your own conscientious convictions are found in opposition 
to the views of Your first servants, whether about the so-called 
completion of the constitution or about any other measure of 
utility, then I beseech Your Majesty with all the respect and 
feeling of a servant's loyalty of over forty years to remember 
that Your advisers with all their zeal for their views could not 
wish, and dare not wish, to bend the will of their Lord and to 
cause division in His sovereign conscience, a state which would 
deeply embarrass and burden the advisers themselves. 
Von Roon was appearing to be most concerned about the royal 
conscience, not to let it be torn by inner dissention. He knew that in 
fundamentals the ruler sided with the Conservatives and wished to 
retain his absolute power. The general was appealing indirectly to 
the King's sense of honor to keep his conscience free from doubt and 
trouble by getting rid of the liberals. At the same time, he blamed 
not the King but the liberals for the split in the royal conscience and 
said that they should feel shame for causing it. 
Von Roon continued in his letter to the King: 
Moreover, pressure is not demanded by the situation. In 
order to attain the great objectives of the government, over-hasty 
concessions to parliamentarism would in my modest opinion be 
the most questionable means of all. The King of Prussia is at 
this moment still in full possession of his sovereignty and for the 
well-understood interests of the country must remain so. He 
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does not lack constitutional means in order to execute his jus-
tified will in a legal way. If this is so, why should one seize 
means which against the will of Your Majesty limit and stunt 
the power of the Crown? 
The answer to this question could only be found in the as~ 
sumption that Your Majesty's advisers regarded the immediate 
completion of the constitution according to their own political 
convictions as an unavoidable necessity, or without such comple-
tion they held their authority in the chamber to be endangered 
by their own friends in that body, or without initiative aiming 
at that objective they would come into contradiction with their 
own parliamentary antecedents. Then it would surely be less a 
question of a constitutional than of a ministerial need. 
Von Roon accused his liberal colleagues of pressing for reforms, not 
because the King wanted these reforms or the country needed them, 
but because the ministers needed them in order to hold their positions. 
He attributed selfish, petty motives to the liberal ministers and did not 
even consider worth mentioning the fact that the Lower House existed 
as the representative of the people, that the liberals held an over-
whelming majority in that house, and that the country manifestly de-
manded constitutional reforms. He kept the controversy within the 
limited, personal group of the King and a few liberal ministers. The 
country needed Hohenzollern absolutism; the desires of the people 
as expressed in elections and in the wishes of their representatives in 
the Lower House did not even deserve to be mentioned, especially 
in a letter to a sovereign eager to be shown a way of saving face while 
actually repudiating liberalism and restoring the absolutism of the 
Hohenzollern tradition. 
Since, moreover, under the assumption that only the intro-
duction of the laws but not their passage, that is, not the com-
pletion of the constitution but only the beginnings of that pro-
cess would be intended or at least only needed to be intended, 
one could perhaps regard their [the liberal ministers'] measures 
as mere sham battles and devoid of danger, if a large part of the 
nation did not become angry over such onsets and regard them 
as an injury to the Crown. Your Majesty's Minister of War may 
not conceal the fact that such views find repercussions in 
that part of the nation which bears Your Majesty's arms and in 
which Your Majesty has always found the firmest pillar of Your 
throne. Whoever is faithful to Your Majesty can only with 
reluctance think of the possibility of this "rocher de bronce" 
being undermined. 
The King's comment on this last sentence was, "I should not survive 
that!" 
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Von Roon was saying that the army, "a large part of the nation," 
took affront at these liberal reforms; they should not be accepted, for 
they would lead to undermining the army, the firmest support of the 
throne. The army represented the nation, and nothing should occur 
which would offend it. The Lower House was not even mentioned; 
it did not represent the nation; it was of no importance in the nation. 
The army expressed the national interest; that is, the top officers, 
almost all Conservatives, expressed the national interest. Rarely, if 
ever, has an argument based on self-interest been advanced more 
blandly. For the sake of its national defence the nation should sub-
ordinate itself to the will of the officer-king and his officer advisers. 
This ideal was the essence of militarism. Von Roon assured the King 
that the army would defend him in case of any difficulty with the 
liberals. Far from opposing the King for not accepting liberal reforms, 
the general was saying that the army would be seriously alienated if 
the King did accept these reforms. 
Finally, I have to repeat once more the thought that in con-
tradiction to Your own conscientious convictions, Your Majesty 
may feel that You must make concessions in order thereby to 
further the great objectives of Your government. But what if 
the quid pro quo were not forthcoming? Parliamentary majori-
ties have always been unreliable. In view of this fact, would it 
not be much more advisable to expect beforehand the evidence 
of love and trust ... ? If this proof is given, and if Your Ma-
jesty's power is thereby strengthened to the necessary degree in 
internal and in foreign affairs, then Your Majesty can be less 
hesitating in Your concessions. The strong and rich can be 
obliging and generous; but as long as power and property are 
found in a doubtful situation wisdom advises caution and 
economy. 
Let the Landtag first approve the military reforms, von Roon ad-
vised his lord; after that act the King could think about granting a 
quid pro quo. Two statements in von Roon's advice could be used 
time and time again to block any reforms: first, since "parliamentary 
majorities have always been unreliable," how could an absolute 
monarch ever trust them by granting reforms at any time; second, 
what is the "necessary degree" of power "in internal and in foreign 
affairs" which a state must possess before the absolute ruler dare allow 
any constitutional concessions to a parliament? 
The heart of von Roon as Prussian soldier was instructing the 
monarch how to be at the same time an absolute sovereign and a con-
stitutional sovereign. He was teaching constitutional law as interpreted 
by the military, a subject in which he was undoubtedly proficient. 
190 / Prussia 1858-1864 
With the most self-righteous thoughts about serving the state, he was 
showing the King ways of defying the Prussian people. The content 
of this document fitted the period over fifty years before, when other 
Pruss ian army officers had fought to prevent the Steins and the Harden-
bergs from putting through constitutional reforms. The document 
reveals no understanding of the new society in the making, its prob-
lems and desires. It does not consider the fact that industrialists and 
bankers, merchants and railroad magnates, newspaper editors, profes-
sors and other professional personnel were becoming numerous, aware 
of their social and economic significance in the state, and eager to share 
the power by which their own fate and that of their state was deter-
mined. Von Roon's ideal world consisted of an absolute monarch 
surrounded by conservative nobility and army officers who were in a 
position to guide the will of the absolute monarch. Everyone else in 
the state belonged in the general category of "people," second and third 
class subjects who did not know enough to run the state or even their 
own affairs. 
The King wrote in his own hand on von Roon's letter, "You deserve 
for your candour my sincerest thanks for all time!" And at numerous 
places on the margin, he commented, "Agreed" and "Entirely agreed."18 
He withdrew his approval of the reforms for which his liberal ministers, 
especially Count von Schwerin, had been pressing; but his troubles 
were not over. A few months later in the same year, 1861, he turned 
to von Roon again for reassurance against the renewed pressure from 
the ministers. Von Roon replied in a long letter manifesting the in-
creased strength of his position. He turned from the defensive to the 
offensive. One of the liberal ministers had 
... demanded of Your Majesty to give way to his urging or to 
dismiss him. Can there be ... a choice? Your Majesty believes 
that You cannot dismiss him because the survival of the ministry 
would thereby be endangered. The disadvantage from it should 
not be underestimated. But on mature reflection it appears in 
fact to be tolerable. [It certainly did to him since he had been 
working for months for this objective.] Your Majesty will by 
virtue of Your authority appoint other ministers, and if You 
do not select them from among the leaders of the loudest and 
most extreme parties, the outcry of the parties will not be worse 
than it is at present. Your Majesty's pure intentions are known. 
You wished and wish to govern according to the constitution, 
but You wished and wish also to rule as a true King of Prussia. 
In this lies the insufficiency of several of Your present advisers. 
'·Ibid., II, 38-43. 
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Because You wished to rule constitutionally, You chose men who 
helped develop the constitutional doctrine in Prussia, whose 
names therefore had a good repute among their party comrades. 
But Your Majesty overlooked the fact that they had only the 
loudest but not at all the most competent voices in the country 
in their favor, that the consequences ?f the const~tutional doc-
trine of these men could be harmolllzed only wIth the sham-
monarchy of Belgium, England, or of Louis Philippe, but not 
with a genuine Pruss ian monarchy by the grace of God, with a 
monarchy in accordance with Your intentions which was rooted 
in the legal consciousness of Your people. Your Majesty did not 
wish to break with the past; the legal continuity should be pre-
served; also an improving hand should be laid upon the tradi-
tional. It would not be surprising if these Royal intentions, 
capable of various meanings, were to be interpreted by everyone 
according to his own wishes and outlook. In how far an identity 
of understanding was found between Your Majesty and Your 
newly chosen advisers remained uncertain from the beginning. 
When I entered the ministry, I found this lack of clarity; yes, 
the opposition of opinions and basic views was already plainly 
marked. Your Majesty had overlooked the fact that the parlia-
mentary antecedents of several of Your advisers imposed party 
obligations upon them which stood and stand in the most de-
cided opposition to their obligations toward Your Majesty. I 
often thought that I recognized that Your Majesty's policy would 
indeed have found the approval of these prejudiced persons if 
former assertions and party commitments had not made it im-
possible for them. It was absolutely impossible for them! At 
the moment in which they had the bona fide wish to follow Your 
Majesty's political directions, they would have ruined themselves 
in the eyes of their party; their influence would have been lost; 
they would have been overwhelmed with insults. They could 
not-and also would not do it. 
This was von Roon's understanding of political parties. The 
leaders became such not because the best qualified people chose them 
but because the loudest shouters favored them; often these leaders 
would have liked to support the King, but previous public commit-
ments and fear of the party would not allow them. What was the 
inference? That one could not have absolute monarchy and at the 
same time a ministry composed of party heads, a view about which von 
Roon was certainly correct. The further inference to be drawn was 
that party leaders obtained their position through the aid of the worst 
elements in the state and were responsible to them, that no respectable 
and powerful state could possibly be governed by means of a popular 
representative ministry. The liberals would have had no difficulty in 
refuting these assertions by citing the example of England; but as long 
as von Roon was writing for the eyes of the King alone his inferences 
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could not be challenged. One can see why Conservatives preferred the 
dark of absolutism to the light of representative government: they knew 
how to intrigue and wield personal influence on a few select indivi-
duals; they knew almost nothing about political parties and popular 
government. These devices were alien to them. Von Roan had a 
clear eye for the inconsistency of absolutism and party rule, just as 
Bismarck and subsequent Conservatives had. Von Roon went on: 
That is the situation. It is horrible; it brings the Fatherland 
to the edge of the abyss. But it should not cause despair. 
Your Majesty has two ways out of the confusion of the mo-
ment. One is called "giving in," full and complete, uncondi-
tional giving in, sacrifice of one's own conscientious conviction, 
binding the Royal will to the will of the ministers. It leads ir-
revocably along the path of monarchy by the grace of the peo-
ple; the special lustre of the Prussian Royal Crown will be 
extinguished, but in the background will beckon a citizens' 
crown and Prussia will in the future perhaps compete with Bel-
gium in the material blessings of an unhistorical existence. This 
would mean a breach with the historical past; the step in this 
direction would be a big one, but it would lead out of the em-
barrassment of the present on to the smoothest path. All un-
seasonable friction would cease, the state machine would gain 
new movement and jubilant approval would not be lacking. 
Von Roon failed to mention the fact that the overwhelming num-
bers of the Pruss ian people wished, not the extreme form of govern-
ment here portrayed, but a constitutional monarchy in which they 
would also have a share in the government. They wished a govern-
ment responsive to their wishes, one which would keep abreast of the 
times; they certainly did not desire the alternative which von Roan 
advocated: 
The other way calls for the assertion of the legally justified 
Royal will! It loosens the chains of the eagle; the King by the 
grace of God remains at the head of His people, the center of 
gravity in the state, ruler in the country, not subjected to minis-
terial guardianship and parliamentary majorities. There would 
be no breach with the past, and an improving hand can with 
wise moderation be applied to the completion of our public 
life. This way leads at the beginning over a rough path but 
with all the splendor and all the armed majesty of a glorious bat-
tle to the dominating heights of life. It is the only way worthy 
of a Prussian king. 
Von Roon was urging his ruler to take steps which would lead to 
civil war. But it would be a glorious civil war. Just how it would 
lead "to the dominating heights of life" was not any clearer than why 
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"the only way worthy of a Prussian king" was to force his people into 
a civil war. 
One has attempted to intimidate Your Majesty by the loud 
cries of the day. The same has occurred in the case of all un-
fortunate kings of history. Only because they believed in ghosts 
were they frightened and ruined. I beseech our Majesty, do 
not believe in this cry. Speak one word and the phantom will 
disappear. This word is "change of ministers," not "change of 
system." You have erred not in your goals but in the tools with 
which You strive toward that goal. .. _ Your Majesty said today 
that if you dismissed that minister who desired to retire others 
would follow. I grant this, but I do not recoil from the act. 
On the contrary, I should thank God on my knees for it if Your 
Majesty could thereby be free from the chains which now hold 
captive Your noblest self. 
Von Roon assured the King that he did not wish the liberal 
ministers to be supplanted by leaders of the Conservative party. He 
wanted no parties represented in the ministry, for "ministers with a 
parliamentary background are Your Majesty's ruin. Among Your 
Majesty's officials there are to be found many able persons who are not 
yet bound to parties. Choose some of these no matter whether they are 
numbered as members of the Constitutional or of the Conservative 
party." 
This has been the time-honored solution of all absolutists, a govern-
ment of officials supposedly above parties to execute the king's will 
and serve the best interests of the land. The system transfers the 
struggle for power to the entourage of the king, turns it into secret 
channels, and prevents the public from exercising any control, short 
of revolution, over their own affairs and from learning about national 
welfare and about how to achieve it through the only effective means, 
namely, the participation of all in public life- Von Roon was con-
sistent to the end. The kind of ministry he proposed was the only 
one suited to the retention of absolutism under a constitution. 
The long letter closed with a display of emotion which the writer 
no doubt felt but which was cleverly calculated to make the deepest 
impression upon the King. 
How can I justify the boldness of this letter? I answer: 
With the zeal of a brave soldier who sees his Prince in bonds, of 
the faithful servant who sees his beloved master on the edge of 
the abyss. Should one hesitate to break the chains, to spring to 
the rescue? Certainly not! Even if one were certain to fall. 
And another thing: today I saw tears in the eyes of my beloved 
King which filled me with pain and wrath_ I had to write 
Your Majesty what I could not say today because my heart was 
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in my throat. Believe me, Your Majesty, millions of ~ou.r loyal 
subjects would feel the same fury and the same pam If they 
should be so unfortunate as to know that their faithful King 
was in such deep sorrow, in such profound anxiety of conscience. 
No one of them would hesitate to offer Your Majesty his life 
and blood to free You from the distress which threatens the 
country with the heaviest of all losses, with the loss of its King.19 
The Minister of War was creating imaginary emotional "millions" 
of loyal subjects to counterbalance the results of the liberal elections. 
This self-styled "brave soldier" and "faithful servant" was springing to 
rescue his King from a situation which he was doing his best to make 
worse. He had his way, in that the King again refused to sanction the 
proposal of bills for developing the constitution, and against the urgent 
advice of his liberal ministers he insisted on carrying through his own 
autocratic plans for the ceremony of coronation. To his friend Perthes 
von Roon wrote in November, 1861: 
The cardinal point of Prussian internal politics is and re-
mains the military question. Therefore, I cannot, dare not, and 
will not resign now. Nor dare I show myself to be yielding on 
that question. The army, up to this time the sole reliable 
anchor and pillar of our future, should not become confused 
in its self-confidence and in its convictions; otherwise chaos will 
overtake us. To prevent this by preserving the army in its actual 
physical strength and with its inner values is the political part 
of my task. Herein alone I am able to do something with assur-
ance; therefore I must restrict myself to this. All other dam-
age which I cannot prevent is not irreparable; but the decay of 
the army would be the ruin of all ordered social relations. God 
give me sound vision, mental alertness, and the will to act.20 
From the Conservative point of view von Roon was entirely correct 
in his estimate. Since the bureaucracy contained many liberals, in an 
emergency it could not be trusted. In last analysis the conflict would 
have to be decided by force. The attitude of the army would determine 
the outcome. If the army were loyal to the King, the latter could act 
as he pleased. The army had sworn allegiance, not to the constitution, 
but to the King; and von Roon intended it to abide by that oath. Con-
cessions to the Lower House liberals would disgust the army officers, 
overwhelmingly Conservative in their politics, and might cause them 
to be indifferent toward the outcome of the constitutional conflict. 
In their rigid loyalty to the King the officers might be confused about 
10 Ibid., II, pp. 44.49. 
"Ibid.~ II, 54-55. 
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the import of the conflict. Von Roon had to watch the effect of any 
legislative proposal upon the spirit of the military. He kn~w that he 
controlled the decisive force in the controversy, if he could only per-
suade the King to be adamant and to allow the issues to come to a 
crisis. He knew that the outcome of this crisis would determine the 
future character of Prussian society. He was fighting for the preserva-
tion of the Old Regime, for rule by the absolute monarch and the 
nobility. He did not have to be particularly astute to grasp the 
social significance of the conflict; all the Conservatives and most of 
the liberals understood it quite early, and all the liberals did so before 
the conflict ended. Von Roon's historical significance in the crisis 
arose out of the fact that he spearheaded the Conservative forces in 
winning back the King to their side and in keeping in safe control the 
instrument of their power. To von Roon, as to the other Conserva-
tives, and to the liberals, the army problem was not primarily one to 
determine the power of the state in international affairs, but one to 
decide the character of Prussian institutions and society. 
By the autumn of 1861 von Roon was defending the Conservative 
party to the King, saying that apart from a few hot-heads it had come 
to accept the constitution and was ready to preserve and defend it. 
"Since a reliable and adequate ministerial party does not exist," he 
wrote the King, "since alliances with the radicals or democrats are out 
of the question, there remains only the possibility of looking about the 
Conservative camp for auxiliary troops in order to oppose the expected 
assault of the revolutionary party." He formulated once more his 
solution of the situation: "The King cannot resign, the ministry 
can'''21 He was preparing the way for the change of ministry and the 
appointment of Conservatives. Since no liberals of any shade were 
acceptable, Conservatives alone remained. 
The results of the elections in April and May, 1862, turned out 
worse for the King than before. The liberals were chosen in even 
larger numbers and the more determined representatives won over 
the right-wing candidates. Von Roon felt deep scorn for public 
opinion in any circumstances, and, although he had hoped for at least 
the election of moderates who might let themselves be pushed and 
shoved in the Conservative direction, he was not at all disheartened by 
the results. He had laid plans for a showdown and, writing to Perthes 
in April, did not believe that the liberals would dare revolt . 
• , Ibid., II, 51-54. See also von Bemhardi, op. cit., III, IV passim. 
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Do you believe that the liberal mass, the vulgar Philistines, 
love high stakes? I do not believe it. To wish to force the 
government either to give in or to drown the darling child of the 
blind monkey-mother "Constitutionalism," perhaps in blood, is 
a high stake which not even Vincke [an outspoken liberal aristo-
crat] would risk.22 
His strategy for handling the new Lower House remained the same 
as the one he had used on its predecessors. 
A vote of no-confidence in the address debate accomplishes 
nothing; the address will either be accepted or coolly rejected on 
the basis of the constitutional rights of the King. Or the pro-
posed laws will be rejected. Good. Things remain as they were. 
Always cold-blooded, urbane manners, rude despatch only in 
case of pronounced shamelessness, economical in words, no at-
tempt at engaging manners to curry favor; all corrections factual; 
no quarrels over theories.23 
In the following month he wrote Perthes, "The stakes are indeed 
high, very high. It is better to bleed to death than to rot away .... 
Prussia must act, make history and finally exchange the role of anvil 
for that of hammer!" He was reading the history of Strafford and 
Charles I; but he thought that he had a much better cause than the 
English ruler. When the Lower House in the autumn rejected by 
an overwhelming majority the proposal to provide funds for the mili-
tary reforms and demanded the two-year term of service and the 
restoration of the former organization of the army, von Roon saw 
that the crisis had arrived. He had deliberately baited the liberals 
so as to bring it on;24 and he was happy. "Nonsense, you win!" he 
wrote his friend Perthes on September 20, "and if I do no add 'and I 
must perish,' this is not because I still feel absolutely no desire and no 
occasion to perish."2l5 
What made von Roon so cheerful was the prospect of obtaining for 
the first time since 1858 a unified ministry supporting the King with 
initiative, courage, and determination. He had striven since at least 
186.0 .to bring his friend Bismarck into the ministry and had ·always 
met with disinclination on the part of his sovereign. He believed that 
at last the King could find no one else capable of resolving the conflict 
in .an acceptable way. The ruler had tried a mixed ministry of Con-
.. Von Roon, op. cit., II, 70, 77-78. 
··Ibid., II, 84. 
so See von Bemhardi, op. cit., IV, 190-91, 196-97: Tagesbericht, Feb. 4, 1862, 
citing the Danziger Zeitung, No. 1150 . 
•• Von Roon, op. cit., II, 84, 89, 101, 107. 
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servatives and liberals and had failed; in 1862 he had tried a cabinet 
of Conservative ministers not especially active in party affairs and 
therefore supposedly not committed to a party program and had failed 
again. He now had reached the point at which he had either to 
find some person of extraordinary ability to overcome the difficulties 
or to carry out his frequent threat of abdicating. 
The story of the King's conference with Bismarck at Babelsberg 
in September, 1862, need not be retold. The King undoubtedly mis-
trusted this Junker and feared that he could not control him. The 
ruler hated to repudiate his past relations with the right-wing liberals 
by appointing a person whose name alone indicated the most profound 
hostility to liberalism and the willingness to use extreme means. The 
appointment revealed the King's desperate plight. It required the 
extreme act of the Lower House in rejecting his military reforms to 
make him willing to entrust his future to this high-handed, brilliantly 
versatile and determined aristocrat. The King was thinking of the 
fate of Charles I, as Bismarck was of that of Strafford. Neither was 
deterred by his thought for both were determined to win. 
When Bismarck became Minister President, he had to maintain 
himself against or between two centers of power, the King and the 
Lower House of the Landtag. He knew that the King had appointed 
him to the present position only as an act of despair. He understood 
also that the Queen had opposed the appointment with all her in-
fluence and that she would continue to be hostile. As for the Lower 
House, he had entered the ministry at the peak, so far, of the conflict 
between the King and that body, and he had no illusions about the 
attitude which it would take toward him. 
The King proved to be fairly easy to handle. He was so angry 
at the liberals and so determined to preserve his military reorganization 
and his royal power that the more ruthlessly Bismarck fought the 
Lower House while preserving the appearance of constitutionality, the 
better the King felt. Once Bismarck took up the warfare in earnest 
against the liberals, the King for the first time since 1860 became cheer-
ful and confident. As we shall see, the gap theory of the constitution 
pleased him through and through as an interpretation exactly to his 
liking. 
Within a span of five years the King made the transition from 
aversion to Manteuffel Conservatism to support of mild liberalism to 
enthusiastic advocacy of a regime much more ruthlessly Conservative 
than that associated with Manteuffel. His mentality was so limited 
and his personal belief in his own divine right so strong that he shifted 
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his opinions easily and with a free conscience. When under proper 
verbal coverage Bismarck flouted the constitution, the King felt him 
to be entirely justified. When Bismarck used far more coercion in the 
elections than Manteuffel had done, the King vigorously approved. 
When Bismarck punished liberal officials, the King found all in order. 
The shoe was now on the other foot, the King's foot; he did not like 
the pinching. As a King by grace of God he reacted favorably to any 
means which flexible minds could make him think constitutional. 
The liberals accused Bismarck of exacerbating the conflict with the 
Lower House in order to hold his ministerial position. The allegation 
lacked foundation, even though at the time it seemed plausible. Bis-
marck was so self-confident and so aware of the possibilities of both 
the internal and the external situation that he actually would have 
preferred peace with the Lower House, at his price. His offer of co-
operation to liberal leaders immediately upon entering the ministry 
was not bluff. One may doubt his political acumen in conceiving that 
the liberals would accept; but from another angle it was good politics. 
If they accepted, they would lose their popular following and would 
be dependent upon Bismarck. If they refused Bismarck could always 
assert that he had come into the governmnet as a dove of peace.26 He 
had no fear of a solution of the conflict on terms acceptable to both 
liberals and the King. Under such conditions the latter would have 
been highly pleased, and Bismarck would have won his favor by a suc-
cess which no other ministers had been able to achieve. 
Bismarck's conceptions of government possessed a quality of realism 
that was lacking in the views of his Conservative colleagues. He 
understood something of the complexity of purpose and conditions 
which government had to serve, and realized that simple, old-fashioned 
rule by divine right would not satisfy modern needs. He had positive 
ideas about the structure and functions of government which resembled 
in part those of liberals and in part those of Conservatives; but he 
blended them in an original way appropriate to the furtherance of his 
own power. 
Provided the authority of parliament was restricted in favor of the 
executive, Bismarck regarded the assembly as useful and essential. As 
early as 1853 he had written to the Prince of Prussia, the future King 
William I, as follows: 
It is true that the good reputation and the undoubted 
achievements of the Prussian bureaucracy have led this body to 
•• See Zechlin, op. cit., p. 334; von Unruh, op. cit., pp. 220-28. 
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overestimate itself, to lean to one side, and to endeavor to rule 
more than is necessary. This disease points to a gap, the filling 
of which is the task of the representative assembly. The latter 
provides a counterweight to the presumptuousness of the offi-
cials, a correction of their one-sided and impractical theories and 
a protection against the dangers which arise out of our scholarly 
educational institutions. In these institutions our officials re-
ceive a higher type of education than perhaps in any other state, 
but this education easily leaves an attitude of skeptical criticism 
of life which brings disbelief in the field of religion and classical 
republicanism in the field of politics. If there is added dissatis-
faction with the subsequent position, slow advancement and the 
entire practical results of such a long, tiresome and costly prep-
aration, then one understands how easily our officials can change 
from servants of the Crown to opponents; for they anticipate an 
improvement in their own position from changes in the condi-
tions in the country. Against these dangers the Crown and the 
country find support in the control and counter-activity which 
are exercised by the representative assembly with respect to the 
bureaucracy. But to prevent the representative assembly from 
becoming itself a danger, it should have not a dominant and ag-
gressive character but basically a defensive one. 
In 1861 and 1862 Bismarck still believed in the need for a parliamen-
tary assembly, even on the eve of his assuming power as minister; and 
the fact that he advocated the creation of a popular representative 
body for Germany and introduced one in the newly unified country in 
1867 and 1871 showed that he did not intend to abolish the Prussian 
Landtag. He meant to use it in realizing his personal, state, and na-
tional objectives.27 
Bismarck's approval of the Landtag as an institution was condi-
tioned by his views on the political ability of the Prussian people and 
their liberal leaders. He dismissed any notion of a parliamentary 
government like that in England by citing the absence of a two-party 
system in Prussia and the lack of an equivalent of the English gentry. 
The Pruss ian nobility, he had stated in 1849, had not acquired the 
qualities of political leadership possessed by the gentry. As for the 
party system in Prussia, he declared that the liberals were too divided 
among themselves to be able to govern even if they had the chance. 
"We are too educated," he asserted in the Budget Commission of the 
Lower House in September, 1862, "to be able to maintain a constitu-
tion, we are too critical; the ability to judge governmental measures, 
acts of the representative assembly, is too widespread."28 
.7 Rothfels, op. cit., pp. 343-44, 50, 205 . 
.. A dress-De batte, pp. 242-43; Rothfels, op. cit., pp. 25, 32, 206. 
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In keeping with this conception of parliament Bismarck scorned the 
liberal deputies. "Even though we are an educated country, doubtless 
too much so, I am amazed at the political incapacity of our Chambers," 
he wrote von Roon in July, 1862. "The other parliamentary bodies 
are certainly no wiser than the flowers of our class system of elections, 
but they do not have this childish self-confidence with which ours in 
full nakedness publicly expose their incapacity as a model. How 
have we Germans acquired the reputation of timid modesty? There 
is not one of us who does not believe that he understands everything 
better than all trained specialists from the conduct of war to picking 
fleas off a dog, whereas in other countries there are many who admit 
that they understand less than others about many things and remain 
modest and silent." In a private letter he referred to liberal deputies 
as "petty,"29 and during a session of the Lower House he wrote his 
American friend, John Lothrop Motley: 
I sit again in the House of Phrases and listen to the people 
talk nonsense .... The chatterers can really not govern Prussia; 
I must oppose them; they have too little wit and too much self-
satisfaction, are stupid and audacious. Stupid in a general 
sense is not the proper expression; the people are individually in 
part fairly sensible, mostly informed, with standard German uni-
versity education; but about politics beyond local interests they 
know as little as we knew as students, yes, even less. In foreign 
affairs they are, taken individually, mere children; but in all 
other questions they become childish as soon as they meet in a 
body-stupid as a mass, understanding as individuals.30 
Bismarck was addicted to the use of extreme words about opponents, 
often to statements which went beyond his actual opinion. There 
can be little doubt, however, that in this instance he expressed his 
real views. 
Evidence was supplied by the strategy which Bismarck evolved for 
attacking the Lower House. At least as early as 1861 he believed that 
ultimately "only by a change in our foreign policy can ... the position 
of the Crown within the country be freed from the present pressure.":!1 
In July, 1862, he proposed to von Roon a plan: 
The longer the affair continues, the more the Lower House 
will sink in public prestige, because it has committed the mis-
take and will continue to do so of locking its jaws upon trivia, 
•• Ibid., pp. 46, 49. 
I. Quoted in Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 163, from Politische Briefe Bismarcks 
(Berlin, 1889), p. 124 . 
.. Rothfels, op. cit., p. 46. 
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and because it has no speaker who does not augment the bore-
dom of the public. If one can induce them to bite tenaciously 
into such petty matters as the continuation of the Upper House 
and begin a conflict about that and delay the settlement of im-
portant business, it will be a great good fortune. They will be-
come tired and hope that the government will give out of breath, 
and the county judges must be alarmed about the cost of substi-
tutes. When they become soft and feel that the country is bored 
and urgently hope for concessions from the government in order 
to be freed from their false position, then the time will have 
come to show them by my appointment that we are far from 
ready to give up the battle, and that on the contrary we are re-
newing it with fresh forces. The display of a new battalion in 
the ministerial order of battle will perhaps make an impression 
which at present cannot be achieved. Especially if beforehand 
they are threatened somewhat with phrases about dictation and 
coup d'etat, myoid reputation of lighthearted violence will help 
me, and they will think, "now it begins." Then all those in the 
center and all half-hearted ones will be inclined to negotiate.32 
As soon as the country understood the issue, rule by king or rule by 
parliament, Bismarck believed, it would support the king. Several 
elections might be necessary before the government obtained a co-
operative Lower House, but he did not doubt that ultimately one 
would be elected. No concessions should be made and no long debates 
should be held with the liberals, as they would only encourage opposi-
tion. "Patient and persistent efforts at understanding," Bismarck 
wrote, "will alone lead us through the straits between the Scylla of 
Kurhessian conditions in the country and the Charybdis of parlia-
mentary rule."33 
The plan of action is most revealing of Bismarck's mental limita-
tions. The imputation to the liberal deputies of low motives, such as 
fear of material loss, reflected his usual slight esteem for human beings. 
In his failure to realize that questioning a parliament's budgetary 
authority would arouse the deputies to action as no other issue would, 
he showed such lack of understanding of parliamentary government 
that one can appreciate the liberal deputy Virchow's remark that Bis-
marck was acquainted with Russia but not England. His plan mani-
fested the jaunty nonchalance of a Junker concocting a scheme to 
suit his own measure. 
Needless to say, the plan did not work. Bismarck's appointment 
did not discourage the Lower House or make it ripe for compromise. 
·'Ibid., pp. 48-49 . 
.. See Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 257-59. 
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His procedure did not cause the conflict to degenerate into quarrels 
over details with the result of alienating the public. In fact, the more 
Bismarck tried his strategy on internal affairs, the more he consolidated 
the public against him. He was manifestly not equal to many liberal 
leaders in debate on constitutional issues. The fact was virtually ad-
mitted when he replied to Virchow with personal insults, his usual 
recourse when cornered. He maintained himself in office simply be-
cause he had the backing of the King and the military and because 
the bureaucracy continued to function for him as it had for the liberal 
ministers, for Manteuffel, and before 1848 for Hohenzollern absolutism. 
He won out ultimately because he carried through the unification of 
Germany, an objective so ardently desired by the liberals that in order 
to attain it they were willing in internal affairs to swallow defeat. 
After having served as Minister President for a few weeks Bismarck 
perceived that the constitution offered many possibilities of employing 
terror and enticements, and he was already playing with the idea of 
a coup d'etat in case of necessity.34 In the following July he urged 
his Minister of Interior to revive the notorious Hinkeldey regime of 
the Manteuffel period by banning particular individuals from Berlin, 
especially writers. The further the conflict progressed, the more ruth-
less Bismarck became. In accordance with his plan of the summer of 
1862 he tried to stir the liberals to fight on a series of continually new 
issues, some of major, some of minor significance, but all useful, he 
thought, to wear down the endurance of the Lower House and its 
supporters in the country. The first opportunity presented itself in 
the action of the House of Lords. When the Lower House rejected 
the government budget in September, 1862, the House of Lords refused 
to follow suit and passed instead the government's original budget. 
Then each side accused the other of unconstitutional action. In 
November the government tried to mobilize the provincial Landtags 
against the Lower House, only to find that even they refused to be 
exploited for that purpose. In September of the next year after many 
threats the government required officials who served as deputies to 
pay the cost of their substitutes and withheld the amount from their 
salaries; since 1848 the costs had been covered out of public funds.35 
Each side advanced legal arguments in its favor. When the Lower 
House in January, 1863, voted an address to the King accusing the 
ministers of unconstitutional acts, Bismarck declared that he would 
.. Zechlin, op. cit., p. 342 . 
•• Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 107, 128, 178. 
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not advise the King to accept the document. The Lower House replied 
that this attitude violated the constitutional right of Pruss ian subjects 
to petition their sovereign. Bismarck countered that "there is a limit 
to what a Prussian monarch can listen to."36 The liberal majority 
severely criticized the government for signing a convention with Rus-
sia agreeing to assist the latter in suppressing the Polish rebellion. The 
government accused the majority of infringing upon the King's con-
stitutional right to declare war and make peace and to conduct foreign 
relations. The liberals were equally furious at the ministry's attempt 
to prevent the Lower House from expressing its views about an issue 
so important for the entire state. In May, Minister von Roon lost his 
temper in the Lower House, whether deliberately or not would be 
hard to say. He began to make personal remarks about certain depu-
ties and was called to order by the president of the chamber. The 
minister refused to be called to order. He swore that the authority of 
the president did not extend to the ministers, that the constitution en-
titled a minister to speak at any time he wished. He accused the 
House of endeavoring to impose censorship upon the ministers and of 
forcing them under parliamentary control. The president of the cham-
ber, with the full support of the liberal majority, asserted that he did 
have authority as presiding officer to enforce parliamentary rules and 
that the minister must abide by them. He denied that the constitutional 
rights of the ministers were involved and countered with the assertion 
that the constitution gave to the Lower House the right to organize it-
self and to establish its own rules of conduct. The liberals denounced 
the ministry for trying to force the Lower House to obey its orders and 
feared that if the ministers should maintain their claim to be free from 
any control by the president of the chamber they would wreck the 
order of business of that body. Each accused the other of violating the 
constitution, of trying to extend authority over the other. 
The ministry regarded the incident as an excellent opportunity to 
stir up a maximum amount of trouble over a minor affair. It declared 
that its members would not appear again in the Lower House until 
the latter had receded from its position. The liberals refused and 
appealed to the King, who completely vindicated the ministry's most 
extreme position in a document that possessed all the characteristics of 
Bismarck's style. When the Lower House in turn declared to the 
King that it could not work with this ministry, the King utilized the 
occasion to close the session and send the deputies home. The affair 
•• Adress-Debatte, pp. 5-7; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 124-25. 
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suited Bismarck's prescription exactly, a fight over a matter of no 
great intrinsic consequence which the public would not understand, 
thus causing general irritation and disgust. This kind of incident 
would lead, according to Bismarck's strategy, to an alienation of the 
public from the liberal Lower House and would help prepare condi-
tions for a new election.37 
The Landtag was closed on May 27, 1863. On the first of June the 
ministry began a campaign by which it expected to restore order. The 
statement of program which it published in the official papers offered 
such a striking example of ministerial hypocrisy that it deserves to be 
quoted. First came the justification: 
In Prussia it is something unheard of and entirely unnatural 
for such a division to occur. Among us there exists no oppo-
sition between monarchy and popular freedom, between army 
and citizens, between the authority of the King and genuine 
progress. Prussia's Kings have always cultivated and furthered 
progress in all areas of civic right and welfare. 
After having denied by fiat the existence of any conflict between 
Lower House and government, after having denied by implication 
the occurrence of the Revolution of 1848, after having established har-
mony among all Prussians, the ministry explained in kindly terms 
what it proposed to do in order to restore order to a country already 
in perfect order. 
Therefore it will certainly need only a time of calm, only a 
soothing of that unnatural excitement in order to revive once 
more the traditional spirit of loyalty, the old unity between 
prince and people, in order to return to complete understanding 
between the government and the people's representation and 
thereby to a blessed new development of our constitutional life. 
Only a slight controversy existed, the ministry soothingly explained, 
between the ministry and a Lower House which had little or no sup-
port in the country and which would once more return to the happy 
state of constitutional development as soon as the unnatural excite-
ment was overcome. 
This is the meaning and the purpose of the most recent 
measures. The government will thereby exercise a policy of 
pacification and reconciliation, not a policy of anger or of des-
potic passion. It will use the severity, which it has momentarily 
adopted, only in the spirit of healing, and in legal discipline, not 
in the spirit of revenge or of reprisal. 
.7 See the pertinent documents in Die lnnel"e Politik, pp" 184-95; see also Paris-
ius, von Hoverbeck, II, 137, 155-59. 
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When the government succeeds in restoring peace to the 
spirits and in finally quieting again the conflict of party passions, 
it hopes that the results will soon show that with the restoration 
of order, legality, and moderation it has made possible and again 
assured the further development of our constitutionalliberties.88 
The few liberal deputies were assumed to be trouble makers, rather 
than the King, who demanded a huge increase in the army budget, or 
the ministry, which proposed to rule by interpreting the constitution 
out of existence. The few liberals were to be handled by the King, 
a wise father who punished his dear children for their own good. The 
limited intelligence of the subject was to be enabled by a few stern 
measures to recover its natural equanimity. Then constitutional free-
dom would be restored, that is, freedom to reorganize the army in a 
way which the people did not want, freedom to collect taxes and ex-
pend money without the consent of the people's representatives, free-
dom for the King to rule by divine right under a constitution. 
How should peace be restored? The government plan of action 
had already been initiated as soon as Bismarck became Minister Presi-
dent. At that time the Minister of Interior had sent a secret order to 
Police President von Bernuth: 
The present situation makes necessary the duty of the Royal 
officials to devote special attention to the expressions of public 
life and to act with decision against punishable deeds which con-
cern public order. Under the guise of constitutional loyalty and 
in apparent defence of existing fundamental laws, the mani-
festations contrary to the laws are increasing. There repeatedly 
occurs in direct or concealed fashion a violation of the respect 
for His Majesty the King and in the same way the loosening of 
discipline in the army is being aimed at. Moreover, there exist 
numerous provocations to hate and despise the institutions of 
the state with respect to the sovereign power .... 
The police were ordered especially to watch the political newspapers 
and to take all legal steps against them. They should keep under 
close observation all societies, check on all public meetings, and pre-
vent political associations from entering into contact with each other.39 
On May 27, 1863, the Landtag was closed. On June I the govern-
ment issued a decree curbing freedom of the press. The government 
recognized that the press law of 1851 did not permit such an act; it 
also recognized that since 1860 it did not have the power to apply to 
a. Die Innere Politik, pp. 206-07. 
a. Preussisches Geheirn Staatsarchiv. Pr. Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, 
Lit. P. 377, Vol. II. 
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the press the concessionary authority that it exercised with respect to 
other business. Nonetheless, it sought and found means to curb the 
press during the election campaign, and it now exercised its power 
ruthlessly. In July, 1863, it declared it to be "the urgent and un-
avoidable duty of the government" to take all steps to calm "the 
passionate and unnatural excitement which in recent years as a re-
sult of party activity has seized hold of all spirits." To that end it 
proposed to restrict "the exciting and confusing effects of the daily 
press." It accused the press of having a large share in "undermining 
all bases of orderly state life, of religion, and morality." It admitted 
that the Conservative press was unable to stem these attacks, for it 
lacked the physical resources and did not have the attention of the 
public. The press law of 1851 gave insufficient justifi<;ation for curb-
ing the excesses, it said, since the newspapers were expert at including 
articles the meaning of which was sufficiently clear to their readers 
without violating the letter of the law. The government changed the 
basis for legal action against the press by asserting that not individual 
articles or statements but "the entire attitude of a paper over a longer 
period of time" should be used in deciding whether a paper should be 
banned. Press cases should be decided not by the judiciary but by 
administrative officials. Knowing that journals from other German 
states also brought the contamination of liberalism into Prussia, the 
government assumed the power, in spite of the clause in the press law 
of 1851 prohibiting such an act, to forbid the entry of foreign news-
papers which it considered dangerous. 
In justification of its action the government referred to Articles 
27 and 63 of the constitution. Article 27 guaranteed the freedom of the 
press and prohibited the introduction of a censorship. It stated that 
every other restriction of freedom of the press should be imposed only 
by law. These constitutional clauses did not cause any concern to a 
government bent on violating them. The ministry maintained that by 
its decree "the free exchange of opinions which the constitution guar-
antees will in reality not be restricted .... Since the reprehensible ex-
cesses of an unrestrained press will be curbed," it declared, "the free-
dom of the press will be restored to the foundation of morality and self-
respect on which alone it can prosper and permanently strengthen 
itself."40 
Just how the prohibition of freedom of the press achieved freedom 
of the press was a riddle which may have been crystal clear to the Con-
•• Die Innere Politik, pp. 195-98. 
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servatives, but to no one else. Article 63 regulated the conditions 
under which a decree could be promulgated. It read: 
In so far as the chambers are not in session and under the 
responsibility of the entire ministry, decrees which do not violate 
the constitution can be promulgated with the power of law only 
in case the preservation of public safety or the settlement of an 
unusual emergency makes them urgently necessary. These are 
to be laid immediately before the chambers for approval at their 
next session. 
The government had dissolved the Lower House before it had 
issued the decree, for it knew that the House would never approve 
the measure. Then it called the time "an unusual emergency," al-
though no rebellion or civil war threatened. Nothing was occurring 
except peaceful electioneering with the liberals severely condemning 
the government. It was assumed that the government would lay a bill 
before the new Landtag in the autumn for approval of its action; but 
in the meantime the government would have used this arbitrary 
measure, a clear violation of the constitution, to cripple the liberals 
in the election campaign. The execution of the act was entirely par-
tisan; only liberal and democratic papers suffered, while the Conserva-
tive ones indulged in the most vulgar vituperation against the oppon-
ents of the government without being molested. 
The liberals immediately declared the decree to be unconstitu-
tional. The law faculties of the universities of G6ttingen, Heidelberg, 
and Kiel issued a public statement condemning it as a violation of the 
law of the land. The Crown Prince publicly dissociated himself from 
the act.41 When the Landtag reconvened in November after the new 
elections, the Lower House immediately condemned the government 
action and refused to approve a bill to make the press decree legal and 
permanent. In analyzing the ministry's justification of the decree, 
Deputy Gneist declared that the ministry regarded as a state of emer-
gency that which in the rest of Europe passed as constitutional govern-
ment. The embarrassment of the government was never an emergency 
for the country, he continued, and he condemned the decree as the 
"most extreme dictatorial measure since the introduction of the con-
stitution." He accused the government of curbing only the liberal 
press. 
You speak of the falsification of the truth, of the demoraliza-
tion which the press spreads. Yes, there is such and it continues . 
.. See, among others, Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 165-66; R. Haym, Das Leben 
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The hateful falsification of the truth, the malignings, the sum-
mons to revolution, to a violation of the constitution, these con-
tinue; but they continue in the press which is found in the camp 
of the Royal government, in the press which dares to call itself 
the governmental press, in the press which has not been warned 
a single time by the presidents of the twenty-six regional ad-
inistrations. There lies the root of the evil in which we find 
ourselves. 
That the government had succeeded in curbing sharply the op-
positional press not even the liberals denied. That it had gained its 
purpose of calming the "unnatural" excitement in the country could 
not have been maintained even by the government. As the liberal 
deputy von Carlowitz asserted, "Figures show that even though the 
press is not entirely silent, it is nonetheless half silent. Still, the peo-
ple have understood what is to their interest and have re-elected those 
deputies in whom they have confidence."42 
Although the Lower House in the autumn made short work of the 
ministry's bill to legalize the press decree, the government continued 
to harass and curb the opposition press by administrative measures. 
Bismarck had no conception of a free press; he regarded the press as 
an instrument of political power to be used along with the bureaucracy, 
the army, and all other available means. The conflict for freedom 
continued.43 
The decree of June I abolishing for the time being the freedom of 
the press led to another restrictive measure. One of the main forces 
of the liberals' political support lay in the personnel of the town and 
city councils. These councils in urban centers in all parts of Prussia 
frequently discussed the conflict occurring between the government 
and the Lower House and passed resolutions or sent petitions and 
deputations to the House or to the King condemning the government's 
actions and supporting the liberal majority of the House. They were 
deeply alarmed by the decree of June I on the press, and they de-
nounced it as unconstitutional. On June 6 the government therefore 
took a further step characteristic of its authoritarian regime by for-
bidding the urban councils to discuss or pass judgment on "affairs of 
the state constitution, of the Landtag and of general politics." It 
restricted their deliberations exclusively to local affairs as the only 
objects legally within their jurisdiction, and it commanded the com-
.. See the debates in the Lower House, Nov. 19, 1863, in the St. B.; see also 
Aktenstiicke zur Neuesten Geschichte Preussens 1863, Vol. I (Verwarnungen), No. 
I-June, July; No.2-August, September, October (Berlin, 1863) . 
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munal authorities to take all measures "with all decisiveness" necessary 
to suppress these "illegal endeavors."44 Moreover, it advised the King 
not to receive delegations from the town councils seeking to lay their 
views on state affairs before him.45 Thereby, the Bismarck government 
was endeavoring to restrict participation in political life as sharply 
as possible. It tried to suppress one of the best organized and most 
vocal centers of liberal opposition and preclude any possibility of 
real and effective organization by the town councils, representative as-
semblies in themselves, for resistance to the government. 
At the time that it isolated the King from petitions and delegations 
from liberals, the government encouraged the Conservatives to use the 
same means for expressing their devotion to the King and his govern-
ment. The King was eager to receive every such manifestation of 
loyalty. The aristocrats headed the procession, but handworkers, 
peasants, and pastors were found who would also participate. The 
most famous, or notorious, expression of loyalty was sent to the King 
by peasants of the village of Steingrund in Silesia. The sentiments 
may be regarded as typical of this kind of governmental support. 
"We, Your Majesty's loyal subjects, again confront the elections to 
the Lower House. Since Your Majesty calls, we shall come as good 
Silesians are used to doing, whether into military battle or into election 
battle. If it were possible, we should elect no one else than our King 
and Lord." Since this was not possible, the petitioners asked the King 
to tell them for whom they should vote; and the petition ended with 
the promise to vote for those who supported devotedly the King and 
the government.46 
Since Bismarck disliked and mistrusted officials, it was to be ex-
pected that he would be doubly hostile to a Lower House in which 
a large percentage of members was bureaucratic. Under the Man-
teuffel regime the Conservatives had developed the system of using 
the bureaucracy for purposes of political control. While still Prince 
of Prussia, the King had objected strongly to coercion of an official to 
support the Conservatives; but now that his policies and his ministry 
had become the object of attack, he swung to the other extreme and 
approved completely Bismarck's efforts to force the officials into pol i-
ticalline.47 
.. Die lnnere Politik, pp. 199-200 . 
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The government's pOSItIOn with respect to the political attitude 
of officials was stated by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of 
Interior in orders to their respective personnel. Each aimed at the 
same objective, but because of the difference in the nature of their 
tenure justice officials could not be treated as arbitrarily as administra-
tive officials. The order from the Minister of Interior read as follows: 
The loyal and self-sacrificing devotion of the Royal officials 
to the Crown is a foundation pillar upon which the Pruss ian 
state is gloriously built. The government of His Majesty the 
King must rely on this unconditioned devotion all the more 
completely since the introduction of free institutions has as-
signed to the bureaucracy in the main the task of supportin~ 
the constitutional rights of the Throne. For that purpose it IS 
indispensable that throughout the administration unity of spirit 
and will, decision, and energy appear. The authority of the 
Royal rule dare not be weakened and shaken in public opinion 
by conflicts within its organs, and Royal officials may not mis-
use the prestige which their position gives them for the further-
ance of political endeavors which run contrary to the views and 
the will of the government.48 
The circular order meant that the government was determined to 
force the officials not merely to execute state business but to support 
the government politically. This fact had been frankly explained by 
Minister of Interior von Eulenburg in the Lower House during the 
January debate on the address to the throne. 
We do not doubt that all officials are loyal to the constitu-
tion. But we have had to note in the events of recent years 
that the more sharply the political controversies come to the 
fore, the more must the government muster its means in the 
same way as individuals who stand at the head of the parties, 
and it would sin against its duty if it did not attempt to gain vic-
tory according to its possibilities and with the use of all its 
means. 
In the Lower House you also call together your members in 
every serious debate. You recommend discipline. You call 
attention in all newspapers to the view that individuals must 
submit to the decisions of the whole, that they have to place 
restrictions upon themselves in order not to endanger the suc-
cess of the whole. 
Now, Gentlemen, how will you question the right of the 
government to do that which you claim as a parliamentary as-
sembly; how will you deny that the government cannot possibly 
rule if it does not assure that unity of thought is evident in the 
administration and that the power of execution is not broken? 
•• Die Innere Politik, p. 132; Adress-Debatte, p. 22. 
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Prior to the introduction of our present constitution th~ con-
stitutional guarantees of the country lay in the laws and III cer-
tain institutions among which the bureaucracy also belonged. 
The officials were at that time, more or less, not merely the 
bearers of the Royal power, but also those through whom the 
King and the government ascertained the opinions of the coun-
try. Since no great obstacles were to be overcome, one could be 
more lenient toward political pronouncements of the officials 
and request the freest expression of opinions from them as some-
thing within their duty. Today the voice of the people has 
been placed in another body; it lies in you, in these Houses; 
and the official has fundamentally another responsibility. He 
must stand by the government. It is impossible to allow an 
official to say: today I am an official and tomorrow a free man, 
a deputy, then I will be again an official. 
I say, an official who actively follows a line which contra-
dicts that of the government, who opposes the government in a 
noticeably agitational manner-with such an official the gov-
ernment cannot govern. If it must take measures to get rid of 
him, the action is not to be blamed upon the government but 
upon the official. 
In other countries it is customary that when a change of 
ministries occurs, so and so many officials are dismissed or have 
the tact to resign. In our country this does not occur: one even 
has the impression at times that certain officials demand that in 
case of their opposition the ministry must retire. Such condi-
tions are untenable, and assuredly times were better when one 
spoke of Prussian officialdom as distinguished not merely by 
intelligence but also by tact. Be convinced that we shall handle 
all personnel questions sine ira et studio. It will not occur to us 
to wish to eliminate an official merely because he does not please 
us or is uncomfortable for us. We investigate carefully whether 
his external behavior is in keeping with his position as state 
official; and if we find the two out of harmony with one an-
other, we shall take steps against him ... with all the means at 
our disposal, even though he appears personally to be worthy 
of respect or is in close personal relations with us. We take no 
pleasure in such proceedings, but we regard them as our un-
avoidable duty.49 
Acting according to plan, the government shifted liberal officials 
from positions in the Western provinces or from larger towns to the 
rural areas of the Eastern provinces, those areas of the purest possible 
Junkerism, areas where the curse of industrialism, a free press, and 
an active civic and cultural life had not yet fallen. A liberal deputy 
estimated in 1878 that during the period of conflict the government had 
•• Adress-Debatte, pp. 234-35. 
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disciplined by transfer or dismissal more than a thousand officials, 
among them twenty deputies of whom nine were judges.5o 
Since many liberal deputies were officials, it was to be expected 
that they would be well acquainted with their legal rights and would 
fight the government's policy. Few of them were administrative 
offcials, because these, being most exposed to government pressure, 
had kept out of leading political positions. The judiciary supplied 
most of those deputies from the ranks of the bureaucracy; supposedly 
secure from governmental chicanery, judges could take an independent 
stand in politics. Even they had to defend themselves, for the govern· 
ment had its own interpretation of the law on judicial tenure, an 
interpretation which it concocted to suit its needs. 
In the Lower House the deputies subjected the government's policy 
to thorough denunciation. Deputy Waldeck, a former judge of the 
highest court, cited the paragraph from the general law on the judi. 
ciary by which the Minister of Justice claimed the power to force his 
subordinates to refrain from actively working for the liberals. The 
paragraph read as follows: 
Also the private life ... and the conduct of the ministers 
and subalterns of the courts must be the object of attention by 
the presidents. And although it cannot be expected of or per· 
mitted to them to interfere in the private and family affairs of 
the judicial officials subordinate to them, they must nonetheless 
take care that these officials lead in public an orderly and respec· 
table life, carefully avoid all excesses and baseness, which would 
arouse anger and offend the public and dishonor the dignity of 
the office, and in general do or begin nothing whereby the 
prestige due them and necessary to the exercise of the office is 
endangered. 
Deputy Waldeck stated that the minister found aggressive party 
activity for the liberals bad, but that for the party supporting the 
ministry good and worthy. He demanded the same personal rights 
for justice officials as for anyone else, and among them he included 
the right to be active in politics. He condemned the minister's order 
as another violation of the constitution, another attempt to restore 
absolutism. 51 
Deputy von Vincke brought out the fact that the Minister of 
Justice was aiming to force the state's attorneys to be Conservative. 
Since those officials monopolized the power to bring criminal action 
··Parisius, von Hoverbeck, 11,104·05,176; Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 347·51. 
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against an individual, one could imagine to what extent in a police 
state like Prussia they could be used to hound persons politically 
active against the government. Deputy von Vincke stated that such 
a condition had obtained under no previous government, not even 
under absolutism.52 
Deputy von Bockum-Dolffs spoke for the administrative officials 
of whom he himself was one. Countering the Minister of Interior's 
accusation of their trying to be at one moment an official and at the 
next a free deputy, he declared: "I will abide by the constitution as 
a deputy in the same way that I do as official." He accused the 
government of overstepping its legal rights.53 His assertion was ela-
borated by Deputy Lette, who had grown old in bureaucratic service. 
The old legal teachings of Germany which up to the most 
recent time were assumed to be inviolable bases of German state 
law hold that an official is in no respect subordinate to his 
superior or has to resign his position because of his political and 
religious opinions, but that of course he has to administer his 
office loyally-the judge loyal in the sense and according to the 
letter of the laws, the administrative official strictly and loyally 
following also the instructions from the appropriate higher of-
ficials. But ... how very much apart from these are religious 
and political convictions, how little the freedom and independ-
ence of them is conditioned by the requirement of fulfilling 
one's official duty can be seen from an article in the constitution 
the validity of which the Minister of the Interior has questioned 
with respect to officials, namely, that no one can be made respon-
sible for his vote in the legislative chamber and for his opinions 
expressed there. According to my understanding the declaration 
of the minister has gone so far that he demands of the officials 
that they should as deputies and as officials represent and sup-
port identical political and religious views. 54 
The minister had said nothing about religious conformity; that 
practice of the Manteuffel era had at least not yet been restored. But 
Deputy Lette correctly interpreted the minister's remarks with respect 
to politics. This part aroused Deputy Immermann to speak. 
These measures are objectively immoral because if executed 
they would bring about a complete demoralization and debase-
ment of the official class. In every person, also in every official, 
there is a moral kernel; and in the person this moral kernel 
should above all be loyalty to convictions. Shame and disgrace 
to the person who recognizes something as completely right and 
·'Ibid., p. 181. 
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necessary and does not defend it in word and deed; shame and 
disgrace above all to officials, shame and disgrace to the judge, 
whose occupation indicates to him that if he has recognized the 
right he should under no conditions deviate from the recogni-
tion of it but should manifest it in actions .... It is a vain delu-
sion to speak of a Christian state devoid of legality, and it is 
a vain delusion to wish to be Christian without first and above 
all abiding by the law.')!' 
The government did not bother to answer the liberal arguments. 
It merely asserted the contrary opinions and depended upon its power 
to enforce them. The liberals were correct when they said that the 
ministers had different moral standards, different constitutional and 
political principles from them, that they spoke a different language. 
The conflict over the political rights of officials illuminated the 
difficulties which arose out of the newness of the constitutional system. 
Each side could claim to be in part correct, but each side pushed its 
claim to an extreme-the government to the extreme of complete 
political subordination on the part of the deputy-official, the opposi-
tion to the extreme of complete political freedom. It did seem para-
doxical that a person who in his official capacity was subordinate to a 
government should upon election as deputy fight that government 
tooth and nail. Each side was trying to utilize its position to enhance 
its strength. It must be said, however, that from the standpoint of 
moral principles the government was sinning by its endeavor to cor-
rupt the freedom of political personality of its officials in order to trans-
form them into instruments for executing political orders. The 
liberals did not break any comparable moral ideal. The government 
accused the liberal officials of wrecking orderly government; the 
officials aptly and justly replied, as Bockum-Dolffs did, that if the 
government would act constitutionally the public business would be 
transacted without any difficulty. While each side claimed to be 
acting in accordance with the constitution, there can be no doubt 
that the government was violating both the letter and the spirit of 
that document and that it aimed at victory irrespective of the constitu-
tion. It refused to compromise on any but its own terms. It inti-
mated that if the military conflict could be settled all other con-
troversies could be arranged. 56 It did so while employing every con-
stitutional and unconstitutional means at its disposal for crushing the 
liberal opposition. 
··Ibid., pp. 273-75 . 
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Each side accused the other of a series of violations of the consti-
tution. The liberals declared that evil begets evil, that once the con-
stitution was violated, it would have to be violated again and again 
in order to defend the first breach. The ministry accused the Lower 
House of breaking every clause of the constitution57 which the liberals 
accused the ministry of violating. The conflict became superficially 
a matter of name· calling. Actually it involved the fundamentals of 
governm~nt. In late 1862 Bismarck had coolly advised the liberals 
not to take the conflict so seriously. By the autumn of 1863 he was 
waging a fight for popular support against the liberals. His plan had 
called for a process of softening up the opposition, culminating in an 
appeal to the country in a new election. That election was held in 
October and November, 1863. To understand it adequately, one must 
analyze the liberals' interpretation of the constitution and the govern-
ment's counter-arguments during the critical year of 1863. 
"Absolutism, the noble genuine absolutism," wrote the Konigsberg 
Hartungsche Zeitung on April 17, 1862, "has the objective of training 
the people to the point at which it can cease to exist; for at a certain 
stage of the people's development absolutism becomes impossible. 
When industry, trade, the arts, and knowledge have advanced so far 
that they will not endure arbitrary measures, even well-intentioned 
ones, then in the course of natural development the constitutional state 
replaces absolutism. We have reached that point." The liberals were 
striving to make that "course of natural development" a reality. 
Irrespective of party affiliation the liberals shared a common con-
ception of the constitution. They expressed loyalty to King and con-
stitution; they wished "a strong monarchy of the Hohenzollerns and 
the full assertion of the rights guaranteed the people." They requested 
"a constitutional, just, and liberal government and the development 
of the constitution in that spirit by organic laws." The only difference 
between the right-wing liberals, from whose platform the above quota-
tions are taken, and the left-wing Progressive party arose over the fact 
that the latter demanded more initiative on the part of the Lower 
House and the liberals in the ministry. "We think," stated the 
Progressive party in September, 1861, "that the new Lower House must 
take a forceful initiative and must decidedly use its constitutional 
powers to assure an independent and vigorous public life alongside a 
strong government, a progressive development along with order:'58 
51 Die [nnere Palilik, pp. 177-178. 
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The liberals recognized that they had been living in a state of 
doubtful, undeveloped constitutionalism. They knew that they owed 
their re-entry into the government in 1858 to the ruler. "The present 
liberal conditions of administration," wrote a Berlin correspondent to 
the Magdeburger Zeitung, "the mild practice of the government, etc., 
should not deceive one about Prussia and its existing legislation, name-
ly, that Prussia is an absolutist state in which there are some excep-
tions sanctioned by the constitution. Apart from these exceptions 
there is no state in Europe in which the state has such extensive power 
as in Prussia."59 
By early 1861 the Lower House of the Landtag was inclined to push 
the center of power from the ruler and his ministers to the body of 
representatives of the population. The Progressive party took the 
lead in bringing about this shift. 
When the editor of the liberal Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung in 
November, 1861, tallied up the accomplishments of the New Era 
government, he noted that some reforms had been accomplished in the 
economic field, that almost nothing had been done for intellectual and 
spiritual needs, and that 
... in the stony and weedy field of constitutional and legal mat-
ters even these precarious and doubtful achievements become 
ever scarcer and more questionable. We manifestly approach in 
it the main stronghold of the opponents and feel at every step its 
laming, dominating influence. One cannot entirely deny the 
good intentions of the ministry and its dependents .... But our 
ministers remain simply "royal servants."60 
The liberals recognized that the constitution was full of gaps and 
uncertainties. That document had been preserved after 1848 by a 
Conservative government, but modified and conditioned in such a way 
as to satisfy its wishes. A typical method had been to retain a clause 
with a liberal content but to make its execution dependent upon 
future legislation. That legislation would then never be passed, 
and the status quo ante would be restored. Another method had 
been to cancel the liberal clauses by temporary or transitional clauses 
added at the end of the constitution and never repealed. Loose 
phraseology had been employed which could be interpreted according 
to the will of the government, or one clause had not quite agreed with 
another one and was subject to interpretation by the government. 
What had proved to be of especial use to the Conservative government 
.9 Tagesbericht, No.1, Jan. 2, 1862. 
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had been the omission of terms in the constitution to cover certain 
fundamental issues; thereby wide freedom of action by the dominating 
authority had been retained. 
When the liberals demanded the development of the constitution 
and the establishment of a state ruled by law, they meant the aboli-
tion of the Conservative methods of preserving absolutism and caste 
and the passage of laws making ,the constitution actually effective in 
a liberal sense. They understood that constitutional development re-
quired as a minimum the introduction of reforms of provincial, county, 
and local government and of ministerial responsibility. They knew 
that these innovations would mean the transfer of political power from 
the forces of the Old Regime, the absolute monarch and the con-
servative and military nobility, to those of the developing liberal 
society of the middle class and its allies in the other social groups. 
They recognized that a constitutional conflict involved a social conflict 
and entailed basic institutional changes in Prussia. They regarded 
these changes as a continuation of the achievements in favor of free-
dom during the Stein·Hardenberg period, changes called for by the 
constitution.61 
The constitutional crisis arose over the fact that while the govern-
ment demanded military reforms of such a nature as decidedly to 
strengthen the power of the Conservative nobility and the military, it 
failed to put through a single major constitutional reform desired by 
the liberals. The latter found themselves in the quandary of being 
expected to supply an enormous increase of men and money for 
strengthening the most reactionary institution in the state while noth-
ing was done in return to release the energy of the people by liberaliz-
ing the political institutions. Since absolutism and caste remained 
in supreme control of those institutions or at least in a position to 
obstruct change, the liberals perceived no reason why they should 
strengthen even more the position of their opponents by acquiescing 
in the military reforms, especially as they would have to bear the cost 
and provide the manpower. The constitutional conflict broke out 
in 1862 over this military issue. 
The conflict centered on the question of financial power. "The 
money is in our pockets," asserted the Progressive party in an election 
appeal of April, 1862, "and the government always needs more money. 
It cannot obtain new taxes until our representatives approve, and the 
latter will only approve when they are convinced that the funds will 
"Ibid" Nov, 7, 1861. 
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be used for the benefit of the country."62 What would happen in case 
the Lower House refused to grant the money requested by the executive 
for maintaining permanently a military reorganization for which funds 
had twice before been granted on a temporary basis? As soon as the 
issue was joined, it drew into question other clauses of the constitution 
than those about financial power, until it appeared that the entire con-
stitution was at stake. Although practically all liberals refused con-
sistently to admit it in words, the conflict involved the issue of 
whether the King or parliament should have ultimate authority. Each 
side phrased the issue in its own terms, and each swore that it was being 
constitutional and denied the accusations of the other .. In reality the 
liberals were interpreting the constitution in a forward-looking direc-
tion, and the King and the Conservatives in a backward-looking way. 
Each was defending a conception of the constitution which the other 
refused to recognize. 
When Bismarck took office the Lower House had just rejected the 
government's budget and passed a budget of its own, eliminating the 
items for the military reorganization. How should the situation be 
met? The House of Lords immediately rejected the revised budget 
and approved the original one, and Bismarck's government continued 
to collect taxes and to expend the public money for the military re-
forms as well as for all usual purposes-irrespective of the lack of a 
legal budget. When the liberal majority of the Lower House con-
demned this action as a violation of the constitution and proposed to 
appeal against the ministry to the King, Bismarck responded with a 
brief but complete statement of his interpretation of the constitution. 
He adopted what was known as the gap theory, first formulated in an 
article in the semi-official Stern Zeitung in the previous summer.sa He 
supplemented it with arguments and assertions of power of his own. 
Bismarck initiated the defence of his views about the constitution 
by an attack. He declared that the Lower House was fighting the 
Crown for supremacy, that it was claiming rights which it did not 
possess. He formulated the practical significance of its demands as 
transferring the constitutional rights of the Crown to the majority of 
the Lower House. 
You clothe this demand in the form of a declaration that the 
constitution is violated in so far as the Crown and the Upper 
House do not bow to your will. You direct the accusation of 
.J J'olksuitung, April 24, 1862 (Supplement) . 
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violation of the constitution against the ministry, not against 
the Crown whose loyalty to the constitution you place beyond 
all doubt .... You know as well as anyone in Prussia that the 
ministry acts in Prussia in the name of and on behalf of His 
Majesty the King, and that in this sense it has executed those 
acts in which you see a violation of the constitution. You know 
that in this connection a Prussian ministry has a different posi-
tion from that of the English. An English ministry, let it call 
itself what it will, is a parliamentary one, a ministry of the par-
liamentary majority; but we are mInisters of His Majesty the 
King. I do not reject the separation of the ministers and the 
Crown, as you have assumed in the address ... in order to pro-
tect the ministry behind the shield of the Crown. We do not 
need this protection; we stand firmly on the ground -of our good 
rights. I repudiate the separation because by it you conceal the 
fact that you find yourself not in conflict with the ministry, but 
in conflict with the Crown for domination over the country. 
Article 99 reads, if I remember correctly: all income and ex-
penditure of the state must be estimated each year in advance 
and brought together in a state budget. 
If it followed that "the latter will be fixed annually by the 
Lower House," then you were entirely correct in your complaints 
in the address, for the constitution would be violated. But the 
text of Article 99 continues: The budget will be fixed annually 
by law. Now, Article 62 states with incontrovertible clarity how 
a law is passed. It says that for the passage of a law, including 
a budget law, agreement of the Crown and of both Houses is 
necessary. That the Upper House is justified in rejecting a bud-
get approved by the Lower House but not acceptable to the 
Upper is, moreover, emphasized in the article. 
Each of these three concurrent rights. is in theory unlimited, 
one as much as the other. If agreement among the three powers 
is not reached, the constitution is lacking in any stipulation 
about which one must give in. In earlier discussions one passed 
over this difficulty with ease; it was assumed accordingtoanalogy 
of other countries, whose constitution and laws, however, are not 
published in Prussia and have no validity here, that the difficulty 
could be settled with the two other factors giving in to the Lower 
House, that if agreement over the budget is not reached between 
the Crown and the Lower House, the Crown not only submits 
to the Lower House and dismisses the ministers who do not have 
the confidence of the Lower House, but in case of disagreement 
with the Lower House the Crown also forces the Upper House 
by mass appointments to place itself on the plane of the Lower 
House. In this way, to be sure, the sovereign and exclusive rule 
of the Lower House would be established; but such exclusive 
rule is not constitutional in Prussia. The constitution upholds 
the balance of the three legislative powers on all questions, also 
with respect to the budget. None of these powers can force the 
others to give way. The constitution therefore points to the 
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way of compromise for an understanding. A statesman of con-
stitutional experience has said that the entire constitutional life 
is at every moment a series of compromises. If the compromise 
is thwarted in that one of the participating powers wishes to en-
force its own views with doctrinaire absolutism, the series of 
compromises will be interrupted and in its place will occur con-
flicts. And since the life of a state cannot remain still, con-
flicts become questions of power. Whoever has the power in 
hand goes ahead with his views, for the life of a state cannot re-
main still even a moment. You will say that according to this 
theory the Crown would be in a position to prevent the passage 
of a budget because of any insignificant difference of opinion. 
In theory that is indisputable, just as in theory it is also indis-
putable that the deputies can deny the entire budget, in order 
thereby to cause the discharge of the army or the dissolution of 
all government agencies. But in practice this does not happen. 
Such misuse of the undoubted theoretical right of the Crown has 
not occurred in all these fourteen years. 
. .. The Prussian monarchy has not yet completed its mis-
sion, and is not yet ripe for becoming a purely ornamental 
decoration of your constitutional edifice, not yet ripe to be 
integrated like a dead part into the mechanism of a parla-
mentary regime.64 
In these few paragraphs Bismarck analyzed the situation created 
when a constitution is introduced into an absolute monarchy. Ir-
respective of one's view of why it was introduced, whether through 
fear of revolution or out of the goodness of the sovereign's heart, the 
monarch would almost inevitably refuse to budge when the parlia-
ment opposed him on some favorite measure; he would be certain to 
find loyal subjects willing to offer constitutional justification for his 
stand. 
How did the liberals meet the Bismarckian interpretation of the 
constitution? Among their leaders in the Lower House the concep-
tion of the conflict as a question of power was generally repudiated. 
To the enthusiastic applause of his colleagues, Count von Schwerin, 
the former liberal Minister of Interior, spoke against Bismarck. He 
attributed to the latter the assertions that "power goes before right," 
that "we have the power and therefore we will put through our theory," 
and he repudiated such views with vehemence. The Prussian dynasty, 
he asserted, could not in the long run maintain itself on this belief. 
Prussia's greatness and honor had depended and would continue to 
depend upon action in accord with the opposite view, that "right goes 
.. A dress-De batte, pp. 58-6(. 
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before power."65 The count, like the other liberals, misinterpreted 
Bismarck. The latter had made no such statement; rather, he had 
said that when two opposite conceptions of legality came into conflict, 
power would decide which one would win. The liberals objected to 
considering the question from the standpoint of power at all; they 
believed that they were right and had legality and morality on their-
side and that their opponents had neither legal nor moral basis for 
their actions. 
The liberals steadfastly denied that they were attacking the King 
or trying to take away his authority. They took the position that the 
King should be above parties, that he could do no wrong. They con-
sistently endeavored to exclude the Crown from the discussion. When 
the King on one occasion in 1863 submitted a statement to the Lower 
House not countersigned by the ministry, the liberal majority refused 
to consider it. Deputy von Sybel explained the liberal argument as 
follows: 
The King can do no wrong. This old constitutional prin-
ciple is nothing more than the juridic expression of the natural 
necessity that a hereditary monarch can never intend to injure 
the fatherland. In his position such an intention would be a 
suicidal denial of himself and his family, for hereditary mon-
archy has its highest merit in the fact that it has succeeded in 
placing in the service of the fatherland the strongest passions in 
the human breast, egoism and love of family. 
Hereditary monarchy would be insanity if it imposed upon 
every successor to the throne the demand that he must be fully 
educated and read in all branches of political science, in all 
complexities of state law. The expert minister of the King is 
responsible for every error which may be made in this respect, 
even without a written constitution and without a constitutional 
fiction. To call the attention of the bearer of the Crown, as our 
address has respectfully done, to such mistakes of the govern-
ment, particularly when they are of a doubtful, dangerous 
nature, that is in the opinion of your commission not to insult 
but to support the Crown.66 
The ministers should make certain that the Crown, not able or 
expected to be omniscient, abided by the law; if the King proposed a 
measure which the ministers considered illegal or unconstitutional, the 
latter should prevent the King from carrying out his plan or should 
resign. The liberals regarded the practice of ministerial responsibility 
•• Ibid., p. 78 . 
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as essential and as actual under either an absolutistic or a constitu-
tional regime; they considered a law to that effect to be an integral 
part of constitutional government. They accused Bismarck of violating 
the basic principles about the position of the Crown and of exploiting 
the Crown for his and his party's own purposes. Deputy Gneist con-
trasted Bismarck's behavior with that of the liberal ministers of the 
New Era. 
The former ministers have with piety interposed their own 
persons in order to protect the person of the King .... against 
this situation, in order to prevent the transformation of every 
controversy of this kind ... into a personal conflict between the 
King and his loyal subjects. 
The present ministers have encouraged and furthered this 
kind of controversy in every way. They have started agitation in 
the country on a literal interpretation of the slogan, "for the 
King and against the parliament." This is certainly not constitu-
tional. I will add something more which one who has the deep-
est respect for the dignity of the King can add. You have done 
the King a disservice by bringing him, the exalted bearer of the 
crown of Frederick the Great, into such a situation that in our 
country, as in the Swiss cantons, one votes over whether one is 
for or against the constitution, and that one counts and weighs 
by thousands what is for and what is against the King. 
That is the worst service which a loyal servant could do for 
the King.67 
The liberals, in a speech by Deputy Gneist, ridiculed Bismarck's 
assertion that his duty was to execute the orders of the King. 
This view of the ministry that the members do not have to 
contradict when it is a question of law and the constitution, but 
that they have only to execute the commands of His Majesty ... 
this pOSItion is not one of parliamentary government. It is one 
of rule by privy councillors. . .. The party slogan that you have 
found, "Kmg or Parliament," was not badly thought out by a 
party leader; but it is too palpably untrue. The real contro-
versyis ... very dear: it is a question of government by privy 
councillors or by the constitution. 
To express it more plainly; it is a question of the new regi-
ments or of the oath to the constitution. 
Today constitutional ministers tell us that the orders of His 
Majesty must be carried out, and nothing else. Since the minis-
ters will not inform the King what is legal and what is not, the 
Lower House must do so. It must say most respectfully that 
His Majesty has high, holy, inviolable, immovable rights by the 
., Ibid., pp. 249·50. 
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grace of God; which God .preserve~ for him .f~r the ble.ssings of 
his people, but not those nghts WhICh the Mmlster PresIdent ... 
has proclaimed as the rights of His Majesty. The King has 
neither inherited nor acquired such rights, neither by the grace 
of God nor by the constitution of the country. 
As long as a right of German rulers has existed it has never 
been acknowledged that a German ruler personified the law. 
No German ruler has ever had the authority from God or 
anywhere else ultimately to decide according to his personal 
opinion about the rights of his subjects. No German ruler has 
ever had the power in case of conflict to order by decree from his 
privy council what is right and what is wrong. 
And what is true of the fundamentals of our constitution is 
above all true of our military constitution, which of all the basic 
rights of the Pruss ian people is that which was most dearly 
bought. 
The Crown has the highest command over the army and the 
Crown is the highest bearer of the law about the military, but 
these are not identical. 
The law about the army, which is for us the cherished heri-
tage of King Frederick William III and the War of Liberation 
and which rests upon constitutional laws, may not be changed 
except by law and except by hearing those who annually provide 
40 million Thalers and 60,000 men for this army. 
The Crown cannot almost double the size of the standing 
army by orders in council; it cannot partially disband the Land-
wehr and partially push it to one side. And to determine where 
the borderline of a change in the constitution lies is no military 
question. 
The Crown has the right to give laws, and no syllable be-
comes law in this country without the approval of His Majesty. 
But the Crown does not have the right by orders in council 
radically to change the basic institutions of this country which 
have been purchased more legally and dearly by the blood and 
money of the people than anything else in the country. 
The Crown does not have the right by orders in council to 
create hundreds and thousands of new officers' positions which 
are not approved by the representatives of the country as new 
expenditures, but are rejected. 
The Crown does not have the right by orders in council to 
empower the ministers to expend money for purposes which are 
not approved by the constitution and by law. The Crown does 
not have the right by orders in council to allow millions to be 
spent which are not founded upon law or the constitution but 
have been produced only by orders in council as new expendi-
tures. 
The Crown does not have the right by orders in council to 
break off the budget negotiations for the current year, to break 
off the deliberations over the budget law in the current year and 
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to postpone them to a later year. The Crown cannot make good 
the necessity of a budget by an order in councilor protect the 
ministers against civil and criminal responsibility .... 68 
The logic of the liberals seemed impeccable, unless the opponents 
refused to be impressed. Bismarck and his colleagues simply denied 
the validity of the liberals' arguments and met assertion of right by 
assertion of other rights. "We take our oath to the constitution as 
seriously as you do," declared Bismarck.69 The King supported the 
ministry absolutely, denouncing with heat the accusation that it was 
violating the constitution. To a complaining address from the Lower 
House, he replied: 
The Lower House has justly denied all doubt about my seri-
ous and conscientious will to preserve the constitution of the 
country, but it has cited orders of my government, issued with 
my approval, as facts to justify the complaints about violations 
of the constitution. 
I should not have approved these orders if I had regarded 
them as unconstitutional, and I must with complete conviction 
reject the censure of my government as unjustified.70 
The King refused to be excluded from responsibility for the acts 
of his government. He rejected absolutely the liberal idea that the 
Crown could do no wrong, that the Crown was above parties. The 
King took it for granted that he could and would do no wrong: that 
went without saying for an absolute monarch by the grace of God. 
He assumed that he did not take sides in party conflicts. A monarch 
by divine right never behaved in a partisan manner; he always acted 
in accord with the best interests of his country. The King did not 
even understand the liberal position. His whole training and experi-
ence prevented him from regarding the liberals' policies as other than 
an attack on the rights of the Crown. 
The problem of the relation between the King and parliament 
might have been solved by the introduction of ministerial responsibili-
ty, but the conditions were far from favorable for the passage of any 
such law. The King intensely disliked any mention of the possibility. 
When in 1858 liberals had advocated a law to that effect, the King 
had replied with the simple statement, "Place your trust in me."71 By 
•• Ibid., pp. 245 If . 
•• Ibid., p. 63. , 
.0 Die Innere Politik, p. 148. Reply of the King to the Lower House, February, 
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71 On the King's attitude, see Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 171, 190-92, 199,210-12. 
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the end of 1861 the liberal ministers had persuaded him to agree to 
introduce a bill, much against his will; but the content of the pro-
posed measure left no doubt that it would be meaningless. It pro-
vided that a minister could be indicted only by a common decision 
of both Houses. In view of the character of the Upper House, there 
was no likelihood that under the proposed law a minister would 
ever be called to account for anything. The liberal Kolnische Zeitung 
commented that the bill sounded almost like ridicule of the repeatedly 
expressed wishes of the Lower House, and the Freiherr von Hoverbeck 
labeled it "shameless."72 
The constitution dealt with the question of ministerial responsi-
bility in two articles. Article 44 stated: "The King's ministers are 
responsible. In order to be valid all governmental acts of the King 
require the counter-signature of a minister who thereby assumes the 
responsibility." The second article, 61, appeared to supplement but 
actually opened a way to circumventing the earlier clause. "The minis-
ters," it read, "can be impeached by a decision of one House for viola-
tion of the constitution, corruption, and treason. The supreme court 
of the monarchy in united session decides such indictment. Further 
stipulations concerning cases of responsibility, concerning procedure 
and penalties will be reserved for a special law." 
As long as no law was passed, Article 61 remained null and void. 
The Conservatives had seen to it that up to 1858 nothing had been 
done; and when Bismarck took over the presidency of the ministry, he 
declared that the time was not ripe for introducing a bill on the sub-
ject. He definitely rejected a proposal in the Lower House that 
questions of constitutionality be referred to the courts for decision. 
As long as disagreement existed over the relative power of the Crown 
and of the Landtag, he said, he would not allow the controversy to be 
settled by any court. The issue affected the King too closely for any 
such delegation of responsibility to be accepted.73 Bismarck did not 
intend to impose any curbs upon his power. In the constitution of 
the German Reich he subsequently restricted the pertinent clause to 
the same general statement that the Chancellor is responsible, without 
saying to whom or in what sense. 
The liberals were confused over the meaining of the term minis-
terial responsibility. In the fourth edition of his work on Preussisches 
Staats-Recht, published in 1864, the prominent jurist von Roenne, 
7. Tagesbericht, No. 21, Jan. 25, 1862, citing Kiilnische Zeitung, No. 25; Parisiu5, 
von Hoverbeck, II, 7 . 
.. Abg. H., St. B., April 22, 1863, II, 952. 
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himself a liberal, distinguished among several kinds of ministerial 
responsibility. 
The general usage of language designates with the expression 
"moral" responsibility the responsibility before public opinion. 
By "parliamentary" responsibility is meant the ministers' duty to 
appear in the sessions of the representative assembly to give the 
necessary information and explanations; it also include respon-
. sibility on the part of the ministers for their bad acts of govern-
ment which do not violate the constitution. The designation 
"political" responsibility is used in an entirely different sense, 
for it may refer to (1) responsibility for the purely political mis-
stakes of the ministers, (2) "parliamentary" responsibility in the 
sense meant above, (3) the responsibility of the ministers toward 
the sovereign or (4) the general duty of the ministers to withdraw 
from office as soon as an insoluble divergence arises between 
their views and those of the representatives of the people. In 
contrast, the designation "juridical" or "legal" responsibility is 
always applied to those cases where an impeachment of the 
ministers on the part of the representatives occurs. These cases 
differ widely, for among them one includes at one time viola-
tions of the constitution and of the law and at another, breach 
of duty. The expression "constitutional" as well as "special" or 
"legally punishable" responsibility is at times used as compar-
able to "juridic" responsibility. The customary so-called "moral" 
responsibility before the tribunal of public opinion, the effective-
ness of which is mainly conditioned by the degree of political 
freedom and the sound political sense of a people, stands in no 
relation to the ministerial position but applies to the judgment 
of this court of decision and reaches everyone in the state. In 
contrast, "parliamentary" responsibility, namely, the duty of the 
ministers to stand to account to the representatives at any time, 
to defend their measures and acts before them and altogether 
to bring into harmony their views with those of the representa-
tives, is of high significance for the life of the state, because in a 
representative monarchy government and representative assem-
bly can only fulfill their state responsibilities in common by 
uninterrupted organic reciprocity. This kind of responsibility, 
however, derives its significance and thereby its actual value first 
from "legal" responsibility. If the ministers have caused damage 
to the state or to individual citizens by violations of the civil 
law, it is self-evident that of itself nothing opposes their being 
brought before courts like other officials. Likewise there can 
can be no doubt that they are subordinate to the general crimi-
nal law fOf common crimes or misdemeanors as well as for 
special breaches of office like all other public officials who are 
guilty of such punishable acts. The institution of "juridic" or 
"legal" ministerial responsibility is therefore in no sense based 
upon the idea that the ministers are responsible to the monarch 
an~ his courts for illegal actions which they have committed of 
thelf own accord. The purpose of this institution is especially 
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that the ministers can be arraigned by the organs of the people 
before an independent court in case they contravene the consUtu-
tion and the laws as organs of government. This special criminal 
responsibility of the ministers for the observance of the constitu-
tion and of the constitutional rights is the most important 
security for the preservation of the constitutional state of law. 
Without it the constitution and the constitutional rights of the 
people would be exposed at any time to the misuse of power by 
the government, and the sole security would then consist of the 
good will of the wielder of power. The realization of this re-
sponsibility forms, therefore, the keystone of the constitution and 
the guarantee which vouchsafes all others their stability and real 
significance. The Prussian constitution also recognized this 
principle in that it (in Paragraph 61) stipulates "that the minis-
ters can be impeached by a decision of one House for violation 
of the constitution, corruption, and treason," and "that the 
supreme court of the monarchy in united sessions decides such 
impeachment."74 
Von Roenne's distinction between "political" and "constitutional" 
responsibility provides the key to the confusion in the liberals' think-
ing. They were advocating "constitutional" responsibility and were 
honestly claiming that they were not aiming to infringe upon the 
authority of the King. They merely wanted means by which to com-
pel the ministers to abide by the constitution. Deputy Gneist called 
the absence of a law on the subject "the only gap in our constitution"75 
and believed that by filling it the problems of the relation between 
the legislative and the executive branches of government would be 
solved. At the same time the liberals insisted upon the ministry's 
abiding by the decisions of the Lower House. A typical statement ' 
was that by Deputy Beseler in the Lower House in April, 1861. "It is 
. . . ,a main complaint against the entire institution of ministerial 
responsibility that it changes the center of gravity in our state life, 
that it attacks the monarchical principle, that by means of it parlia-
mentarism is established. This accusation can be refuted without 
difficulty .... How can it be against the monarchical principle if the 
inviolability of the Crown is protected and made possible by the 
responsibility of the ministers?"76 
The confusion arose from the fact that the liberals wished to make 
the Crown inviolable, to elevate it above party strife, to make the 
ministers responsible for government action, without infringing upon 
.. Von Roenne, op. cit., II, 352-55 . 
•• Adress-Debatte, p. 257 . 
.. Abg. H., St. B., April 27, 1861; II, 943. 
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the powers of a king who considered himself a monarch by divine right 
with powers over and above the constitution. They were endeavoring 
to evolve practical means by which they could exercise the control 
over the government necessary for implementing policies which the 
government opposed. 
The liberals' understanding of the nature of ministerial responsi-
bility may be gauged from the report of a commission of the Lower 
House in 1861 on this subject. Practically all liberal political groups 
agreed on the necessity for such a law, and this commission was estab-
lished, not to propose a bill itself, but to urge a supposedly liberal 
ministry, at least one containing liberal ministers, to introduce legisla-
tion to this effect. Besides a few Conservatives the commission was 
composed of some of the most distinguished members of the Con-
stitutional and of the Progressive patries. Of the members, Gneist 
and Beseler were both professors, the former in particular being an 
authority on law and jurisprudence and a profound student of English 
constitutional practice. The report showed an extraordinarily high 
level of learning and an equally extraordinary inability to reduce the 
problem to its simplest, most manageable terms. These liberals had 
not yet comprehended the difference between the procedure ap-
propriate to the assertion of ministerial responsibility on the one 
hand and a judicial process for handling violations of the constitution 
on the other. The judicial experience of a number of them was being 
misapplied in the attempt to solve an essentially political question. 
Ministerial responsibility cannot be decided on a legal basis of whether 
0r not the -ministers have violated the constitution. Such trials are 
usually long and costly in time, emotions, and money; and pending the 
decision, what is to happen in the conduct of state affairs? Ministers 
maintain or lose the confidence of their supporters depending upon 
the acceptability of their policies and actions. The English example 
showed how simple the solution of this complicated political problem 
should and could be. 
In the report submitted by the commission of the Lower House in 
1861 the opinions were almost as varied as the membership. The Con-
servatives frankly saw no justification for a law of ministerial responsi-
bility. The time was bad for introducing one; there was afready too 
much political controversy. Other articles of the constitution had 
not been executed; why should this one be? Since it was called the 
keystone to the constitution it should be introduced last. Such a law 
W;lS not needed "because the necessary guarantee against constitutional 
and legal violations is already found in the King's conscience." The 
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law would create, the Conservatives argued, a dualism and a contra-
diction in Prussia, for it would make the ministers responsible both 
to the King and to parliament, and this system would violate the 
powers of the Crown. 
One liberal member of the commission opposed advocating the 
law at present. Since the ministers were liberal, he argued, such a 
recommendation would seem like a vote of no-confidence. He and his 
friends did not regard the matter as urgent. His view coincided in 
general with that of a colleague who thought that the present system 
was "not so bad." Article 61 at least prevented the ministers from 
being regarded merely as the King's personal servants. Nor, said this 
deputy, did the public demand the law. 
Most of the liberals on the commission wished the law introduced. 
"In the entire civilized world," they argued, "the view is held that a 
constitutional regime without ministerial responsibility is incomplete. 
. . ." The principle was not new in Germany, they declared; for in 
the organization of estates the diets had participated in the making 
of laws; they had had the power to grant taxes and by way of the right 
of complaint to control the administration. The Reich courts had 
also had the authority to try a prince guilty of illegal acts. One 
liberal member of the commission in denying that ministerial respon-
sibility violated the monarchical principle cited the precedent of Eng-
land, where ministerial responsibility had obtained under four dynas-
ties. Another denied that it would lead to "parliamentary party 
government." Another distinguished between juridical and political 
responsibility of the ministers and said that only the latter meant rule 
by a majority in parliament. Repudiating any desire for the intro-
duction of political responsibility, he stated that the liberals sought 
only juridical responsibility, by which the existing legal responsibility 
of all officials would also be imposed upon the ministers. Another 
avoided the issue of the particular kind of ministerial responsibility 
but emphasized that the Landtag must be able to prevent the ministry 
from performing acts like the increase in the standing army without its 
approval. 
One member of the commission went at some length into a com-
parison of the English method of ministerial responsibility and the 
conditions in Prussia. He found the two to be entirely different. 
An English ministry is a parliamentary combination to put 
through new laws and general measures and to fill certain offices. 
The current administration is carried on by the officials of the 
permanent staff according to fixed principles, that is, according 
to old and new precedents of the courts which since the Middle 
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Ages have exercised jurisdiction over public law which with us 
lies in the so-called administrative agencies. Since 1808 in 
Prussia the decision over controversial limits of police, finance, 
and military authority, the interpretation of the laws with refer-
ence to them, and the decision over all important controversial 
questions of public law rest ultimately in the hands of the minis-
ters and in ministerial orders. This is for us the center of gravi-
ty of the position, while a responsible minister in England has 
nothing to do with it. The English ministerial responsibility, 
which is nothing more than the general responsibility of offi-
cials, has for centuries assumed that the courts would decide the 
legality of an administrative act. It enters into question in a 
supplementary way in the rare cases in which a court decision 
could not be had or in which a minister refused to be bound 
thereby .... In this subsidiary sense it is the keystone of the 
constitution. But the guarantee for the legality of administra-
tive action lies in the decisions of the courts, with which the 
ministerial responsibility has for centuries stood in inseparable' 
connection. 
The speaker warned against trying to introduce the one part of respon-
sibility without the other and urged that both be introduced. "Not 
until the courts for public law again exist in Prussia will ministerial 
responsibility assume its proper subsidiary position, and then we hope 
that it will never be put into practice."77 
Even the expert on the English constitution was not clear about the 
nature and purpose of ministerial responsibility. He gave too legal 
an interpretation to that term; he failed to understand the essentially 
political use of the institution. He and almost all his colleagues made 
it too intricate. They should have heeded one liberal who compre-
hended the problem, namely Schulze-Delitzsch. During the debate in 
the Lower House on the address to the King in January, 1863, he 
analyzed the question in some detail. Citing the ministry's use of the 
King's name to cover its own acts, he denounced this practice as a 
complete violation of the constitution which could not be "greater or 
cruder." He condemned it as an attack on the Crown itself, for, he 
argued, "the undisputed basic conditions of every monarchy, un-
limited as well as limited, are the hereditary nature of the Crown 
and the inviolability of the person of the bearer. If you attack one of 
these you attack the monarchical principle itself." The speaker then 
discussed the second of these bases. 
The entire constitutional system depends upon the fact that 
one is no longer ruled by the arbitrariness of one person . 
.. Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1861, Vol. V, No. 156. 
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Now with respect to legislation, approval of the budget, order-
ing of the state household, that is easy. On these matters the 
people receive by way of their representatives a vote, a formal, 
real participation, so that nothing can happen without their ap-
proval. But there remains the other equally important side of 
state affairs, the executive. Here you cannot so proceed. A de-
liberative body cannot interfere in the executive ... ; it would 
thereby not only work against the necessary unity in administra-
tion but would also come into decided opposition to the sov-
ereign rights of the monarch. How is this to be dealt with? ••• 
The executive must also be limited or the whole constitutional 
principle is nullified. How does participation in legislation 
help the people if the bearer of the Crown is entirely free not to 
observe the laws at all ... ? Of what value is the constitution if at 
any minute the Crown is free to annul it or encroach upon it? 
The sole solution which protects the just interests of the people 
without infringing upon the sovereign's power is the institu-
tion of ministerial responsibility. In it we have the necessary 
restriction upon the prince as executive. He can no longer act 
alone; he cannot proceed arbitrarily if he cannot find persons 
who are willing to assume responsibility for the acts. And what 
do we gain by this order? On the one hand it protects the peo-
ple; it gives them the guarantee of a constitutional, a legal gov-
ernment .... On the other hand it also protects ... the throne. 
For it takes the responsibility for all government measures 
away from the bearer of the Crown. Responsibility is incompa-
tible with inviolability .... A constitutional minister may well 
defend himself by citing his responsibility to the prince whom 
he serves if measures are demanded of him for which he does 
not dare to assume responsibility. But no constitutional minis-
ter may protect himself by the person and will of the King 
against the responsibility which he bears toward the country. 
The Minister President has by his deductions turned this situa-
tion upside down and has thereby violated one of his main con-
stitutional duties.78 
If Schulze-Delitzsch's view had become valid, the ministers would 
have been responsible not merely in a constitutional but in a political 
sense. In practice the English system would have resulted. The 
liberals' protests against the accusation of their infringing upon the 
King's power would have had to be dropped. The liberals scoffed at 
the divine right theory of kings; their newspaper loved to quote a 
statement of 1850 by the historian Dahlmann: "Even if one is filled 
with belief in the divine enthronement of princes, I should like to 
see who can prove that the devil has installed the people. If he has 
•• AdTess-Debatte, pp. 128-29. 
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not done so, then who has?"79 Schulze-Delitzsch repeated his assertion 
of 1848 that absolutism by the grace of God was bankrupt. He added 
the general view held by liberals that monarchism should not be 
identified with absolutism; he supported the one but not the other.so 
Almost all his liberal colleagues failed to understand his line of reason-
ing for curbing absolutism by the simple institution of parliamentary 
responsibility. 
The liberals were not united among themselves in their attitude 
toward parliamentary government in the English sense. Deputy 
Gneist declared in 1863 that not even the slightest trace of any such 
system existed in Germany.S! In April, 1860, von Forckenbeck denied 
at an election rally in East Prussia "that the Progressive party has 
striven for a government by the majority of the Lower House or has 
wished to infringe upon the rights of the King .... Under the entirely 
different social conditions of Prussia a government by parliamentary 
majority as in England is neither possible nor desirable for freedom." 
If anyone could be accused of desiring the rule of a parliamentary 
majority, he said, it would be the majority in the Upper House, "which 
had made impossible the former ministry by its consistent rejection of 
every liberal proposal."82 
Other liberals took a different view. "Parliamentary," wrote the 
Volkszeitung in January, 1861, "is only a mild translation of the pro-
position that it is advisable for a government to defer to the voice of 
the country when it notes that the country has more accurate views of 
the needs of the time than one would like to force upon it." A year 
later the same paper declared that granting a constitution had not 
sufficed to stop revolutionary action, that a constitution was a contract 
which changed the relation between a prince and his people. "One 
may think about the question of parliamentary government as one 
will," the paper said; "in practice the ministers must nonetheless 
govern in accordance with the will of the parliamentary majority or 
seek to do so by corrupting it. And the government must be at least 
as unified as the present popular assembly."83 
Two of the leading Progressive newspapers, the Kolnische Zeitung 
and the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung in June, 1862, drew con-
clusions about the conduct of the controversy which showed realistic 
79 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 3. 1861. 
'0 Volkszeitung. Feb. 28. 1861. 
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understanding of the nature of a constitutional conflict. The former 
stated that "the right of the King to appoint his ministers according 
to his wish is undoubted, and our representatives can only gradually 
and indirectly gain influence over it. It can aim to eliminate all 
illiberal elements in the ministry by rejecting all illiberal measures, 
even when introduced by liberal ministers."84 The Konigsberg journal 
was even more explicit. It denied the accuracy of the government's 
accusation that the Lower House wished to take over the powers of 
the crown; and it equally denied the validity of the view of the left-
wing liberals, Kirschmann and Waldeck, that ultimate authority 
should be transferred to the Lower House. 
Parliamentary government is not a legal question but a ques-
tion of power and as such the product of development. No letter 
of the law can bring it about; only a series of legal battles, of 
surmounted illusions and disillusions, of long experience, can do 
so. A series of good, conscientious parliaments which exercise 
their budget rights unreservedly and self-confidently and which 
make the feeling of dependence of every government upon its 
financial control ... gradually become habitual: that is the only 
way under our constitution to introduce parliamentary govern-
ment. There should be added the consequent introduction of 
self-government in the counties and the communities . . . 
and therewith the legal elimination of a system of centralized 
bureaucracy.85 
"I am convinced," asserted the Catholic party leader Reichensperger, 
"that in comparison with the importance of the main question, namely 
the right of the Lower House to approve or to change the budget of 
expenditures annually, all other questions recede into the background." 
The liberals agreed fully with this view. They, as well as the Catholic 
party, denounced the ministry's action with respect to Article 99 as 
creating constitutional conditions worse than those under absolutism. 
"It was the law of the Prussian monarchy even prior to 1848," Reichen-
sperger said, "that the Crown could introduce no new taxes and make 
no loans without the approval of the representatives of the country. 
That was decided at a time in which there was no representative as-
sembly, a striking proof of how necessary the monarchy regarded it 
not to stand there with unlimited power." The liberal deputy von 
Unruh completed the argument about finances by denying that the 
government had any authority to expend any state money without a 
legal budget for the year in question.86 
8£ Ibid., Feb. 4, 1862. 
85 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, June 21, 1862. 
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To the liberals the gap theory not merely violated the constitution; 
it destroyed the constitution. The mild and cautious right-wing Con-
stitutionalist Deputy von Simson asserted in a commission of the Lower 
House that "no one in the entire country would be so forsaken by 
intelligence as to interpret Article 99 in any other sense than that of 
the majority." Count von Schwerin accused the Bismarckian ministry 
of "standing the law and the constitution on their head." Deputy 
Twesten spoke for all in asserting that "the defraying of expenditures 
in consequence of the failure of the budget law to be passed, solely 
according to the judgment of the government, could be continued in-
definitely until some catastrophe occurred which would put an end to 
this theory by means of terror, but then probably not the theory 
alone." Deputy Virchow denounced the ministry's interpretation of 
the constitution as "the purest arbitrariness." Deputy Schulze-De-
litzsch condemned the gap theory as equivalent to abolishing the con-
stitution. If one questioned the budget rights and other rights of the 
Lower House, he said, one could call in doubt any and every article 
of the constitution, and one had absolutism. "When one supplements 
one system by its opposite, when one supplements constitutionalism by 
absolutism, the possibility of deduction ceases to exist for me." De-
puty Gneist declared that Bismarck's extravagant personal views about 
the constitution had suddenly become the law of the land.87 
The liberals defended their position by reference to the constitu-
tion rather than by the arguments developed in England and the 
United States of no taxation without representation. During the 
three-day debate on the address to the King in January, 1863, only 
one deputy, von Unruh, advanced the general claim that "it lies in the 
nature of the newer state forms that those who pay the taxes also 
have the foremost and most important authority to grant them."88 He 
did not elaborate upon the thesis; he merely stated it in passing. The 
liberals assumed that Prussia had developed beyond the point of hav-
ing to defend first principles. Bismarck's seeming acceptance of the 
constitution may ha~e deluded them into thinking that first principles 
of constitutional government were not in question. In the light of 
history one knows that they should have gone back to the assertion of 
fundamentals and not have concentrated, as they did, upon legal rights. 
They assumed that in case of disagreement among the three factors of 
government a budget would not be forthcoming. When the govern-
.7 Parisius, von Hoverbeck, 11,144, 106; Adress-Debatte, pp. 88, 149, 126-27,248-49. 
II Ibid., p. 66. 
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ment adopted the gap theory and continued to raise and expend money, 
the liberals had no other line of attack than the defence of a constitu-
tion which the government denied was in any danger. 
On only one point of general argument did the liberals attack the 
government's position. They did so rather from the angle of politics 
and statesmanship than of constitutionality. Bismarck had justified 
his use of the gap theory on the grounds that "the state must live," 
that it could not stand still. Deputy Virchow asked: 
Is this the sentence of a statesman? Can one approach a 
representative assembly which is expected to grant money with 
the thesis, the state must live; therefore you must give the funds? 
Is this the entire result of our constitutional development that 
the constitution, that the long struggle for the legal founding of 
our financial system should finally arrive at the point where one 
says to the representatives of the country: the state must live, 
therefore you must say yes to everything? I shall not continue 
these questions; one could easily arrive at an observation that 
would touch a statesman too closely. But I believe that we must 
most decidedly guard against the assertion of views so contrary 
to written and sworn constitutional rights, views which were 
drawn from an ancient time when perhaps a lord of the country 
would justify to subordinate estates this or that conception by 
saying, "I could not do otherwise, I had to act in this way, you 
must acquiesce." ... The state must live and begs its way from 
day to day. Is any plan at hand? Is there anything of that 
which held in the old law of the land, namely, that a regular 
financial administration should exist? Does this correspond in 
any manner to the wise and well-weighed plans of Frederick 
William III?89 
"We find ourselves," stated Deputy Twesten in January, 1863, "in 
one of the most dangerous crises in the history of the Pruss ian state."90 
How did the liberals propose to gain victory? They had refused to 
approve the budget demanded by the government only to find that the 
latter conducted the public finances without a budget. They believed 
that they could not compromise on this question without sacrificing 
all their constitutional rights. They rejected any idea of revolution, 
and disliked so intensely the proposal to refuse to pay taxes that the 
populace overwhelmingly continued as usual to provide the Bis-
marckian ministry with funds. They depended upon the~ support of 
public opinion, believing that the King and the government could not 
hold out against the will of the population. They understood Bis-
S. Ibid., pp. 141, 149 . 
•• Ibid., p. 911. 
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marek's strategy to provoke them to anger, to exasperate them, to in-
duce them to extreme measures,91 and they were determined not to let 
him succeed. The power of liberal ideas and the force of history, they 
believed, were on their side. Although they knew about the King's 
hostility to them, his stand on military reform and his support of the 
gap theory, they appealed to him against the acts of the ministry and 
sought to win him over by information about what they considered to 
be the true situation. In spite of the futility of this endeavor, they 
stated to the King in May, 1863, that they could not work with the 
present ministry, again in vain. The King and ministers considered 
the declaration another unconstitutional attempt to infringe upon the 
rights of the crown. 
The difficulty of the liberals' situation may be judged from an ex-
change of correspondence in May, 1863, between two liberal historians, 
the Prussian deputy, Professor von Sybel, and the Southwest German 
professor, Hermann Baumgarten. Von Sybel listed the efforts of the 
Lower House to overthrow the ministry, all of them legal and verbal; 
"but," he continued, "we have no means of impeaching the govern-
ment. It has money and soldiers and an old bureaucracy which is 
stuffed with reactionary powers. So we frankly possess no material 
power; we are not and never will be in a position to gain quick results. 
We strive to preserve moral superiority." Von Sybel feared that any 
radical measures would alienate the upper bourgeoisie as they had in 
1848 and force it into the arms of the reactionaries. 
Baumgarten replied with a rousing proposal for action. 
Prussia's future will presumably be bad if its fate remains 
tied to the views and will of the Hohenzollerns, if the people 
cannot take affairs into their own hands. One must force nar-
row-minded and prejudiced persons to be reasonable or emanci-
pate oneself from them entirely. I should prefer the former ... 
and in view of experience elsewhere I should not despair of re-
sults even in this case. But one must be deadly serious and 
arouse in the persons in question the very definite feeling that 
everything is at stake for them if they do not very soon become 
reasonable. For this purpose the speeches in the Lower House 
do not appear to be enough. The entire country must bestir 
itself and very decidedly express its will. It seems to us that up 
to this time the conflict in Prussia has been conducted too tame-
ly. Persons who scorn the constitution, reason and right as bad 
boys must be made to tremble. One must arouse in them the 
lively concern that one of these days they will be killed like mad 
t1 Some (in Essen and the vicinity) refused to pay taxes. Heyderho/I, op. cit., J, 
176; Philippson, op. cit., p. 109; Adress·Debatte, pp. 114, 157, 208. 
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dogs. One must display to them the passionate determination 
in case the worst happens to use extreme measures. Such a man-
ner of fighting is certainly not according to the taste of civilized 
man. But it is not a question of our taste; it is a question of 
what is necessary. If you allow Bismarck only temporarily to 
make headway, revolution appears to me unavoidable. If Prus-
sia endured such a regime permanently its position in Germany 
and in Europe would be at an end. The question, thus, is how 
can one prevent such terrible dangers. Allow just anger to be 
fully and energetically expressed. Send deputations to Berlin 
from all towns and counties! Let them come into the palace by 
the thousands accompanied by the most respected citizens and 
speak very seriously and firmly. You would do only what the 
English did in 1770, for example, against the North ministry. 
It is possible that you will thereby convulse the peace. But .on 
the other side stands the certainty of a fearful revolutionary 
change or of deep humiliation. 
Von Sybel replied with a virtual confession of defeat. 
There has often been talk here since December of the plan 
[of mass deputations] which you propose. I have always ad-
vocated it. ... But the leaders of the Progressive party have up to 
now been of the opinion that it would be difficult to start peo-
ple in motion particularly for this purpose; to petition about 
this man would be most unpopular. And it would be a great 
defeat if the demonstration turned out to be slight. On the 
other hand, if it succeeded, the gain would be less than you 
seem to assume. If forty thousand deputies came on one day 
they would receive a polite negative answer and would return 
home. It would be another chapter in agitation and indigna-
tion among the people, but I can assure you there is already a 
surplus of this in Prussia. I cannot very strongly contradict the 
estimate of the Progressive party. Our wielders of power have 
long ceased to tremble over addresses and deputations and popu-
lar feeling. They know very well how categorically they are con-
demned by the latter. Their only question is, have we money 
and reliable soldiers? They tremble before every under-officer 
who reads the Volkszeitung, before every word in Parliament 
that could attract the soldiers, but before nothing else. They 
are correct in their judgment. As long as the army hold loyal 
the people can use no physical force. Their regime will con-
tinue until the army declares for the constitution or until it is 
defeated in a foreign war ... or it might be that we should have 
the good fortune like that of the English in 1688 in the Prince of 
Orange, a split in the leading circles themselves, for example, a 
declaration of the Crown Prince for the constitution. 
Von Sybel cited historical examples to show that a revolution 
would not succeed without the support. of the army. He cited the 
opinion of better-informed persons than himself to the effect that the 
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present anny remained loyal to the Crown. And to clinch his argu-
ment of pessimism he said that no one doubted that Bismarck would 
enthusiastically welcome an attempt at revolt. 
During the summer of 1863 the liberals tried to mobilize the public 
further for demonstrations against the government. A letter from 
von Sybel to Baumgarten of June 17 described what was being done. 
The state of mind here on the Rhine is excellent. In Bonn 
the Catholics and the liberals united for a big celebration for 
the deputies. The students aimed to stage a torch-light parade, 
and when that was prohibited to stage a party. When that 
suffered the same fate they sent in yesterday a memorial. In 
Crefeld, where I was on Saturday, the entire town was in move-
ment. The stores were closed, the Catholics, if possible, even 
more zealous than the liberals. My speech at Crefeld has been 
printed as a pamphlet. You will read it in the South Gennan 
papers. This month we concentrate on addresses and deputa-
tions from town councils, electors, and so forth to the King. It 
is intended to set in motion the chambers of commerce of the 
monarchy in July. Also the Rhenish notables plan new action, 
this time addressed to the ministry, somewhat more strongly 
peppered than the earlier address to the King. In Berlin 
ephemeral publications are being organized as a partial replace-
ment of the newspapers. In short we do not doubt that we can 
solve the present problem of keeping public opinion favorable 
to us and active up to the end of the year. There is nothing else 
at present to be done unless foreign affairs intervene. You would 
not find in all Prussia a single person who did not regard steps 
of open violence as foolishness and a crime, since they would be 
sure of immediate suppression. What is frequently in the air is 
the thought of paying no more taxes. But it is clear that for 
this to be effective the upper bourgeoisie must begin, and for 
them the matter must still ripen somewhat.92 
The liberals' anger at Bismarck in 1863 could scarcely have been 
greater. Deputy Twesten asserted in the Lower House that the 
government was "in dangerous hands." In a private letter Von Sybel 
stated the question he had put before the Crefeld notables: "If the 
French overrun the left bank of the Rhine and plague you with 
quarterings, war contributions, and so on, but in the House I still vote 
against a loan or war taxes without a change of ministry: would I 
receive a vote of no-confidence? The immediate and unanimous 
answer was: 'A thousandfold vote of no-confidence if under any cir-
•• Heyderholf, op. cit., I, 147 If. In June. 1863. von Hoverbeck knew that the 
King was to blame for the obstinacy of the government. Parisius. von HoveTbeck~ 
II. 169. See also Philippwn. op. cit., p. 87. . 
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cumstances you approve the smallest sum for this ministry:" When 
Bismarck asked the Lower House at the end of the year to approve 
a loan in connection with the Danish war, the liberals overwhelmingly 
refused. In March, I 863, von Hoverbeck wrote a friend in East 
Prussia: "The bitterness here in Berlin and among almost all deputies 
against this ministry is so intense that I believe it cannot increase. A 
part of it also falls back upon other responsible personalities."B3 
What made the liberals so angry was their belief that Bismarck 
could not be trusted, that he would do anything to gain his end, that 
he had no principles except those of reaction and power. "You 
[the government] do not understand our language at all," said Deputy 
Virchow. "You have no conception of the fact that the written con-
stitution really exists, that compromises are not first to be made, that 
the law does not have first to be made, but that the only question is 
one of preserving the law." Deputy von Sybel declared that the 
ministers lived in a different world with entirely different basic beliefs 
and views from those of the present day. Futher, 
. . . Your political assumption is that the government 
possesses from the beginning the power to dispose of the life and 
property of the subjects, that the government is not allowed to 
do only that which some law expressly forbids, and even that in 
certain emergencies, naturally defined by it, the government can 
cancel such prohibitions and take back the authority. Our as-
sumption is the opposite, namely, that a citizen's money belongs 
first of all to him and not to the government, and that the latter 
first receives the right to expend it for governmental purposes 
and for the country when the citizens have through their legal 
representatives approved these expenditures. 
Deputy Gneist openly asserted that "our government has lost the 
power to distinguish between right and wrong." He summed up the 
experience of the Lower House with the ministry by stating: "It is not 
true that we have repulsed the hand of reconciliation. The hand has 
on the contrary fallen upon us more roughly and insultingly from year 
toyear."u 
Deputy von Unruh stated the liberals' belief about the future. 
History speaks for our views. . . . The attempt to restore 
absolutism again in a constitutional state when absolutism could 
no longer maintain itself has never gone unpunished. Even 
more dangerous, even more serious, is the attempt to defend ab-
II A.dress-Debatte, p. 95; Heyderhoff, op. cit., I, 156; ParisiU5, von Hoverbeck, 
II, 209, l~O. . . .. . . 
•• Adress·Debatte, pp. 142, 215-16, 246, 258. 
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solutism under the forms of the constitutional state ... because 
it is especially dangerous for the dynasty. Sham constitutional-
ism cannot be preserved. It may last ten years, fifteen years; but 
under all circumstances it will collapse, and as a rule the dynasty 
collapses with it. 
I boldly assert that not our opponents but we ourselves are 
the supports of the monarchy ... in the only form possible in 
our time and in the future. We shall persist in this endeavor, we 
and those who come after us, . . . and we shall hope that the 
monarchical spirit of our people will not be completely eradi-
cated by interpretations, by granting and withdrawing rights .... 
The struggle may last a long time. We with gray hair may 
never see the end of it. But we have one positive conviction, 
and that is, the future belongs to US!95 
•• Ibid., pp. 77-78. See similar remarks by Twesten and Schulze-Delitzsch. Ibid., 
pp. 91-92, 122. 
II 
THE ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH 
OF THE PARTICIPANTS 
7 / The Public View of Political Parties 
T HE political party em..-ged in response to practical 
needs. As soon as representative assemblies were created, political 
life had to receive some kind of organization. The selection of candi-
dates, the conduct of the campaign for election, the preservation of 
contact between the representative and his constituency, and the 
orderly conduct of business within the representative assembly required 
the establishment of facilities for large-scale cooperative action. The 
work of the state and national assemblies in 1848 and 1849 introduced 
conditions in which political organizations developed. The parties 
in Prussia in the early 1860s conformed to the general pattern of 
organization and purpose set at that period, not out of any sense of 
imitation but as a practical way of meeting a common problem. 
By the time of the elections of 1862 and 1863 in Prussia, the poli-
tical organizations had scarcely had time in. which to assume their 
ultimate role. They had not as yet become the standard vehicles of 
popular activity. The number of Prussians who had had actual experi-
ence in the politics of modern constitutional government with repre-
sentative assemblies was not more than a couple of thousand. In so far 
as local elections had been held they had offered the voting Prussians 
little precedent for political participation on matters of general state 
concern. These elections involved local affairs, requiring the exercise 
of judgment on grounds of practicality, efficiency and personality, but 
not of principle. Where the elections were held on a class basis, as 
in the case of those for representatives of the three estates in the county 
and the provincial assemblies, the class itself afforded an adequate 
organization for action and performed those functions which in a larger 
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group of heterogeneous social and economic interests would have re-
quired the service of a political party. 
The Prussian constitution of 1850, like that of the United States over 
half a century earlier, contained no provision about political parties as 
such. Parties were not regarded as an essential apparatus of govern-
ment and were left within the area of private endeavor. Nonetheless, 
the constitution established the conditions in which parties would 
develop. In contrast with the county and provincial assemblies, repre-
sentation in the Lower House of the Landtag rested not upon caste 
or class distinctions but upon a numerical basis. The change entailed 
fundamental adjustments in attitudes and ways on the part of the 
different social groups, not merely of the Conservatives but of the 
liberals, not merely of the aristocracy but of the middle classes, the 
industrial workers and the peasantry. Under the system of county 
representation by estates election campaigns were unnecessary, for 
every member of the first two estates knew personally every other mem-
ber, or in case of indirect elections the electors were or became per-
sonally acquainted. Voting was confined to social equals. The three-
class system for the state forced this personalized, informal, caste pro-
cedure to admit new methods. While preserving a degree of inequality, 
it shifted the basis from legal privilege of caste to economic interest. 
The inequality of political power under the three-class system did not 
alter the new facts that almost all adult males had the power to vote 
and that to win an election a person must be a candidate and seek 
support in all three voting classes. He might have to organize a cam-
paign and solicit the vote of classes socially below him. The shift from 
a social to a political basis for elections entailed the introduction of a 
degree of actual equality in practice and constituted an essential step 
in the elimination of caste privilege and the development of equal 
ci tizenshi p. 
The significance of the shift may be noted in the difficulty with 
which public leaders of upper-class origin adapted themselves to the 
process of social change revealed by this requirement. During the 
period under discussion, not even all liberal and democratic political 
leaders were free from the traditional inhibition. The Conservatives 
made only slight concession to the necessity of conforming to the ways 
of popular elections and continued to rely mainly upon their ac-
customed means of exerting power. Their aversion to popular poli-
tical action followed historic practice in the field of government, 
wherein membership in a political body was considered a personal right 
resting upon familial privilege. Although in Prussia the individual 
The Public View of Political Parties / 245 
aristocrat was drilled to consider the welfare of the whole, he expected 
to attain this end primarily by defending and furthering his own in-
terest on the assumption that the welfare of the leading social group 
determined the health of the whole society. He did not accept the 
principle of representation, where the individual regards himself as 
an expression of the will of many. He objected to subordinating his 
will and personality to the interests and wishes of the many and to 
developing qualities appropriate to a de-personalized representative 
of people with most of whom he had merely a superficial contact. The 
arist,ocratic Conservative in a popular representative assembly still 
thought and acted essentially in accordance with his rejection of the 
idea of equality. He still adhered to the counter-principles of social 
and political hierarchy. In his control of the government he enforced 
the policy that local governmental bodies should not be allowed to 
show any interest in state or .uational affairs. They should concern 
themselves solely with local matters, as befitted the hierarchical, orderly 
division of government. Thereby, the Conservatives prevented the 
growth of practical political experience at the level most important 
for the development of democratic ways; but it is doubtful whether 
they thought much about this aspect of their policy. They were con-
tinuing in the period of constitutional government and popular state 
elections the division of function of an autocratic age. They were 
still acting on the assumption of "the limited intelligence of a subject" 
in state or national affairs and were endeavoring to prevent the de-
velopment of the political man with all-round interests and personality. 
They disliked the political party and press as forms of activity beneath 
their dignity; and even though they had known about English customs, 
they would have been loath to follow the example of the English Con· 
servatives.1 
The attitude of the reactionary element among the Prussian Con-
servatives is strikingly revealed in the will of Count Diedrich von 
Bacholz of Alme in 1861. The Count charged his heirs to give up none 
of their feudal rights, judicial, police, hunting, or church, to oppose 
the wielders of power and "their faithless, partisan, power-hungry 
officials, ... to scorn the favor of princes as well as of the mob, in short, 
without arrogance and conceit, without avarice and without extrava-
gance, to be a true German nobleman, not according to the letter 
but according to the deed."2 The Count was fighting both the ab-
1 Tagesbericht, No. 19, Jan. 23, 1862. 
• Volkszeitung, Jan. 16, 1862. 
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solutism of the Eighteenth Century and the liberalism of the N ine-
teenth. He remained loyal to the feudal ideals of aristocratic inde-
pendence. He had not discovered the fact that modern political party 
life had begun; or if he had, his will expressed his utter aversion to it. 
A social group in which sentiments like these could be seriously ex-
pressed scarcely qualified as a supporter and practitioner of popular 
politics. 
The attitude toward politics taken by most Conservative aristocrats 
lacked the defiant self-sufficiency of Count Diedrich. Most of his 
peers had acquiesced in the fact of absolute monarchy and had estab-
lished effective ways of protecting their interests by serving the King 
at court and taking high positions in the government and the army. 
Since the identity of interest between monarch and Conservative 
aristocracy became well established in the first part of the Nineteenth 
Century, the latter looked to the King and his government for political 
guidance. After constitutional government, a state representative 
body, and state elections had been introduced in 1848-50, the Con-
servatives had continued to rely upon them for maintaining this iden-
tity. In accordance with their name the Conservatives wished to pre-
serve the structure of the state and the distribution of power as it 
existed in the 1850s when they were in control, and a large number 
longed for the restoration of pre-1848 conditions. They tended to 
accept the government's program as their program, the government 
bureaucracy as their political organization. They preferred to avoid 
the establishment of a political party of their own in order not to 
encourage political activity and in order not to lower themselves to the 
level of the liberals and democrats by entering into competition with 
them. During the period they constantly used their customary means 
of influencing the government, namely, by way of private conferences 
with the King, petitions and addresses of loyalty to him, deputations 
with asseverations of devotion to him and of aversion to liberalism. 
They worked through the officials at court, the officers in the army, the 
church leaders, and the high bureaucrats. They practically surround-
ed the King in his private life and to a large extent in his public 
actIvity. Like Minister of War von Roon they believed that "the 
King must remain consistent; a change of government from Whigs to 
Tories as in England should not spread among us." Political parties, 
that is to say, should continue to playa minor role; the power should 
remain with the King and his conservative officials. After being dis-
missed from authority, former Minister President von Manteuffel 
showed his low estimate of the politics of popular representation by 
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remaining silent in the Lower House of the Landtag, to which he be-
longed, and finally by resigning. He let it be known that he did not 
regard the assembly elected by the people as the proper place for him 
to defend his former administration. For him the honor of having 
been appointed by and made responsible to the King outranked by far 
the position of representative elected by the people. To justify him-
self before the other representatives of the public would have lowered 
his dignity and might have been misinterpreted by the Lower House 
as an acknowledgment of its enjoying some political significance.3 
When Prince William assumed the authority of regent for his sick 
brother, he placed the Conservatives in a difficult and embarrassing 
dilemma. He dismissed them from most of the ministerial posts, intro-
duced into power his friends, the mildest of mild liberals, and pro-
ceeded to support a general line of policy which ran counter to that 
of the Conservatives. The latter faced the problem of how to be con-
servative, to be above parties, and at the same time to oppose both the 
King and the government. While persevering in the use of their time-
honored political methods, they could no longer rely upon government 
initiative in behalf of their political fortunes and had to enter the 
arena of political action themselves. They had to organize a party, 
augment their facilities for campaigning for votes, and compete with 
the liberals and democrats for popular support.4 The dialectic of 
political party life and representative government was drawing them 
into the kind of activity which was contrary to their principles and 
repulsive to them in practice. 
In spite of the embarrassment caused the Conservatives by the New 
Era, they found a large amount of agreement with the King and his 
ministers on the role of political parties. The governmental attitude 
toward parties and their activities became administratively somewhat 
more lenient under the liberal ministers than before; but the legal 
control remained the same. The parties had to register with the police; 
in order to hold a political meeting, they had to receive an official 
permit. They were treated more severely than non-political private 
organizations under the laws and ordinances concerning the right of 
organizing and the right of assembly. The fact that they constituted 
the means of enabling the people to express their will in government 
• See von Bernhardi, op. cit., III, 310, 323·24, IV, 173; Tagesbericht, No. 25, 
Jan. 30, 1861, No.7, Jan. 9, 1861. 
• See as an example Preussisches Volksblatt, No.6, 1861, as given in Tagesbericht, 
No.6, Jan. 8, 1861. 
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did not gain for them any special rights. They were placed in the 
same category with labor organizations, handicraft associations, and 
all others. The police subjected party activities to the most careful 
attention. Dossiers accumulated on them in the police files; the ad-
ministrative officials reported regularly, although not in much detail, 
on the general state of political opinion. The Conservatives, who had 
made these laws, were inclined to consider opposition to the ruler and 
his government as partaking of the nature of mutiny or treason, or at 
least of subversive activity. They thought that the liberals and 
democrats wished to shift the center of political power to themselves 
and to transform the character of Prussian society, a suspicion that 
manifestly was well founded. Being unable to think in political terms, 
to accept the facts of changing conditions and the need for political and 
governmental adjustments to these changes, they could conceive the 
liberal and democratic action only in the light of the criteria of 
power. They had no other experience by which to judge it; their 
thought immediately applied military and police terms and symbols to 
this new phenomenon, and the experience with the Revolution of 
1848 had confirmed them in this suspicious view. When they opposed 
the King and government, as they had to do between 1858 and 1862, 
they did not apply this line of thinking to themselves; they considered 
themselves as merely more royalist than the King, more governmental 
than the government. They were maneuvering so as to force the King 
back to their side. Even a king might err. 
The liberals and democrats had been ~nd continued to be the driv-
ing force behind the institutions and practice of popular politics. 
They expressed their power in state affairs by means of politics; and 
while almost none of them recognized the full implication of popular 
representative institutions for the character of government and of poli-
tical parties, they at least understood the simple facts of their position. 
They tried to conceal from themselves the impulsion of this system to-
ward the English type of parliamentary responsibility and toward 
equal suffrage and increased efficiency in the conduct of politics as 
an organized profession. Many of them sought to maintain the right 
to act as leaders with knowledge superior to that of the voters and to 
decide issues not according to the wishes of their constituency but on 
the basis of their personal wisdom. Nonetheless, they knew that in 
the last analysis they served as representatives and that they owed their 
position to public support. Although a few of the aristocratic right 
wing of the liberals had close contacts with the King, the vast majority 
of the liberals and especially the democrats had no such means of exert-
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ing influence. The liberals and democrats could have stirred up a 
flood of petitions and deputations in support of their action in the 
Landtag; but, as the Berlin correspondent to the Konigsberg Hartung-
sche Zeitung wrote in October, 1862, they held it inappropriate to do 
so. They represented the people and expressed the popular wishes; 
additional means of expressing these wishes were thought to be un-
necessary.5 Nonetheless, petitions supporting the Lower House were 
signed and sent to it. 
The decision aptly characterized this stage of development of 
Prussian politics. It agreed with the attitude toward the pursuit of the 
game shown in the indifference of the Landtag deputies to election 
statIstIcs. That a Conservative government never published any 
statistics of political affiliation according to local districts conformed 
to their general inclination to reduce the significance of politics; but 
such unconcern is less understandable in the case of a government of 
liberals. The failure of the Lower House or of the parties to collect 
and publish the full political statistics indicated the infancy of pol i-
tical life. When the committees of the Lower House in 1862 and 1863 
reported on whether the elections had been run according to the law 
and on whether the members of the House had received a majority 
of the votes and were entitled to be seated, they frequently did so with-
out supplying any statistics on the vote of the electors for the winners 
and almost never for the losers. Even less often did they supply 
figures on the votes cast for the electors. Since elections had only be-
gun to be held in 1848, party organization and policies were in the 
beginning stage, and the population itself was even less advanced in 
political thinking and acting than the leaders. 
As soon as parliamentary institutions were established the liberals 
and democrats faced the practical problem of purpose and organization 
of the political parties. Contrary to their reaction to most lines of 
activity of the period they hardly indulged in theoretical analyses. The 
practitioners were concerned with working instruments rather than 
with definitions. The concept party had not yet acquired the con-, 
notation of partisanship which the Conservatives later succeeded in 
imposing upon it in the mind of much of the public. The liberals; 
and democrats would have repudiated any such accusation, for they 
were seeking to introduce into Prussia and Germany a new way of life. 
whole and complete within itself even though contrary to conservatism. 
6 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 2, 7, 10, '1862. 
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They tended to distinguish between a "party" as the inclusive unit ex-
pressing the total view of life of the political group and a "fraction" 
as a group within the party differentiated on points of lesser im-
portance. They showed most concern over the question of functions of 
the party or fraction. 
The liberal KOlnische Zeitung published on February 5, 1862, an 
article condemning parties for wasting time, for exhausting the par-
ticipants in preliminary discussion, for preventing the few excellent 
speakers from exercising their talents in the Landtag and exerting 
public influence. The writer much preferred freedom of action for 
the deputies to the restrictive influence of parties. If followed, his 
advice would have led to the destruction of any kind of party organiza-
tion. It would have crippled liberal and democratic strength in the 
Landtag by enhancing the tendency toward anarchy. It sounded like 
the desires of a certain type of German professor, loaded with knowl-
edge, impatient of control by an organization, determined to live up 
to his reputation as leader. The effects of this kind of political be-
havior were described by the historian Professor Baumgarten upon a 
visit to Berlin in the first part of 1862. He said that he could not under-
stand the conditions there. In spite of the wealth of intelligent, active 
men nothing was being accomplished in politics. They carried on 
politics, he said, as if it were a learned subject. They thought that 
an issue was settled if it was thoroughly discussed. They talked too 
much and did nothing about execution. "A great genius or a 
powerful tyrant should arise here; but in Berlin such a person would 
certainly not be great," he concluded; and he saw little hope for 
Prussia to take the lead in Germany.6 Although Professor Baum-
garten failed to recognize the source of the trouble, he at least did 
not conclude that more freedom of action by the individual deputy 
would cure the state of anarchy. 
Manifestly writing from personal experience, a Berlin correspondent 
to the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung dlscussed the problem with no 
clearer understanding of what it involved than that of uninitiated 
observers. His definition of a party as a number of deputies who 
met every evening at a certain restaurant for debate revealed the 
inadequacy of his own criticism. His description of the activity of a 
party suffered from an exaggerated sense of the need for formal struc-
ture and slight comprehension of the value in political work of a 
• Heyderhoff, op. cit., I, 61-62. 
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highly flexible and adaptable organization. He wished the party to 
have definite and recognized leaders, probably a useful proposal,bu't 
he did not explain that effective leadership would assert itself only in 
time and that facilities had to be present for enabling the leading 
personnel to change in accord with changing political situations. He 
failed to perceive the advantage of the party as an instrument for work-
ing out and agreeing upon policies in an informal, non-public way, 
as a means of saving much official time and at arriving at satisfactory 
solutions without hasty and unfortunate public commitment. 
The means which the correspondent offered for eliminating the 
"fraction flaws," as he called them, can scarcely be called profound. 
"The first would be the construction of a decent parliament building, 
in which the deputies could comfortably satisfy their physical needs; 
then the transfer of sessions to the evening, for in the evening the 
human being is fresher and livelier."7 
Apart from the absence of physical facilities for conducting busi-
ness, the parties suffered from more fundamental shortcomings. In 
view of the newness of parliamentary life many deputies were re-
turned who had no previous party affiliation. Their alignment with 
a party or fraction would not be known before the legislature met, 
and they might be quite independent of the party at all times.8 The 
lack of clarity of the political situation between 1858 and the appoint-
ment of Bismarck in 1862 and the difficulty about promulgating 
definite programs handicapped the formation of parties. As long as 
the ministry contained both Conservatives and right-wing liberals, 
many deputies did not know what line to pursue, what policies to 
support, what attitude to take toward the government. They did not 
know what should be the bases of political differentiation and party 
organization.9 
The advantage of party organization and a measure of party dis-
cipline among the elected representatives in the Lower House became 
slowly apparent to certain leaders and voters. It would be an exaggera-
tion to assert that the recognition extended to a large numer, but the 
available evidence leads to the conclusion that by 1861 and 1862 the 
editorial in the National Zeitung Oanuary 6, 1861) of Berlin repre-
sented a view of growing acceptance. It was a "lamentable illusion," 
wrote the paper, "to wish to stand above parties. To be a party man 
• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, July 13, 1862. 
• See Jlolkszeitu1\g, Jan. 15, 1862; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Feb. 2, 1862. 
• Ibid., Feb. 2, 1862. 
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means to have connected and, if possible, thoroughly considered ideas 
about the desirable outcome of state affairs and to unite with fellow 
citizens for the realization of them. Whoever does not attain this 
firmness in thinking and acting stands not above but below parties, 
for everything that happens in state affairs is accomplished over his 
head." 
The newly established Progressive party (1861) took the initiative 
in trying to create a formal organization with a feeling of party respon-
sibility among the deputy-members. As the youngest of the liberal 
political groups and certainly as the most ambitious and the most ag-
gressive, this party had a carefully formulated program. It needed the 
additional power which organization would supply in order to press 
its policies upon the other liberals and upon the government and 
especially in order to increase the number of its voting supporters. 
Although it split into several fractions and was unable to achieve the 
unity needed, it did elect an executive committee each month of the 
parliamentary session, and it succeeded in developing a habit of party 
loyalty. One of its leading members, Freiherr von Hoverbeck, in 
January, 1862, accepted a party decision which he had opposed. A 
decade earlier he had asserted his independence of party. Pressure to 
this effect was being exerted upon the deputies by their constituencies. 
In December, 1861, Rupp, a candidate in Konigsberg for election to 
the Lower House, was asked in a meeting of electors of the Progressive 
party whether in case of election he would join a fraction and in how 
far he would submit to party discipline even when the decision went 
against his own conviction. Rupp replied that after his experience 
in 1849 he regarded it as absolutely necessary to join a party and to 
submit to party decisions. His statement was greeted "with great ap-
proval." In the Western part of the state, in Bielefeld, a few weeks 
later Deputy Schulz had to explain to a political meeting, two-thirds 
of which consisted of persons from the rural districts, why he had p-~t 
joined the Progressive party in Berlin after he had been elected on its 
program. His reply manifested his slight understanding of the value 
which Rupp had recognized as early as 1849. He had aligned himself 
with the Bockum-Dolffs fraction because he had found in it old friends; 
but he had always voted with the Progressive party, and, he said, "that 
is in the last analysis the main thing." At about the same date, the 
electors in Aachen were taking steps firmly to remind Deputy Baur 
that after having declared himself at the time of his candidacy in ac-
cord with the program of the Progressive party and having been 
elected on that basis he should not then have joined the Grabow frac-
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tion. They were pressing him to correct his mistake and affiliate with 
the Progressives.10 
The efforts of the parties or fractions to preserve enough unity and 
identity without depriving the individual members of independence 
led to the formulation among liberals of party rules of order. Those 
of the Grabow fraction, published in the Kolnische Zeitung of January 
19, 1862, contained the following points. An executive committee of 
eleven members should be elected. One should be secretary, another 
treasurer, the others should preside in turn over the party conferences. 
Except for the secretary and the treasurer, the membership should be 
renewed every four weeks, with the right of re-election. The party 
should meet on the evening before each plenary session of the Lower 
House. Any member of the party who aimed to introduce a bill or an 
amendment in the Lower House or to support one introduced by 
members of another party should inform the party beforehand of 
his intention. He should not be prevented from following his aim 
even if the majority of the party had spoken against him. If a mem-
ber first planned to introduce an amendment during the course of the 
plenary session, he should notify two members of the party executive 
committee of his intention. Except on certain matters stated below 
each member was entitled to vote in the plenary session against the 
decision of his party, provided he had expressed his intention in the 
party conference. If he had been absent from the conference or if he 
planned during the plenary session to vote against the party decision, 
he had to inform two members of the executive committee of his aim. 
He had to abide by the party decision on the following points: the 
despatch of an address to the King, the interpellation of ministers, the 
introduction of and decision about a proposal for the establishment 
of investigating committees, the proposal to change or supplement the 
constitution. To make a party decision binding upon all members 
required that the members be informed beforehand of the intended 
action and that at least half of the membership be present at the con-
ference. The measure had to be approved by a two-thirds majority of 
those present. For special reasons the party might release individual 
members from this obligation. In order to achieve unity among the 
party members in case of votes· in the plenary sessions about such mat-
ters as proposals to adjourn or to close the session, the members should 
,. Heyderholf, op. cit., I, 114; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 5; Konigsberg Har· 
tungsche Zeitung, Dec. 31, 1861; Volks%eitung, March 26, 1862; Tagesbericht, No. 45, 
Feb. 22, 1862, on the basis of a report in the Volkszeitung, No. 45. 
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take their cue from the vote of designated members of the executive 
committee. Whoever was unable to attend a meeting of the party 
should learn from a member of the executive committee about what 
had occurred. If a member wished to resign from the party, he should 
notify the executive committee in writing or should declare orally his 
intention in a party meeting. 
The rules reflected a high degree of bureaucratism. They read like 
the statement of organization drawn up by persons trained in govern-
ment administration who were trying to adapt the method and criteria 
of precise definition of official function to a group of popularly elected 
representatives. A party run according to these rules would have been 
neat and orderly. Although party discipline was needed, it seems doubt-
{ul whether such formal rules were appropriate. Even the libera~ 
political leaders had not yet learned how flexible a political party has 
to be in order to achieve efficiency. Such fixed rules seem contrary 
to the nature of politics and a manifestation of political inexperience. 
N or were the rules effective; the parties continued to be run after the 
fashion of a local social club.ll 
11 Wochenschrift des N6ticnalvereins, Feb. 7, IN~. 
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T HE conftk. be'ween .he libmls on .be one hand and 
the King and the Conservatives on the other involved the question of 
representation. Did the Lower House represent the people of Prussia? 
Since the answer depended in part upon the nature of the election 
system, it must be analyzed, and for that purpose three problems will 
be considered-the legal conditions under which the deputies were 
returned, the public's actual experience with voting, and the nature 
of the liberals' and the Conservatives' own thinking about the social 
bases of representation. 
The elections were held under the terms of a law which most 
political leaders, irrespective of party affiliation, considered adequate. 
Government, Conservatives and liberals, Catholics and Poles were 
sufficiently content with it not to make a fundamental transformation 
or even a modification of it a major political issue. After the electoral 
districts had been fixed by law in 1860 so as to prevent-though not 
with entire success-further gerrymandering in favor of reactionary 
candidates, the liberal majority in the Lower House of the Landtag 
voted to postpone indefinitely any proposals for revision of the elec-
tion law, and the New Era government either approved of or acquiesced 
in the decision. The law seemed to be fulfilling its purpose of pro-
viding a neutral mechanism for the expression of the will of the poli-
tically active public. 
The decisive evidence in favor of this view seems to lie in the 
fact that since its promulgation in 1849 the law had served to return 
in the first years an overwhelming Conservative majority of deputies 
and after 1858 a decided liberal majority. Other factors than the 
255 
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nature of the election law were rightly regarded as accounting for the 
change in political expression, and each side thought at the time that 
under the terms of the law it could win future elections. In significance 
political and social issues ranked so far superior to other matters in the 
struggle between the old Prussianism and the new liberalism that 
neither major group was much interested in the conditions of repre-
sentation. 
The system of voting used in 1862 and 1863 had been introduced 
on May 30, 1849, as a means of re-establishing Conservative control 
over the fading revolution. It had been drafted by the government 
headed by Count von Manteuffel with the approval of King Frederick 
William IV. It had first been issued as a royal decree and then legally 
accepted by the Lower House of the Landtag elected according to its 
terms. 
The Manteuffel government incorporated the basic principles of 
the election law into the constitution of 1850. They were to be found 
in Articles 69, 70, 71, and 72, and contained the following provisions: 
The Lower House should be composed of 350 members. The elec-
tion districts should be fixed by law. Every Prussian who had com-
pleted his twenty-fifth year and had the right to vote in local elections 
in his community was entitled to vote. Plural voting was not allowed. 
An elector should be chosen for every 250 people. The voters should 
be divided into three classes according to the amount of direct state 
taxes they paid, in such a way that each third had the power to cast 
one-third of the entire vote. The total amount should be calculated 
for each community or for each election district in case the latter was 
composed of several communities.1 Voting separately, each class 
should elect one-third of the electors, who could be chosen from any 
of the three classes. The deputies were chosen by the electors meet-
ing and voting as a body. In those communities which paid the 
milling and slaughter tax, this sum should be counted in lieu of the 
direct state tax. The only essential point of the election law not 
repeated in the constitution was that requiring the open ballot. 
By the provisional Article 115 the constitution validated the decree 
of May 30, 1849, until a new election law, foreseen in Article 72, should 
have been approved. Since the new election law was never passed, the 
decree of 1849 remained in force during the entire life of the con-
stitutional monarchy in Prussia. 
1 Aceording to the decree on the execution of the election law of 1849, an elec-
tion precinct should not contain more than 1,500 people. Abg. H., St. B., 1849, Vol. 
I, Part 2, pp_ xiii-xv. 
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The origin of the three-class system of voting remains obscure.2 It 
may have been first suggested by David Hansemann, a Rhineland 
banker, a leader of the liberal bourgeoisie and a minister in the first 
Prussian revolutionary government of 1848. He was acquainted with 
the system in the Rhine province, where it had been introduced in the 
law on community government of 1845. In the local form, in which 
numbers of voters were relatively few, the election had been direct, 
whereas for the state elections the law of 1849 required indirect elec-
tions. Apart from the use of the secret ballot in the community elec-
tion as contrasted with the open voting for state elections, the state 
law may be considered an elaboration of the local decree to fit the 
needs of voting in a large area with large numbers involved. 
The Rhenish bourgeoisie should not be given complete credit for 
having originated the system of voting in 1849. The idea of inequality 
underlay the social and political life of the entire Prussian state and 
was accepted as a reality by almost all liberals as well as by the Con-
servative vestiges of the Old Regime. The structure of local, county 
and provincial government expressed much more inequality than even 
the new Landtag. The three-class system of voting actually marked 
an advance in the direction of equality over many of the practices in 
the lower branches of government. The population was accustomed to 
inequality in political power, including the right to vote, and, when-
ever it dared or had the opportunity, it protested primarily against 
extreme manifestations of this inequality. Doubtless the purest 
example of the age of privilege survived in West Pomerania and the 
island of Rugen, where the officials of the municipalities selected new 
colleagues by co-optation; a written code of laws did not exist and the 
officials reigned like autocrats.3 In the villages throughout the state 
the right to participate in the community meeting depended upon a 
property qualification, which divided the residents into two groups, one 
with some political power in the decision on local affairs, and the 
other in a position of dependence. 
The one exception was provided by the law of 1808 associated 
with the name of Freiherr vom Stein. This law had given the male 
population of the towns and cities of all the provinces except the 
Rhineland and Westphalia a basis of voting so liberal and progressive 
that it had remained a matter of concern to the conservative or re-
actionary nobility. By this law vom Stein had abolished the associa-
• See A. Wolfstieg, "Wer ist der 'Vater' des Dreik1assenwah1rechts in Preussen?" 
Preussische Jahrbilcher, CLXIV (1916), 349-55. 
• See Abg. R., St. B., 1862, Vol. II, No. 15, pp. 102-03. 
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tion of the vote in town affairs with property as a personal privilege. 
He had supplanted this feudal conception by the modern practice of 
equal manhood suffrage and secret ballot. Although the Prussian 
government had whittled away certain of the liberal rights of the town 
decree, many essentials remained intact in 1848 and did not succumb 
to reaction until 1853. In that year the government had extended the 
three-class system of voting to town and city elections of the six Eastern 
provinces and had abolished the secret ballot. 
The county assembly (Kreistag) and the provincial Landtag re-
mained in 1862 what they had been prior to the Revolution of 1848. 
As bulwarks of aristocratic privilege and power and of authoritarian 
domination, they afforded few opportunities for popular elections. 
In so far as elections were held, they threw the force of custom on 
the side of unequal voting power and of discouragement or prohibition 
of popular participation. The first estate in the county assembly and 
the first in the provincial assembly, or where in the latter assembly 
there were four instead of three estates, the first two were restricted 
almost entirely to the owners of noble land holdings. Certain holdings 
carried the hereditary right to a seat in the first estate, while the others 
entitled the owners to vote for representatives to the assembly. In the 
case of the second estate, representing the towns and cities, the same 
practice applied. Certain cities possessed the right of direct election 
of a representative, and the others chose electors who met together to 
select representatives for the assembly. In either case the power to 
vote was restricted to the members of the town or city council, and the 
number of deputies to which they were entitled was far fewer than 
that of the first estate. The practice in the villages for choosing 
representatives to the lowest estate was also indirect, resembling that 
in most of the towns and cities, and was about equally restricted as 
to representation in the assembly. Balloting in these elections was 
secret. 
A subject of the King in 1862 and 1863 would have found the three-
class system of voting, with one exception, entirely within the limit 
of his experience gained in provincial and lower elections. In the 
Western provinces he would have been fully acquainted with the 
division of the voters into three groups according to the amount of 
taxes they paid. In the other provinces he would have been accustomed 
to differences in voting strength based on other, but nonetheless real, 
criteria. In all provinces he would have understood the workings of 
indirect elections, either from actual participation or from the experi-
ence of others. In all provinces he would have lived under the rule 
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of assemblies in which the upper class was legally and traditionally 
entitled to far more representatives than the lower ones-in the pro-
vince and in the county, the nobility over the townsmen and the 
peasants; in the towns and cities, certain burghers over the rest of the 
burghers; in the villages, certain peasants over the others. With the 
one exception of elections for municipal officers in towns and cities 
between 1808 and 1853 in the six Eastern provinces, the pattern of 
voting was consistently discriminatory. If one uses the popular right 
to vote as a standard, the election law of 1849 under which the Lower 
House was elected in 1862 and 1863 marked a substantial improve-
ment on the norm established in the years of pre-revolutionary re-
action. 
When the government proposed the three-class system of voting in 
1849 it had arranged its justification according to the three basic 
principles of the bill: first, the division of voters into three classes; 
second, the use of the amount of taxes paid as a criterion for the divi-
sion of voters into these classes; and third, the open ballot. Critics 
of the bill and subsequent law necessarily followed the same form; and 
a comparison of the remarks made about the several terms in 1849-50 
and again in the early 1860s may help to illuminate the degree to 
which Prussian political leaders of this period understood the char-
acter and purpose of elections. 
In 1849 and 1850 both the government and the liberal deputies 
disapproved the French system of direct elections based on a high 
property qualification, and this aversion persisted among liberals in 
the early 1860s. They had seen a revolution develop out of the system 
in France in 1848, and had watched Louis Napoleon manipulate it to 
the advantage of his imperial control since then. They wished an 
election law which would reflect not merely numbers but the differ-
entiation of social and political forces. They approved the three-
class method of voting, and argued in favor of it, to use the govern-
ment's justification, as follows: 
The forces of the citizens, on whose harmonious cooperation 
the existence and prosperity of society basically depend, are in 
part physical or material, in part intellectual and spiritual in 
character. Among the material ones the ability to pay taxes 
occupies a preeminent position. It provides the most general 
measure of individual contribution to the public welfare. It 
therefore seems reasonable to regulate voting power according to 
the tax situation. Thereby one tries to abide by the demand of 
equal duties, equal rights, and one takes into account the fact 
that a very important right of the deputies, whose election is be-
ing considered, concerns the power to levy taxes. Although the 
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tax yardstick is very unsatisfactory, one can expect from the 
allocation of votes according to the amount of taxes paid an ap-
propriate result, for conditions are by and large such that among 
the poorer elements of the population there is usually the greater 
sum of physical force and among the richer there is usually the 
greater amount of spiritual and intellectual power, and there~y 
the importance which one apparently attributes to material 
property accrues to the benefit actually of the higher intelligence. 
It is not necessary to prove further that the amount of prop-
erty owned is more or less decisive for the interest in the state 
organs which protect this property . 
. . . When one decides on the three-class system, that decision 
rests not merely upon the fact that it is regarded as the least 
offensive form of division or that it furthers the formation of 
parties less than a two-fold division would, but much more upon 
the experience that as a rule three main classes of the popula-
tion can everywhere be distinguished by the amount of proper-
ty they own, and that the members of each class in other rela-
tions also usually have most in common with each other. Thus 
the system is more organic than on first glance it appears to be. 
The government rejected the proposal to divide the population for 
voting purposes according to occupation. The occupational struc-
ture, it said, was still too complicated. When a new social structure 
had developed, it would be possible to allocate political power ac-
cordingly; but at present any attempt to do so would arouse far too 
much opposition. 
The government recognized that the proposed election system had 
many shortcomings. Some arose from the fact that the state did not 
possess a uniform system of direct taxation. Another lay in the fact 
that the first class had too few members to be regarded as a genuine 
election body. These, it thought, could be subsequently corrected.4 
In its recommendation of the bill to the King, the government 
added another argument, with an unusual gift of aphasia about the 
events of the preceding year. 
The similarity of interests of the individual classes of the 
population is not as externally recognizable as it is real, and the 
measuring of relative importance among them is so difficult that 
we do not wish to undertake to advise Your Majesty to try to 
fix it in law. We have therefore held to the simpler external 
manifestation of this relation, the participation in the payment 
of taxes. Since only three classes of voters are formed, we have 
permitted wide leeway to the association of interests and have 
taken the particular situation in each locality and in each district 
• Abg. H., Drucksachen, 184950, Vol. I. No. 40, pp. 3 If. 
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into due consideration in that the classes are to be formed in 
each community or in each voting district composed of several 
communities according to the amount of taxes paid in that com-
munity or district and not according to a tax standard for the 
entire state.5 
The government's defence of open voting incorporated all the 
standard arguments employed then and in subsequent years by those 
determined upper-class supporters of responsibility and courage in 
politics. "Since the principle of publicity and oral procedure has 
come to obtain more and more in the conduct of public affairs in the 
other branches of state life," the ministry argued, "many esteemed 
persons have spoken in favor of introducing it in voting as well. ... 
It was most unwelcome apparently," the ministry continued, "to those 
who wished surreptitiously to thwart the main tendency of the prin-
ciple of voting classes, in that they hoped to win at least the votes 
of the masses for the false friends of the people." While recognizing 
that open voting was also subject to impure influence, it regarded this 
influence as small in comparison with "the cancerous affection which 
would be able to grow undisturbed under cover of the secret, written 
procedure." In a free people, the individual must have the courage 
to express his convictions openly. "In no other way will the parties 
learn to know, to respect and to understand each other better." More-
over, the government continued, since the poorest classes were the 
most illiterate, their vote would be known anyway. "Public voting 
treats all alike and exposes no one to the humiliation of exceptional 
handling." 
Public voting, the ministry stated, would be most effective in un-
covering bribery and other irregularities at elections. Public opinion 
would condemn such practices and the investigation of the election 
procedures would impair their success. Whoever sought to misuse 
his influence to prevent others from freely expressing their convictions 
would be damned by the press. Whoever suffered from voting accord-
ing to his conviction would receive public support. Open voting, the 
ministry concluded, would help to establish the constitutional mon-
archy and "would keep at a distance the destructive play of political 
passions and intrigues."6 
In spite of these arguments it is not clear why in 1849 the govern-
ment advocated the introduction of open voting. By tradition that 
manner of voting had been associated with revolutionary terror. The 
• Abg. R., St. B., 1849, Vol. I. No.2. pp. vii-viii. 
• Ibid.; Abg. R., Drucksachen, 1849-50, Vol. I. No. 40. 
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Jacobins in 1792 had used it to obtain a majority and had threatened 
to send advocates of the secret ballot to the guillotine. Stein's law on 
town government of 1808 had introduced the secret ballot; the revision 
of that law in 1831 had not changed the system; the law of 1845 on 
Rhenish communal government had used it; even the Rhenish West-
phalian Church law of 1836 had done so for the express purpose of 
assuring a free and honest manifestation of opinion. The provincial 
and county elections had been held by secret ballot. In fact, open 
voting was an innovation of the 1850s, first in the Landtag elections 
and in 1853 in the communal elections. Apparently the government 
reasoned that it could exert sufficient pressure upon voters in open 
elections to win their support.7 
The general acquiescence of both liberals and Conservatives in the 
election law was manifest at the beginning. The membership of the 
committee of the Lower House recommending the approval of the bill 
in 1849 consisted of representatives of both groups. On that commit-
tee, the liberals, from diverse parts of Prussia (Kiihlwetter, von 
Beckerath, Count von Schwerin, Simson, von Saucken-Julienfelde, 
Pfeiffer, and Gessler) outnumbered the Conservatives by seven votes 
to four.s The committee reporter, the Rhenish liberal industrialist von 
Beckerath, stated to his colleagues in the Lower House that direct 
elections had much in their favor but that there was much to be said 
in favor of indirect elections. According to experience, the latter 
were, he continued in this profound vein, a guarantee for conservative 
voting (he meant anti-revolutionary voting), which was "very im-
portant" at present. He recognized that the recommended system of 
voting rested on the principle that the state was entitled to decide who 
should vote, who should form the pillars of government. He admitted 
that the three-class system of voting was "not entirely the correct one," 
that it was a "crude instrument," and that property was not an 
accurate measure of "the highest political right," but, he said, there 
was still much to be said for it.9 
These remarks of von Beckerath's are impressive because of the 
extraordinarily paternalistic authority conceded to the government (ex 
post facto to the representatives of the people) to decide on (1) who 
should participate in state affairs even to the modest extent of voting, 
and (2) what should be the conditions of voting. They disclosed the 
• See H. von Gerlach, Die Geschichte des Preussischen Wahlrechts, (1908), pp. 
34-39: 
• Abg. H., St. B., Dec. 13, 1849, pp. 1690-91. 
I Ibid., Oct. 27, 1849, pp. 900-01. 
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frank approval of material wealth as the basis of political power. If 
one wished to increase his political influence he should increase his 
wealth. The advice belongs in the tradition of the continental bourge-
oisie, Guizot and Louis Philippe. 
From the beginning of the New Era requests for the reform of the 
election law were made occasionally in the Lower House of the Land-
tag, always without success. The government even promised in 1859 
to introduce a reform bill, but that particular ministry gave way to an-
other before any steps were taken. Count Schwerin, the next Minister 
of the Interior, had served in 1849 on the Committee of the Lower 
House which had recommended the approval of the election law; and 
in 1861 he persisted in his support of the old law. His successor in the 
same office, von Jagow, refused to agree to any modification of the law 
on the grounds that the views of the country were divided on the 
question.10 
The Lower House voted in April, 1861, in support of a declaration 
that a new election law was an "urgent need";l1 but in the same declara-
tion it postponed any consideration of this "urgent need," and the 
available evidence attests to the accuracy of Minister von Jagow's 
estimate. On the issue of the best method of voting in state elections 
the liberals could not agree among themselves. When the Progressive 
party was founded early in 1861, the leaders admitted this dissension 
publicly in their official program and had to omit any expression of 
party policy about it. They called the method of voting an open ques-
tion. A few leaders vigorously advocated the abolition of the present 
system in favor of universal equal manhood suffrage and the secret 
ballot. Others, apparently a great majority, opposed this change with 
equal vigor; and rather than split the new party, the proponents bowed 
to the fearful ones. Freiherr von Hoverbeck, Krieger, certain leaders 
from Berlin, a few from Breslau, some from the Rhineland, and 
Schulze-Delitzsch led the proponents, while Twesten and professors 
like Theodor Mommsen were absolutely opposed to their views. In 
general, the Old Liberals and members of the other liberal groups to 
the right of the Progressive party lined up against the reformers.12 
The arguments deserve analysis as evidence of the state of political 
10 Ibid., Feb. 26, 1859; I, 256. Ibid., April 6, 1861; I, 650 f. Ibid., Aug. 20, 1862; 
III, 1337. 
11 Ibid., I, 658. 
12 Parisi us, Politische Parteien, pp. 36-39; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, I, 209; von 
Gerlach, op. cit., pp. 211-14. 
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thinking at the time among those who sought to align Prussia with the 
liberal forces of the century. 
As early as September, 1849, Maurach, a member of the Upper 
House, had disapproved the voting law. He had predicted that the 
law would separate the deputies from the people and had denied that 
persons not voting or unable to vote were necessarily stupid. "As 
representatives of the people," he had warned, "we must go along with 
the entire people. Only then can we win and maintain the bases of 
our power and influence,"13 In 1861 Schulze-Delitzsch stated to the 
Lower House the views of a small group of deputies which justify their 
being ranked among the most clear and honest thinkers and the most 
thoroughly liberal leaders of the century, irrespective of country. 
Although he was speaking on the subject of conditions for voting in 
town and city elections, the ideals which he supported had general ap-
plication. An election should assure that real interests, he said, were 
represented. He believed that important social interests exerted their 
due influence most effectively under a general election law without 
property qualification. A factory owner, the owner of a large estate, 
a person of outstanding intelligence would gain a position of influence 
irrespective of the nature of the election law. He accused the op-
ponents of equal suffrage of confusing unjustified social equality with 
a thoroughly just political equality. He argued that the three-class 
system stimulated class antagonism, and that the restriction of voting 
rights by a property qualification was no improvement. He stood out 
staunchly for equal and secret suffrage,14 
The arguments of Maurach and Schulze-Delitzsch might well have 
been heeded. These leaders realized that the existing election law 
divided the public into voting groups in such a way as to deprive the 
liberals of increasing support from the public. They saw that the law 
encouraged an authoritarian relationship between government and 
the governed and tended to preserve the ways of life of the Old Regime, 
that it caught the liberal bourgeoisie in the framework of Conservative 
rule and prevented it from gaining the popular backing which it 
needed. They recognized that the defence of the three-class system 
of voting could not be reconciled with the liberal program of their 
party. 
The liberal opponents of universal equal suffrage feared that this 
method of election would lead, as Karl Twesten declared, to "the 
,. I. Kammer, St. B., Sept. 7, 1849; II, 625 . 
.. Abg. R., St. B., 1861; II, 1049·50. 
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dominance of dilettantism and charlatanism in politics." The occa-
sion for their most vigorous denunciation arose in 1866 and 1867 when 
the introduction of equal and direct suffrage was being considered for 
the proposed North German Confederation; but their opinions as ex-
pressed then applied equally to the earlier years. "In normal times," 
Twesten said, "the pressure of the government and in abnormal times 
of excitement that of radical agitation would produce undesired results 
and falsify the voice of the people."15 His colleague, Professor von 
Sybel, used even more Cassandra-like expressions. To the professor 
this was a matter of conscience. His historical knowledge showed him 
that the introduction of direct and equal suffrage marked the beginning 
of the end of all parliamentary government. He thought that such an 
election law could be accepted only under ideal conditions, when all 
men were good, all were socially equal, all had the same measure of 
intelligence, when the lion lay down with the lamb. While he be-
lieved in progress, he thought that mankind had not arrived as yet at 
the conditions necessary for it. He declared that the right to vote was 
the right to select the lawmakers, that this was a right to political 
dominion and should not be considered in the same category with the 
right to work or travel or associate with others. A person was not 
born with a right to select legislators; he had to prove that he possessed 
the ability to do so. Von Sybel preferred indirect elections to direct 
ones. The latter, he said, especially with a wide suffrage right, stirred 
up the passions and killed discussion; it meant the death of indepen-
dent political life and opened the way to every form of influence. It 
made people think they were equal when they were not. In Prussia 
two years ago, he declared, there were about 6,000 students and 44,000 
pupils in the gymnasiums and other high schools. Using these figures 
as a basis, he reckoned that there were about a million men in Prussia 
with education above the most elementary. He thought that the same 
relations held true with respect to the degree of social independence 
and property holding. He denied that the common people knew 
enough to elect an able man to parliament; he associated democracy 
with Caesarism.16 
The liberal leaders failed to agree on the issue of secret versus 
public ballot almost as completely as they did on that of the three-
15 Abg. H., St. B., Sept. 12, 1866, pp. 335-36. 
18Norddeutcher Bund, Reichstag, St. B., March 27, 1867, pp. 427-28. See also 
Robert von Mohl, Politik, (Tiibingen, 1869) , pp. 715-24; and the views of the Polish 
deputy, von Morawski, in the Prussian Lower House on March 23, 1860. 
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class system of voting.17 More of them seemed to be willing to support 
secret suffrage than the equal and direct vote; but persons like Count 
Schwerin preferred open voting on principle, and Deputy Beseler, the 
. -liberal professor of law, shared his opinion. Open voting, hOe said, 
corresponded more "to the moral dignity of a free people" and was 
closer to "the Germanic principle" of "publicity." Whoever voted for 
a deputy, he added, should not feel as if he were acting as a private 
person, but rather as if he were exercising an official public function. 
Beseler's support of open voting was shared by a leader of the Polish 
fraction in the House, Doctor Liebelt, who asserted that a voter must 
have the courage to express his opinions publicly. The advocates of 
secret voting included persons as far to the right among the liberals 
as Freiherr von Vincke. Both von Vincke and the far-from-liberal 
Catholic deputy Reichensperger from Geldern, who agreed with his 
views in this matter, remarked that open voting had not been customary 
in Prussia before 1849 in any elections. Von Vincke accused the Polish 
deputies of preferring the open ballot so that they could be certain of 
the vote of their Polish constitutencies, and he had no illusions about 
government pressure on the voters throughout the state in favor of 
Conservatism. Reichensperger quoted from the decree of 1836 in 
which King Frederick William III had ordered the use of the secret 
ballot in Rhenish-Westphalian church affairs so as to avoid any sug-
gestion of influence upon the voters.IS 
Many liberal deputies offered irrefutable evidence about the feel-
ings of the public on open voting. They cited numerous petitions from 
their constituencies asking for the introduction of the secret ballot. 
Deputy Frystatzki declared that ninety per cent of the people favored 
it, that open voting was hated. In his district, he said, half the ones 
eligible did not cast ballots. Everyone said, Frystatzki added, "Why 
should I go and let myself be ordered to vote for a particular person? 
I love peace and ... this open voting opens the door to ambition and 
selfishness." Deputy Professor Gneist expressed his conviction that 
three million signatures could be obtained in favor of the secret ballot. 
Too many voters had had an experience like that described to the 
Lower House in 1859 by Deputy Mettenmeyer. The Landrat of Stargard 
County had kept careful record of how each person voted; when a 
druggist had voted against his wishes, the Landrat and the Conserva-
17 See von Gerlach, op. cit., pp. 34-39. 
1. See the debates in Abg. H., St. B., April 6, 1861; I, 640, 656. Ibid., Feb. 26, 
1859; I, 256-58. 
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tives had seen to it that he immediately lost one-fourth of his business 
and had tried to deprive him of the rest. One understands why many 
deputies did not agree with the government official representing the 
Minister of the Interior, who told the Lower House in 1861 that the 
introduction of open voting in Prussia was a "sign of progress." None-
theless, the House never took active steps to replace it by the secret 
ballot. It always postponed consideration of the question.19 
The seeming diffidence of the liberal deputies toward reform of 
the system of voting for state elections did not extend into the area of 
town and city elections. The forty-five years' experience under the 
Stein law in the six Eastern provinces, that is, in all but the Rhineland 
and Westphalia, had won the devotion of the urban population to the 
practice of equal and secret suffrage, and the towns and cities of these 
provinces especially sent impressive petitions to the Lower House in 
favor of the restoration of the former system of voting. A list of 
those from which the city or town councilmen sent petitions would in-
clude urban centers of all sizes, large, small and medium. The 
councilmen of only two towns, Breslau and Liegnitz, made an excep-
tion: they wished to retain the three-class system, but not, at least in 
the case of the Breslau councilmen, the open voting. In the two 
Western provinces the sentiment favored the retention of the three-
class system; but many townsmen of prominence disapproved it in their 
petitions, and almost everyone sought the introduction of the secret 
ballot. 
The evils of the three-class system and open voting were condemned 
in almost identical terms. As typical as any was the statement sent to 
the Lower House by a group of 226 prominent citizens of Breslau.20 
According to this system, the petitioners declared, out of 6,992 voters 
some 362 belonged to the first class and had one-third of the voting 
power; 1,669 belonged to the second class, and 4,961 to the third. 
Even apart from the inequality and injustice of this division of poli-
tical power, the petitioners complained, the system introduced social 
differences based on income into a communal organization, and in-
volved social distinctions in political controversy. A community had 
many functions, like poor relief, in which all citizens should cooperate; 
instead of uniting it, the three-class system of voting tended to divide 
'"Ibid., May 6, 1861, p. 1268; Aug. 20, 1862, III, 1333·38; Feb. 26, IS59, I, 255 ff.; 
May 16, IS61, pp. 1272-73; Feb. 26, IS59, I, 263; March 16, 1860, I, 558; April 6, 
IS61, I, 657-5S. 
20 See Abg. H., Drucksflchen, IS59, Vol. III, No. lOS. 1860, Vol. VI, No. 262. 1861, 
Vol. V, No. 160. St. B., May 2, 3, 16, IS61; St. B,. 1862, Vol. II, No. 15. 
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the citizen body. An artificial organization of the citizens thereby re-
placed a natural one. The petitioners denied that the three-class sys-
tem was necessary in order to prevent mass rule and asserted that a 
small property qualification or intellectual qualification, as in the old 
town law, would suffice. Too many persons who should be town 
leaders were now forced to vote in the third class. 
The Landtag deputies could not have ignored the flood of petitions 
even if they had wished to. As soon as the New Era began, the liberal 
majority of the Lower House appointed a commission to report on 
the problem, and as early as 1859 the majority of the latter declared 
that the three-class system was not suitable for town elections. Apart 
from the arguments used by the petitioners in Breslau, the liberal de-
puties cited one convincing piece of evidence, the tremendous decline 
in voting since the introduction of the new procedure. One example 
may suffice. In Berlin under the Stein law over seventy per cent of 
the voters had cast ballots; after the introduction of the three-class 
system, in 1858 and 1860, not over twenty-six and twenty-five per cent 
respectively voted in the third class, not over forty-two and fifty per 
cent in the second class, and not over sixty-three and sixty-five per cent 
in the first.21 With each newly elected Landtag, until the fight with 
Bismarck monopolized attention, a new commission picked up the 
work of its predecessor and recommended almost the same liberal re-
forms for town elections-the secret ballot and equal suffrage with a 
low property qualification. 
The Conservatives manifested much less interest in the manner of 
voting than the liberals. They disapproved the entire system of govern-
ment and society in which popular elections were required and felt no 
strong devotion to any particular method. Their basic demand about 
elections was that the Conservatives be kept in power, and their will-
ingness within the space of a decade or less to shift their support from 
the three-class system with open ballot to that of equal manhood suff-
rage with secret ballot attested to their persistence in using any means 
to achieve their end. In 1849 the Conservative theorist, Professor 
Stahl, a member of the Upper House of the Landtag, could scarcely 
find adequate phrases for his scorn of universal and equal suffrage. 
Speaking with the assurance of a constant communicant with the 
Absolute, he had denounced elections by individual suffrage as "un-
bearable tyranny," as mass rule by the propertyless, by those incapable 
"Ibid., Drucksachen, 1861, Vol. V, No. 160, pp. 15-16; 1859, Vol. III, No. 108, 
Fp· 26-30. 
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of governing. Like the liberal Professor v6n Sybel he had regarded the 
right to vote not as a personal one but as a public duty to be ex-
ercised by a competent few.22 His colleagues had taken a less doc-
trinaire view and had followed the government by approving the three-
class system. 
After the elections turned against them, the Conservatives began 
to lose some of their preference for the three-class system of voting. 
They now feared that the present method suffered from some serious 
defects. As early as 1858 Deputy Count Pfeil condemned the use of 
indirect elections. When elections were bad, he said, they were made 
much worse by the electors. When the voters inclined left, or right, 
the electors voted extreme left, or right, and the true voice of Prussia 
was not heard.23 The year after the first major defeat of the Con-
servatives in the election, Deputy von Blanckenburg stated to the 
Lower House that if the secret ballot had been employed, many mem-
bers of his party would have won. Speaking in 1861 for the same 
group, Deputy von Krosigk declared that there was no such thing as 
free elections, that influence was exerted upon them from either above 
or below. He and his friends admitted that in case of open elections, 
it was possible for government officials to influence the voters; but, 
he said, the secret ballot opened the way to demagoguery and pres-
sure from below. He continued to prefer the open ballot. In the same 
session of the Lower House his fellow Conservative, Deputy Wagener, 
the--editor of the main Conservative newspaper, the Kreuzzeitung, 
twitted his opponents for preferring the secret ballot. Indeed, he said, 
"there has never been a constitution resting on the constitutional 
principle of the majority which lasted longer than a few decades." He 
accused the liberal proponents of the secret ballot of being inconsistent; 
they based their political system, he declared, upon the virtues of in-
dependent, spartan-like citizens, who did not have the courage to vote 
openly. Wagener condemned liberal government by elections as built 
upon" a political falsehood."24 
You tear asunder state and society; you recognize no other 
citizen than Plato's well-known two-legged animal without 
feathers, whom you abstract from all possible social conditions 
and endowments, and then you wonder why in every concrete 
case reality makes itself effective as over against this abstraction . 
.. Herrenhaus, St., B., Sept. 7, 1849; II, 622 . 
•• Abg. H., St. B., April 20, 1858; I, 604-05 . 
.. Ibid., Feb. 26, 1859; I, 258. May 16, 1861, p. 1271. April 20, 1858; I, 604-05. 
April 6, 1861; I, 653-54. 
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Apart from his social position one has no political signific-
ance at all; the social and the poltical significance of a man lire 
identical. 
Look at France, Wagener continued, where one had so-called despotism 
and the secret ballot, or at America "where one stands at the ballot box 
with revolver and dagger." Wagener did not regard the present system 
of voting as ideal; but he still preferred it to any other Prussia had had, 
because, he said, "even if only in crude form, it does contain the 
thought that the political importance of a name should be graded ac-
cording to its social and political achievement and significance." 
As defeat after defeat rolled over the Conservatives in the elections 
to the Lower House during the period of constitutional conflict, they 
sought some other system of voting to stop the liberal victories. Bis-
marck offered a solution, not for Prussia, where the election law re-
mained unchanged, but for the proposed North German Confederation. 
In 1866 as soon as the Austro-Prussian war ended, he recommended 
the introduction of universal, direct and equal manhood suffrage, and 
he acquiesced in the use of the secret ballot as a matter of minor im-
portance. Liberals were startled. Several deputies in the Lower 
House of the Landtag mistrusted the proposal as an attempt to under-
mine the influence of their political groups and of the Lower House. 
Others, as has already been stated, condemned it on principle in ab-
solute terms. Most of the liberals accepted Bismarck's recommenda-
tion with amazement and seemingly without much relish. The hated 
Junker had stolen the thunder of the most leftist of the liberals.25 
So far as Bismarck's intentions were concerned, the liberals' fears 
were justified. The Minister President did not aim to strengthen the 
liberals or introduce popular government-quite the contrary. As 
early as the meeting of the United Landtag in 1847 Bismarck had be-
lieved that the lower classes were much more conservative and mon-
archical in their thinking and feeling than the middle classes and that 
especially in the agrarian provinces of old Prussia the property-owners 
would be able to control the vote!> of their workers even under a sys-
tem of universal suffrage.26 At the time, he had rejected both this 
method of voting and the three~class system, declaring in 1849 that 
the Prussian people were politically so immature that elections would 
be "a lottery," "a gamble." The experience with elections during the 
"Ibid., Sept. Il-12. 1866; Norddeutscher Bund St. B., March 28, 1867. Abg. H., 
St. B., Nov. 26, 187l!; I, 95-99. I09-Ill!. Il8-20. 
"See G. von Below, .Das parlamentarische Wahlruht in Deutschland (Berlin, 
1909), p. 90. . . 
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1850s had inclined Bismarck toward a broad popular basis for voting. 
In 1854 he had opposed curtailing popular participation in the state 
elections by a high property qualification, for, he had argued, "the 
classes excluded thereby are better royalists than the rest of the bour-
geoisie and upper classes, even apart from the arbitrariness of any 
property qualification and the damage resulting from endless playing 
with constitution-making." After watching the same election system 
return a Conservative majority to the Lower House in the 1850s and 
a liberal majority in the 1860s, Bismarck stated that whatever the law 
might be, the elections always expressed the opinions of the time. It 
is doubtful, however, whether he actually believed his own words; 
otherwise, he would not have proposed an election law for the North 
German Confederation which was the reverse of that of Prussia. He 
expressed his views more frankly in a circular despatch to Prussian 
ministers abroad in March, 1866, that is, even prior to the defeat of 
Austria and to the election defeat and split of the Progressive party 
later in the same year. 
I consider direct elections and general suffrage greater assurance 
of a conservative attitude than any artificial election law cal-
culated to achieve manufactured majorities. According to our 
experience, the masses are more honestly interested in preserving 
state order than the leaders of those classes which would be pre-
ferred by the introduction of some property qualification for the 
right to vote. 
I may assert as a conviction based on long experience that the 
artificial system of indirect and class elections is much more 
dangerous in that it obstructs contact of the supreme power with 
the sound elements which form the kernel and the mass of the 
people.27 
Bismarck wished to gain popular support for the new North Ger-
man Confederation by this move. His use of the election law pro-
posed in April, 1849, by the Frankfurt Parliament as the basis for his 
proposal may be interpreted as a bid for liberal aid in founding the 
new German Reich. He hoped to be able to control the vote in favor 
of conservatism by direct and universal suffrage even with secret ballot 
and to use the support of the lower classes a a means for weakening the 
liberals. His miscalculation reveals Bismarck's extraordinary lack of 
understanding of the social and economic forces of his age; but the 
fact remains that, in so f='lr as one may make a dogmatic statement 
about so uncertain a subject as politics, he had very little choice. He 
'7 Quoted in von Gerlach, op. cit., p. 83. 
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could accept either an election system restricting political power to the 
liberal bourgeoisie and their supporters, whether by the three-class 
system or by some high property qualification, or one based on equal 
and direct suffrage for all male adults. A Conservative, agrarian 
Junker, even if a Bismarck, had had enough adverse experienci! with 
the bourgeoisie; he preferred to try the ma~ses. 28 
The glee of the Conservatives in supporting Bismarck's proposal 
can be felt even in the dry pages of the parliamentary debates. They 
now strode confidently behind their leader, and a mere ideological 
somersault caused them no qualms. They did it quickly and with as 
much poise as a Pruss ian Conservative could preserve in such an act. 
Strosser, an average Conservative deputy, declared in 1866 that equal 
suffrage had been contrary to the Conservative views up to now, but 
that if the government favored it he would heartily give it his ap-
proval. "Under any election system," he said, "it depends upon the 
energy and strength of the government whether one attains good elec-
tion results."29 A few days later Deputy von Blanckenburg denied 
that support of direct elections violated Conservative principles. He 
believed that this kind of election could be trusted more than the 
indirect method. For example, he said, in a system of indirect elec-
tions a deputy like Dr. Jacoby, who had recently said about the Austro-
Prussian War, "This war does not redound to Prussia's honor or to 
Germany's welfare," would be protected by the electors; in a system of 
direct elections the voters would not tolerate such a representative.so 
The most perfect somersault was made by the expert in Conserva-
tive debate, Deputy Wagener. He disagreed with his political friends 
that the method of election would not change the outcome. He now 
favored direct and universal suffrage, and opposed as unjust not merely 
the three-class system but even a property qualification on voting. In 
this society of compulsory military service there should be equal 
suffrage. Indirect elections were and are, he said, the true source and 
bearer of factious opposition and rule by a clique and did not favor 
the intelligent bourgeoise. He still preferred open voting, but was 
willing to follow the government's proposal. Devising a social theory 
•• On Bismarck's views. see Heinrich Herrfahrdt. Das Problem der berufsstand-
ischen Vertretung von der franzasis'chen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart and 
Berlin. 1921). pp. 58-61; von Gerlach. op. cit.; Abg. H .• St. B., Sept. 12. 1866. pp. 
307-08, 320; Protokolle der Deutschen Bundesversammlungen, April 9. 1866. Pl" 
102-03. See also the embellished account in Bismarck. Gedanken und Erinnerungen, 
II. 68-70 . 
• 9 Abg. H .• St. B., Sept. II, 1866. p. 286 . 
•• Ibid., Sept. 12. 1866. p. 332. 
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to support the new line, he said that general, direct suffrage was a 
necessary sign of a certain social and political condition. The old 
corporative forms which had been the basis of suffrage had decayed 
and new ones had not yet developed. He hoped that universal suffrage 
would further this development. He recognized the danger of the new 
method of voting, but he knew nothing better to offer. He did not 
believe that a Berlin merchant with a big bank account should have 
three or ten times as much voting power as a war veteran. The main 
attraction of general, direct suffrage was that it would affect persons 
at the most sensitive point: it would affect their social position and 
force them to defend that position "not by words" but "by positive 
social and political action." Thereby Wagener thought that social 
and political power might once again be united, a line of argument 
which, except for the difference in objective, was remarkably like that 
of Schulze-Delitzsch.31 
The core of Wagener's thought about the new election system con-
sisted in his wish that the Conservative party and the government 
would seize the initiative in the use of it; for, he said, only thereby 
would they prevent the institution from getting out of control, only 
then would they make it serve them.32 The advice was no doubt 
sound, but the Conservatives had let loose a Frankenstein monster.33 
Bismarck soon found that not even the lower classes followed his 
dictates. Mass parties turned against him; the people did not always 
think like Bismarck and the Conservatives. The Conservatives them-
selves sometimes failed to support him; all the pressure of which the 
powerful government disposed failed to win docile majorities. At the 
end of his dominance in 1890, Bismarck was devising means of abolish-
ing the Reichstag, the creation of his own election system. 
Subsequently Prussian liberals did not fare well under the reten-
tion of the three-class system and open voting of 1849. Within a few 
years after the German Reich was established the subject of reform of 
31 Norddeutscher Bund, Reichstag, St. B., March 28, 1867, pp. 420-22 . 
•• Abg. H., St. B., Sept. 12, 1866, p. 333. 
3. A small group of diehard reactionaries had never reconciled themselves to the 
existence of elections at all. It should be remembered that this group had broken 
with Bismarck, who was too modern for it. Deputy von Gerlach expressed its views 
in September, 1866, as follows: "Every election is a misfortune," but we should not 
abolish the three-class system of voting, deficient as it was. We should improve it. 
Universal suffrage was no improvement; it merely presupposed an atomized people. 
Society should be organic, and the "natural" leaders should dominate, each in his 
appropriate sphere, the Schulze in the village, and so on. In other words, von 
Gerlach wished the election system to be built on the caites of the Old Regime. See 
Abg. H., St. B., Sept. 11, 1866. pp. 299 f. 
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the election law came up again (1873) in the Lower House of the 
Landtag. Once more the liberals postponed consideration of the 
problem.34 A Catholic deputy accused them of avoiding it out of fear 
of the loss of their political influence.3li A left-wing member of the 
Progressive party had at the time of the Austro-Prussian war privately 
expressed the same suspicion.36 The evidence does not bear out this 
view. Most of the liberals seem rather to have opposed universal and 
equal suffrage on grounds of both material interest and principle. Bis-
marck and the national situation pushed them into accepting it for 
the Reich; but they undoubtedly preferred the vote to be restricted to 
the upper classes. After a few years the liberals lost their chance to 
change the system, for with the change in the social and political situa-
tion the three-class system returned a steady majority of Conservatives 
and their allies which could not be ousted until the Revolution of 
1918. 
Most liberals, even as the Conservatives, accepted social inequality 
as a fact, and most liberals wished to divide political power in the 
same way. The two groups, with the exception of some left-wing 
liberals, were not far apart in their views about an appropriate elec-
tion law. They faced a common problem-how during a definite move-
ment toward legal equality to change from a type of representation 
based on estates and caste to one based on classes. The Conservatives 
sought an election system which would preserve as much of the power 
of the estates as possible; the liberals sought one which would retain 
enough authority to prevent revolution and would nonetheless give 
the bourgeoisie the power safely to reform state and society in their 
interest. The three-class system afforded a neat compromise. It re-
tained the principle of inequality; it did not apply a yardstick of the 
ownership of a specific amount of property to all Prussia but rather 
left the qualifications for voting to the localities in such a way as to 
retain the existing relationship of economic and to some extent social 
power in ea~h locality. It based political differentiation upon the rela-
tive amount of taxes paid, a patriotic or civic basis on which one could 
counter any accusation of selfishness. It widened the group of the 
powerful without destroying the old ruling group and supplied a 
q.eutral foundation for a merger. Its importance, however, depended 
upon the importance of the institution for which elections were held . 
•• Abg. H., St. B., Nov. 26, 1873; I, 118-20 . 
•• Von Mallinckrodt, Abg. H., St. B., Nov. 26, 1873; I, 109-10 . 
•• L. Dehio, "Die preussische Demokratie und der Kreig von 1866," FOTschungen 
%UT Brandenburg-Preussischen Geschichte, XXXIX (19%7), 258-59. 
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The failure of the liberals to develop the Lower House into the 
dominant institution of government relegated the elections and con-
sequently the election law to a position of lesser significance, and the 
Reich method of voting deprived it of further prestige. 
The Prussian election law of 1849 was significant for the character 
of the political standards of the people and the leaders. The dis-
cussion of it offered insights, confirmed in many other ways, into the 
level of cultural life of Prussia. Being in vigorous transition from the 
caste state to the modern state of high social mobility, this society was 
setting standards and forms for a long future. Apart from a few on 
the left, the liberals failed to appreciate that fact and to seek a broad 
popular basis for their ideals. The historians among them led the 
fight against this reform. The preservation of the three-class system 
of voting by the liberals offers an example of their shortsightedness 
and is one of the reasons why they failed to gain authority. The liberals 
helped to preserve a political system which within a few years became 
the bulwark of reaction. 
The only respect in which the government of the New Era changed 
the system of voting had to do with the creation of election districts. 
The constitution called for the fixing of these districts by law (Article 
69), but the Manteuffel ministry had conveniently ignored that clause 
and had arbitrarily changed voting districts by administrative act. Its 
one standard in doing so had been that of returning a Conservative 
deputy. Wherever necessary, it had split counties among several elec-
tion districts; it had joined Germans and Poles in such a way as to 
assure a victory for the former, or Protestants and Catholics in order 
to defeat the latter. It had taken into consideration the state of trans-
portation and wherever possible had forced the opposition voters to 
travel long distances over bad roads. It had frankly stated that it 
gerrymandered and had assured the Landtag that it would continue 
to do so. Even some Conservatives became critical of such flagrant 
corruption. 
In 1860 Minister of Interior Count Schwerin introduced an election 
district law, the first one which the state adopted. After thorough 
consideration by the Lower House, the bill was somewhat modified and 
passed. Catholics and Poles, as well as Protestant Germans, warmly 
endorsed the law. It went to the Upper House, where it again passed 
with only minor changes. Once the Manteuffel government was 
eliminated, the Conservatives in that stronghold did not have the 
moral affrontery to defend the practices of their former leaders. 
The new law introduced as fair and just conditions for everyone as 
were possible. The liberals agreed that a normal voting district should 
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contain two counties but that in some cases one county might be used 
and in others more than two might be combined. Counties were 
selected for union on the basis of historic or cultural associations or of 
practical considerations. Of the latter, two were of essential im-
portance, the presence of good roads and bridges which would enable 
the voters (the electors) to come together even in bad weather and 
the existence of a building sufficiently large to hold the voters and the 
presence of quarters for them and their teams. A county which had 
road connections with one neighbor but not with another would have 
to be attached to the former. A county without a building adequate 
to hold all the voters assembled to cast ballots by voice should be as-
sociated with one which had. A church, an inn, a railroad station, 
were usually selected; but some counties had none of these large enough 
to contain the voters. Think of keeping seven hundred or eight 
hundred voters crammed in a church, one deputy exclaimed, while 
each expressed his vote by voice! The act of voting would continue 
an day, voters would fill the church and overflow, evening would come 
and candles would have to be used. Think of the confusion! One 
can understand why the committee of the Lower House consulted 
each deputy before recommending the composition of the election dis-
tricts, and why another deputy, a Catholic who had not been on the 
committee, urged the House to pass the bill as submitted by the com-
mittee and not to tamper with its details. 
The only major objection which a few reactionaries in the Upper 
House made against the law concerned the relation of rural and urban 
population. The law designated each city of 50,000 population and 
over a separate election district for the self-evident reason that one 
deputy was to be elected for every 50,000 people. In the case of towns 
of lesser size the law merged them into the county along with the rural 
areas. Some Conservatives wished to keep the two distinct for fear that 
the town voters would outnumber the rural ones, or that the former 
would by superior strategy in campaigning win the latter to the side 
of liberalism. They wanted to keep the rural areas as dormant as 
possible. Nonetheless, the administrative difficulty of separating town 
and country in voting was so clearly evident that the criticism was not 
pressed. The reactionaries could not justify a division for voting be-
tween a town and its surrounding region when for every other purpose 
the two were interdependent. 
A few liberals and Conservatives preferred the single county as a 
basis of representation, arguing that the county formed an organic, 
historic unit. They were unable, however, to sustain their proposal 
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against criticism. The sponsors of the law used the most recent census, 
that of 1858, as the basis of arranging districts so as to be numerically 
just; and they pointed out that if the county were selected great un-
fairness would result, since many counties lacked the amount of popu-
lation necessary to merit a deputy. They stressed the value of the 
larger district as a means of reducing the political prestige of the 
Landrat and other traditional wielders of power, and of allowing a 
larger choice of candidates than at present. More persons would then 
vote, the committee of the Lower House stated, because they would 
see greater possibility of their votes' being of some weight. In a small 
district where the distribution of political strength was already known, 
it said, the persons on the side certain to lose would be inclined not 
to vote at all. 
The law was manifestly intended to reduce the material obstacles, 
bad transportation and inadequate quarters, and the psychological 
deterrents to voting. It was intended to encourage the voters by as-
suring them of fair treatment. It vastly improved upon the Man-
teuffel system; but it did not altogether stop gerrymandering. Bis-
marck revived the practice, not in the creation of election districts, 
for these were fixed by law, but in arranging the boundaries of the 
voting precincts within the districts. He was not able to accomplish 
much by these tricks; he hardly needed to do so. He simply ignored 
the results of the elections. 
The liberals made their mistake in not transforming the three·class 
system of voting into one of equal manhood suffrage. Then the voters 
might have come to the polls in numbers comparable to those appear-
ing in town elections under the Stein Ordinance of 1808, and the 
liberals would have had far more popular strength against Bismarck 
and the King then they were able to muster. The shortsightedness of 
the liberals was apparent from Deputy Lette's remark that the new 
districting law was "perhaps more important" than a new election 
law.37 
.7 Abg. H., St. B., May 22, 1860; II, 1229. For the discussion in the Landtag of 
the districting law see, Abg. H., St. B., Feb. 7, 1856; ibid., Jan. 20, March 22-23, 27, 
May 19, 22, 1860; St. B., 1860, Vol. IV, Nos. 66,67; Herrenhaus, St. B., 1860, Vol. III, 
No. 35; Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1855-56, Vol. VI, No. 256; Abg. H., St. B., Feb. 7, 
1856; ibid., April 20, 1858; Herrenhaus, St. B., May 19, 1860; Abg. H., St. B., Oct. 26, 
1849; Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1854-55, Vol. V, No. 214; Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1855-56, 
Vol. III, No. 149; Abg. H., St. B., Sept. 12, 1866; Abg H., St. B., 1858, Vol. 11, No. 65. 
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AT THE nME 01 the two election, 011862 and 1863 the 
political alignment had reduced the parties and fractions into two 
major groups, with the Catholic Center party tending to divide, 
especially in 1863, in the same way. On the one side stood the Con-
servatives, as rock-ribbed, intolerant and defiant as ever; on the other 
was to be found an assortment of liberals and democrats, essentially 
agreed on fundamental objectives, forced by the government's be-
havior to act in unity, but suffering from a variety of centrifugal ten-
sions which deprived them of the power of fully harmonious and 
organized cooperation. 
The Relations Among the Liberal Parties 
In spite of the fact that all liberals advocated an almost identical 
program, they split easily into fractions for reasons too insignificant for 
many intelligent and well-informed contemporaries to grasp. During 
the first two years of the New Era the Constitutional party dominated 
the liberal movement. Its leaders held ministerial posts, were friends 
of the ruler, and acted on the political slogan, "Do not press." They 
were liberals of the older generation, many of them men of the highest 
aristocratic standing, who disliked speedy action. They appreciated 
the wide scope of power of the King and were more concerned with the 
problem of leading the monarch slowly and gently along the road to 
constitutional government than they were with that of satisfying im-
mediately the public demand for action in that direction. Accustomed 
to positions of dignified prestige in the local community as in the 
state, they preferred to act as individuals and disliked party organiza-
tion, party control or discipline, campaigning for votes, or anything 
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associated with popular politics. They were people who signed only 
their family name to a public statement, without Christian name, 
initials, or any designation of position or location. They expected 
the public to know who they were and to respect them as public 
leaders of long and mature experience and ripe learning. "Never in 
my life have I sought the position of representative," declared one of 
them, Deputy von Vincke of Hagen, in the Lower House in May, 1861; 
"I have not sent a single statement to my voters. I have never re-
ceived an address from them expressing confidence or no-confidence. 
I have forbidden it every time. I believe that, with respect to my 
voters, I am in a completely independent position."! 
The caution and slowness of the Constitutional party so thoroughly 
exasperated many liberals and democrats, both those in the Lower 
House and those outside, that in 1861 a group of critics came together 
in Berlin and formed the German Progressive party. "New people 
must be elected to the Lower House," declared the Niederrheinische 
Zeitung early in that year; and although the new party was formed 
mainly by East Prussians and developed its main strength in the 
Eastern and Central provinces, it undoubtedly responded to a state-
wide desire for action. It did not wish to destroy or weaken the unity 
among the liberals in the common struggle against the Conservatives; 
it sought rather to bring together men of all liberal groups, from the 
right-wing Constitutionals to the leftist democrats, who wished to 
work vigorously for the execution of the liberal ideals and national 
unification.2 The party divided into several fractions, but on the 
whole it worked as a cohesive group. 
In the Western provinces of Westphalia and the Rhineland but 
also to some extent in the Central provinces, the liberals in the main 
held together and without much difficulty made the transition from 
old liberalism to views and policies similar to those of the Progressive 
party.3 The two strongest fractions of the liberals of the Western 
provinces took their names from the deputies who acted as leaders, 
Grabow whose group formed the right wing and Bockum-Dolffs whose 
group kept close to the Progressives. By the time of the two elections 
of 1862 and 1863 the increasingly reactionary deeds of the government 
1 Abg. H., St. B., May 28, 1861; III, 1440. 
• Tagesbericht, No. 50, Feb. 28, 1861; Parisi us, Politische Parteien, p. 40; National 
Zeitung, Nov. 21, 1861. 
• In a letter to Baumgarten, March 25, 1862, von Sybel, a Rhenish deputy, wrote 
that the liberal majority in the Western provinces was "entirely for harmony," and 
he hoped that the Progressive party would not cause trouble there. Heyderhoff, 
op. cit., I, 86. 
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led to the decimation of right-wing liberals in the Lower House and 
to the actual unity of all liberal groups under the direction of the 
aggressive and positive leaders, primarily from among the Progressive 
and the Bockum-Dolffs, or Left-Center, groups. Petty differences gave 
way before the common need of defending liberalism against its 
enemies. 
The fact that the liberals and democrats could cooperate in the 
case of practical necessity does not detract from the actuality and im-
portance of the differences among them. The immaturity of the poli-
tical life, the struggle for power among the parties and fractions, the 
search for bases of party distinction, the survival of social and poli-
tical ways of the pre-parliamentary period, as well as the personal and 
psychological friction to be found in all forms of group activity at all 
stages kept the liberal groups apart, but conflict over principles and 
objectives scarcely existed at all. The right-wing liberals mistrusted 
the democrats and accused them of endeavoring to introduce parlia-
mentary government and full political equality; but the democratic 
forces never became strong enough to alarm them. Contemporary 
comment gauged the relations correctly when it explained the differ-
ences on other bases than those of ideal or general objectives. 
"Our party [the Constitutional] is a pitiful party," said the his-
torian Droysen to von Bernhardi at the end of 1860. "Our party is 
discrediting itself in the state," lamented at about the same time an-
other liberal who, like Droysen, had been supporting the government 
of the New Era. A member of the von Saucken family, disgusted with 
Minister of Interior von Schwerin for leaving all the reactionaires in 
office, declared that the liberal ministry had helped no one in the 
state except the Jews. In November of the next year, 1861, Doctor 
Kosch, the chairman of a political rally called by the Progressive party 
in Konigsberg, declared, according to the Konigsberg Hartungsche 
Zeitung, 
Not only the so-called Constitutional party but we also are 
"constitutional." The name "ministerial party" fits the former 
more precisely. They, the Constitutionalists, are blood of our 
blood, but very much less flesh of our flesh. They are so gentle, 
they are so soft that every raw breeze affects them unpleasantly. 
The Progressives are of a less sensitive nature; their energy dis-
tinguishes them from the others. 
A right-wing liberal accurately described his party as "moderate," the 
Progressives as "agitational." The Progressive party aimed to supply 
the political energy, stated the National Zeitung, which the "learned 
liberalism" of the Lower House lacked. The left-wing Volkszeitung of 
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Berlin distinguished between the Constitutionals and the democrats 
in a cruder way. After stating that both wished to establish a legal 
state and differed at most over the guarantees for it, the paper declared 
that the democrats vigorously demanded the legal state, whereas the 
Constitutionals requested it "with apparent submissive loyalty." Or 
as the same paper declared three days later, the von Vincke form of 
constitutionalism wished consciously to "swindle the prince out of his 
former rights," whereas the democratic party stated freely and openly 
its demands.4 
The opposition between the two liberal parties varied according to 
the traditional strength of the Constitutional group. In places like 
Halle, Magdeburg and Konigsberg, where the Constitutionals had oc-
cupied the leading role, they disliked the competition of a young, 
fresh, vigorous group and felt hurt and indignant at the accusation of 
lack of activity. They had local vested interests and social prestige 
to protect.5 Self-conscious about their superior experience and wis-
dom, they found reasons to object to many of the Progressives' acts. 
Even if the reasons seemed flimsy in actuality, they revealed that curse 
of a highly intelligent people learning the ways of practical politics, 
disagreement over methods and timing. They had to disagree or be 
swallowed by their more vigorous ally. One member of the party, 
Deputy Riedel, frankly said in a political meeting in Berlin that he 
had changed his stand from affirmative to negative on an amendment 
proposed in the Lower House because in the second instance a younger 
member, Freiherr von Hoverbeck, had introduced it. "It is not our 
custom," he said, "to support measures which are taken up by young, 
inexperienced members of the House."6 They suffered from personal 
antagonism toward the Progressives and, wrote Wilhelm Dilthey in 
May, 1862, from the illusion that they alone were capable of govern-
ing.7 They had great difficulty in swallowing their pride, and only the 
pressure of the reaction in 1862 induced them to do SO.8 The Con-
• Von Bernhardi, op. cit., IV, 75, 71; III, 278-79; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, 
Nov. 20, 1861; Wochenschrtft des Nationalvereins, April 17, 1863; Konigsberg Har-
tungsche Zeitung, Nov. 16, 1861; National Zeitung, June 12, 1861; Tagesbericht, No. 
60, March 12, 1861; ibid., No. 63, March 15, 1861. 
• See Volkszeitung, March 29, 1862, for a despatch from Magdeburg; ibid., April 
15, 1862 from Halle; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, April 10, 1862. 
• Despatch from Berlin to the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 29, 1861. 
7 Heyderhoff, op. cit., I, 89. 
• See the statements by the Constitutionals in Konigsberg in the Konigsberg 
Hartungsche Zeitung, Sept. 25, 1861, March 7, 1862. How unfortunate the intransi-
gent attitude seemed to the other liberal groups was made clear in an appeal to 
282 / Prussia 1858-1864 
stitutional party paper, the Stern Zeitung of Berlin, in April, 1862, 
blamed the failure on the part of the liberal factions to ally and to 
dam back the democrats not on "the well-tested leaders but on the 
younger, uncontrolled combative forces." The paper deplored the 
coalition which had begun in 1858 between the Constitutionals and 
the democrats, and accused the latter of having intentionally poisoned 
the liberal supporters of the Constitutional ministry and turned them 
into opponents.1I The Constitutional leaders were looking for a scape-
goat for their failure in the government.1O 
Since issues of such gravity for the future of Prussia and Germany 
were at stake, the Progressives had great difficulty in comprehending 
the instransigent stand taken by the Constitutionals. Fortunately for 
the cause of liberalism, the attitude remained confined to groups in a 
very few places. In towns like Stet tin and Breslau the news of the 
composition of the new Conservative ministry in 1862 led the Consti-
tutionals to drop their plans for a separate election campaign and to 
join forces with the other party.H Already in the preceding year the 
liberals of all parties had united their strength in the rural areas and 
in those urban centers where the Conservatives could muster sufficent 
votes to constitute a threat. The continuation of competition in 
elections between the Constitutional party and the Progressives was 
restricted to the larger cities and to those election districts where 
reactionary influence scarcely existed.12 Even the fact of their dis-
agreement revealed in those localities the general strength of liberalism. 
The Progressive party had advocated unity of action among the 
liberals from the beginning. When the liberals in the ministry were 
eliminated in 1862 and the government became composed exclusively 
of Conservatives, the force of events achieved what the Progressives 
alone had been unable to do. The four liberal fractions in the Lower 
House began in March, 1862, to meet together from time to time in a 
social way.13 A few weeks later there occurred a final rebellion. The 
the Constitutionals in April, 1862, by the election committee of the Progressive 
party in the election district Konigsberg-Fischhausen, ibid., April 2, 1862; see also 
Kolnische Zeitung, Oct. 12, 1863_ 
• Tagesbericht, No. 57, March 8, 1861. 
10 One Constitutional paper tried to find a social basis to distinguish the party, 
but the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung was unable to discover any proof for this 
view. See Parisius, Politische Parteien, p. 61; Tagesbericht, No. 66, March 19, 1861; 
Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, March 21, May 25, 1862. 
11 See Volkszeitung, March 22, 1862, on Stettin; Kolnische Zeitung, Sept. 21, 
Oct. 4, 1863, on Breslau. 
12 See National Zeitung, Dec. II, 1861; Kolnische Zeitung, Jan. 13, 1862. 
,. Kolnische Zeitung, March 5, 1862. 
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Grabow fraction, the current right-wing group of liberals, split into 
two groups over the question of cooperation with the Progressive party. 
The small minority under the leadership of that most difficult in-
dividualist, von Vincke, refused to accept the recommendation of 
Grabow in favor of cooperation and formed a separate fraction.14 The 
actual effect upon the political strength of the liberals was so slight 
as to be negligible. This kind of jealously was taken care of by the 
voters, who increasingly returned to the Lower House those persons 
able to unite with others against the hated government. 
Leadership, State and Local 
An analysis of state-wide and local leadership should afford in-
sight into the strength of liberalism in the population. The issues at 
stake between the liberals and the Conservatives involved the basic 
organization of society, that is, whether it should be that of caste, 
privilege and absolutism or that of freedom; and social and occupa-
tional interests were sufficiently uniform to enable one to gauge the 
attitude of these groups from the political affiliation of their leaders. 
The method of inference must be used with caution, for without 
additional information it would not suffice to establish the political 
alignmeRt of the social and occupational groups. It should work best 
for the industrialists, merchants, and bankers, those who were most 
aware of the value of liberalism and most eager to open new op-
portunities. It should be least effective in disclosing the attitude of 
the aristocracy and the handworkers, the groups that remained closest 
to the Old Regime. For insight on the politics of these two groups 
one must know whether they regarded the preservation of the old order 
as more important than the development of the new opportunities 
which liberalism would bring, a question more of choice of ideals than 
of occupational or social interest. In the case of the peasantry one 
needs to ascertain whether they had heard of the issues, whether they 
understood them, and whether they had enough freedom to dare to 
pursue their own interest. If one keeps these limitations in mind, 
however, information about the social and occupational bases of poli-
tical leadership should offer useful evidence on the attitude of the 
various groups in the conflict, 
The types of persons selected as deputies did reflect the changing 
structure of the population. In the two decades of the 1850s and 18608 
the rapid development of industrialism in the state added an in-
.. See Parisius, Palitische Parteien, pp. 54-55, 61; Kolnische Zeitung, May 26, 1862; 
Parisius, von Haverbeck, II, 47-48; von Bernhardi, ap. cit., IV, 194-95. 
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creasingly strong bourgeois element to the old society of the caste-
state. The bases for public leadership became diverse. Certain 
social groups and certain occupations which had supplied public guid-
ance under the regime of agrarianism and absolutism continued that 
function after a popularly elected parliament had been introduced. 
At the same time industrialism created the need for new types of public 
leaders; and by affording many new opportunities for individuals to 
rise in the social scale it began to provide the personnel for taking on 
these functions. In many cases the leaders reflected in varying ways 
and degrees both the Old Regime and the new industrial society; in 
others they represented one and not the other. The characteristics 
of a transitional period appeared in the diversity of criteria. 
The aristocracy continued to be expected to provide public leaders 
and did so. Accustomed to dominance in a society without a written 
constitution and a popularly elected parliament, they had over the 
members of the other classes the great advantage of traditional prestige 
and the habit of leadership. Their difficulty lay in the fact that in 
order to remain leaders they had to sacrifice their legal privileges and 
caste status and accept the principle of equality before the law. They 
had to become natural, useful leaders, depending for their position 
upon ability. While the liberal aristocrats were willing to do so, the 
Conservatives refused. Whether liberal or Conservative, the arist<r 
crats instinctively disliked seeking popularity and vying for votes, 
for these actions violated their standards of upper-class personality. 
Since the competition in politics had not advanced far enough by the 
1860s to require much of this kind of political behavior, members of 
the aristocratic class continued to be accepted and to serve as public 
leaders in politics while preserving many characteristics of the Old 
Regime. The unconscious assumption of social superiority toward the 
mass of voters and the preservation of a certain degree of dignified 
aloofness rather enhanced their prestige, provided they were willing 
to accept the principles of liberalism, to associate on a basis of equality 
with the leaders from the other classes, and to respect the dignity of 
even the little man. The public liked leaders whom they could respect, 
on whom they could rely, to whom they could defer. A good family 
name seemed to assure the necessary guarantee. Lacking experience 
in politics and not having as yet developed many new leaders in the 
Landtag's brief existence, the public turned to members of well-known 
aristocratic families for deputies. While they did not need to be equali-
tarian in social practice, they were expected not to adhere too rigidly 
to the aristocratic tendency toward subjectivity in political behavior 
or toward a highly personal attitude in political affairs. If they did, 
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as in the case of von Vincke, they lost standing and were subject to 
political defeat. They had to conform to the discipline necessary for 
political action. 
Among the lower classes, the burghers and workers of the towns and 
cities, the middle-class landowners, and the peasants, position in the 
social structure had relegated them by tradition to the role of subject 
or at most of local leader among social equals. They lacked the 
aristocracy's unselfconscious feeling of superiority in experience and 
wisdom. In the period under discussion, the urban industrial workers 
hardly exerted any political influence; they had not yet developed the 
strength of numbers and organization which a few years later enabled 
them to become politically impressive. They supplied no political 
leaders in the Landtag. The peasants were active only in the local 
elections and did not count as a source of potential state leadership. 
In contrast with the constitutional assembly in Berlin in 1848, not a 
single peasant was sent as deputy to the Lower House in the elections 
of 1862 and 1863, even though these elections were the most liberal 
of any between 1849 and 1918. The urban burghers and the land-
owners of middle-class or aristocratic origin supplied the state poli-
tical leaders for the lower classes and developed the new standards for 
political leadership and action in an industrial society. The needs of 
the institution of politics coincided with many of the basic middle-
class traits of character. The burghers were accustomed to a rational 
approach to problems, to compromise and other manifestations of 
mutual respect, and to action by a group. As contrasted with that of 
the aristocracy, their strength depended in addition to their intelligence 
and aggressiveness upon their large numbers and upon their ability 
to subordinate themselves to and to cooperate for the achievement 
of a common objective. Having to learn by experiment the ways 
which politics required of its practitioners, they made mistakes and 
did not always understand the nature of the new kind of activity; but 
they supplied the driving and creative force in it, and they had a more 
abiding interest in its successful development than the liberals among 
the aristocracy. 
The selection of political leaders depended far more upon occupa-
tion than it did upon the social class to which one belonged. In a 
society as bureaucratically organized as that of Prussia, social prestige 
varied to such a degree with occupation that the two could not usually 
be distinguished. Certain occupations of the Old Regime which had 
carried with them the expectation and responsibility of public leader-
ship continued to do so both in areas and among social groups remain-
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ing economically largely in the Old Regime and in those being trans-
formed by industrialism. The government official, the lawyer, the 
professor and school superintendent, the pastor or priest, the owner 
of large or middle-seized landed estate, the wholesale merchant-these 
occupations retained their prestige. To them the industrial society 
added the industrialist, the banker and insurance director, the news-
paper editor, and with the increase in scientific knowledge, the phy-
sician. Practically all the Landtag deputies of the New Era and the 
years of the constitutional conflict came from these occupations; many 
belonged as well to the aristocracy. A person like Schulze-Delitzsch, 
able to live by being what one may call a professional public leader, 
stood out as a rarity; even he had begun his career as a county judge. 
Not yet reached was the stage of development of modern industrial 
society when politics was a profession, when economic undertakings 
were large enough to enable certain members to concentrate on public 
relations and public service and to enter into political life as part of 
their jobs. 
An analysis of the data on the deputies in five Pruss ian political as-
semblies between 1848 and 1866 will show the relative prestige of the 
occupations for public leadership.15 The landowners and the govern-
ment officials, especially the justice officials, played the dominant role. 
Each of the other occupations, the professors, merchants and in-
dustrialists, even the retired officials and officers, provided a small 
number in proportion. Prussia remained, as it had been for two cen-
turies, a state led by landowners and government officials. These two 
groups merged, for the landowner usually had some official duties. 
The two groups had served absolutism loyally and diligently and had 
managed the subjects of the Hohenzollerns in the name of autocracy. 
They claimed to reflect whatever public opinion existed, to be the 
guardians of freedom and the exponents of responsible government, 
that is, of government responsible to them, who in turn would attend 
to the welfare of the King's other subjects. The majority of them had 
become liberal in the course of the Nineteenth Century and were by 
the 1860s assuming the leadership of the King's subjects in a new 
capacity and in a new way. The bureaucratic leader and the agrarian 
lord were being returned to the Lower House of the Landtag in 
popular election to represent the public. The two were adapting 
themselves to the changed conditions of society and the state; extra-
ordinary as it may seem, they were striving to transform the old state 
to See Appendix C. 
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and society in which they had ruled supreme under the King into a 
new state and society of liberalism and German national unity. 
From the beginning of the parliamentary history of the state the 
prussians were impressed by the advantage of having government 
officials serve as deputies. In October, 1849, Deputy Scherer had de-
clared in the Lower House that the officials enjoyed the confidence of 
the people, as one could see from the large number elected to the Land-
tag. Their theoretical and practical knowledge, he said, was indis-
pensable for law-making; without their aid the Lower House would 
often not know how to proceed. Certain officials were especially 
suited to be deputies, Scherer stated, namely, the administrative and 
the justice officials, "who through their direct and continuous contact 
with the people know and understand their needs best. I mention 
here for example only the Landrats and the justices of the peace."16 
Almost twenty years later, Windthorst, the Catholic leader in the 
Reichstag of the North German Confederation, expressed an identical 
opinion. "In the present stage of development of our social and pub-
lic conditions it is unthinkable," he said, "that all officials could be 
excluded" from the Reichstag. He estimated that about 190 officials 
held seats in the present assembly, and he regarded their participation 
as a healthy sign.17 
Not all government officials were equally available for election, for 
some were more dependent upon the ministry than others. Two 
categories should be distinguished, those in administration and those 
in justice. The former were subject to disciplinary action by the 
government; they could be transferred at will, from an interesting 
position in a town or city like Cologne with varied social and cultural 
opportunities to some monotonous work in a wretched garrison town 
in Posen. Or there were those who could be retired on half pay at 
::my time. Whatever their political sentiments, they usually stood in 
too great dependence on the government to act very often against its 
will, above all to become deputies and openly to oppose it. If they 
were Conservatives, they would enjoy official support in the elections 
of 1862 and 1863; but they could not win enough votes to be returned. 
Few openly became members of either the Progressive party or the 
Left-Center party; for apart from the fact that many were restrained 
by fear of government reprisal, they had largely been retained in office 
from the Manteuffel period and many were more or less opponents to 
,. Abg. H., St. B., Oct. 27, 1849, p. 908. 
17 Norddeutscher Bund,Reichstag, St. B., March 28, 1867, p. 425. 
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even the mildly liberal government of the New Era.I8 Among these 
administrative officials, the most likely ones for election as deputy, 
the Landrats, personified as a rule the characteristics of autocracy and 
caste which the liberals and democrats sought to abolish. They had 
had themselves elected to the Lower House during the Manteuffel 
regime and had constituted the bulwark of that reactionary rule. 
Even apart from their usually reactionary views, the administrative 
officials occupied a position which ill suited them for the role of elected 
representatives. "1£ the opposition especially were led by them," wrote 
Professor Bluntschli in his famous book Allgemeine Staatsrecht,I9 "the 
unity and authority of the governmental body would be damaged; if 
the ministry tried to support itself by them in the Chamber, the in-
dependence of the Chamber would be endangered. In times of vigorous 
struggle the voters would, therefore, do best as a rule to elect no ad-
ministrative officials outside the responsible ministers." Deputy Mathis, 
a member of the Constitutional party, favored making this class of 
officials ineligible for election as deputies. That the candidates and 
the voters were aware of this handicap may be seen from an 1861 elec-
tion appeal in Bielefeld to support the former judge and staunch 
liberal Waldeck. 
Do not let yourself be mislead by the illusion that an industrial-
ist would better represent your interests or that an administra-
tive official knows more accurately your needs.. Think of the 
many considerations which an administrative official has to 
think of when it is a question of opposing openly and freely the 
misdeeds of the bureaucracy, and do not forget how often in 
the recent past apparently liberal views in these circles have bow-
ed before superior influences. Elect Waldeck.20 
It would be wrong to conclude that a large percentage of the ad-
ministrative officials did not favor liberalism. In spite of government 
pressure to support the Conservatives, many bureaucrats showed in-
dependence and courage in openly aligning with the liberals, and a 
considerable number were elected as deputies. Far from having been 
drilled effectively in political docility, they seem to have been con-
vinced by the experience under the Manteuffel regime of the necessity 
of liberalism; and as soon as the government of the New Era relaxed 
control over their political behavior they emerged as champions of the 
18 Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 104; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Jan. 11, 
1862. 
18 4th ed. (Munich, 1864), I, 510. 
00 Abg. R., St. B., April 6, 1861; 1,652·53. National Zeitung, Jan. 1, 1861. 
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new ideals. Some of them possessed independent means, for example, 
Bockum-Dolffs, who was a big landowner and felt secure against any 
official coercion. Most, however, occupied positions of economic de-
pendence and felt compelled to gauge the degree of their public par-
ticipation in favor of liberalism by the attitude of the ministry. When 
the latter allowed such freedom, they worked for the liberal parties; 
when it called them to account, they grew cautious and outwardly 
reserved. The number willing to risk official punishment for the sake 
of principles, however, was so large that one may regard them as the 
heroes of this conflict. 
The justice officials occupied a different position. They enjoyed 
life tenure and were legally protected against official chicanery. They 
could act with independence; they had a distinguished tradition of 
preserving the laws and, whenever it became necessary, of resisting even 
the royal authority in defence of the law. The story of a judge's de-
fiance of Frederick the Great had become an essential part of Prussian 
folklore. The reactionary Berliner Revue might write in 1862 that 
this independence of the judiciary had become "a curse for our Father-
land"; but until Bismarck's breach of this tradition in 1864, the Prus-
sian government had on the whole respected the independence of the 
judges.21 
Among the judicial officials the county judge stood closest to the 
masses of the population. In a state which preserved the police 
authority of the Old Regime the duties of the county judge were 
necessarily wide. This official became acquainted with conditions in 
the area of his jurisdiction as no other one did, not even the Landrat. 
Into his court there came the everyday life, its difficulties, its prob-
lems, its hopes, its frustrations. He viewed it as a judge, seeking to act 
according to the law, and imposing a code of conduct based on general 
principles of equity. He had to understand the mentality of the peo-
ple with whom he dealt, those brought before his court, those who 
formed the society in which they lived. He saw them as they were, 
and he realized what they needed in order to become better social be-
ings. His intimate knowledge of the law enabled him to perceive how 
the government worked and to comprehend by experience in what 
respects the law should be changed for the welfare of the people. He 
lived and acted for and was responsible to the government and to the 
people at that crucial point where government and people might 
11 KOlnische Zeitung, April 29, 1862. See the statement in Parisius, von HoveT-
beck, J, 194, that the county judge was more iridependent than an Oberprlisident. 
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collide. He was able to look in both directions, to know what the one 
should do and what the other needed. His profession required careful 
training in abstract thinking, in thinking through and testing general 
principles by practical application. He had other criteria than the 
Landrat's standards of administrative utility, caste or class interest, and 
prejudice. He could not imitate the Landrat and other administrative 
officials in clearing his mind of some unfair or inhuman act by throw-
ing the responsibility upon the government or upon orders from his ad-
ministrative superiors; he had another criterion, the law, and another 
guide, his own conscience. He served as natural leader of the locality, 
a person whom one could respect and trust, a person thoroughly ac-
quainted with the locality and its needs, known to everyone, and in-
dependent of official or of any other kind of pressure. His liberalism 
reflected the wish to make his knowledge useful. The New Era opened 
the way to political activity, and he became one of the heroes of the 
constitutional conflict, fighting in the vanguard especially of the Pro-
gressive party. 
The county judge as a political leader aroused the severe criticism 
of some other liberals, particularly those to the right politically and 
those who prided themselves on their superior wisdom. The Constitu-
tional party leader from Konigsberg, von Simson, a judge of a higher 
court, complained in March, 1861, about the doctrinaire spirit of the 
county judges, of whom he said there were seventy-two in the Lower 
House. 
They wish to conduct politics acconiing to the articles of the 
legal code, and oppose the ministry in everything; whoever has 
relations with the ministry is an unreliable person to them ... 
for in their opinion they were sent here to control the ministry. 
That is their conception of parliamentary government, and they 
consider it their duty in all cases to oppose the government. They 
cannot go calmly to bed at night without the feeling of having 
attacked the ministry during the day.22 
Since von Simson supported the mildly liberal government of the New 
Era, his opinion scarcely partook of that judicious frame of mind ap-
propriate to one of his profession. The county judges understood 
the mood and wishes of the people far better than this gentlemen did, 
and they aimed to act as befitted representatives of the people, not as 
persons trying to humor the ministers, who in turn were trying to 
humor the ruler. The deputies were learning the ways of politics and 
making mistakes in methods and procedures; but they were also, as 
•• Von Bernhardi. op. cit., IV. 103. 
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another liberal crItIC, Professor von Sybel, was soon to discover, de-
fending principles, the bases of a free way of life; and they were doing 
so tenaciously. 
While the presence of such a large percentage of officials in the 
Lower House caused some complaint from both agrarian and industrial 
and commercial groups, the criticism did not assume any significance 
in political relations and party affiliations, and it did not affect the 
course of events. Except among the Conservatives, the use of politics 
as a major means of protecting or furthering special economic interests 
had not begun. The political issues involved the character of funda-
mental Prussian institutions, whether the country should preserve 
caste structure, autocracy and mercantilism or become liberal. Until 
these issues were settled, controversy among the liberals over repre-
sentation of economic interests could scarcely serve any purpose. Why 
quarrel over the proportion of occupational representation until one 
knew what authority, what role in the state the representatives would 
have? 
The criticism is nonetheless of value for understanding the social 
and occupational background of political activity of the period. In 
analyzing the composition of the Lower House elected in 1863, a 
writer in the Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift noted that the rural popula-
tion was under-represented. It constituted two-thirds of the people, 
he said, but not even one-third of the deputies consisted of landowners. 
The urban population predominated; but even in this element only 
some forty deputies actively engaged in business, while the others were 
government officials, teachers, professors, lawyers, physicians, and so 
on. The reasoning and reflecting elements in the population pre-
dominated, the writer stated, and he deplored the fact that the same 
persons approved the taxes as deputies and spent the money as officials. 
Nonetheless, he said, the Lower House was a truly representative body_ 
Although, he concluded, it would be an exaggeration to say that the 
entire people stood behind the House, a real and significant proportion 
gave it full support.23 
While the author of the analysis correctly judged the dominant 
driving force of the urban elements in the political struggle for a 
liberal society, the fact that agriculturalists constituted nearly one-
third of the Lower House and in number ranked only slightly behind 
the officials requires explanation. The conditions of their kind of 
life must have enabled them to assume this active political role. The 
23 Deutsche Vierteljahrschri/t, 1866, pp. 33-34, 37. 
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peasantry can be eliminated at once from consideration;· it provided 
no deputies. It lacked the political interest, the training, the self-
confidence, and the time to serve as deputy. A peasant felt that he 
had to concentrate on the cultivation of his piece of land, if he had 
any; and he was accustomed to leaving state affairs to the upper classes. 
The large and middle-sized landowners or cultivators of large rented 
holdings assumed the leadership of the rural population, whether 
Conservative or liberal, and were elected as deputies to the Landtag. 
Agriculture made them independent of government and enabled them 
to decide matters for themselves. The ruler and the bureaucracy could 
cause them social discomfort and many inconveniences, but could not 
deprive them of their economic self-sufficiency. The seasonal nature 
of agiculture enabled them to leave for several months to serve in the 
Lower House without suffering economic harm. In some cases their 
holdings were large enough to require the service of a manager, to 
whom responsibility could be given during their absence in the Land-
tag. They were accustomed to political activity and leadership in the 
county and provincial Landtags; and they felt responsible toward the 
rest of the population, especially the rural, for the protection and 
furtherance of common interests. They did not stop at rural affairs, 
however, but endeavored to concern themselves with the welfare of 
the state as a whole. They knew a good deal about government from 
having the responsibility for police and judicial matters in their 
locality. Since even in the late Eighteenth Century agriculture had 
begun to assume capitalistic methods, many of these agrarians had 
characteristics and interests in common with the capitalistic urban 
population. The community between the two groups had increased 
in the Nineteenth Century by the rapid turnover of landed property 
and its purchase by urban families who had turned agrarian. 
The industrial and commercial forces of the population showed a 
low percentage of occupational representation in the Lower House, 
a percentage which at the time expressed fairly accurately their num-
ber but which was out of proportion to their economic role in the state. 
As far as economic independence was concerned, they could withstand 
government pressure as well as the agrarians. Nor did the economic 
leaders suffer from lack of political knowledge and social self-con-
fidence. They had definite objectives in view, summed up in the term 
liberalism. They were accustomed to participating in town and city 
affairs, and for several decades they had been taking an increasing 
interest in state and national matters. As potential political leaders 
in the state they suffered from one serious handicap. Unlike the upper-
class agrarians, they had as a rule to attend constantly to their business. 
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The dynamics of capitalistic activity were particularly strong in these 
years of the 1850s and 1860s with the great expansion of industry and 
commerce, and to seize opportunities these persons had to remain 
closely at their business. The international crises, the Crimean War, 
the wars of Italian unification and the American Civil War, enhanced 
the uncertainty. The businessmen of sufficient prominence to be 
elected as deputies rarely had time to assume the responsibility. 
Even if the leading business personnel had felt free to serve as de-
puties, they would not have regarded themselves as exponents of 
special material interests; they would rather have worked for the estab-
lishment of legal conditions making possible the development of a 
liberal state and society. In this society industry and commerce would 
enjoy the advantages of freedom from the mercantilist state, and the 
middle classes would share the benefits of social equality and self-
government; but these would accrue to everyone in the entire state, 
and not merely to the industrial and commercial interests. Although 
in the last part of 1861 the Berliner Borsen Zeitung24 wished that more 
persons in commerce and industry would serve as deputies, the general 
attitude of business, expressed in a meeting of the merchants' associa-
tion in Konigsberg in July of that year, was that in view of the serious-
ness of the times a deputy representing the entire people was needed 
more than one to look after special business interests. Even at that 
early date business interests preferred to play an indirect role.25 
The popularity of the professor as a public leader had declined 
since 1848. Conditions had changed, and needs and experience had 
modified the conception of the kind of person to choose as deputy in 
the Landtag. A long editorial in the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung 
of October 30, 1861, described the characteristics of an able representa-
tive. He should have sound judgment about the general world situa-
tion, especially about the situation of the fatherland and the immediate 
tasks of legislation. He should possess a general knowledge of state 
finances and of the productivity of the people. He should have a good, 
all-round education and a general understanding of Prussian govern-
ment, but he should not be expected to be acquainted in detail with 
all the matters with which he would be called upon to deal. He could 
find plenty of experts to supply him with the special information. He 
should be firm and dependable in his views and never sacrifice prin-
.< Sept. 27, 30. 1861. 
··Ibid., July 24. 1861; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Dec. 17, 1861, Jan. 29. 
1862. Most of the deputies who took the initiative on economic affairs in the Lower 
House were newspaper men and officials. 
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ciples. Of course, he had at times to make concessions on points, but 
he should do so only for the purpose of furthering the implementation 
of his fundamental principles. The writer of the editorial had an 
entirely different kind of person in mind from the all-wise professor, 
the examiner of the Prussian people, the master of the classroom, the 
friend of pure ideals, the expert on everything. The writer was work-
ing toward a conception of a representative who should not personify 
what the people should be or do but who should represent what they 
were and what they specifically wished. The writer lacked the experi-
ence necessary to clarify this conception fully, but he showed remark-
able improvement over the thinking of 1848. That he stressed the 
importance of firm defence of principles reflected the actual needs of 
the situation. The political conflict between liberals and government 
involved differences of principle of the most fundamental kind. In 
such a time men of character were far more essential than persons of 
expert knowledge. 
In every period of parliamentary history some individuals per-
sonify the qualities which a representative should not have and some 
others display those which constitute the ideal type. As nearly as it is 
possible to select any individuals for these roles for the early 1860s one 
might choose Freiherr von Vincke to illustrate the first and Schulze-
Delitzsch the second. 
A Westphalian aristocrat and one of the most prominent liberal 
leaders in the New Era, von Vincke failed as a party or fraction leader. 
He split the party to which he belonged, and after having had great 
difficulty in obtaining a seat in 1862, he was defeated in the election 
in the next year. Stubborn and haughty, he had an exceptional faculty 
for transforming any minor difference of opinion into a moral issue 
and a personal affront. Heedless of political effect he was irascible, 
bold with words, easy in the use of irony and in denunciation, and 
quick to attack. His liberalism in principle was unquestioned. He 
had a reputation for being a leader of the people, an aristocrat who 
understood the peasant and defended the interests of the lower classes. 
He publicly attacked fellow aristocrats, democrats, or his own col-
leagues with the fury and the wealth of expression of his extraordinary 
mind. The National Assembly of 1848, Waldeck, anyone who opposed 
him received ample attention. He was too proud to ask anyone to 
vote for him and he refused to report to anyone on his actions as 
representative. In March, 1861, the Magdeburger Zeitung accused 
him of servility and erratic conduct. One day he praised Garibaldi 
and the Revolution, and the next day, it said, he put on his uniform 
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of the Order of St. John and appeared at a big political festival as a 
colleague of the Conservative. A year later after even more experi-
ence, the same newspaper drew up a balance sheet on von Vincke as 
follows. He was a crank who was incapable of being a party leader. 
H he had lived a hundred years earlier, he would have been a very 
liberal person. Unfortunately he was born too late. His father had 
praised the English for having already undermined the system of entail 
in the Fifteenth Century. Since 1848 the son had been fighting for the 
preservation of this aristocratic privilege in Prussia. His father be-
lieved in and practiced equality, whereas, said the paper, during his 
entire life the son had struggled unsuccessfully against his own Junker 
traits.26 
Von Vincke refused to cooperate with the Progressive party and 
split his own party over the issue. He was blamed by some for having 
misled the liberals at the beginning of the New Era into provisionally 
approving the money for the military reforms and for having thereby 
caused all the subsequent trouble. When the conflict broke out, so 
his critics asserted, he withdrew from politics and declared that his 
duties as guardian of minors were more important than those of Land-
tag deputy and party leader.27 As the Magdeburger Zeitung said, 
he remained an aristocrat of the age of caste and privilege, and his 
retention of the characteristics of that type in the period of political 
parties, parliaments, and the spreading social forms of liberalism 
doomed him to political failure. 
Heinrich Schulze had had in the course of time the name of his 
birth place, DeIitzsch, added to his name in order to distinguish him 
from the numerous other Schulzes to be found in Germany. The cus-
tom was not uncommon; it was applied to him of necessity as he be-
came famous. His family lacked any mark of distinction; but the 
social changes occurring in the two middle quarters of the Nineteenth 
Century offered him opportunities to rise in the world. After studying 
law he served as county judge and soon became interested in organizing 
cooperative associations for helping the handworkers to maintain them-
selves in the developing industrialism. Since participation as a demo-
crat in the Revolution of 1848 ruined any expectation of an official 
career, he devoted his energy to the cause of the cooperatives and to 
other forms of non-official public activity. His sympathy for the 
•• Tagesbericht, No. 62, March 14, 1861, summarizing an article in Allgemeine Zei-
tung, Berlin; No. 59, March II, 1861, quoting the Magdeburger Zeitung; Konigsberg 
Hartungsche Zeitung, June 1, 1862. 
27 Wochenschrift des National Vereins, May 2, 1867. 
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lower urban groups and his struggle by means of cooperatives to pre-
vent the handworkers of the lower middle class from succumbing to 
industrial competition and becoming proletariat endeared him to both 
handworkers and the developing bourgeoisie. The latter hoped that 
he had found the solution to this particular social problem and would 
overcome the threat of socialism. He wrote numerous articles and 
books, edited a journal, and earned a deserved reputation as a brilliant 
popular orator. The position which he developed for himself made 
him a point of contact between the upper and lower classes, between 
capitalism and the handicrafts, between the small town and even the 
village on the one hand and the city on the other. He was equally at 
ease and equally welcome and respected in the home of a small crafts-
man, a peasant, a wealthy industrialist, and an able and distinguished 
professor. His reputation spread over the state as that of an honorable, 
courageous friend of the people. 
Schulze-Delitzsch personified the ideals of liberal democracy, and 
he understood these ideals in their practical working and in their full 
social implications as almost no other Pruss ian leader did. His 
speeches and writings disclosed a mind which had thought through 
the democratic principles to their simplest elements. Among the many 
confused utterances of this highly verbal generation of liberals his 
assertions possessed the clarity and emotional conviction of a man who 
appreciated the meaning of his own words. In the early months of . 
the New Era the contrast between the precision of his views and the 
too often theoretical nature of those of his liberal colleagues, even 
the ablest and most learned, was striking. As the conflict with Bis-
marck grew in bitterness the liberals were forced to use Schulze's ideals 
as the logical conclusion of their position. They had to go beyond 
their own compromising or halfway views to the fundamentals of 
their ideal objectives. The fury of the battle with Bismarck and the 
sudden collapse of their defence in 1866 prevented them from corn-
prehending the full meaning of their ideological assertions, and many 
of them surrendered to Realpolitik. With Schulze-Delitzsch these 
democratic ideals, more akin to English liberalism than those of other 
Germans, had become too firmly embedded in his character for him to 
change. The surprising fact was that although his policies and ideals 
were far more liberal than those of most of his colleagues he enjoyed 
such wide popularity. In November, 1861, the National Zeitung of 
Berlin declared in an editorial that "today throughout the entire 
state from the East Prussian to the French frontier no name is more 
popular than that of Schulze-Delitzsch and no one is considered more 
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indispensable for the Lower House than he is." Needless to say, 
FreiheIT von Vincke did not agree with this estimate.28 
In discussing the subject of local political leadership among the 
liberals, one must distinguish among three types of situations, that in 
a rural community, that in an urban center with wide and diversified 
economic interests and relations, and that in a town which remained 
primarily dependent upon the economy of the surrounding rural area. 
The first type was to be found over most of the state, but particularly 
in the Central and Eastern provinces. The second type was most 
numerous in Westphalia and the Rhineland, but included towns and 
cities like Berlin in other provinces. The third type predominated in 
the Eastern provinces. The social composition of each entailed es-
sential distinctions in the nature of the political leadership. 
Rural life presented natural obstacles to the development of new 
political organizations and leadership which under existing conditions 
were almost insurmountable. The scattered distribution of the people 
and poor transportation facilities made it difficult to hold meetings for 
political discussion and agitation. Instead of election committees, as 
among the urban people, the rural communities depended for guid-
ance upon the traditional leaders. In the village the Schulze assumed 
the new role as an extension of his regular functions, and he carried out 
the responsibility of close personal rapport with the villagers in the 
same way as he did his other duties. The class consciousness of the 
rural population made it difficult for even a liberal landowner of the 
upper class to join peasants in any kind of equalitarian election com-
mittee; neither lord nor peasant would have felt at ease in such an 
organization, and both would have regarded it as superfluous. The 
upper classes in the rural areas lacked the diversity of interests and the 
actual numbers necessary to make a formal committee. 
The urban centers offered a situation favorable to the emergence of 
political leadership. The large numbers of voters, the complexity of 
interests involved, the habits of discussion, and the availability of 
instruments and personnel for political action made the conscious 
selection of leaders necessary and possible. The Constitutional party 
tended not to encourage the development of new local leadership; but 
the other liberal parties sought to arouse the initiative of local in-
dividuals in all occupational groups, except those like the day laborer 
•• National Zeitung, Nov. 22. 1861. See also the enthusiasm of Konigsberg liberals 
for him. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 27. 1861. Numerous other examples 
could be given. 
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and the industrial worker, who still lacked social and political sig-
nificance. 
The best evidence about the personnel of the local leadership can 
be seen in the membership of the election committees. Except for 
certain officials subject to direct government pressure, the lists con-
tained the names of the most prominent members of the community. 
They showed that in spite of the unwillingness of merchants and in-
dustrialists as a rule to take the time to serve as Landtag deputies, 
these groups devoted many hours of service to secure the election of 
liberals from their district and were actively concerned not merely 
with municipal affairs but with problems of state and national life. 
The lists also included the names of numerous officials, judicial, and 
administrative, and those in such fields as education. They revealed 
that the dominant influence lay with the economic upper bourgeoisie 
but that associated with them were the other local middle-class leaders, 
the newspaper editors, the professors and teachers, the doctors and the 
lawyers. Although furnishing some personnel for the local committees, 
the handworkers lacked the power and drive of their wealthy col-
leagues. 
In the Western provinces of the Rhineland and Westphalia the 
division of function in the economy had progressed sufficiently by the 
1860s for the main lines of the society of industrialism to appear. Urban 
centers had become so plentiful and large that the population of 
numerous towns no longer depended mainly upon the immediate rural 
neighborhood for their market and the source of their supplies and 
income. The expansion of economic interest beyond the locality or 
immediate region had been accompanied by a growing social differenti-
ation and the establishment of political organizations predominantly 
or exclusively for the urban population. The rural people assumed a 
secondary role. They tended to look to the urban centers for guidance 
and initiative; and while they cooperated with their more aggressive 
urban compatriots, they did so in the position rather of a follower than 
ora group of comparable or equal political interest and influence. In-
dustrialists, bankers, insurance directors appeared as political leaders 
in the locality and province along with the traditional merchants. 
With increasing industrialization, the professions became specialized 
and assumed new functions. The lawyer in particular appeared more 
and more as the exponent of industrial interests, frequently in the 
capacity of public representative, of secretary or executive head of an 
organization set up t9 further certain interests. Government officials 
assumed much less significance as public leaders than in those prov-
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inces where industrialism had not yet broken into the old structure of 
society. Where an election committee for a province was established, 
the owners or managers of .large landed estates hardly figured at all. 
An analysis of the structure of a few election committees will 
illustrate the political significance of the occupational changes in 
Westphalia and the Rhineland. The liberal election committee of 
Dortmund called a meeting of political leaders of the province for the 
purpose, among others, of discussing the advisability of creating an 
election committee for the entire province. The meeting, held at 
Hamm early in November, 1861, approved the proposal and selected a 
committee composed of five lawyers, two other professional persons, 
one school director, three justice officials, one former administrative 
official, one estate-owner, one physician, three merchants, one sur-
veyor, and five industrialists.29 At about the same time an election 
committee was created in Mulheim and Siegburg which consisted of 
one estate-owner, one teacher, one justice official, one physician, three 
industrialists, and two city councillors. At Dusseldorf, a similar com-
mittee contained a more diversified personnel-two painters, one writer, 
one editor, one director of an institute, one watchmaker, one apothe-
cary, one estate-owner, one innkeeper, one justice official, one director, 
one retired colonel, four merchants, nine industrialists, two lawyers, 
two other professional persons, and one with no occupation listed. 
Others were added later. In Cologne the local committee included 
three city councillors, one of whom was a prominent textile manu-
facturer, two justice officials, one gymnastics teacher, one director, one 
banker, one master tailor, two lawyers, one assessor, one writer, one 
bookseller, two merchants, and one without a profession listed. Of 
the membership on all these committees, only four belonged to the 
nobility-a director, a retired colonel, an industrialist, and an estate-
owner.so 
The campaign in 1863 aroused much more bitterness throughout 
Prussia than any preceding one and caused the liberals of all shades 
to unite in opposition to the government. At Halle in September a 
large liberal committee was organized for the elections. The personnel 
indicated the occupational spread of the liberal groups. It contained 
one banker, one brewer, eleven merchants, ten industrialists, two city 
councillors, three justice officials, one lawyer, two other professional 
•• National Zeitung, Nov. 6, 1861. 
30 National Zeitung, Nov. 14, 5, 10. 1861. City councillors were in every town 
usually prominent businessmen or persons closely related to busines. 
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persons, one confectioner, one bookseller, five professors, one master 
saddle maker, two millers, one agriculturalist, a master cabinetmaker, 
five local officials, one mining official, one owner of a printing estab-
lishment, one retired official, one landscape gardener, one director, two 
estate-owners, two owners of noble estates, one rentier, and twO for 
whom no occupation is given. Of this group, one person belonged 
to the nobility. 
For Berlin the urban pattern was revealed clearly in the personnel 
of the election committees for each of the four electoral districts and 
substantiates the conclusions drawn with respect to the Western pro-
vinces. As the capital of the state, however, Berlin showed a certain 
distribution of occupational emphasis which was lacking elsewhere. 
The importance of the capital as a center for news enhanced the poli-
tical role of the press and of newspaper editors; at the same time it 
offered opportunities for persons to live by serving private organiza-
tions intended for public purposes. Hence the Berlin election com-
mittees contained representatives of these two occupations to a greater 
extent than elsewhere. If in the industrial cities of the West the 
executive secretary or public relations expert for economic associatio~s 
was appearing as a type, in Berlin the same kind of person was be-
ginning to find an occupation with a wider variety of associations than 
economic ones. Berlin also offered a third type of public figure, the 
retired official who now stayed in public life by means of political 
activity, the town councillor and other persons who were beginning to 
make a career of public life. 
The membership of the election committees of the Progressives and 
center or left liberals in Silesian towns and cities varied from that in 
the Western provinces. It included, relatively speaking, more mem-
bers of the older occupations, merchants and handicraftsmen, and fewer 
industrialists. Nonetheless, all the important occupational groups 
found representation on these committees. The merchant particularly 
remained the prominent leader. At Gorlitz in July, 1861, the election 
committee contained twenty-three members-one master coppersmith, 
one agent, one estate-owner, one cloth manufacturer, one engineer, one 
lawyer, one gold worker, one watchmaker, four town councillors who 
were usually prominent merchants or industrialists, one merchant, one 
factory owner, one justice official, one iron merchant, one master 
carpenter, one Economic Commission Councillor, and four editors. 
A few months later a committee in Liegnitz number~d three noble 
estate-owners, a banker, a schoolmaster, and two without occupation 
given. Two members belonged to the nobility. Of the noble estate-
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owners one had the rank of Freiherr, another also belonged to the 
nobility, and the third had the title of lieutenant. For Breslau the 
committee in April, 1861, contained a lawyer, three merchants, a 
physician, a non-conformist preacher, and two whose occupation was 
not listed. By November the membership had changed and consisted 
of a lawyer, three merchants, an editor, a banker, an accountant, a 
master furrier, and a bricklayer.31 
The committees organized in East Prussia expressed the pre-
dominant significance of commerce and agriculture, and the inter-
dependence of these two economic activities. Relations between town 
and country had to be close, for, except in a very few coastal cities, in-
dustry had hardly begun to emancipate the towns and cities from 
major dependence upon the locality. The committees were fre-
quently dominated by rural agrarian leaders instead of townsmen. 
Government officials constituted the third element of leadership. In 
the committee for Niederung county in 1861 the relationship is clear 
-two justice officials, three estate-owners, a lawyer, and one other 
professional person .. Not a single member belonged to the nobility. 
The committee for the rural counties of Insterburg and Gumbinnen 
showed a different occupational interest, but the same dominant posi-
tion of agrarians-a master bricklayer, a merchant, a justice official, a 
schoolmaster, and six agrarians. The difference between the occu-
pational makeup of the committee for these predominantly rural 
counties and the one for the electoral district composed of Konigsberg 
and Fischhausen counties grew out of the location of the city of 
Konigsberg in the latter. Commerce and the university received places 
on the committee which lent it a distinctly urban character. In-
dustrialists were absent from it, while handworkers played a con-
siderable role. The membership of the committee reflected the eco-
nomy and society of the pre-industrial period. On the committee 
there served in May, 1862, two town councillors, (one retired), a bank 
director, six estate-owners, one estate-renter, two professors, a consul 
(which means that he was also a merchant), a master cabinetmaker, 
a lawyer, a master shoemaker, four merchants, a master bricklayer, 
two physicians.32 
Although not as selective as in the case of the election committees, 
further evidence about local leadership may be gained from an analysis 
31 National Zeitung, July 23, Oct. 10, Nov. 23, 1861; Polizei·Bericht, Breslau, April 
15, 1861. 
II Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Sept. 4, July 27, 1861. 
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of the occupational compositIOn of the electors. The membership 
varied according to the nature of the economy in the same way as did 
that of the election committees. While it is impossible to differentiate 
between those who voted liberal and those who voted Conservative, 
the fact that persons of certain occupations were chosen as electors has 
some bearing on the question of the occupational distribution of poli-
tical interest and prestige. 
Judging from samples of urban and rural areas in the East, West, 
and Center of the state, the electors represented the main groups of the 
voters even more accurately than the committees did. Only those of 
the lowest income, such as the day laborers in both town and country, 
were usually lacking. At the election of April, 1862, in one district 
in the Western provinces, the voters chose among the 460 electors 222 
from trade and industry, sixty-four handworkers, twenty-two military, 
twenty rentiers, seventeen brewers, fourteen advocates, thirteen inn-
keepers, twelve administrative, judicial, and city officials, nine phy-
sicians, five apothecaries, one pastor, one teacher, one writer, and three 
lawyers. The dominant influence lay with the business representatives; 
the handicrafts ranked a poor second, and the other occupations show-
ed such a scattered return as to be relatively unimportant.33 At the 
Eastern end of the state the counties of Konigsberg and Fischhausen 
chose electors in keeping with the character of the area. Of a total of 
704 electors elected in 1862, 402 were re-elected, and 302 were new. 
The electors were composed of 153 handworkers and tradesmen, 103 
merchants, 258 estate-owners, landowners and rentiers, six inn or 
tavern keepers, thirty-two physicians, apothecaries, writers, booksellers, 
printers, artists, thirteen agriculturalists, ten apprentices and workers, 
fifteen teachers, eleven pastors, twenty-two communal officials, eighty-
one royal officials and military personnel.34 In this area where agri-
culture and commerce predominated, where apart from Konigsberg 
the towns remained small and largely rural in character, one would 
rightly expect merchants, handworkers, and agrarians to show the 
largest number of electors. Nonetheless, the size of the group of officials 
and military personnel is impressive evidence that in this region the 
old structure of society-merchant, handworker, agrarian, and official 
and officer-remained in control. 
Berlin, as the capital and the largest city in the state, revealed in the. 
occupational spread of its electors the rapid change into industrial 
.. Kolnische Zeitung, May I, 1862 . 
.. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, May 4, 1862. 
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society. Among the electors chosen in 1863 were some 550 merchants, 
240 industrialists, seventeen brewers and distillers, three bankers, 
forty-three listed as city councillors, who were most likely also 
prominent in the same fields, and 325 handworkers. The last-named 
igure is undoubtedly misleading, for many handicrafts had already 
begun to assume capitalistic proportions-the building industry, cloth-
ing, furniture, and other industries exploiting the market provided by 
a large concentrated population-and they must be classed with the 
industrialists and merchants. The attractiveness of Berlin as a 
residence accounts for the 125 rentiers and the eleven estate-owners, 
and 150 officials would not be an excessive number for a city of 
bureaucrats. That 120 physicians, apothecaries, and assistants in the 
field of health should have been politically active points to the op-
portunities in the city for members of these professions and to their 
characteristic interest in politics at this period, not merely in Prussia 
but in other countries. When added together, the number of teachers, 
professors, doctors of philosophy, writers, editors, artists, booksellers, 
and publishers chosen as electors seems unusually large. They totaled 
almost 200, a showing that could not be equaled even on a propor-
tionate scale in any other city in the state.35 
By way of comparison, the electors in the villages and in rural areas 
in general consisted of peasants, Schulzes and the owners or renters of 
landed estates. The estate-owners and other agrarians were elected and 
served along with the representatives of the inferior and more num-
erous lower class. A teacher, a pastor, or handworker frequently served 
for the rural community in the same capacity. 
Affiliated Organizations 
In May, 1860, the Prussian police received a report from one of its 
secret agents about a discussion among guests in Habel's Restaurant 
on Unter den Linden, Berlin. The guests had spoken at length about 
the establishment of ever more political and other Vereins not merely 
in Berlin but throughout Germany. The agent reported: 
It was said that if the relevant officials do not soon restrict 
this activity entirely or at least somewhat and particularly do not 
observe and control it more carefully, Germany will in a few 
years have another revolution. The present-day youth, especial-
•• See A. M. Hayn, Die Abgeordneten-Wahl fur Berlin am 28. Okt., 1863 mit der 
Nachwahl im 1. Wahl·Bezirk am 16. Nov., 1863 (Berlin, 1863). Preuss. Geh. Staats· 
archiv·Dahlem. Pro Br. Rep. 30, Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, W. 178. 
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ly, is being totally corrupted by these associations, for there is an 
almost incredible rage ... to become a member of some associa-
tion. Almost daily, for example, here in Berlin little clubs are 
being formed under some favored name in beer halls, private 
residences, even in schools which, although they seem to be 
harmless, may become dangerous to the state.36 
The report did not exaggerate the vogue. About a year later 
(March 21, 1861) a writer to the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung 
from the little town of Gumbinnen in East Prussia doubted whether a 
Schiller Verein could be established there because of the large number 
of Vereins already in existence. Handworker Verein, Gesang-Verein, 
National Verein, Charity Verein, Orphan Verein, Credit Verein, Peace 
Verein, Gustavus Adolphus Verein, Agricultural Verein, Bible Society, 
Town Club, lodges, and other Vereins already existed. The article 
spoke of "a certain Verein satiation." 
Except for the economic ones, the list contained the names of the 
typical associations for all Prussia. The New Era produced in every 
field of activity organizations which strove to spread over all Germany 
and to supply the popular basis for political unification and liberalism. 
Within a decade after the Revolution of 1848 the population sought 
forms for the expression of its wishes which would a second time be 
effective. It created them in religion, education, politics, cultural and 
social affairs and economics. In Prussia, although to a varying extent, 
people from all classes and occupations participated. The towns-
people took the lead, but many burgher and aristocratic agrarians with 
large estates joined the movement, and even handworkers and peasants 
participated as much as they could. The only groups lacking were the 
Conservative aristocrats and their followers, numerically a small minor-
ity. While most Vereins were unable to exert much influence upon state 
action, they did express the longing of the popular masses. In the case 
of certain economic associations, the Pruss ian and the German Com-
mercial Associations, the Congress of German Economists, the various 
organizations of mining interests, of iron and steel, and of other special 
interests, the power controlled by them had to be respected even by 
the Prussian government. 
The new stir and movement in national public life originated in 
North and Central Germany, that is, in Germany north of the Main. 
The drive was associated primarily with the expansion of industrial 
and commercial activity in the 1850s, the establishment of banks, the 
a. Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94. Lit. 7. 
377, Vol. II. 
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construction of railroads. and the creation of insurance companies. 
It was accompanied by a rise in prices. pardy the effect of the in-
creased amounts of gold available from California. and was manifested 
in an outburst of entrepreneurial spirit and optimistic speculation. 
The new forces were getting well under way when the commercial 
crisis of 1857 struck them and made clearer than ever before that 
golden opportunities were at hand if only. in Prussia. the bureaucratic 
state would drop its social and mercantilist paternalism and grant the 
private economic interests the freedom to take the initiative. All the 
demands or objectives of all the associations merged in liberalism and 
national unity. 
The organizations provided essential means by which liberal persons 
of various classes and occupations could participate actively in public 
affairs. Membership enabled individuals to work for liberalism and 
nationalism without having to run the risk of joining a political party. 
The organizations concentrated on building a liberal society as a 
necessary foundation for liberal politics. They all opposed common 
enemies, absolutism and the conservative society of the Old Regime, 
monarchy by divine right, feudal aristocracy, caste and privilege, and 
state particularism. As we have seen, the freedom of the individual 
entailed the rise in importance of each person; with each person free, 
active. conscious of his own worth, able to take the initiative, the feel-
ing of nationalism would grow, the feeling of the importance of the 
nation as a brotherhood of intelligent. alert, self-reliant individuals 
united by the common national bond. The unification of the nation 
would have to follow from the pressure of these free individuals; the 
enemies of national unity, the same enemies as those of liberalism, 
would be compelled to give way. 
The close relationship between these organizations and the Prussian 
political parties or fractions was substantiated at both the highest level 
of leadership and at the lowest. The prior existence of these non-party 
organizations made it possible for the political parties and faction~ of 
the New Era to build upon them and to become strong quickly. The 
Progressive party actually grew out of the Pruss ian units ofthe National 
Verein. The name "Progressive," already being used by new political 
groups in other states, had been sponsored and popularized by the 
Verein. The addition of the name "German" to the title of the Pro-
gressive party in Prussia was suggested by the same source and attested 
to the growing respectability and prestige of such a revolutionary act. 
A few examples from localities in different areas of Prussia will 
show the value of the organizations to liberal politics. They pertain 
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primarily to the two most active political groups, the Progressive and 
the Left-Center, but even the Constitutional party members took an 
active interest in the organizations and, although to a lesser extent, 
shared the benefits of their work. In the small town of Pillau in the 
far northeast corner of Prussia the local members of the National Ver-
ein met late in July, 1861, and in preparation for the next election to 
the Lower House agreed to establish a local election committee which 
by co-optation should expand into a committee for the entire county. 
Two months later the meeting of the National Verein, after discussing 
the forthcoming elections, decided to draw up a list of candidates for 
electors in Pillau.37 At Danzig the local members of the National 
Verein in February, 1861, sent thanks to the forty-two deputies in the 
Lower House who had voted for the liberal Stavenhagen Amendment.3s 
In July of the same year the Danzig conference of the National Verein 
of the provinces of Prussia, Pomerania and Posen approved almost un-
animously the program of the Progressive party and involved itself 
further in politics by passing, among others, two resolutions,39 one in 
favor of electing to the Landtag men who would work for national 
unity, the other in favor of the complete transformation of the Upper 
House. In September the local members of the National Verein in 
Danzig agreed that it was time to begin activity for the election of 
deputies to the Lower House, but they thought it advisable to consider 
the matter in a special meeting called for that purpose.40 
In Elbing the Economic Congress,41 instead of the National Verein, 
. played the political role. Deputy von Forckenbeck reported to the 
Congress in February, 1861, about the split in the von Vincke fraction 
in the Lower House. A year later the Congress concentrated upon the 
consideration of the matters before the Lower House, became entirely 
political in its interests, and discussed in some detail the liberal legis-
lation before the Landtag. It was educating the local pop'ulation in 
political affairs. The next month it laid plans for the campaign for 
the elections to the Lower House. As the report of the meeting stated, 
"We are sufficiently well organized to be able by the activity of our 
trustworthy associates in the smaller centers to compensate at present 
for the lack of mass activity."42 That is to say, the Economic Congress 
'7 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Aug. 2, Sept. 17, 1861. 
•• Tagesbericht, No. 46, Feb. 23, 1861, from Volkszeitung . 
•• National Zeitung, July 30, 1861; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, July 28, 1861. 
40 Ibid., Sept. 14, 1861. 
.. This was the regional unit of the Congress of German Economists . 
•• Tagesbericht, No. 44, Feb. 21, 1861, based on Neuer Elbinger Anzeiger, No. 
1679; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Feb. 9, March 18, 1862. 
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supplied the organization and the contacts for conducting the political 
campaign. Deputy von Forckenbeck participated in the meeting and 
delivered a speech defending his and his party colleague's action in the 
Landtag. 
In the counties Osterburg and Stendal in the Altmark, according 
to an article in the National Zeitung of December 11, 1861, the activity 
of the members of the National Verein had been mainly responsible 
for breaking the domination of the Conservatives and returning liberal 
deputies by a large majority. At Halle the local members of the same 
organization passed a resolution in August, 1861, which manifested the 
interdependence of the program of the National Verein and of the 
liberal political movement in Prussia. Goerlitz and Breslau in Silesia 
were centers of similar endeavor: the National Verein took a vigorous 
part in politics and campaigned for liberals. In Breslau it included 
as members persons belonging to the Progressive party and to the 
Constitutional party; on national affairs, the two could cooperate. At 
Elberfeld on October 6, 1861, Schulze-Delitzsch spoke to about 800 to 
900 members and friends of the National Verein on the relation of 
the members of that association to the election. He advised against its 
taking the campaign actively in hand, but he said that participation 
of its members in the election campaign was "natural and necessary," 
and he defended the program of the Progressive party as a coalition of 
democratic and constitutional members of the Lower House. In near-
by Dortmund the Navy Committee actually transformed itself in 
October, 1861, into an election committee with a full-fledged liberal 
program.43 
Almost every organization in the towns and cities became a center 
of politics in support of liberalism. At Magdeburg late in 1861 the 
Conference of Elder Merchants heard one of its members, a deputy 
in the Lower House, emphasize how absolutely necessary it was for 
more merchants, industrialists, and other businessmen to be elected 
to the Lower House than heretofore; for, he said, the most important 
business was transacted in committees and more experts in economic 
affairs were needed.44 
The town and city councils, composed of elected representatives, 
and the Biirgervereins extended their activity into politics, not merely 
•• National Zeitung, Aug. 22, 1861; Tagesbericht, No. 56, March 7, 1861, from 
Breslauer Zeitung, No. 109; Volkszeitung, March 19, 1862; National Zeitung, Sept. 20, 
1861; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 11, 1861; National Zeitung, Oct. 12, 
1861. 
.. Berliner Borsen.Zeitung, Dec. 5, 1861. 
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by passing resolutions in support of the Lower House against the King 
and the government but by furthering the election of trustworthy 
deputies. The meetings of the councils offered excellent opportunities 
for discussing election matters and planning the campaign. A few 
examples may be chosen from many. The council in Unna, a small 
town in Westphalia, called a meeting of the local citizens in January, 
1862, at which it was decided to organize a Biirgerverein for the dis-
cussion of political and communal affairs. At Stralsund the local 
Biirgerverein, which in 1848 had opposed the Revolution and had since 
then kept free of political discussion, in 1861 changed its policy and its 
views and by an overwhelming majority became a supporter of the 
Progressive party. Two of its oldest directors resigned from the Verein 
in consequence; but the vote in the Verein of Il5 to 39 in favor of the 
Progressive Landtag candidate could not be changed by such an act. 
At Magdeburg the Biirgerverein invited the two deputies in Berlin 
to speak to it about the developments in the Landtag.45 
In Ravensberg the liberals founded a Culture Verein which sought 
to spread information and enlighten people in all classes of society 
"in a liberal sense." This type of Verein became popular as a means 
of educating the public in the new ways of constitutional government, 
of keeping it informed about state affairs and of having an effective 
means of exerting influence in a liberal direction. In Breslau in 1861 
the leading citizens organized a Verein of Supporters of the Constitu-
tion with III members. In Dortmund a similar one, called "Progress," 
was intended to discuss political questions at regular meetings and 
especially to follow the debates in the Landtag. At Bonn, one took the 
name of Constitutional Verein.46 
One of the most effective and widespread centers of political life 
proved to be the Stadtische Ressource, a social club for the middle 
class, found usually in every town and city. As an organization already 
in existence, it offered opportunities for the citizens, ostensibly as-
sembled for social purposes, to talk politics, to hear speeches supposed-
ly of a non-political character, and to plan steps in favor of liberalism. 
The one in Breslau may be used as an example. The police reported 
•• Tagesbericht, No. 26, Jan. 31, 1862, citing Westfiilische Zeitung, No. 26; see 
also National Zeitung, June 3, 1863; J. Stein, Geschichte der Stadt Breslau im 19. 
Jahrhundert, pp. 603-04; Tagesbericht, No. 34, Feb. 10, 1862, citing Kolnische Zei-
tung, No. 39; Tagesbericht, No. 53, March 4, 1862, Magdeburger Zeitung, No. 52 . 
•• Tagesbericht, No. 20, Jan. 24, 1862, citing Elberfelder Zeitung, No. 24; Polizei-
Bericht, Breslau, Feb. II, 1861; Tagesbericht, No. 22, Jan. 27, 1862, citing West-
fiilische Zeitung, No. 22; Tagesbericht, No.1, Jan. 2, 1862, citing Kolnische Zeitung, 
No.1. 
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to the government in March, 1860, that the Stadtische Ressource 
formed, together with the Morgen Zeitung, the center of democratic 
endeavor in Breslau. With 383 members it had recently begun to ex-
pand its activities by petitions and addresses. It had passed a resolu-
tion in favor of joining the National Verein and sent it to the Landtag 
deputies from Breslau; it had signed a petition supporting Italian uni-
fication, another advocating the abolition of the reactionary school 
law, another defending the limitation of military service to two years, 
another for complete freedom of occupation. The next year it organ-
ized a political election committee, which entered into combination 
with the Verein of Supporters of the Constitution to aid the National 
Verein and to prepare for the elections. In March, 1861, it listened to 
an address by Pastor Hofferichter in which that worthy divine showed 
on the basis of history that empires had been hostile to the idea of 
nationality and that Germany must give up the dream of Charlemagne. 
and create a German kingdom of German people alone.47 
The Stadtische Ressource, on the liberal side in politics, was often 
the strongest, the oldest, the most respected of local organizations. Its 
membership included every middle-class citizen of significance in the 
urban population. The organization was difficult for the police to 
control. Its respectability and dignity scarcely invited espionage and 
police raids. If the members discussed political matters and laid poli-
tical plans, who was to censor or effectively to forbid them? When 
the leading citizens of an urban community became actively liberal and 
opposed the government, the latter found it extremely difficult to treat 
them like communists or the revolutionists of 1848. They were not 
single radicals or small groups with which the community was out of 
sympathy; they constituted the responsible, directing intelligence in-
dispensable to the locality and to the state. The government had not 
found adequate new means of controlling them, and the old means 
of autocracy and mercantilism no longer sufficed. 
About the middle of 1860 the Berlin police received the following 
report from one of its secret agents: "I recently heard a leader of the 
democrats say: 'If the reactionary party knew what a power we are 
developing for ourselves in the gymnastic and singing Vereins, one 
which can be used against it at any moment, it would not rest until 
the last of these Vereins was abolished: ... And so it is in factI Every 
•• See Tagesbericht, Nos. 58, 59, March 9, 11, 1861; Polizei-Bericht, Breslau, March 
12, Aug. 27, Nov. 5, 19, Dec. 5, 17, 1860; Zeitungs-Bericht fur ]uli-August, 1860, 
Marz-April, 1861, Regierungs-Bezirk, Breslau. 
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newly established Verein (and in all areas, even in the rural ones, 
there is a veritable mania for founding Gymnastic and Rifle and Fire-
Defence Clubs) provides the democrats with new manpower .... "48 
The police agent no doubt reproduced accurately in his report the 
belief of many Germans. So far as speeches and other forms of verbali-
zation were concerned, the Vereins did participate in the spread of 
liberalism. They were organized and directed in a liberal way, and 
by keeping in close touch among themselves and especially with the 
National Verein, they served as popular channels for the new ideals. 
While especially devoted to the objective of national unification they 
had of necessity to be involved in the work of achieving liberalism with-
in Prussia as a requisite change for the other. While not supposed to 
participate in politics, they could not keep away from that subject, 
and their work helped to account for the victory of liberal deputies in 
the Landtag elections. This type of organization had a long history in 
Germany and was regarded as eminently respectable. 
The Berlin police received a secret report about the Main Valley 
Sangerfest in September, 1859. Although no one of any importance 
from North Germany was present and the agent noted no unusual oc-
currences, the police wished to be informed. The number in at-
tendance, 1,200 singers and 20,000 to 25,000 visitors, was unusually 
high. The singers came from the "educated middle class" and also 
from the workers, but numerous rural people were also present. In 
addition to the entertainment those present engaged in "excited poli-
tical discussion" which concerned itself with one topic, "National 
Party, reform of the Diet, unity under Prussia's leadership."49 Two 
years later, the Festival of North German Singing Societies held in 
Bielefeld invited Deputy Waldeck to speak. For two hours he ad-
dressed the singers on the policies of the Progressive party.50 The 
relation between music and politics could hardly be closer. When local 
admirers wished to pay tribute to a leading Ruhr industrialist active in 
liberal politics, they serenaded him. The German liberals had found 
a safe kind of political activity: they sang. 
Although it might be supposed that the Rifle Clubs had more 
importance in politics, in reality they proved to be similar in nature 
to other such groups, expansive in hopes, strong in words and weak 
48 Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30 Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. 
T. 102, Vol. II . 
•• Preuss Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. 
D.335. 
5. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Aug. 3, 1861. 
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in deeds. The German Rifle 4ssociation, organized in July, 1861, as 
a means of furthering national unification, declared its purpose to be 
the fraternity of all German riflemen, the improvement in the art of 
rifle shooting and the increase in the defensive power of the German 
people.51 How important the Rifle Association considered itself may 
be gathered from the report of its first big festival published in the 
Wochenschrift des National Vereins (No. 119, 1862), an account 
which the Pruss ian police thought worthy of preservation. 
One must have experienced the enthusiasm which from the 
twelfth to the twenty-second of July surged through the free city 
of Frankfurt. One must have been moved and gripped by that 
inexpressible mood which for ten full days ruled the meeting 
place, the rifle range and the festival hall, in order to be able to 
speak of the significance and expressiveness of this first German 
federal rifle festival. This was not merely a shooting contest, 
although the guns were shot a half-million times, nor was it 
merely a spirited contest, although the prizes of honor, estimated 
at a value of 150,000 Gulden, most of them ennobled by artistic 
hands, were worthy of the sweat of a knight. Nor was it merely 
a festival where tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands 
banqueted, drank, and celebrated. It was all this together, but 
it was more; it was a great national act and the consciousness of 
this national act. 
It is not true that the movement for improvement in which 
we have all worked since 1858 depends on the graciousnessofany 
single person. The fool's fancy that "The Lord has given, the 
Lord has taken away" is not true. On the contrary, the revival 
roots in the people; the people themselves have taken affairs in 
their own hands and to all the other demonstrations of our folk 
spirit, the Singing Societies, the Gymnastic Vereins, the economic 
parliaments, they have added the concluding, the crowning 
movement: the German shooting festival. It befits this demon-
stration, which signifies the initiative of the people in popular 
arming and military training, that it should be made in the most 
ceremonious manner possible. It has been held in this manner, 
and the nation owes the free city of Frankfurt the heartiest 
thanks for having preserved the honor of the German people so 
nobly and for having staged this national act in the worthiest 
way. 
When the guests arrived at the festival they found that a storm had 
blown down their hall. They set immediately to work in fraternal 
spirit to rebuild it and within a day or two that historic demonstration 
of freedom and national unity had been completed. Shooting con-
51 Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pr. Br. Rep. llO. Berlin C. Pol.. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. 
S. 11211. 
312 / Prussia 1858-1864 
tests and banquets, toasts and speeches followed one another in 
ecstatic order. Proclaimed Friedheim from Solingen: 
Oh, may the hope soon be fulfilled that ou~ princes all unit~ 
to build a great ReIch ... for the use and blessmg of our beautI-
ful German fatherland; may they out of free love renounce all 
sense of sovereignity and have for Germany's greatness only one 
heart! Then we shall be strong and powerful within and with-
out and can calmly look about us. No enemy will dare to dis-
turb us, to hinder us in our work, for our power is great through 
love and trust. We would then stand as firmly as the cliff in the 
sea through our own harmony, which adorns and blesses and 
strengthens us. Once the goal is reached, the end is good! 
Up, believing, loving, hoping, let us rise with a single cry: 
Long live Germania! 
Doctor Luning, the democratic physician from Rheda, proclaimed, 
"The day will come ... when the Prussian eagle, now much curbed 
and chained, will lift its powerful wings and offering protection and 
demanding protection will with powerful beat of its wings descend 
under the black, red, gold banner of the German Reich (unbounded 
enthusiasm) ."52 
According to its participants, the first German Rifle Festival was 
a tremendous demonstration by the German people for national unity 
and for the ways of personal initiative and freedom. The Progressive 
Election Verein in Breslau had contributed a cup to it, as had many 
other organizations, and the festival received enthusiastic publicity. 53 
The gymnastic clubs had a half century of patriotic tradition upon 
which to develop their activity for national unity and individual 
liberty. Like the other Vereins after 1848 they had subsided into 
purely local, non-political activity and had first stirred to new life 
under the stimulation of the National Verein. In the early 1860s the 
German Gymnastic Verein was founded as an expression of the will 
to German unity, and the executive board contained personnel iden-
tical with that found in the Rifle Association and the National Verein. 
The first attempt to unite the gymnastic Vereins occurred at the 
festival held in 1860 at Coburg. Thirteen hundred gymnasts, as well 
as numerous visitors, assembled there. The secret police of Saxony 
reported the number present, the toasts, the songs, even a long 
•• Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30 Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, S. 1123 . 
•• See Zeitungs-Bericht filr ]uli.Aug., 1862, Regierungs-Bezirk, Breslau, Sept. 8, 
1862. But what is one to think of the Statutes of the Schiltzen·Verein der Handlungs-
Gehil/en in Stettin of 1863 which did not even mention national unity? See Preuss. 
Geh. StaatsarchiV. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. G. 465. 
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patriotic poem written for the occasion and recited by the author to 
an enthusiastic audience. The proposal to establish a German Gym-
nastic Verein did not receive full approval, especially from the South 
Germans, and the effort had to be postponed. Differences also arose 
over whether to favor the use of the German colors of 1848, black, red, 
and gold, and over the question of whether politics should be dis-
cussed.54 The South Germans particularly were disinclined to unite 
with their northern colleagues. They were not yet attracted by the 
inspired phrases of a writer in the Deutsche Turner Zeitung (1860) to 
"build a temple" of unity "under which the spiritual and physical 
welfare of the people will be furthered, a bulwark against which the 
attempts of foreign conquerors will miserably shatter." 
By August of the next year, 1861, the members of the National 
Verein in Saarbriicken and its vicinity had progressed so far in their 
enthusiasm for German unity that they approved the proposal to unite 
the. German Gymnastic Vereins and the RifteClubs for training persons 
in the use of a common type of gun, thereby to create a popular army. 
They wished in this way to prepare for a reduction in the size of the 
standing army.55 
The celebration in 1863 of the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of 
Leipzig stirred the gymnastic Vereins to new efforts of heroism. The 
third German Gymnastic Festival was held in Leipzig in August; the 
closing ceremony described in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the 
motto of which was "Truth and Justice, Freedom and Law," conformed 
to the pattern of action by this type of organization: "a jubilant cele-
bration," a parade of the gymnasts accompanied by singers, a ceremony 
in the meeting hall introduced by the singing of "Die Wacht am 
Rhein," the patriotic speech by Professor Treitschke, which was re-
ceived with "enthusiastic bravos."56 
More serious business faced the gymnasts toward the close of 1863. 
The controversy over Schleswig-Holstein was reaching a climax and 
war was imminent. The executive committee of the German Gym-
nastic Vereins issued a call to the comrades to prepare themselves for 
military service by exercise in marching, gymnastics, parading, bayonet 
work, shooting, and so on, wherever possible under the direction of a 
.< See police report in Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. 
Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. T. 102, Vol. II . 
•• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Aug. 1, 1861. 
•• Deutsche Algemeine Zeitung, Leipzig, Aug. 7, 1863. The article is to be found 
in Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pr. Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. T. 
102, Vol. II. 
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trained military person. They should join an army to be developed 
for Schleswig-Holstein and help to save those territories for the beloved 
German fatherland.57 Unfortunately the gymnasts did not win the 
war; the regular troops of the Prussian and Austrian armies performed 
so well that the aid of the gymnasts, except in so far as they served as 
regular troops, was not needed. 
Like the other Vereins the gymnastic societies denounced caste 
feelings as contrary to their ideals. Their membership consisted main-
ly of handworkers and merchants, with few teachers, students, in-
tellectuals and officials. Only one Verein, that in Munich, contained 
officers; higher officials, pastors, and rural people were lacking in 
almost all of them. The gymnastic clubs were a thoroughly middle-
class affair, a product largely of the small towns emerging from the 
Old Regime.58 
The close relation between the gymnastic Vereins and the liberal 
parties becomes evident from the names of the persons interested in 
them. The police noted in 1862 that in Breslau the gymnastic Verein 
"Forward" was directed by Stein, the liberal editor of the Breslauer 
Zeitung, and other leaders of the Progressive party. 59 The invitation 
to a gymnastic festival for East and West Prussia to be held in Elbing 
in 1861 was signed by the leading liberals in the area, men like von 
Forckenbeck and former Burgomaster Philipps. A year later a group 
of prominent citizens of the same area issued a call for funds for the 
furtherance of gymnastics. The list of sponsors of the request reads 
like the roster of the liberal deputies in the Landtag-Bender, von 
Forckenbeck, von Hoverbeck, von Hennig, Philipps, two von Sauckens, 
Schubert, Techow, and many others.60 
Knowing about the close relationship, the government held the 
Vereins under observation. In this work it kept in touch with the 
Saxon government and probably with others. From Dresden in May, 
1861, it received a secret report that all the Vereins of whatever sort 
had a secret central executive committee of unknown personnel which 
received instructions from a revolutionary committee in London led 
by the fugitive Carl Blind. The Prussian government took this report 
with a grain of salt, but in the next year, 1862, when the constitutional 
•• J'olkszeitung, Dec. 12, 186~ . 
•• See the article in the Ergiinzungsheft zur Deutschen Turn-Zeitung (Leipzig, 
1860); Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. ~O. Berlin C. Pol. Priisid. Tit. 94, Lit. 
T. 102, Vol. II . 
•• Potizei Bericht, Breslau, Nov. S, 1862 . 
•• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, June 6, 1861, Nov. 7, 1862. 
The LibeTal Parties / 315 
conflict was growing intense, it became somewhat concerned. In 
August, September, and October, Minister of Interior von Jagow 
secretly ordered the police department in Berlin, which had jurisdic-
tion over the police of the cities of the state, to learn whether the 
gymnastic Vereins were training persons with weapons. If this were 
the case, the matter was to be brought immediately to the attention 
of the minister, for such practice with guns might lead to revolu-
tionaryaction. The minister was assured that these Vereins, including 
the rifle clubs, were harmless. 
Toward the end of 1863 Minister of Interior Count von Eulenburg 
felt it necessary to prohibit the arming of the gymnastic Vereins. From 
Dresden came a report emphasizing the liberal and democratic poli-
tical tendencies in the various Vereins and the close connection be-
tween them and the National Verein and suggesting that the govern-
ments of the various states keep in touch on these matters. Early in 
1864 the police report from Dresden admitted upon investigation that 
there was no danger of the defence and other Vereins being organized 
for arming and training the population at large in the German states, 
in fact, that the existing Vereins were not dangerous and that in 
Saxony the rifle clubs were even regarded as reactionary. The alarm 
died down.61 
The statistical evidence which is available supports the judgment 
of the police. In 1860 only forty-five gymnastic Vereins with a total 
membership of about 4,300 persons existed in the entire State of Prus-
sia. By March, 1861, the number in Germany as a whole had in-
creased from 224 to 506, and in Prussia from forty-five to 144. Even 
if the total membership had grown in similar proportion, it would 
have remained insignificant for any but political purposes.62 
However harmless as revolutionary threats, the singing, shooting, 
and gymnastic Vereins helped to popularize the cause of liberalism 
and national unification. They aided in electing men of these views to 
the Landtag. They supplied part of the organizational basis of the 
liberal political parties by reaching particularly the lower income 
groups of the middle class. They enabled these people to associate 
with the upper middle class, and they offered channels by whichCthe 
latter could influence the lower groups in the liberal and national 
cause. Through these Vereins the timidity and fearfulness of the 
01 Polizei Vierteljahrbericht, Dresden, Dec. I, 1863; Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. 
Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. S. 1123, Lit. T. 162, Vol. II • 
•• See Bremer Handelsblatt, July 13, 1861. 
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middle class about participating in politic!! and having opinions on 
public affairs could be combatted, the example of the liberal leaders 
could be made real to them, and a feeling of personal responsibility 
and the value and possibility of showing some independence of the 
authoritarian government might be imparted. The beginning practice 
of social equality in the Vereins would be useful in developing a sense 
of the political importance of the individual. As policy formulaters, 
as sources of potential physical power, these Vereins played no role; 
as channels of liberal and national expression, they proved to be 
eminently usefu1.63 
The cooperatives, guided by members of the Progressive party, 
especially by those of a democratic leaning, belonged in a similar 
category. The movement owed its development primarily to Schulze-
Delitzsch, who even prior to 1848 had begun to work for the establish-
ment of these associations. He perceived the democratic character of 
the cooperative and believed that from this cooperation in economic 
affairs would develop similar ways and habits in politics. 
The movement became popular with the upper middle class and 
the capitalistic bourgeoisie as a means of preserving the middle-class 
character and affiliation of the handworkers. The cooperative was 
expected to enable the handworkers to adjust to industrial capitalism 
while remaining skilled craftsmen. It aimed to prevent them from 
becoming a proletariat and succumbing to the enticements of socialism 
or communism, or, almost as bad, from allying with the forces of re-
action. The bourgeoisie supported the cooperatives not merely or not 
even primarily out of self-interest; the threat of radicalism on the 
left did not appear sufficiently dangerous at this period for them to 
be thinking mainly of withholding new socialist recruits, and the threat 
of reaction on the right could be countered by the spread of informa-
tion about the advantages of liberalism along with positive assistance. 
The bourgeoisie felt proud of the traditition of the handworkers and 
sought to maintain it as a valuable factor in the national culture. The 
work of Schulze-Delitzsch early received the general reputation of being 
safe, reliable, practical, and patriotic. Liberal thinking did not extend 
very far into the field of labor economics, for relatively few liberals 
had had any practical experience with factory industry. The craftsmen 
were to be preserved by way of cooperatives; the factories were in 
some unknown way to obtain labor which would remain middle class, 
.S See among many others the estimate in the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, 
Dec. 11, 1861. 
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perhaps by cooperatives also; a proletariat was not to arise, it was 
hoped, to alarm the middle class and the bourgeoisie. Just how this 
happy situation would be achieved was not clear. The social changes 
involved in the emergence of industrialism had not advanced far 
enough for problems of middle-class relations with labor to become 
acute. Schulze-Delitzsch's cooperatives seemed at this stage the solu-
tion to the social question; in addition they could help to win support 
for liberal politics. 
The transitional character of the workers' position in society was 
clearly evident from the proceedings of the German Workers' Conven-
tion held at Leipzig, October 23-25, 1864.64 The meeting showed al-
most no proletarian character. A personal greeting from the burgo-
master inaugurated a conference mainly devoted to the discussion of co-
operatives, education, freedom of movement and domicile throughout 
Germany, and German unification-an agenda scarcely distinguished 
from that of any middle-class association. The recommendations in 
favor of social insurance, to enable the worker to accumulate 
capital for his old age, and in favor of shorter working hours were ac-
ceptable in middle-class circles as well. The condemnation of social-
ism and the subjects for the numerous toasts hardly seemed in keeping 
with the presence of the future socialist leader, August Bebel, and 
with his selection as a member of the executive committee. The social 
problem considered at this meeting remained essentially the condition 
of the handworker: how could he be preserved as a member of the 
middle class even when he became a factory worker? The ideas and 
interests of Schulze-Delitzsch and of liberal economists like Wirth 
dominated the conference; the presence of Bebel was significant only 
for the future. The split between the middle class and the proletariat 
had not yet occurred. Liberalism and democracy rather than socialism 
expressed the objectives of the workers. 
The Lassallean socialist organization proved to be so weak in the 
early 1860s that it scarcely did more than provide a little work for the 
police and considerable opportunity for literary polemics between the 
elegant Lassalle and his democratic or liberal opponents. In Berlin 
Lassalle had a following of a couple of hundred members. The case of 
the Berlin cigar workers may illustrate the attitude of skilled workers. 
The Progressive party had many supporters among the cigar workers. 
In Berlin the organization of these workers asked Schulze-Delitzsch 
•• See the police report in Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. 
Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. A. 212. 
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whether it should join the German Cigar Workers' Association. The 
distinguished democrat replied that although approving the statutes 
of the Association, he did not like its Lassallean leadership. The cigar 
workers chose to ignore the advice and in 1866 the members joined the 
general Verein. Two years later, however, they broke aw-ay from it 
and formed a cooperative. The fact that they chose to associate with 
the newly established Hirsch-Duncker organization of cooperatives 
rather than the one guided by Schulze-Delitzsch did not indicate any 
diminution in the strength of liberal and democratic principles.65 
The potential significance of the cooperatives for the liberal and 
democratic parties cannot be gauged from the small number of the 
Vereins and of their members.66 Among a social group as nearly 
homogeneous as the handworkers the example of liberalism offered by 
even a small organized minority must have attracted others. The same 
social elements supplied many supporters and members of the gym-
nastic and the other Vereins; they tended to be the ardent patriots, the 
proponents of national unification; they upheld the democratic left 
of the liberal movement. 
The emergence of the society of modern industrialism in Prussia 
could be seen in the increased number and enlarged scope of economic 
organizations. A few of these gained particular importance for the 
state and for the entire German nation, while a large number of 
smaller ones expressed the needs and wishes of regional or local in-
terests. All the organizations were interrelated by personnel and 
program. They all aligned with the liberal groups and constituted 
the backbone of liberal strength in the urban population. Although 
they claimed to be non-political in character and purpose, their pro-
grams and policies were primarily concerned with governmental action 
-the transformation of an absolutistic, mercantilist government into 
one with a liberal administration guided by liberal economic policies, 
the achievement of German national economic unity. With respect 
eo Walter Frisch, Die Organisationsbestrebungen der Arbeiter in der deutschen 
Tabakindustrie (Leipzig, 1905), pp. 39-40. 
00 In 1861 in entire Germany there were 364 credit cooperatives with a member-
ship of about 50,000, and in 1864 some 889 with a membership of 135,000. In 1861 
there were in addition some 129 raw materials and consumers' cooperatives, but these 
were less important than the others. In Prussia in 1861 there were 188 credit co-
operatives, and in 1865 some 436. Their distribution according to provinces was 
as follows: Saxony 101, Brandenburg 89, Silesia 85, Prussia 50, Pomerania 44, Rhine-
land 26, Posen 25, Westphalia 16. The raw materials and consumers' cooperatives 
were fewer and much less important. Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. 
Berlin C. Pol. Priisid. Tit. 94, Lit. G. 465. 
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to the first part of the program one economic aSSoCIatIOn might be 
more aggressive than the other or more inclusive in its objective; but 
all agreed on fundamentals. The second part, the question of the form 
and degree of national economic unity, especially of the political im-
plications of economic unity, also caused little dispute. Most Prus-
sians favored a unified Germany under Prussian leadership with Austria 
excluded, while relatively few demanded a greater-Germany solution 
with Austria, at least German Austria, included. 
The three leading economic associations, the Pruss ian Commercial 
Association, the German Commercial Association, and the Congress of 
German Economists, were established between 1857 and 1861. Of 
these the Prussian Commercial Association developed out of a con-
ference in Berlin in May, 1858, of the executive committees of the 
chambers of commerce in Konigsberg, Elbing, Danzig, Stettin, Posen, 
Breslau, Berlin, Magdeburg, Halle, Leipzig, and Cologne, that is, of 
about half the cities with a population of over 20,000. At the confer-
ence the Pruss ian Minister of Commerce expressed regret that the com-
mercial class did not represent its interests more fully than it did. 
Acting on his suggestion-another instance of the initiative on the part 
of the absolutist state-the representatives of the chambers of com-
merce in the Prussian towns and cities met and organized the Prussian 
Commercial Association.67 Thereupon, the Bremer Handelsblatt68 
advocated the establishment of a similar body for all Germany, arguing 
that none of the questions proposed for consideration by the Prussian 
Commercial Association concerned Prussia alone. In 1861 the larger 
organization was created. 
These two powerful associations were formed at the time when 
controversy over the future character of Prussia and Germany began 
to grow acute. The associations met each year, with representatives 
of the important chambers of commerce present, with committees 
reporting on their work during the past year, with recommendations 
being made by the combined force of Prussian and German economic 
leaders. Wherever controversies arose in the German Association they 
as a rule pertained only to the tariff question; on problems of the rela-
tion between government and business the opinion was usually un-
animous. Almost every business representative disliked the vestiges of 
mercantilism. He wished economic freedom, and he wished the 
.f See Bremer Handelsblatt, Aug. 31, 1861, quoting from Der Jahresbericht der 
Handelskammer zu Koln fur 18elJ; Der Deutsche Handelstag, 1861-1911 . 
•• Nov. 5, 1859, p. 385. 
320 / Prussia 1858-1864 
government to devote more funds and attention to the furtherance of 
the economy-technical schools, roads, railroads, and the like. In 
these respects, the decisions of the German Association agreed with 
those of its Prussian counterpart. On the whole the initiative was 
taken in the German rather than in the Prussian organization, but the 
weight of both was thrown on the side of economic liberalism.69 The 
objectives were almost identical with those of the Congress of German 
Economists and the liberal parties in Prussia. The relationship among 
these organizations was maintained by the bond of common personnel 
in leading positions in all of them. Representing Prussia in the 
executive committee of the German Association in 1861, for example, 
were the well-known liberals Behrend of Danzig, Weigel of Breslau, 
von Sybel of Dusseldorf (not the historian but a prominent business-
man), Classen-Koppelmann of Cologne, and Hansemann of Berlin 
(whose influence proved to be less than that of some of the others).7o 
Behind the chambers of commerce and the commercial associations 
were to be found a large number of special business associations. The 
Berliner Borsen Zeitung estimated the number at the beginning of 1861 
to be about 400 for all Germany, with 101 of them located in Prussia.71 
The fact that Prussia had the largest number reflected not merely her 
size but also the vigor of her economy. Highly industrialized Saxony 
with eighty-three associations had a larger number than Prussia in 
proportion to the size of her land area, but no other state approached 
either of them in economic significance. In the Rhineland and West-
phalia, according to an estimate in the Berliner Borsen Zeitung, Janu-
ary 26, 1861, there existed in addition to some twenty chambers of com-
merce many other economic organizations. The paper gave the name 
of nine of them and then had recourse to a double etcetera. One had 
to do with the marketing of coal, another with mining, another with 
iron and steel, another with the reduction of freight rates on iron, an-
other with projects for canal construction, each concerned with a 
special interest, each showing the considerable degree of specialization 
in the industry of this region. In Silesia the Silesian Central Industrial 
Association was founded at a meeting of 436 persons in Breslau in 
April, 1862. It represented thirty-seven individual associations with 
about 5,000 members and also some 130 single persons, among them 
twenty-three m,erchants, twenty-two manufacturers, twenty-six officials, 
thirteen teachers, and some handworkers. Containing as members the 
, '··oSee remark in Bremer Handelsbldtt, Feb. 10, 1866, p.48 . 
•• Der Deutsche: Hande/stag, I, 18, 211-24. ,', ' , 
71 Berliner Borsen Zeitung, Jan. 9, 1861. 
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leading economic personnel of the province. it resembled the Congress 
of German Economists rather than the special-interest organizations 
of the Western provinces; but it functioned in a way and for purposes 
similar to those of the other economic associations.72 The business 
world was feeling the same enthusiasm for entrepreneurial action that 
stirred the political leaders to form new organizations. This was the 
founding period, rich in energy, rich in experimentation, unable as yet 
to gauge the most efficient distribution of strength and the proper 
organizations. 
The economic associations did not assume as active a role in the 
other provinces as in the three most industrialized ones of Silesia, the 
Rhineland, and Westphalia. Nevertheless, they existed elsewhere 
and in cooperation with the chambers of commerce helped to strength-
en the liberal forces. Numerous conferences of economic groups were 
held with the government. A few examples will show the range of 
interest and the methods and channels used to uphold them. The 
Zollverein Beet Sugar Verein had members in 1861 serving as deputies 
in the Lower House of the Prussian Landtag and planned a conference 
at which these deputies would be present to discuss how to defend the 
beet-sugar interests. Representatives of the private banks met in Berlin 
in 1861 to prepare material to submit to the Landtag about their 
difficulties and needs. The Merchants' Association in Konigsberg 
complained to the government about the tariff on grain and seed. 
From Magdeburg came lamentations about the tolls on the Elbe. The 
papers were full of reports of conferences among business interests, 
often with Lower House deputies present, for the purpose of ex-
ercising pressure on the government in favor of liberal reforms.73 
Throughout the state the well-established, eminently trustworthy 
men of commercial and industrial property were profoundly concern-
ed with the outcome of the elections, and they saw to it that candidates 
sympathetic to their views were selected. An instance of the intimate 
relationship between economic and political liberalism was afforded 
in the growing industrial town of Dusseldorf. The local members of 
the Commercial and Industrial Verein for Rhineland and Westphalia 
met in October, 1861, to discuss the elections to the Lower House of 
the Landtag. A similar conference was held in Duisburg. The mem-
bers urged the election of businessmen as electors and as deputies, and 
several names were proposed as possible candidates for the Lower 
•• See Bremer Handelsblatt, Nov. II, 1865, pp. 400-401. 
.s Berliner Biirsen Zeitung, May 14, Jan. 16, Sept. 30, 186); This paper was.espe-
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House, in particular those of the industrialists von Sybel, Hugo Haniel, 
Gustav Stinnes, and the young Hammacher, who was to make a dis· 
tinguished career as a professional representative of the Ruhr.74 
The third of the most important economic associations was created 
on non-Prussian initiative. In May, 1857, the Bremer Handelsblatt 
published a call for the establishment of a Congress of German Eco-
nomists. The idea of such an organization seems to have been derived 
from Belgium. In the preceding year an International Congress for 
Tariff Reform had been held in Brussels which had led to the founding 
of an International Committee for Economic Reforms with head-
quarters in the same city. The North German towns as the greatest 
commercial centers of the country had been especially interested, and 
by the middle of 1857 local committees of the Brussels organization 
had been established in Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, Berlin, Cologne. 
Stettin, Hanover, Heidelberg, Frankfurt a. M. and Mannheim. The 
International Committee had not interpreted its function narrowly 
as pertaining solely to tariff problems, but had proposed to deal with 
all questions that adversely affected international trade. It aimed, ac-
cording to the Bremer Handelsblatt, to further freedom and security 
in trade and to arouse a feeling of individual responsibility by spread-
ing knowledge of the natural laws of economic activity.75 The Bremer 
Handelsblatt used this association as a precedent for the one it was 
proposing: the new organization should be a place where theory and 
practice went hand in hand and men of knowledge cooperated with 
men of practice. The Handelsblatt thought that the future Congress 
of German Economists might affiliate with the international commit-
tee; but it pointed out that alongside the problems common to other 
countries Germany had special ones to deal with, the problems of 
freedom of occupation, movement and domicile, indeed all the prob· 
lems caused by German disunity. Since Germany had to solve these be-
fore it could catch up with the other countries, the Congress was to 
assist in the achievement of this goal. 
The proposal to establish the new association received the enthusi-
astic support of the liberal newspapers. When the International Wel-
fare Congress met at Frankfurt a. M. in September, 1857, the German 
delegates used the occasion to call for the establishment of economic 
Vereins in the larger and smaller towns of Germany either independent 
of or in conjunction with the existing commercial and industrial or 
"Ibid., Oct. 25. 1861. 
•• Bremer Handelsblatt, June 27. 1857. 
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agricultural organizations. The aSSOCIatiOns were to endeavor to 
spread the knowledge of accurate economic concepts and to arouse 
active interest in better economic institutions and ways. The Prussians 
who participated in the proposal and signed the call were President 
Doctor Lette of Berlin, Professor Schubert of Konigsberg, Schulze-
Delitzsch, and Doctor S. Neumann of Berlin, all prominent liberals.76 
Together with eighteen others from the other states of Germany, they 
set up a small provisional committee to pursue the work, and the first 
German-wide Congress met in Gotha in September, 1858. From then 
on the organization was well established, with an enthusiastic member-
ship and, from 1862, with even its own journal, the Vierteljahrschrift 
fur Volkswirtschaft und Kulturgeschichte, edited by Julius Faucher 
and Otto Michaelis, two prominent Prussian liberals. It proved from 
the beginning to be a highly effective organ of liberalism, emphasizing 
the economic aspects but doing so with the full realization of their 
political implications. 
The first Congress was composed of those persons sufficiently in-
terested to attend. No other conditions were set. One hundred and 
ten individuals participated; among them were to be found members 
of all the important occupations in Germany, for example, about forty 
government officials, three agrarians with large-scale holdings, six 
handworkers, two manufacturers, ten merchants, eight lawyers, nine 
editors, three writers, two teachers, four professors, two pastors, four 
bankers and bank employees, one physician, one apothecary. The 
number of handworkers may be misleading in that it may have in-
cluded individuals who while retaining the title of master had trans-
formed their business into a thoroughly capitalistic enterprise. The 
title of professor was also not very revealing, for of the four one repre-
sented the Industrial Society of Weimar, one taught economics and 
served as editor of a journal, one taught in a technical school, and one 
was an authority on law. Most significant was the large number of 
editors and writers, approximately one-fifth of the persons present. 
The purpose of the Congress, to unite men of theory and men of 
practice and to spread enlightenment about economic problems and 
criteria, was reflected in the membership and became increasingly 
evident as the work of the Congress developed and the membership ex-
panded. The active participation of Schulze-Delitzsch, Otto Michaelis, 
Julius Faucher, Prince Smith, Bergius of Breslau, Hubner of Berlin, 
G. Weiss of Berlin, Wolff of Stettin, and Lette of Berlin assured close 
.. Ibid.; Sept. 26, 1857. 
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cooperation with the Prussian liberal parties, so much so that in 1861 
a group of about twenty deputies in the Lower House of the Prussian 
Landtag, most of them active in the Congress, formed an informal 
economic committee to further the work of reform along the lines of 
the proposals of the Congtess. The committee contained persons 
from the various liberal groups, from the right wing across to the left; 
even when the liberal parties could not agree on other matters, eco-
nomic problems brought them together. 
The Congress encouraged its supporters to organize in local and 
regional Vereins. Like the National Verein it had on association to 
respect the strict laws of Prussia, not to mention other states. For this 
reason as well as for the practical purpose of demonstrating the 
efficiency of liberalism it preferred to decentralize its operations. Re-
liance on local initiative encouraged the habits of self-help, individual-
ism, freedom and personal responsibility. Wherever appropriate 
organizations already existed, it worked together with them. In some 
areas of Prussia, like the Western provinces and Silesia, it played a role 
secondary to that of the industrial Vereins, the chambers of commerce, 
and the specialized economic associations. The economy and society 
of the Western provinces and to a lesser degree of Silesia had already 
advanced beyond the stage in which the proposed type of economic 
Congress could be of much value. In the Central provinces except for 
Berlin, which as the capital, the largest city in the state, and developing 
center for industry, commerce, and banking, was already won to 
liberalism, the work of the Congress was needed, but it failed to be 
as significant as that in the East. The area in which the Congress led 
the discussion and formulation of economic policies and furthered the 
spread of information about them was East and West Prussia. As-
sociations were established in such number that in June, 1861, one 
was created for the entire region. The invitation to found the Eco-
nomic Society for East and West Prussia was signed by the prominent 
liberals of the area, many of them deputies in the Lower House. 
The occupational representation in the Economic Society for East 
and West Prussia included merchants, large-scale agriculturalists, 
bankers, lawyers, an editor and a professor, but no handworkers. By 
the end of 1861 the Verein had 520 members, all of whom one can as-
sume belonged to the upper middle class and the liberal land-holding 
nobility. At its congress held in December in Konigsberg about llO 
members were present, and the list of speakers again reads like that of 
the liberal representatives in the Landtag from this area-Ropell, 
Schubert, Philipps, von Henning-Plonchet, Behren~, Jo~,.voJll;lover-
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beck, Papendiek-Liep. Its standing executive committee, Behren~ 
(Danzig), von Forckenbeck (Elbing), von Hoverbeck (Nichelsdorf)/, 
A. Philipps (Elbing), and C. Ropell (Danzig), were all promineru 
leaders of the Progressive party and Landtag deputies;77 but the par-
ticipation of persons like Professor Schubert of Konigsberg, a leader 
o.f the Constitutional party, attested to the full agreement of the liberal 
political groups on economic problems. With such individuals as 
leaders, the Economic Society could not have kept out of politics; it 
acted as a vigorous center of political organization and propaganda and 
formed an essential support for the liberal parties, especially the Pro-
gressives. 
The National Verein proved to be one of the most influential of 
the new associations. It developed in 1859 out of two almost con-
temporaneous meetings, one in Hanover of North Germans, the other 
in Eisenach of South and Central Germans. Finding that their pro-
grams were similar, the two groups called a further conference at 
Eisenach for August of that year, at which a statement of policy was 
promulgated. Germany, it said, should be unified under Prussia's 
leadership. A national convention should be held for the purpose of 
drawing up a German constitution. All parties that loved their coun-
try, whether democratic or constitutional (it did not even mention 
Conservatives), should work together for the unification of the nation. 
One of the members, Metz from Southwest Germany, read an explana-
tory statement in which he formulated the plan for accomplishing this 
objective. Local Vereins should be organized and other legal means 
should be used; a "national progressive party" should be developed.78 
In this way liberals and democrats should win control of the parlia-
ments in each state and force the rulers to work for national unification. 
Power and freedom were inseparable, a broadsheet of the National 
Verein stated in 1860; absolutism was unable to unite the people in 
enthusiastic defence of the country. The new Verein should be the cen-
ter for all activity aiming at the single objective of a free, united, and 
self-governing German nation. 
Metz's explanation received the general approval of the conference 
but was not attached to the declaration of policy for tactical reasons: 
it might have caused difficulty for persons not present to sign the 
declaration, and the primary objective was to gain open adherents to 
the basic proposal.79 Nonetheless, Metz stressed the essential inter-
.. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Dec. 14. Nov. 24. 27. 1861. 
•• National Zeitung, Sept. 2. 1860 . 
•• Ibid., Sept. 2. 1859. 
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dependence of national unity and of liberalism and democracy and 
introduced the significant phrase "progressive party." When new, 
aggressive political parties were organized in several German states 
during the next year or two, the founders took this name, for example, 
the German Progressive party in Prussia. The name indicated the 
relationship of the party to the national movement and its guide, the 
National Verein. The intimacy was well known, so much so that the 
Neue Preussische Zeitung early in 1861 described the address to the 
throne of the Lower House of the Prussian Landtag as a political pro-
gram in accordance with the principles of the National Verein, and the 
Mainzer Journal stated that in addition to the three usual factors in 
law-making Prussia now had a fourth, namely, the National Verein.so 
The meetings of local members of the National Verein in Prussia 
proved to be useful in organizing and campaigning for the Progressive 
party. They were acting in accord with the plans to elect liberal de-
puties to the Landtag who would use their official position not merely 
to introduce liberalism in government and society but also to bring in-
to power a government which would support the National Verein pro-
gram for national unification.s1 The enthusiasm with which the Woch-
enschrift des National Vereins welcomed the formation of the Progres-
sive party in Prussia was unbounded. "For the first time," it stated, 
"the ban of particularism in the chamber of one of the larger German 
states has been broken; for the first time there arises among the repre-
sentatives of the people a party which declares the German point of 
view to be foremost, which places the watchword Germany upon its 
banner. "82 
The National Verein did not align with anyone liberal party, not 
even with the one using the magic words "German Progressive" in its 
name. It sought to unite all liberals and democrats in its ranks. The 
Progressive party in Prussia had the same intention; it welcomed 
liberals and democrats of all shades and hoped to become the sole 
or the main liberal party on the basis of common devotion to freedom 
and to national unity. In the local National Vereins the Progressives 
00 Tagesbericht, No. 29, Feb. 4, No. 52, March 2, 1861. 
01 See, for example, the statements by Roepell and F. W. Kruger in the meeting 
of the members of the National Verein in Danzig, September, 1861. Konigsberg Har-
tungsche Zeitung, Sept. 14, 1861; National Zeitung, Sept. 20, 1861. Also see the story 
of the predominant success of the National Verein members ih the counties of Oster-
burg and Stendal in 1861 in winning the voters away from the Conservatives, so that 
instead of a Conservative majority, the counties voted for 237 Progressives out of 
a total of 332 electors. See ibid., Dec. 11, 1861. 
02 J'olkszeitung, Feb. 1, 1862. 
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and the right-wing liberals were almost always able to work together, 
even though they quarreled over the means to employ.s3 
The close association between the Prussia liberals and democrats 
and the National Verein became evident from the fact of common 
personnel in leading positions. At the conference in 1859 founding 
the National Verein, five Prussians participated, Schulze-Delitzsch, 
Franz Duncker, the liberal editor of the Volkszeitung in Berlin, Julius 
Frese of Berlin, Victor von Unruh, an industrialist and future liberal 
deputy, and Franz Zabel, editor of the liberal National Zeitung in 
Berlin.s4 The first executive committee of twelve members included 
threePrussians, Schulze-Delitzsch, Veit, bookseller and at the time 
a liberal member of the Lower House of the Landtag, and Victor von 
Unruh. The next year the guiding committee consisted of twenty-five 
members, among them the Prussians Doctor Otto Luning, a liberal 
physician from Rheda in Westphalia and future deputy in the Lower 
House; Theodor Mullensiefen, a prominent industrialist at Krengel-
danz near Witten and a liberal political as well as economic leader 
and future deputy; Schulze-Delitzsch; von Unruh; Veit; and Cetto, an 
estate-owner at Trier and future liberal deputy.s5 
Almost every Prussian attending the conference in Frankfurt a. M. 
in 1859 when the National Verein was formally established was a 
well-known Prussian liberal leader. Franz Duncker of the V olks-
zeitung, Zabel of the National Zeitung, Streckfuss, H. Ruckert of the 
Danziger Zeitung, President Lette, Veit, the physician Doctor G. Weiss, 
von Unruh, Frese, and City Councillor Duncker of Berlin were all 
prominent liberals. Schulze-Delitzsch, Cetto, the manufacturer Berger 
from Witten on the Ruhr, the manufacturer Friedberg of Berlin, 
Doctor Luning of Rheda, Dietzel, connected with industry in Cologne, 
and Consul Muller of Stettin were present, along with a couple of less-
known physicians, Stamm and Norman of Berlin, and Assessor Fischel 
of the same city. Government officials were conspicuously absent. In 
contrast to the Congress of German Economists the National Verein 
was not a safe place for the official of a German state to be. The rela-
tive number of editors and physicians (three from Prussia) was high; 
•• See, for example, the split among the members of the National Verein in the 
Lower House over the Kiihne amendment to the military bill, Konigsberg Hart-
ungsche Zeitung, June 6, 1861. 
•• See National Zeitung, Sept. 2, 1859 . 
• 6 Verhandlungen der ersten General-Versammlung des deutschen National 
Vereins am 3, 4, 5 Sept. 1860 (Coburg, 1860). Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 
30. Berlin C .. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. D. 335. 
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but the group included a fairly wide representation of occupations. 
The Prussian liberal agrarians were to join in force, but they moved 
more slowly than the urban residents.86 
The first general conference in 1860 in Coburg attracted about 500 
members. The secret report about the meeting to the Berlin police 
headquarters, contrary to what one might expect, coolly appraised it 
as of no great consequence. Among those present, it said, were Wil-
helm von Humboldt's son, two Wurttemberg peasants in costume, a 
large number of lawyers, many editors, and some Jews. Of the fifteen 
or twenty persons from Berlin no one, it said, was important.87 
The secret agent misjudged the personnel; at that conference were 
to be found once more, and in larger number than ever, the liberal 
leaders of Prussia, especially those who were to form the Progressive 
party. Over fifty Prussians attended, among them the prominent 
liberals Bramer of Gumbinnen, Cetto of Trier, Franz Duncker of Ber-
lin, The Lucas, Doctor Luning, Lawyer Martiny of Kaukehmen in 
East Prussia, Parisius, Rohland of the province of Saxony, Schulze-
Delitzsch, Werner Siemens of Berlin, Steinitz, the future secretary of 
the Progressive party, Streckfuss, Temme and von Unruh of Berlin, 
and von Vaerst of Herrendorf near Soldin. The occupations repre-
sented included that of bank director, physician, lawyer, merchant, 
manufacturer, estate-owner and knight's estate-owner, baker, book-
seller, teacher, engineer, editor, master mason, and official. Peasants, 
workers, professors, and pastors were lacking; otherwise the main 
occupations were fairly represented, especially those independent of 
government pressure. 
At the general conference held in Leipzig in October, 1863, far 
larger numbers of Prussians participated, but most of the prominent 
liberal leaders were forced to remain at home because at that time the 
election campaign for the Lower House was nearing its close. None-
theless, the number of Prussians present (ca. 175) was three and one-
half times as great as in 1860 and tJ.:te occupational representation was 
wider in spread. An extraordinary number of handworkers attended, 
from small towns as well as the cities. All areas of Prussia were repre-
sented, but the largest number came from Leipzig, the region nearest 
to the meeting place. To judge from the size of their delegations, small 
towns with growing industry like Luckenwalde and Torgau showed 
particularly active interest . 
• 8 See the list in the National Zeitung, Sept. 19, 1859 . 
•• Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Priisid. Tit. 94, Lit. D. 
335. 
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By the date of the general conference in 1865 the Prussan libera~s 
had become so deeply involved in the fight with Bismarck that less 
than a dozen appeared. The continuing failure of their struggle to 
reform Prussia along with the intense hostility to Bismarck and his 
national policy in the rest of Germany disinclined most liberals from 
-venturing to attend a conference at which they could only make ex-
cuses for Prussia and hang their heads.88 
The plan of operation and the organization of the National Verein 
were described by Streit, the executive secretary, at the general meet-
ing in 1860 at Coburg. The Verein would seek to use the right of 
association in the German states to solve the problem of national uni-
fication. Streit recognized that this task faced tremendous obstacles, 
such as the habits of obedience engendered by years of absolutism, the 
disappointment over the outcome of 1848, the hostility among parties 
and classes, the organized, well-established power of ultramontane and 
reactionary forces. Nonetheless, the National Verein aimed to over-
come these obstacles by legal means and to spread understanding of 
the political need for liberalism and national unity. Streit repudiated 
any revolutionary intentions. The German people lacked the revolti-
tionary spirit found among other people, he said, nor were conditions 
such that they needed to develop this spirit. He did not know whether 
the struggle for the Verein's objectives could succeed by legal means, 
but he added that no one had ever tried thoroughly to employ them. 
He considered the free press, the right of association and of assembly 
to be "powerful levers," and since the German people possessed them 
to such a large extent, he thought that by using them efficiently and 
tenaciously over a period of years the goal could be reached. 
Since the laws of the German states prevented the establishment 
of branches, the National Verein organized as a single association on a 
nationwide basis. Each member belonged and paid dues to the national 
body, not to a local or regional chapter. The high degree ofcen-
tralized authority had both advantages and disadvantages, but since 
an alternative was impossible the Verein made the best of the situation. 
A large executive committee was selected so that there would be 
actively interested members on it from each part of Germany. In 
addition, agents were appointed to serve as centers of endeavor in 
smaller districts. In this way a considerable number of persons would 
88 See the list of those in attendance given in the Verhandlungen of the confer-
ences, published at Coburg, 1860, 1863, and Frallkfurt aM., 1865. Preuss. Geh. Staats-
archiv. Pro Br. Rep~ 30. Berlin C. Pol.ptasid. TiL 94, Lit. D. 335. 
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be directly responsible for pushing the work of the Verein and would 
be aided by and report to the central office. The disadvantage of not 
having local branches with elected officers and means of arousing 
enthusiasm might thereby be overcome. The Wochenschrift was 
started in 1860, but without the expectation that it would earn its own 
way. It should serve the usual purposes of agitation and information 
and be a rallying point for all members.89 
The membership in the Natio,nal Verein never grew very large. 
According to the business report made to the general conference in 
October, 1865, the Verein had in the previous year (1864) 303 agents 
and 17,862 members. In addition, there were sixty-four agents and 
3,160 members who were in arrears on their dues. If they were in-
cluded, the Verein would have had a total of 21,022 members. Of the 
17,862 members, 8,355 were found in Prussia. In August, 1861, the 
Wochenschrift showed a normal sale of 5,324 copies. Of these 1,865 
were sent through the mail, 206 were forwarded in other ways, and the 
rest were sold through bookstores. The only separate figures available 
about Prussia were those for the number sold in bookstores, namely, 
864 copies. 
The National Verein suffered most from inadequate financial sup-
port. At the general conference in 1863 the secretary reported that the 
Verein had an annual budget of 55,807 Florens. He contrasted this 
sum with the £50,000 with which the Anti-Corn Law League had begun 
in England, the £100,000 which it had raised after the initial sum had 
been exhausted, the two million Guldens which it had spent over a 
period of fifteen years of agitation. If the English spent such sums for 
the repeal of the corn laws, he asked, how much more ought the Ger-
mans to give for the cause of national unification? A member from 
Frankfurt a. M. was so concerned over the state of finances that he 
proposed a three-class system of self-taxation to be introduced for 
members. His suggestion was rejected.90 
Neither the urban nor the rural supporters of the objectives of 
the National Verein, neither its industrial nor its agricultural members, 
saw fit to contribute large sums to the cause. Although they were 
89 Flugbliitter des deutschen National Vereins. Hrsg. im Auftrag des Ausschusses 
vom Geschaftsfiihrer (Coburg, 1860), Vol. I, 3rd printing; Verhandlungen der ersten 
General-Versammlung des deutschen National Vereins am 3, 4, 5 Sept. 1860 (Co-
burg, 1860). 9. Verhandlungen der vierten General-Versammlung des deutschen National 
Vereins, Leipzig am 16 Okt. 1863 (Coburg, 1863). The rate of exchange at the 
time was approximately twelve Florens to the British pound. The Gulden current 
throughout Germanic Europe and England, was equivalent to the Floren. 
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prospering and would greatly benefit from the victory of liberalism 
and nationalism, they were disinclined to expend their own money. A 
reporter from Elbing to the Konigsberg Hartungsclle Zeitung (Septem-
ber 8, 1861) explained the lack of response as a result of years of govern-
mental paternalism and absolutism. Unless the state forced them to do 
so, the people gave little money to public causes. 
The Verein aimed throughout to appeal to the upper classes, 
primarily the middle class and the bourgeoisie. From the towns the 
influence was to spread among the rural people in the surrounding 
area.91 The membership dues were too high for peasants and most 
handworkers to afford. One of the members, Habicht of Gotha, pro-
posed in 1860 that the Verein publish an inexpensive popular paper 
for handworkers and peasants, as the W ochenschrift itself was intended 
for the educated upper classes. The handworkers were, he said, easily 
interested in political ideas and news. It would be more difficult to 
influence the peasants; but the work of agricultural associations and 
expanded educational activity were bringing greater mobility in the 
political views and interests of even this class. The peasant, he con-
tinued, read only one paper completely and loved to hear the school 
master read to him on Sunday out of a popular journal. This paper 
should be put out by the National Verein. Habicht's speech failed to 
convince the audience, and no action was taken to implement the 
proposal. 
The National Verein encouraged the local members to gain the 
support of the masses for the cause, but it did almost nothing to help 
them. By this approach it would not tamper with the existing social 
structure, except to undermine privilege. While seeking to abolish 
legal inequality it would continue to recognize the fact of social in-
equality. It would uphold the liberal principles of reasonableness and 
the liberal methods of discussion, compromise and agreement. Like 
its Pruss ian counterpart and ally, the Progressive party, it did not 
express an official view on the subject of equal and universal suffrage. 
When urged to oppose the general idea of equality, of which suffrage 
provided one example, von Bennigsen, the head of the National Verein, 
refused on opportunistic grounds. He feared that such a step would 
by indirection alarm the propertied classes who might think that after 
all the National Verein was unwittingly stirring up revolutionary 
sentiment. The Progressive party in Prussia, he said, suffered from 
the same dilemma.92 
9. See Wochenschrift des NatiOnal Vereins, Jan. 24, 1862, pp. 745·46 . 
•• See Volkszeitung, May 25, 1862. 
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It should not be inferred that the National Verein was composed 
of political and social snobs, unconcerned about the welfare of the 
masses and even afraid of them. The strategy may have been at fault; 
the Verein might have fared better than it did if it had stirred up a 
popular following and sought by means of a popular national assembly 
to exert mass influence both upon the state governments and directly 
in favor of the unification of the country. However, the members re-
called the failure of this policy in 1848 and wished to avoid a repeti-
tion. They disliked revolution in any violent form on grounds of 
principle. They believed, and they had a reasonable right to believe, 
that the nation could be unified and made liberal in the way they 
proposed-by building up liberal and national parties in each state 
that would take over the governments and then fulfill the dream of 
unification by agreement. The German nation would be united with 
the least upset; the foreign enemies, especially France, would not dare 
to intervene, as they might in case of a revolution; bloodshed and re-
volutionary action would be avoided; the even course of business 
would not be interrupted; in fact, everyone would benefit from this 
kind of action-the middle classes, the peasants, the capitalists, the 
agrarians, the workers, everyone except the supporters of autocracy and 
caste, the vestiges of the Old Regime, the bulwarks of particularism 
and privilege. Local political and social leadership by liberals and 
democrats would not be supplanted by some far-away, alien group 
with headquarters in Coburg; the natural sources of leadership and 
strength as they existed would be encouraged to practice the liberal 
principles of private initiative and civic responsibility. Liberalism and 
democracy would lift themselves by their own bootstraps; the people 
would receive training by practice. The German nation would unify 
itself; it would not have unity imposed from above to the advantage 
of authoritarianism and the detriment of liberalism. It would be a 
model for the world of what to do in politics and society and business, 
and of how to accomplish ends with most efficiency and economy, with 
most reasonableness and freedom. This approach was the antithesis of 
Bismarck's methods and ways.93 
The social and economic character of the provincial and local 
leadership of the Verein was in keeping with the intention and strategy. 
Well-known liberals of the upper classes everywhere controlled the 
.~ Hermann Oncken, Rudolf von Bennigsen, ein deutscher liberaler Politiker 
(Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1910). I, 359·60; Wochenschrift des National Vereins, April 
25, 1862. p. 847. The latter warned that the educated classes must keep in close 
touch with the manes. 
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local groups. For example, in Breslau, the lawyer Fischer served as 
agent of the National Verein in 1862. He, the wholesale merchant 
Molinari, and Moecke, the editor of the Schlesische Zeitung, were 
all active for the National Verein and at the same time served as 
guiding spirits in the Constitutional party.94 In the former they co-
operated with the leaders of the Progressive party; but according to 
the police report of 1865, the National Verein never became strong in 
Breslau.95 In Tilsit, a teacher and pastor took leading roles; in 
Fischhausen County, two merchants, an apothecary, and two knights' 
estate-owners; in Konigsberg, Bender, Professor John, Medical Council-
lor Doctor Moller, City Councillor Stadelmann, Teacher Witt, City 
Councillor Bohm, City Councillor and Bookseller Bon, Professor of 
Medicine Jacobson, Merchants F. A. Kadock and H. Welle, Falkson, 
Johann Jacoby, Theodor, von Facius, Kleeberg, Professor Hanel; in 
Gumbinnen, Bramer, Frentzel-Perkallen, and Headmaster Marcus; in 
Danzig, L. Biber, Th. Bischoff, Professor Bobrik, Lievin, F. Rattenburg, 
H: Riickert, F. Schattler.96 Leadership in other regions of Prussia 
was of comparable significance. 
The occupational distribution of membership did not necessarily 
depend upon the degree of exposure to governmental pressure. Govern-
ment officials, especially those in the administrative positions and there-
fore susceptible to discipline, tended to keep away from the Verein. 
The same was true for pastors, the trainers in Christian obedience, the 
moral preservers of the old order; but some did participate in the 
meetings and support the Verein in spite of pressure. The teachers 
were active to an extraordinary degree. National unification meant 
for them the realization of such an enticing ideal and opened such an 
opportunity for this sheltered profession to work and even to suffer 
for a noble cause that many of them joined the Verein and devoted 
their efforts to it notwithstanding the danger from their dependence 
upon the government.97 
. The association had the largest number of members and supporters 
in the cities and towns, where the population was densest, opportunities 
for organization were most numerous, and the ability to resist govern-
ment 'Coercion by mutual assistance was greatest. In reporting a ban-
quet held in Berlin in honor of von Bennigsen, the head of the Na-
., •• 'Volksieitung, March 19. 1862 . 
•• Polizei-Bericht, Breslau. Nov. 5. 1865 .. 
.. See the contemporaneous issues of the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung . 
•• See. for example. Wochenschrift des National Vereins, May 17. 1861. March 7. 
1862; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Feb. 27. 1861; Tagesbericht, Jan. 30. 1861. 
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tional Verein, the Vossische Zeitung (March 13, 1860) analyzed the 
audience of 500 as follows: it contained some pastors and elderly 
military personnel, no one from the Upper House, numerous judges 
and lawyers, few city councillors and even fewer members of the city 
magistracy, a large number of the most important industrialists and 
merchants, the overwhelmingly majority of the booksellers, numerous 
professors and teachers. The analysis agrees in general with that made 
by the police of meetings of the National Verein in Berlin in Decem-
ber of the same year and in January, 1861. Of the 350 present at each 
conference, the police found that the overwhelming number belonged 
to tl,le "better and well-to-do middle class," namely, merchants, 
doctors of philosophy, writers, lawyers, and so on. Handworkers were 
few, laborers were entirely absent.98 
The National Verein for Konigsberg and the surrounding region 
had 294 members in February, 1862, among them 107 merchants, 
seventy-one estate-owners, thirty-five handworkers, twenty-seven phy-
sicians, eighteen teachers and professors, ten brokers, seven officials, 
and three writers.99 In the small town of PiIlau, nineteen of the most 
respected businessmen joined the National Verein.lOo In Danzig by the 
last of September, 1859, a large number of merchants, four or five 
physicians, several teachers, manufacturers, brokers, rentiers, apothe-
caries, brewers, bankers, and the editor of the Danziger Zeitung had 
already become members of the Verein.101 
In other towns, especially the smaller and medium-sized ones in the 
Eastern and Central provinces, within a few months of the founding 
of the Verein, the signers of the Eisenach Program included a wide 
spread of occupations. Particularly significant among these signers 
in the small towns were the names of many handworkers. In Bromberg 
participation was active, for the conflict with the local Polish popula-
tion made the Germans acutely aware of their nationality. Of the 
upper-class occupations only certain officials were unable to join: 
Minister von der Heydt would not allow them to do SO.102 In the 
Western provinces the leadership and the personnel belonged to the 
same occupations and classes as everywhere in the state, the same ones 
that supplied the support for the liberal parties . 
•• Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. 
D.335 . 
•• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, No. 40, Feb. 16, 1862. The breakdown was 
given by Professor John of the National Verein. 
100 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, No. 121, May 28, 1861. 
101 National Zeitung, Sept. 23, 1859. 
10' Wochenschrift des National Vereins, April 26, May 17, 1861. 
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One group, the youth and especially the students, which had been 
traditionally active in liberal and national movements, was discouraged 
from participating. That the students were interested in the Verein 
and that many would have signed the Eisenach Program seems certain. 
The reason for their exclusion was explained very simply in the 
Wochensshrift:103 the students were too young; this was a man's affair 
youth inclined toward impetuous action and revolution; the National 
Verein relied upon calm, persistent moral and intellectual persuasion 
and parliamentary influence; if youth became members they might in-
volve the Verein in trouble with the police; it was better to deny them 
official membership and to restrict their participation to being told 
what the objectives were and what the adults were accomplishing. 
The National Verein membership should be mature and safe. 
The participation of the workers and the peasantry raised difficult 
problems. Neither could be expected to assume much, if any, initia-
tive in the cause of national unification. Their economic status, their 
lack of knowledge and the absence among them of a tradition of poli-
tical action kept them as a whole in a passive position. In many cases, 
however, peasants actually did officially belong to the National Verein. 
In the Goldene Aue along the Sa ale the well-to-do peasants joined in 
large numbers.104 The same was true for the peasants of Carwitz, 
where as early as 1859 some nine joined, of Schlawin and of Notzkow, 
in each of which in the same year over a dozen became members. One 
could cite other examples, all taken from the contemporary press. If 
given the opportunity numerous peasants would have signed the 
Eisenach program. lOll 
The collection of funds for building a Prussian fleet illustrated the 
way in which the National Verein and its supporters operated. It 
provided an opportunity for arousing the interest of the various social 
groups, including the lower classes, in the question of national unifica-
tion. The movement set a goal understandable by all, the collection 
of funds with which to build naval vessels for the defence of the Ger-
man coast and of German commerce-a goal which in its concreteness 
symbolized the cause and need for German unification. One may as-
sume that if the lower classes with a modest donation supported the 
plan for building a Prussian fleet or adding ships to it, they were in-
terested in national unification. 
,.3 Ibid., July 12. 1861. 
, •• Volkszeitung, July 29, 1862. 
, •• See. for example. the National Zeitung, Oct. 28, 1859. 
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Navy Vereins had been popular in 1848 as an expression of the de-
sire for national unification. Dormant during the years of reaction 
in the 1850s, they had revived with the New Era; and the war of 
Italian unification, the outbreak of the Civil War in the United States 
and the threatening trouble with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein 
aroused them to vigorous activity. The Navy Vereins collected funds 
continuously, but in 1861 a campaign was inaugurated to obtain a 
large sum for a special number of ships. The National Verein took 
a leading part in the entire matter; usually the members of the local 
Navy Verein were also local members of the National Verein. The 
two worked intimately together, even to the extent of the local Navy 
Verein's sending its collections to the National Verein headquarters 
for despatch to the Prussian Ministry of Marine. While some Cun-
servatives supported the Navy Vereins, the usual attitude of their col-
leagues was decidedly negative. They disliked a fleet, commerce, and 
all that went with them. The stronghold of their power lay in the 
army, and they wished no competitor to develop.106 The staunch sup-
port of the navy came from the middle and lower classes, the same 
ones which formed the strength of liberal and democratic parties and 
the national movement. 
The campaign started in Leipzig and Dresden and was immediately 
taken up by Hamburg 'and Bremen, not one of them a Prussian town. 
The Rhineland and Westphalia showed less interest than other parts 
of Prussia and Germany. They did not feel the same need for naval 
protection, for they had few overseas interests in trade as yet, and so 
far as defence was concerned they were most afraid of France. The 
Pruss ian areas most active for the fleet for economic reasons were 
those of the Center and of the East. They traded by sea in grain, 
textiles, and colonial products, and they felt danger from the superior 
power of the Danish fleet. Nonetheless, the main force behind the 
naval collection was not economic but political. As Schulze-Delitzsch 
said in August, 1861, it was recognized that the couple of hundred 
thousand Florens collected during the drive would help very little; 
but, he added, "the question was one of moral aid and of new pressure 
for Prussia finally to devote itself to the national cause."lOT 
The agitation aimed at the creation of a fleet capable of defending 
the sea coast of Germany not merely in the Baltic but on the North 
Sea. It was to protect German interests on the high seas as well. 
108 See Volkszeitung, Jan. 30, 1862. 
,., National Zeitung, Aug. 29. 1861. 
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Although Prussia had no territory on the North Sea, the sponsors wish-
ed it, as the largest state, to assume responsibility for the defence 
everywhere of the entire German people. The plan called for building 
a German fleet under Prussian control; it fitted into the klein-deutsch 
solution of the problem of German unity as supported by the National 
Verein. While some Prussians may have felt that donations for this 
purpose could not cause anyone to question their loyalty to Prussia and 
that in making them they were safe from governmental or social re-
prisals from the Conservatives, the public statements made the issue 
clear that the donations were for a German fleet under Pruss ian leader-
ship and responsibility. Donations could hardly be viewed as other 
than a mark of approval of and desire for national unity in some form 
and for its concomitant, liberalism. 
Danzig, Konigsberg and all the Baltic coastal towns and cities in 
East Prussia were active in the collection of funds. Without danger 
the burgomaster in each place could and did assume a prominent role. 
In Konigsberg the executive committee of the Navy Verein contained 
fifteen members, of whom eight were merchants, one a master cabinet 
maker, one a banker, one a lawyer, one a manufacturer, one the burgo-
master, one an estate renter, one of no listed occupation. lOS 
In one town a restaurant proprietor placed a large box in a 
prominent place so that the guests could contribute and obtained "a 
considerable little sum" for the fleet.I09 At Darkehmen the hand-
workers donated seventy-five Thalers to the Navy Verein out of their 
guild treasury. In the Lithuanian rural counties in East Prussia the 
peasants became enthusiastic about the German fleet and aimed to 
donate enough funds to make possible the construction of a boat to be 
named "Mukkit," that is, "Attack."llo Silesia took an active part. At 
Breslau the burgomaster, Elwanger, a Conservative, served as head of 
the Silesian Committee, composed, as it was, of the most prominent 
citizens.lIl At Gorlitz the organization showed that in a popular cause 
the people knew how to conduct an effective campaign. The commit-
tee was composed of eight town officials and twelve members of the 
town council. The burgomaster called together the members, the 
officials in charge of district affairs within the town and the representa-
tives of the press and discussed how to make the collection thorough. 
It was decided to publish a call in the press, to use printed lists of the 
, •• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 22, 1861. 
, •• Tagesbericht, No. 74, March 28, 1861, citing Danziger Zeitung. 
11. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 2, 1861. 
111 National Zeitung, Sept. 15. 1861. 
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citizens and to have everyone covered by the house-owners. The guilds 
were to be asked to contribute out of their treasuries. So successful 
was the effort that on March 8, 1862, the head of the committee for 
Silesia was able to send 55,100 Thalers to the ministry for the con-
struction of a cannon boat "Silesia."112 At Berlin the committee was 
equally active, but the title it chose did not stress the objective of 
national unification as sharply as elsewhere, even though the purpose 
was the same. The Berlin group called itself the Committee for Col-
lecting for the Prussian Fleet to Protect Germany. The title used in 
other areas of the state was dearer-the Committee for the Collection 
of Funds for the German Fleet under Pruss ian Leadership. The mem-
bership of the Berlin committee, merchants, bankers, officials, editors 
of newspapers, most of them prominent liberals, manifested the fact 
that the latter title would have expressed its sentiments more accurate-
ly, but the other title was apparently chosen so as not to prevent even 
Conservatives from contributing. The committee felt so patriotic 
that it issued an ardently nationalistic appeal for funds even to the 
workers. 113 The other towns followed suit, and the newspapers re-
ported the exact amount of contribution from each individual. The 
total sum did not prove to be large, but it expressed the longing for 
lib~ralism and national unity of almost every donor, with only the 
few Conservatives excepted. 
The National Verein took an interest in the other popular move-
ments for strengthening German defence comparable to that for the 
construction of a fleet. Its relations with the gymnastic Vereins and 
the rifle Vereins were very dose. The executive secretary of the Na-
tional Verein and editor of its paper, Doctor Streit, edited also the 
official organs of the other associations and was prominent in their 
central administration. The common membership and interlocking 
directorate were as characteristic in these cases as in those of the other 
liberal and national organizations. Within a few months of its found-
ing the National Verein approved at its general conference (September 
5, 1860) two resolutions submitted by von Rochau in the name of the 
executive committee. One advocated military training in the schools 
as part of the education of all the youth. The other called for the 
establishment of shooting societies so that young people could be 
110 Ibid., Sept. 27, 1861; J. Stein, Geschichte der Stadt Breslau im 19. Jahrhundert, 
p.587. 
118 National Zeitung, Sept. ll, 1861; J7olkszeitung, Jan. 18, 1862. 
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taught the use of arms.1l4 The next year, 1861, at the general con-
ference in Heidelberg the National Verein returned to the same ques-
tion and passed among others a resolution in favor of the creation of 
military societies for training civilians all over Germany.llli It stirred 
up interest in national unification among all groups and classes, in-
cluding the workers and peasants, and used the many related associa-
tions for this purpose. 
The success of the National Verein depended upon the outcome of 
the conflict in Prussia between the liberals and the Conservatives. n 
the liberals won, the National Verein would have a strong chance to 
achieve its goal. If they lost the society saw no immediate prospect of 
its own success. It therefore encouraged the liberals in every possible 
way. At local and regional meetings outside Prussia the members 
passed resolutions supporting their battling colleagues and denouncing 
the Conservatives. In October, 1863, Chairman von Bennigsen con-
demned the policy of the Prussian government under Bismarck as 
"suicidal blindness," and declared that the conflict in Prussia could 
not prevent the Verein from continuing its work. The political report 
of a committee to the general assembly of the Verein at the same time 
stated realistically that "the near future of Germany depends upon the 
speedy victory of the constitutional party in Prussia." So it did, 
although not in the implied sense, for the constitutional party lost 
the battle.l16 
The Press 
The Conservative Preussisches Volksblatt early in 1861 asked the 
question, who supported the present ministry-the mildly liberal minis-
try of the New Era, which that journal despised. The journal sup-
plied its own answer: "It does not depend upon the handworkers and 
the peasants who together amount to fourteen million souls, pay most 
direct and indirect taxes and almost alone provide the entire force 
for the Prussian army. Nor can the ministry depend upon the other 
three million. What does it depend upon? First of all upon so-called 
public opinion. But who is public opinion? All the newspapers of 
11< Verhandlungen der ersten General-Versammlung des deutschen National 
Vereins, am 3, 4,5 Sept. 1860 (Coburg, 1860). 
115 National Zeitung, Aug. 27, 1861. 
116 See resolutions of support from Frankfurt a. M., Braunschweig and Gera, 
Darmstadt, Dresden, to cite a few examples, in Volks%eitung, Feb. 5, March 22, 26, 
28, 1862; see also Verhandlungen der vierten. General-Versammlung des deutschen 
National Vereins, Leipzig am 16 Okt. 1863 (Coburg, 1863). 
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the Prussian State, mostly edited by Jews, have scarcely 100,000 sub-
scribers, of whom a part do not even belong to the ministerial party! 
And this enormous 'minority' of 100,000 persons is the solid founda-
tion of the ministry!" The accusation must be investigated. What 
was the size and significance of the liberal press? 
The creation and continued operation of a press may be said to 
have been in itself an act of liberalism. Respect for ideas, confidence 
in the efficacy of reason based upon free information, recognition of 
the value of knowledge, of news, of data on which people could decide 
issues for themselves bespoke the acceptance of the liberal way of life. 
The contrast in tone between the Prussian liberal or democratic and 
the Conservative journals revealed how harshly and crudely the latter 
adapted itself to the methods of a free press. The Conservative papers 
could not and would not discuss an issue coolly and reasonably, for a 
Conservative did not feel reasonable. He damned and blasted and 
employed bitter irony to bludgeon his point through. He did not 
respect his opponent; he was convinced that morality sided exclusively 
with him. The liberal and democratic press set itself a different pur-
pose and gauged its role in a different way. Where the Conservative 
journals, with lavish use of superlatives, denounced and demanded, 
claiming a monopoly of wisdom, virtue, and statesmanship, the liberal 
and democratic press had a more modest conception of its function. 
Each kind of press reflected the ideals and ways of its form of life. 
The one dictated to the people on the basis of dogmas and beliefs; 
the other sought to express the views of the public. The one scorned 
a public to which it unfortunately had to appeal; the other sought 
to enlighten and to interpret the mind of that public, which it respec-
ted even when it thought the policies and views of certain groups to 
be wrong,117 The mild classical liberal of the old school, Rudolph 
Haym, took this responsibility as editor of a periodical so seriously 
that he refused to seek election as deputy in the Lower House. He 
argued that the political views of the public were not entirely reflected 
in the Lower House and he believed that the press was needed to sup-
plement the work of that body,118 
Liberalism and democracy implied the union of ideas and practice, 
popular enlightenment, and appeals for support on the basis of facts 
and understanding, not merely for the bourgeoisie and middle classes 
but for all social groups. All the leading papers throughout Prussia 
11. The editor of the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung wrote on August 6, 1862, 
"We liberal newspaper men do not make public opinion with our editorials; we 
only interpret it," 
118 Heyderhoff, op. cit., I, 128-30. 
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upheld the liberal or democratic principles and supported one or the 
other liberal political party or fraction. In Berlin, apart from the 
K reuzzeitung, the organ of the Conservatives, liberalism and democracy 
had the field of journalism almost to themselves. The Volkszeitung, 
edited and published by Franz Duncker, catered to the democratic ele-
ments. The National Zeitung, edited by Zabel with the aid of Otto 
Michaelis, served as the leading organ of the Progressive party. The 
Spenersche Zeitung expressed the views of the right-wing Constitutional 
party, while the Berliner Borsen Zeitung acted as the main vehicle of 
liberal economic interests. The Danziger Zeitung, the Ostsee Zeitung 
in Elbing, the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, the Morgen Zeitung, 
Schlesische Zeitung and Breslauer Zeitung in Breslau all advocated 
liberalism in their respective geographic areas of influence. So did the 
Magdeburger Zeitung, the Kolnische Zeitung, and the leading news-
papers of the Ruhr. In fact, not merely the prominent papers of state-
wide or regional appeal but almost all those of merely local circulation 
supported the liberal side. In Gumbinnen the liberal large land-
owner John Reitenbach, a cousin of Deputy John Frenzel, founded 
and directed the publication of the Burger-und Bauernfreund for 
peasants and the lower middle class.119 The leading members of the 
Progressive party urged its support. The liberals living in the coun-
ties of Stolp, Schlawe, Lauenburg, and Butow established an Intelli-
genzblatt for their area.120 At Neurode the democratic Allgemeine 
Dorfzeitung, subsidized for a time by Count Pfeil in Hausdorf, began 
to appear in the 1850s.121 Back of the liberal journals financially stood 
booksellers, publishers, bankers, industrialists, merchants, even big 
landowners. 
Contrary to the Conservative accusation, very few of the owners 
or editors of the liberal or democratic papers were Jews. Of the Berlin 
papers, the Volkszeitung had two Jewish editors among a large num-
ber of gentiles. The other papers were in the hands of Christians. 
In Breslau, the popular Morgen Zeitung was controlled by Jews, and 
the Breslauer Zeitung, owned by Christians, in 1860 came under the 
editorship of another prominent Jewish liberal, Doctor Stein; the 
other papers remained under Christia~ control. Evidence that race or 
religion affected the editorial policy of the papers is entirely lacking. 
119 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Feb. 27, 1861; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 84. 
120 Volkszeitung, Jan. 15, 1862. 
121 Klawitter, Die Zeitung und Zeitschriften Schlesiens von den Anfiingen bis zum 
Jahre 1870, pp. 6-7. 
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The editorial standards of a popular newspaper of the time may be 
judged from a statement in October, 1861, by the editor of the Tilsiter 
Zeitung. In the political section, he wrote, the paper would bring 
short articles about the events of the day. With respect to the internal 
and foreign affairs of Germany it would continue to follow a decidedly 
liberal policy, to further political progress, to spread political educa-
tion, to write short, intelligible editorials, which aimed "less at gain-
ing adherents to a definite political party than at stirring up the 
political conscience of the citizens." The journal would report news 
from the other towns in the province and supply information about 
trade, shipping, industry, agriculture, and the like. Finally it would 
provide material for social conversation, the recent news about the 
theater, concerts, literature, and so forth.122 
The main newspapers throughout the state utilized the services of 
many kinds of correspondentS. The Landtag deputies frequently 
wrote long despatches about events in the capital, especially political 
events, for their local papers. Professors did likewise for various favorite 
papers. The universities and the popular press were in close contact, 
for in the case of the leading newspapers the academic and the news-
paper personnel came from and appealed to much the same social 
class. Prominent citizens when travelling, including businessmen, 
sent back reports, and a growing number of free-lance journalists was 
available. 
An example of the number and geographic spread of correspondents 
of a prominent paper is had in the case of the non-Prussian Augsburger 
Zeitung. The journal was widely read by intelligent circles through-
out Germany and enjoyed the service of a large assortment of writers, 
probably few if any of them being professional journalists. In 1867, 
according to a Berlin police report, it had one or more correspondents 
in each of forty-three towns. Twenty-three of these were in towns in 
Germany, the largest contingents being in Munich (thirteen), Frank-
furt a. M. (eight), and Berlin (six). The others were located in Austria, 
England, the Ottoman Empire, France, Italy, Switzerland, and 
Sweden.123 . 
Most papers merely took news items from others, either reprinting 
whole articles with a credit line or condensing the information. The 
range of information provided in local papers was wide as to topic 
and geographic coverage. However, the need for better facilities led 
"2 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Sept. 27, 1861. 
111 Berlin-Dahlem, Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Bi'. Rep. SO. Berlm C. Pol. 
Priisid. Tit. 94, S. 129. 
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to the establishment of the Berliner Liberale Correspondenz, the first 
issue of which appeared in January, 1863. It proposed to serve the 
local papers which did not have regular correspondents in Berlin. 
The leaders of the Progressive party agreed to write for it and especial-
ly to provide news about affairs in the Landtag and about party con-
ferences and decisions.124 The degree of success of this service may be 
estimated in only a rough way. The news appeal of the constitutional 
conflict in Prussia was so high that an abundance of items was available 
for an eager public, and the service responded to the demand. 
Statistics on the edition of the important papers were frequently 
published at the time. In December, 1862, the Magdeburger Zeitung 
made the following estimate. The Berlin liberal press paid a tax on 
a daily edition of about 100,000 copies. In the provinces the liberal 
press turned out probably 150,000 copies, not including the small local 
papers. Thus the liberal press printed a total of 250,000 copies each day. 
By way of contrast, the Conservative Press in Berlin, even when the 
Volksblatt and the Stern Zeitung were included, printed probably 
15,000 copies. It was much more centralized in Berlin than the liberal 
papers, for many liberal journals in the provinces competed with those 
in Berlin, while among the Conservative ones the K reuzzeitung stood 
alone. The feudal papers in the provinces probably printed 20,000 
copies, making at most 40,000 subscribers for Conservative journals. 
If five readers are reckoned to one subscriber, the liberal press had 
1,250,000 readers, the Conservative press 200,000. One should also 
add the liberal non-Pruss ian papers or periodicals read in Prussia, for 
example, the Gartenlaube, of which out of an edition of 130,000 copies 
at least 40,000 were subscribed for in Prussia.125 
Figures about the size of the edition in Berlin, Breslau, and a few 
other larger cities tend to support the estimate of the Magdeburg 
journal. For Berlin these are available for the years 1858 and 1863, 
as follows: 
Neue Preussische Zeitung 
(Kreuzzeitung) 
Spenersche Zeitung 
Vossische Zeitung 
National Zeitung 
Volkszeitung 
... National Zeitung, Jan. 10, 1863. 
1858 
4,000 
8,000 
15,000 
5,000 
9,000 
1863 
8,500 
4,000 
13,000 
8,500 
36,000 
us Article reprinted in Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Dec. 2, 1862; Allgemeine 
Zeitung (Augshurg), Oct. 31, 1863. 
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In Breslau in 1864 the Schlesische Zeitung published 7,520 copies daily, 
the Breslauer Zeitung 5,004, the Provincial Zeitung 1,800, the Morgen 
Zeitung 12,200, the Schlesisches Morgenblatt 4,000. By way of com-
parison, the Kolnische Zeitung printed in 1858 some 14,000 copies. The 
available figures on the number of out-of-town papers distributed in 
a particular locality tend to show that readers mainly relied upon 
regional or local journals, and that those with a state-wide reputation 
achieved that position not through the spread of their circulation but 
by enabling the local papers to borrow the important news stories. 
For example, of the two main local papers in Trier in 1857 one had a 
circulation of 696, the other of 559. The Kolnische Zeitung was 
subscribed to by 389 persons there, the Vossische Zeitung and the Na-
tional Zeitung of Berlin by sixteen and fourteen respectively. Cologne 
had even fewer subscribers to outside papers; the KOlnische Zeitung 
sufficed for local needs. The same conditions held true in Breslau.126 
The quality of articles in these liberal and democratic papers com-
pared favorably with that of the best articles in any journal in England 
or other countries of free institutions. The superior intelligence of 
the writers, whether professional editors, professors, public personages, 
businessmen, or lawyers and members of other professions, was mani-
fested in the broad range of interest, the marshalling of evidence, the 
clarity and succinctness of expression, and the thoroughness of analysis. 
The reader could rely on finding in each issue a compact article giving 
facts and expressing a balanced opinion in a cool, reasonable tone. In 
the liberal press of this period German journalism reached a peak. 
Facts were not omitted or warped to conform to an editorial policy 
as they were later under Bismarck and his successors in all but the few 
best papers like the Frankfurter Zeitung. While news and editorials 
were mixed together, the latter interest had not yet begun to cause 
violations in the accuracy of reporting. The articles or despatches, 
written usually by public-minded private citizens, not professional 
journalists, were intended for persons like the authors, persons of in-
telligence whose judgment deserved respect; they were not meant to 
flame the public or to serve a tactical purpose in a political game 
among professional politicians. The journalism of upper-class liberal-
ism still prevailed; and the liberal papers for the workers, peasants, 
and lower middle class adopted equally high standards. The Prussian 
people in the towns and cities were well supplied with objective news 
"6 Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv Dahlem. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 
94, z. 81, 169, P. 383; Polizei-Bericht, Breslau, March 4, 1866; Allgemeine Zeitung, 
Oct. 31, 1863. 
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and with calm, objective analyses of the news. The rural areas were 
not as yet able to obtain the news service that they needed to keep 
informed, and the liberals criticized themselves for not taking steps to 
develop a widespread local press for the agricultural communities. 
Nonetheless, in some regions big landowners of liberal or democratic 
views were beginning, with the aid of persons of similar views in the 
towns or cities of the region, to establish journals for these social 
groups. 
The relatively high cost prevented the lower classes as a rule from 
being able to afford the newspapers. Many middle-class persons pre-
ferred to read them in the public reading rooms, which were found in 
each large town and city. There all the journals were at the disposal of 
those paying a small entrance fee, and together with the numerous 
rental libraries for books they enabled every person to keep informed 
at a low cost.127 The estimate of the Magdeburger Zeitung that each 
copy of a newspaper had about five readers may be considered as fairly 
accurate. The people in both town and country were accustomed to 
lending their newspapers and journals to others; and since time and 
speed had not yet become for most of them an essential factor in 
regulating their lives, they did not object to an issue's being several 
days old. Reading material was not yet so plentiful that they would 
pass by a paper or journal merely because it was out of date. They 
read carefully and conscientiously, and especially the upper middle-
class members in town and country tried to arrive at their own con-
clusions on the basis of the evidence. 
One may strongly doubt whether the Conservative government's 
efforts in 1862 and 1863 to restrict the freedom of the press had any 
appreciable effect upon the spread of news. The repression certainly 
failed to change opinion in favor of Conservatism. The fact of govern-
ment censorship became immediately known far and wide and in-
creased the extent of antagonism to the existing ministry and its. 
policies. The liberal and democratic papers in Berlin had as early 
as May, 1862, followed the practice of destroying manuscripts as soon 
as they were used, so that in case the police searched the newspaper 
offices they would be unable to identify the authors.128 It may be as-
sumed that other newspapers adopted the same procedure. Under 
these circumstances the readers acquired the faculty of knowing when 
12. Breslau alone had in 1863 some thirteen of these libraries and ninety other 
localities in the province had 163. Jahresbericht der Handelskammer in Breslau, 
1863, pp. 95-96. 
128 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, May 23, 1863. 
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and how to read between the lines, and that fact enhanced their 
antagonism to the kind of regime that forced them to do so. The 
suppression of the freedom of the press in a society beginning a period 
of vigorous economic and political development afforded sufficient 
news in itself to induce the social forces back of this develqpment to 
oppose an oppressive government. 
The Organization for the Elections 
When the New Era began, the liberal political parties had had 
little experience in conducting election campaigns. During the years 
under discussion the diversity of methods and policies employed not 
merely by the different parties or fractions but often by individuals 
or groups within them showed that they were learning the ways of 
politics by trial and error. The Constitutional party never did develop 
anything approaching adequate facilities for party activity among the 
voters; and, setting the example as usual, the Progressive party ex-
perimented most and in spite of mistakes achieved the best results. 
Each party created a central election committee by having its 
deputies in the Lower House choose a couple of dozen members from 
among their number, with considerable power of subsequent co-opta-
tion in case of need. The fractions within the Progressive party never 
became so independent as to establish their own committee, and for 
the elections of 1862 and 1863 the Left-Center fraction and the Pro-
gressive party joined forces under a common committee. The Left-
Center, or Bochum-Dolffs, fraction, in fact, never established any kind 
of permanent organization. The Constitutional party had its own 
committee, but in the elections of 1862 and 1863 it also declined in 
the main to compete with the central organization of the other liberal 
parties and left the responsibility for political action to the local 
groups. As a rule, for these two elections all the liberal parties and 
fractions agreed to help each other against the government candidates. 
Wherever the one liberal group had had a representative in the prev-
vious Lower House, all liberals were to support his re-election.129 
On the whole the central election committees did not rank in prac-
tical importance with the local committees. That of the Progressive 
party drew up a program for the entire state, not as a body of dogma 
but as a basis for common action on the part of the local election 
committees. Any local group was free to change the program according 
... See Parisius, Politische Parteien, p. 56; Parisius, von Hovef'beclr., II, 108; Kol-
nische Zeitung, March 29, 1862. 
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to its wish, but the central committee expected it to serve as a state-
ment of proposals acceptable to all. The party leaders sought a 
minimum basis of agreement with maximum freedom for local action 
and initiative.l30 They were practicing their ideals of responsible 
government. 
The central committee of the Progressive party served as a clearing 
house for information and advice.lSl The value of this work was 
recognized. A Berlin correspondent of the Konigsberg Hartungsche 
Zeitung, who manifestly had close working contacts with the commit-
tee or was even a member of it, declared in an article auly 4, 1861) 
that 
. . . the main deficiency of our popular representation rests on 
the isolation of the election districts and the resulting pre-
ponderant influence of local authorities. If the proper candi-
dates are lacking, the so-called respected people, the officials and 
rich landowners, will be victorious; and, since the representation 
of the rural population is larger than that of the towns, an un-
free representation of too conservative a character must arise. 
This deficiency can only be overcome if the election committee 
becomes very active and proposes a sufficient number of liberal 
candidates and sends them to places where prospect for them 
exists. 
The central committee of the Progressives received a number of 
requests from the local groups for a list of names of reliable and 
worthy persons whom they might propose as candidates for the Lower 
House. The localities often lacked the means of transportation and 
communication which would enable them to keep well informed. 
They could not know whether their political views agreed with those 
held elsewhere in the state, and whether the persons for whom they 
might vote on the basis of merely local knowledge were in harmony 
with the party as a whole. Recognizing the practical need for the 
list, the central committee prepared one and in the autumn of 1861 
sent it confidentially to the party leaders in the various localities. The 
list contained names of individuals of the Progressive and of other 
liberal political groups; for, true to its original intention, the party 
aimed to unite all shades of liberal and democratic opinion for the 
purpose of positive action. By the time of the election of 1863 the 
events of the constitutional conflict had aroused the population so 
110 See statement by Virchow, National Zeitung. July 17, 1861. 
101 See National Zeitung, Nov. 8, 1861; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 3. 
1861. 
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intensely that central guidance on personnel had become unneces-
sary.132 
That the guidance offered by the central committee was welcome 
appears proven from the large number of places in which the local 
election committee discussed and approved the program-to mention 
merely a few, Tilsit, Gumbinnen, and Lotzen in the East, Cologne and 
Dusseldorf in the West. ISS Whether the advice on the names of 
worthy candidates gained much attention is less certain. In the urban 
areas of the East and Center and throughout the Western provinces 
the advice was not needed, for adequate information already existed 
about available candidates. The quality of political activity in these 
regions ranked superior as to knowledge, experience, and supply of 
current information to that in the rural area of the Central and 
Eastern provinces. 
Throughout the state the party leaders organized election commit-
tees on a local basis, or for a county or an election district. The ad-
herents to the party usually did so by vote in an open political meet-
ing. At Pillau, for example, the party instructed its local election 
committee to co-opt persons known and respected throughout the 
county and become an organ for the entire county. In November, 
1861, the election committees of Cologne and Dusseldorf called a con-
ference of representatives of the local committees of th"e Rhineland 
province. Most of the local committees actually sent delegates, especial-
ly those of Coblenz, Bonn, Dusseldorf, Trier and Aachen. The meet-
ing decided to form a provincial committee which would continue be-
yond the election, would work closely with local committees, and would 
further the political education of the population by party literature and 
meetings. IS4 
The extent of organization in the cities and towns varied according 
to the degree of enthusiasm of the local leaders. In Berlin, for the 
election of 1861, the Progressives established a committee in each of 
the four election districts and usually in the precincts.ls5 The election 
of 1862 was announced so short a time ahead that in the first election 
district of Berlin the party was unable fully to organize the campaign 
and had to rely upon the initiative of a leader elected for that task 
in each precinct to call rallies and maintain contact with the election 
132 See Kolnische Zeitung, Nov. I, 1863. 
, •• See Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Aug. 6, July 27, Sept. 28, 1861; National 
Zeitung, Nov. 17, 1861. 
, •• National Zeitung, Nov. 17, 1861. 
135 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 5, 20, 1861. 
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committee for the district.136 It was evident that in the capital the 
party had established no continuing local organization. At Cologne 
the city election committee of 120 members of the Progressive party 
prepared more efficiently for the election of 1862. It divided the city 
into fifteen sections and arranged for each section to name its own 
committee with a president.137 At Elbing the Progressive party in 
October, 1861, held a meeting of about 300 members to discuss the 
necessary preparations for the campaign. The chairman of the meet-
ing, Burgomaster Philipps, proposed that a committee of twenty-five 
persons be selected by secret ballot to draw up the list of electoral 
candidates. The list, he said, should then be submitted to a sub-
sequent meeting of the party members for discussion and ultimate ap-
proval. Another liberal criticized this proposal as not encouraging 
public participation in political affairs and suggested instead that pub-
lic meetings be held in each precinct to select candidates and that the 
central election committee for the district restrict its work to making 
certain that in these meetings the party performed its duty. The 
majority of the members, however, found even Philipps' proposal too 
complicated and asked him to select a committee to recommend can-
didates. He did so, and about a month later the liberals approved 
the list by acclamation.13s 
For the election of 1862 the party in Elbing put into practice the 
more liberal suggestion. Instead of referring the task to a large com-
mittee it stirred the voters into action and held small meetings in each 
precinct for the selection of the electoral candidates. A contemporary 
observer wrote: 
This independent participation gives the voters a far greater 
interest in the victory of their candidates. It has the further 
advantage that in individual precincts associations are formed 
in these political meetings which plan to come together period-
ically for social and political conferences and especially during 
the time of the Landtag sessions will work beneficially for the 
political development of the members. 
The party likewise had agents in the small rural localities around 
Elbing and helped them to spread information about issues and can-
didates among the peasants. In this way it expected to overcome the 
handicap of impassable roads which prevented the rural voters from 
attending the city rallies.139 
138 Volkszeitung, April 20, 1862. 
137 Kolnische Zeitung, April 10, 1862. 
138 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 4, Nov. 14, 1861. 
13. Ibid., March 18, April 26, 1862. 
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The laws caused such difficulty in establishing associations and 
subjected them to such close supervision that party leaders had tended 
in 1861 not to create election associations but to be content with the 
more flexible and less formal institution of the election committee. 
As the conflict with the government grew in intensity, liberals in cer-
tain areas, for example, Konigsberg town and county and Dortmund 
and the surrounding area, established associations (1861 and 1862) for 
spreading knowledge of the constitution and of politics, so that "in 
the most remote and the smallest cottage one would find alongside 
the Bible and an almanac a copy of the constitution."14o They were 
a kind of society for adult education in constitutional government and 
were supported by the most prominent liberals in the region. In 
numerous places all over the state local leaders created informal groups 
of electors and even voters to keep in touch with the deputies during 
the Landtag sessions. Many liberal deputies wished to maintain these 
close contacts. They sent reports to friends for circulation or wrote 
articles for the local paper. Whenever possible, as in Berlin, the 
deputies appeared in person at meetings, spoke and discussed with 
those present the course of legislation in the Landtag. Voters and 
electors singly or in groups sent letters or resolutions to their deputies 
on many subjects.141 Indeed, the evidence points to the conclusion 
that in the vast majority of cases the relations between liberal deputies 
and their constituencies were close all the time. For the election of 
1862 the issues were clearly understood by upper classes and numerous 
members of the handworkers and peasantry. For the election of 1863 
the liberals did not even consider it necessary to campaign as vigorous-
ly as before.142 It required little effort to gain votes for the liberals. 
The fact that the elections were fought over basic principles of society 
and government, the meaning of which could be dramatized by con-
crete details, made it relatively easy for the liberals to win the lower 
classes to their side. A couple of speeches or a pamphlet were usually 
enough to show the classes, provided they were sufficiently inde-
pendent to risk antagonizing their Conservative masters, that their ad-
vantage lay with the liberals.u3 
16. Ibid., July 10, 1861, May 9, 1862; J'olhszeitu.ng, Feb. 21, 1862. 
'01 See the many examples in the contemporary press. 
, .. See Kolnische Zeitu.ng, Oct. 20, 1863. 
, .. The small amount of money spent on an election points to the same con-
clusion, that the political propaganda of the liberals was carried on largely through 
the normal channels of .social influence, the press, and personal contacts. The ex-
penditures of the Progressive party election association of Breslau for the election 
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In a few cities, Breslau for example, the Progressive party even ex-
tended its activity to the election of city councillors and through them 
to the election of the burgomaster.144 On the whole, however, the 
liberal political parties kept elections for local offices separate from 
those for deputies to the Lower House. They still distinguished be-
tween issues of what they called a political character, namely, of state-
wide significance involving principles, and problems of only local im-
port, problems merely of detail. Few of them perceived the advantage 
for self-government of stimulating political activity at all levels, of 
associating local with state politics as a means of increasing political 
interest and providing concrete, practical ties between the two for the 
benefit of each, of expanding the area of politics as far as possible for 
purposes of general education in individual political initiative and 
civic responsibility. Without the close affiliation with local organiza-
tions, vigorous in every election, local or state, the organization would 
not be permanent, the interest would not be all-inclusive and continu-
ous, the liberal deputies in the Landtag would lack the wide institu-
tionalized support which comes from the intimate inter-relatedness of 
local and state politics. The Conservative government would be able, 
as it actually was, to prevent wide-spread activity in politics by ob-
structing the development of a sense of political responsibility in local 
as well as state affairs. It succeeded in keeping politics at the state 
level, where they seemed too exalted and offered too few opportunities 
for the common man, the bulwark of democracy, to participate. An 
occasional use of the ballot did not afford much opportunity for him 
to learn about politics; the election of local officials and the deciding 
of local issues on a party basis would have enhanced his opportunities 
and would have increased the vested interests in popular government. 
The action of the Progressive party in Breslau was sound and healthy, 
but it lacked sufficient imitators. 
of 1862 amounted to l,lll Reichsthalers, 16 silver Groschen, and ~ Pfennig. Of 
this amount 185 Reichsthalers were used for advertisements and 275 Reichsthalers 
for printing. See Poli%ei-Bericht, Breslau, July 2, 1862 . 
... Poli%ei-Bericht, Breslau, July 21, Oct. 27, Nov. 24, 1862. 
10 / The Conservative Party 
T HE NUMBER of deputies elected by the Come",",iv" 
to the Lower House of the Landtag declined from 181 in 1855, to forty-
seven in 1858, to fifteen in 1861, to ten in 1862; it rose to thirty-six in 
the election of 1863. What kind of party was it that fell from power 
so completely and so fast? 
The Conservatives differentiated themselves sharply from every 
other political group. Occasionally the members were willing to co-
operate with other parties on a local basis, as in Konigsberg and Bres-
lau, where in November, 1861, the Conservative committee of the elec-
tors proposed cooperation to the election committee of the Constitu-
tionalor right-wing liberal party. In Konigsberg the offer was refused, 
but in Breslau the two parties traded support so that in 1861 each elect-
ed one deputy.l In the Western provinces, the Conservatives actually 
did establish working relations' with conservative Catholic voters. On 
the whole, however, they defended such reactionary political, economic 
and social principles that they repelled every other party or fraction. 
Minister von Roon privately criticized them for refusing to give any 
support to the government of the New Era because it contained a few 
right-wing liberals. He thought that they felt the need of adapting 
themselves to the constitutional system and of aligning with the 
government, but that personal antagonism between them and the 
liberal ministers, who had opposed them for over a decade, made 
rapprochement difficult.2 It is more than questionable whether the 
'Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Dec. I, 1861; National Zeitung, Dec. II, 1861. 
• Von Bemhardi, op. cit., IV, 174. 
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Conservatives ever thought of cooperating with other groups except on 
their own terms. In politics they were fanatical dogmatists. 
Upon Prince William's becoming regent in 1858 the Conservatives 
found themselves in an embarrassing situation. Many of them had 
openly opposed the Prince's being given this power, for they knew 
that he intensely disliked many of the acts of the Conservative Man-
teuffel government. They considered him far too friendly toward the 
liberals; and they wished to delay as long as possible his coming to 
authority and ending their happy regime. 
When Prince William dismissed the most objectionable of the 
ministers in 1858 and appointed right-wing liberals instead, the Con-
servatives lost their political power. Since the new Minister of the 
Interior issued a directive to the officials to remain neutral in the 
Landtag election, the Conservatives lost their party organization. The 
Prince Regent's somewhat liberal program of government deprived 
them of a political directive. Their fundamental political problem 
became that of how they could be Conservative and at the same time 
loyal to a ruler who was not Conservative. After having become accus-
tomed to receiving what they called a "tip from above," a "Wink von 
Oben," they were suddenly not receiving it. Deprived of the "tip from 
above," deprived of their political workers, the bureaucrats, deprived 
of the royal sanction of their policy and activity, what should they do? 
The Conservatives were not accustomed to taking the initiative in 
political activity. Those in the bureaucracy as well as those in private 
life had been brought up to receive political orders. Those outside 
the bureaucracy disliked intensely having to organize political activity 
and to seek votes. Such work seemed utterly out of keeping with 
conservatism. They were too comfortable and apathetic as a group 
to cope with the extraordinary situation of having to fend for their 
political lives. They understood almost nothing about political 
propaganda or party organization and instinctively disapproved of any 
such activity. In a well-ordered state with a sensible, that is, con-
servative ruler, one did not have to lower oneself to this kind of be-
havior. 
The loss of the election of 1858 did not shake the Conservatives 
out of their apathy. In fact they seemed so stunned by the appearance 
of an apparently liberal Hohenzollern ruler that they could not re-
concile themselves to the continuation of such an aberration. They 
worked by way of their contacts at court and in the army and by 
means of the Conservatives remaining in the ministry to bring the 
ruler back to their policy. They supplemented these efforts of social 
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persuasion by actions aiming to place the ruler in such a position of 
difficulty that he would be forced back into their camp. This was a 
matter of political strategy, and Prince William lent himself ad-
mirably to it by his adamant stand in military reform. They also 
endeavored to develop a political program and organization of their 
own and on their own responsibility and initiative to regain strength 
in the Lower House by entering into political party battles. The first 
and second lines of action have been treated above and need not be 
reconsidered here; the third deserves some analysis. It should be kept 
in mind that the Conservatives did not again become a powerful poli-
tical party until they were able to line up once more behind the govern-
ment and to use official resources for winning political victories. 
The Neues Preussische Sonntagsblatt, an offshoot of the Kreuz-
zeitung, wrote in June, 1861, that the Conservatives needed "a firm, 
integrated organization in which the individuals would willingly 
sacrifice their favorite personal views and opinions for the sake of the 
great good for which we fight, and attaching themselves to the larger 
totality would feel themselves to be important and effective members 
of the entire party." Although a few Conservative aristocrats were 
advocating the same proposal, the bourgeois lawyer Wagener had to 
take the necessary steps for executing it, and one can say without 
exaggeration that during the next few years he alone organized and 
led the party.s 
Through his speeches in the Lower House of the Landtag, of 
which he was usually a member, and especially through the articles in 
the Kreuzzeitung, which he edited, Wagener called the Conservatives 
to battle and strove to arouse them to the necessity of organization. 
He constantly pointed to the example set by the Progressive party and 
urged his colleagues to learn from their opponents. The elections to 
the Lower House forthcoming in the autumn of 1861 afforded the 
occasion for concrete steps to be taken, and by this time the Con-
servatives received a "tip from above." In the summer of that year 
the King said to a deputation of Conservatives, "Think about the next 
elections!"· 
Early in June, 1861, a group of Conservatives in Berlin formed a 
small committee to develop an organization. The committee, com-
posed of Count Eberhard zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, von Below-Hohen-
dorf, von Blanckenburg-Kardemin, Baron von Hertefeld and Wagener, 
• Miiller. op. cit., pp. 19, 42. 62. 67. 
• Ibid., p. 20. 
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sent a confidential letter to all the Conservative men known to it in the 
provinces. The committee urged them to campaign even where pros-
pects for success were slight. They should cooperate with the hand-
workers in this activity and should volunteer their services in organizing 
a Conservative association in each election district to direct and push 
the campaign. The committee decided against issuing a central 
election program, since according to experience such a program caused 
more division than unity. It urged the group in each district to 
promulgate its own and to make certain that copies of the program 
were widely distributed.1i 
The committee found an ally in the central election committee of 
Pruss ian handworkers. The latter had come into existence by a change 
of name. With the organization of the Prussian Handworker Congress 
for the Preservation of the Industry Law, an executive committee had 
been established to protect the interests of these guild-minded handi-
craftsmen against the threat of freedom of occupation. The organiza-
tion defended the law of 1849 by which some of the monopolistic 
privileges of former days had been restored to the guilds. The mem-
bers now transformed their executive committee into an election com-
mittee, and since the raison d'itre for the handworker organization 
conflicted with the essential principles of liberalism the committee had 
to line up with the Conservatives. It provided the popular aspect to 
the latters' endeavor. 
In September, 1861, the Conservatives, including the handworkers, 
held a convention in Berlin. The invitation had been a general one 
throughout the state to all friends "irrespective of class and influence" 
who were ready to hold firmly together "under the banner of loyalty, 
justice and morality." It was expected to found at that convention the 
Prussian Volksverein as a party organization to combat especially the 
Progressive party and the National Verein. Over a thousand persons 
attended, nobles, large and small landowners, hand workers, pastors, 
teachers, intellectuals and workers. The conference was opened by 
Vice-Superior Master of the Hunt and Second President of the House 
of Lords Count Eberhard zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, and among the 
well-known personalities present were retired Presidents von Meding 
and von Kleist-Retzow, Lieutenant General von Maliscewsky, Major 
General von Winterfeld, Counts von Wartensleben and von Fincken-
stein, Barons von Waldow-Reitzenstein and Senfft-Pilsach, Ludwig von 
Gerlach, Wagener, and the handworker leaders Master Cobbler Panse 
"Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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and Upholsterer Wohlgemuth. The Verein was created amidst an 
outburst of speeches and started on its indifferently successful career. 
"Hundreds and thousands," said the propaganda of the new organi-
zation, joined the Pruss ian Volksverein immediately; within a year the 
membership numbered about 12,000 to 15,000 persons. Nonetheless, 
the central election committee of the handworkers refused officially 
to the join the Verein or to sign the program. Panse declared that 
the handworkers would cooperate loyally with the Conservatives with-
out accepting the latter's program. He explained his decision on the 
grounds that the handworkers had to prevent the suspicion from 
arising that they were merely "instruments of a political party other-
wise alien to them." Their chief aim at present, he said, was to elect 
a few handworkers to the Lower House of the Landtag to protect their 
interests. 
In the course of the next few months it became clear that the hand-
workers had nothing in common with the Conservatives except the 
defence of the Industry Law of 1849. While the Pruss ian Volksverein 
claimed, with truth, that many handworkers joined the organization, 
it also knew that many did so unwillingly and that others declined the 
invitation because of fear of what the Kreuzzeitung called the "jeers 
of the masses." Panse was reported in the liberal newspapers as having 
said on October 30, 1861, at a public meeting of the Conservatives in 
Berlin that "all handworkers would decidedly go with the liberal 
party, if the latter had not written the fatal words 'freedom of occupa-
tion' on its banner." The alliance seems not to have been a happy 
one. Almost at once after the founding of the Volksverein the leaders 
of the handworkers were complaining that they had no opportunity to 
discuss matters privately with the central election committee of the 
Conservatives.6 The Count This and That, the Lieutenant General, 
the Vice-Superior Master of the Hunt seem not to have had much in-
terest in the problems of the handworkers. Let the latter make suits 
and mend shoes and lay stones, and vote Conservative.7 
The Prussian Volksverein established headquarters in Berlin and 
selected a central election committee composed characteristically of 
thirteen nobles and one burgher, the latter being the indispensable 
Wagener. It set to work so bureaucratically and with such authori-
tarian zeal, at least in words, that Professor Leo of the University of 
• Ibid., pp. 29-30, 33-34, 40, 42. 
• There was also complaint that the aristocrats preferred to buy their clothes from 
elegant stores and not to entrust their business to mere handworkers. See Tages. 
bericht, Feb. 17, 1862. 
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Halle, one of the party's most prominent and devoted members, com-
plained. In order to counter the criticism that this was a feudal or 
Junker party, he said, the committee should have included others 
besides nobles. He urged that the mistake be corrected so that the 
party would draw those with conservative sympathy but without 
sufficiently strong convictions to be immune to the attractions of 
liberalism. He acknowledged that in the existing "war situation of 
the party" the member should be obligated to pay dues, but he con-
demned the bureaucratic way in which the committee proposed to 
assess and collect them. He disliked the committee's complicated and 
impractical method of conducting correspondence and its failure to 
establish personal contact with local leaders and to use them as local 
agents responsible for party affairs in their district. If the committee 
continued its present methods, he concluded, the Volksverein would 
soon lose every member in Halle. He urged that the management be 
vigorously decentralized.s 
In one respect Professor Leo's criticism was accepted. In December, 
1861, the central committee became composed of seven aristocrats and 
£our burghers, Eberhard Count Stolberg-Wernigerode, von Below-
Hohendorff, von Blanckenburg-Zimmerhausen, General Count von 
Finckenstein - Trebichow, Count yon Piickler - Ober - Weistritz, von 
Krause-Schwarzow, Wagener, Baron von Hertefeld-Liebenberg, Burgo-
master Strosser, Knight's Estate-Owners Andrae-Roman and Losch-
Ober-Stephansdorf.9 Of the burghers two were knight's estate-owners 
and the other two were officials. Burgher businessmen, handworkers 
and peasants were not included. 
The Volksverein scarcely attempted to meet Professor Leo's other 
major criticism, that the organization was too centralized and bureau-
cratic. It was unable to develop branch and local Vereins because of 
the prohibition contained in the law on associations of March 11, 
1850, a law which the government, composed at the time of Conserva-
tives, had passed against the liberals. It followed the example of the 
hated National Verein in creating only one central Verein-the Prus-
sian Volksverein-to which all members belonged. These could meet 
in local groups as members of the central Verein in Berlin and conduct 
the necessary business.1o The county and the mail station were 
selected as the natural geographic units of activity. Every county 
could have as many local divisions of the Volksverein as there were 
8 Miiller, op. cit., p. 36. 
• Ibid., p. 55. 
10 Ibid., p. 55. 
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mail stations. If possible, every rural community with more than 
twenty members of the Verein should constitute a separate group. 
The local group should establish direct connection with the leader 
of the county organization, the county commissioner. It could like-
wise enter into direct relations with the central agency in Berlin. 
The executive committee of the Volksverein recommended certain 
measures to be taken by the county and local groups. First, the mem-
bers should be invited to a discussion in order to elect a chairman. 
The latter should prepare a list of members, attend to the correspond-
ence with the central office in Berlin and keep the local members in-
formed. The members should pay a small fee to cover expenses. The 
chairman was expressly empowered to collect the fees and disburse the 
sums for Verein business. 
Anyone entitled to vote could become a member of the Verein by 
signing the program. If any member acted in public in an anti-
monarchical or in a democratic manner, he should be excluded from 
the Verein by a decision of the county or the local organization. 
The local chairman or the county commissioner had the power to 
constitute the organization as he saw fit; the form should be appro-
priate to local or county needs. At the local level it could just as well 
be a social organization, a loan association or any other. If a Con-
servative organization already existed which could be used as the 
local representative of the Volksverein, it should be kept as it was, 
irrespective of name, with the influential members also being members 
of the Volksverein. If sufficient members were available in a locality, 
the group should select an executive committee, which from time to 
time should hold social gatherings in order to attract new members. 
During the summer at least one social event should be held, in com-
mon with neighboring local groups, with a full display of flags, shields, 
and other patriotic emblems. The famous events in the country's 
history should be celebrated with speeches and other forms of com-
memoration. Above all, discipline should be carefully preserved in 
the Vereins so that no democratic elements could creep in and gain 
the upper hand. 
All correspondence, printed material, petitions and so forth sent 
out by the central committee would be individually addressed at the 
central office to the members in the local division, but in order to save 
postage they would be sent in toto to the county commissioners. The 
latter should then forward them through the mail. The same system 
should be used in case of correspondence from persons at the local 
level to the central committee; it should be sent to the local chairman, 
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by him to the county commissioner and by him to the central com-
mittee. A semi-annual report should be prepared at the local level 
about loss and gain of members and sent via the county commissioner 
to the central committee.ll 
The pattern used in these instructions was manifestly that of the 
organization of the Prussian government. Orders were issued from the 
center to be carried out in the provinces. Instructions were written in 
detail; a semi-annual report on accomplishments should be made; the 
necessary literature for dissemination should be despatched by the 
central office; the expenditure on postage stamps should be carefully 
watched; a commissioner in the county and a chairman in the com-
munity should be selected, as the equivalents of the Landrat, the 
burgomaster, the Junker on his estate, the village Schulze, who were 
responsible for the local activity; membership should be restricted to 
the pure who signed the pledge, and orders were issued to exclude 
all persons disloyal to the King or suspected or guilty of being demo-
cratic and liberal. The organization reflected the habitual dependence 
upon the government. Just how the Volksverein expected to win 
popular support with such an organization is not clear. It seemed 
scarcely suitable to perform the functions of a political party. 
In 1862 Wagener claimed that the Volksverein had 16,755 members 
not counting those in East Prussia. It numbered 462 local units 
organized in seventy county "commissariats" as follows: 12 
Prussia 12 Commissariats with 56 local groups 
Pomerania 13 " " 64 " " 
Posen 4 " " 22 " " 
Brandenburg 9 " " 121 " " 
Silesia 15 " " 96 " " 
Westphalia 4 " " 38 " " 
Saxony 13 " " 55 " " 
Rhineland 10 " " 
The Volksverein reached the peak of its strength in December, 1865, 
when it claimed to have over 50,000 members of whom 1l,145 were in 
Berlin, 34,508 in the provinces, and over 9,000 in a specially consti-
tuted Verein in Konigsberg. These were organized in 534 locals.13 
The Conservatives lacked a press adequate to express and defend 
their views. They despised newspapers too much to be concerned 
llIbid., pp. 55-57. 
U Ibid., pp. 67-68. 
11 Ibid., p. 86. 
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with establishing and maintaining their own organs. They disliked 
the stir which the press caused; they were averse to the obligations of 
continuous intellectual effort which it entailed; they intuitively felt 
that any public discussion of issues, even by controlled Conservative 
journals, would arouse public interest and disrupt the traditional 
acquiescence of the masses in upper-class dominance. They had relied 
so long upon the government to supply whatever organs seemed neces-
sary for imparting information to a docile public that they were un-
able to change their attitude quickly and expand their own press to 
cover the state. As a Silesian Landrat exclaimed in the 1850s, "What 
governmental newspaper, no matter how small, does not need subsidies 
to existl" Even then it was hard to keep the journal alive.14 
The New Era found the Conservatives unprepared to use any other 
than the 'accustomed methods of action. They had only one news-
paper of any consequence, the Kreuzzeitung, established during the 
revolutionary years of 1848-49 and edited by the redoutable Wagener. 
Supplementing it were the Neues Preussische Sonntagsblatt, which was 
actually put out by the former, the Volksblatt fur Stadt und Land, 
the Preussisches Volksblatt, and the Berliner Revue. The organ of 
the handworkers, the Deutsche Burgerzeitung, may perhaps be added; 
and the list is exhausted. A considerable number of local papers were 
founded during the early '60s to assist in the propaganda; a humorous 
journal was established; a Preussischer Volks- Vereins-Kalender was 
published for popular consumption; Wagener's Staats-und Gesell-
schafts-Lexikon continued to be edited; and a large amount of pam-
phlets, broadsheets and similar literature was produced. A correspond-
ence bureau was created in Berlin in January, 1862, to supply news 
four times a week to the provincial and local press about the debates 
in the Landtag. By March of that year its services were subscribed 
for by some fifty papers. At the same time an office was opened to 
provide the provincial and local papers with editorials and long articles 
at a modest price. 
A few Conservatives recognized the weakness of the party press and 
urged the party to change its habits. One writer deplored the feeling 
of superiority toward the press on the part of the Conservatives and 
cited the example of England where the Conservative papers flourished 
and editors associated on terms of equality with the highest personages. 
What a contrast with Prussia, he exclaimed. He urged that editors 
.. Willy Klawitter, Die Zeitungen und Zeitschriften Schlesiens von den Anfiingen 
bis zum Jahre 1870 bezw. bis zur Gegenwart (Breslau, 1930), p. 8. 
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be accepted in a "fraternal, comradely" way by the party leaders.l5 
The central Verein took up the problem and recommended the fol-
lowing procedure for establishing a local paper which, it said, had 
proved successful. One should not concentrate on obtaining sub-
scribers but should be much more concerned with arousing personal 
interest in the existence of the paper. To that end one should issue 
stocks in the paper and sell them in the county at from one to five 
Thalers each. A competent pastor or teacher should assume the 
editorship and the stocks should be repaid from the profits. By fol-
lowing this procedure, the central Verein stated, each stockholder 
would work to secure subscriptions and advertisements and at the 
same time would as part-owner represent and defend the journal.I6 
In 1862 the Conservatives controlled only thirty-three newspapers 
in the entire Pruss ian state. They were beginning to move, however, 
and local groups of Conservatives were in the process of founding small 
local papers to fight the liberals. In the Grafschaft Ravensberg ap-
peared the semi-weekly Konservativer Volks Freund; in Posen, the 
Neue Bromberger Wochenschrift. In Silesia, after months of delay, 
the Conservatives succeeded in founding, in October, 1862, the Pro-
vinzial Zeitung fur Schlesien and in beginning to transform the 
Breslauer Kreisblatt and the Breslauer Polizei-und Fremdenblatt into 
political journals. Good Conservatives in Silesia were thereby able 
to escape the necessity of reading the liberal Schlesische Zeitung.u 
As soon as the Conservatives returned to control of the government, 
the process of transforming existing government papers into political 
journals became much simpler. The local papers which the govern-
ment had created for publishing official information, many of them 
in the preceding century, were turned into political supporters of 
Conservatism. The change occurred throughout Prussia and offered 
a solution in keeping with Conservative standards. The government 
took the initiative, paid the bills, created nothing new and merely 
identified itself with Conservatism and employed the resources of the 
bureaucracy in the fight of Conservatism for survival. How efficiently 
the bureaucracy set to work may be seen from the police report from 
Breslau, July 4, 1863. 
15 Tagesbericht, No. 19, Jan. 23, 1862. 
16 Miiller, op. cit., pp. 43, 58·59. 
17 Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 109; Tagesbericht, No.1, Jan. 2, 1862, Nos. 12, 
16, Jan. 15,20, 1862; Zeitungs·Bericht tilr Mai-Juni, 1861, Regierungs·Bezirk Breslau, 
July 8, 1861. 
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The Breslau county paper has been transformed into a poli-
tical weekly for the purpose of opposing the demagoguery of 
the popular democratic little morning papers. A similar change 
is being prepared here in the city. The Breslau Polizei-und 
Fremdenblatt has already appeared since the first of the month 
in a larger format and will be organized on a basis similar to that 
of the Decker Berniner Fremden-und Anzeigeblatt. Great efforts 
will be made to obtain many subscribers for the paper and by 
many advertisements to make it a necessary directory and guide 
for strangers and natives. As soon as this is achieved the paper 
is gradually to be transformed into a local Conservative poli-
tical journal. 
The Prussian Volksverein proved to be a one-man organization. 
Wagener ran it from the start; the other members of the central 
executive committee were incompetent in popular political activity 
and inclined to do nothing. In the provinces the leadership was, if 
possible and with not over a dozen exceptions, even worse. The Con-
servatives were apathetic. Accustomed to issuing and to receiving 
orders, they understood intrigue at court or among a select few of the 
upper class, but they had neither the inclination nor the ability to 
cater to the masses for votes. Apart from Wagener and a few others, 
they could not make speeches; they could not debate; they could not 
write popular articles or pamphlets; they could not maintain their 
position in a public argument with the liberals. They soon learned 
to avoid public debate with their opponents and sought to exclude the 
latter from their political rallies.18 
The political ineptitude may be illustrated by the following two 
stories, one of the city, one of the rural area. On October 30, 1861, the 
Conservatives held a rally in the first election district in Berlin. The 
invitation had contained the statement that "Master Cobbler Panse 
has promised to attend." Captain von Zastrow opened the meeting, 
and after announcing that Panse had had to go to Danzig he prepared 
to read the latter's speech. Vigorous objections were voiced by the 
liberals and democrats in the audience. These visitors used the op-
portunity to refute and denounce their opponents so completely that, 
as Colonel von Alvensleben was reported to have said, the Conserva-
tives were "totally and openly defeated," and a liberal took over the 
conduct of the meeting. At that moment Panse appeared, declared 
that he was a "shamefully abused sacrificial lamb" of the Conservative 
party, and denied that he had anything to do with politics. He asserted 
that the only reason for the handworkers' aligning with the Conserva-
18 Muller, op. cit., pp. 41-42. 
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tives was that the liberals advocated the abolition of the law protecting 
the handicrafts, that otherwise they sided entirely with the liberals. 
When he spoke in favor of preserving the examination for those wish-
ing to become handworkers, the liberals revealed the fact that he him-
self had never taken the examination and that far from being a bona 
fide handworker he owned a store which sold shoes made by others.19 
The second example of political incompetence occurred at a meet-
ing of Conservative voters in November, 1861, at Cumehnen in Fisch-
hausen county. About twenty-six persons assembled, estate-owners, 
peasants and handworkers. O. W. Fischer from Konigsberg spoke in 
his usual vein about the imperfection of all mortal acts. Only the 
eternal laws of God and His will as revealed in the Christian religion, 
he said, should be held holy. Several members of the Progressive party 
were present and objected to the assertions. They emphasized that in 
state affairs one could manage neither with the divine moral law nor 
with revelations, that one needed definite laws. They led the meeting 
to their side, leaving only the seven nobles in a determined minority.20 
Except for the handworkers and to some extent the factory workers, 
the Conservatives aimed their propaganda not so much at townsmen 
as at the rural people, the large landowners, the peasantry, the pastors 
and county school teachers. They also sought to influence the officials, 
but as long as the government remained neutral in the elections they 
had slight success. Throughout the years of the New Era and the 
constitutional conflict they used their economic and social power over 
dependent persons to the limit. These means were especially recom-
mended by the executive committee of the Volksverein. Even before 
the latter had been established, the Conservative committee in Berlin 
had sent out the following advice: 
In the rural districts the estate-owners should endeavor to 
have everyone subject to their influence cast a ballot. They 
should use every proper and legally permissible means of in-
fluence on their subjects and on those with whom they do busi-
ness. 
The women should also exert their influence. At the time of the elec-
tion the most respected Conservatives should be present in the room 
during the act of voting.21 
11 Ibid., p. 42 . 
•• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 17. 1861. 
.. Muller. op. cit., pp. 45. 37; Parisius. Politische Parteien, pp. 40·41; National 
Zeitung, Aug. 31, 1861. 
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In 1861 the Conservatives were a little careful about carrying out 
the recommendations of the central committee. They complained that 
Minister von Schwerin's election decree on the attitude to be taken 
by the officials toward the election lacked clarity and decision. They 
argued that it was not impartial, that it favored the liberals as 
against the Conservatives. Since it permitted the officials to participate 
in the activities of the National Verein, for example, it should also 
allow full freedom to the Landrats and the other administrative 
officials in behalf of the Volksverein.22 The reason for their concern 
was expressed in a letter which Moritz von Blanckenburg, one of their 
leaders, wrote in December, 1861, to Minister von Roon. "I shall not 
let my courage fall, but against the governmental stream the Conserva-
tives are completely powerless .... If the King does not bestir him-
self, not necessarily now but soon, very soon, these serious democrats 
will quietly and piecemeal do away with what is left of the monarchy. 
I have hope in nothing, for I do not think anyone has courage."23 
When in 1862 the Ministry of the Interior was turned over to a 
Conservative and officials were instructed to use their power to help 
return a pro-government majority, the Conservatives once more had 
fighting troops and backing for vigorous deeds. They became bold 
and optimistic; they had power; they had good speakers; they could 
attack the enemy, even beard him in his own political rallies, and 
challenge him to debate, either written or oral. The officials, who 
had formerly been curbed by Count Schwerin, could, in fact had to, 
come out on their side. The Conservatives could now march ahead, 
for they had a leader; their King was once more calling them to battle. 
The detailed instructions on each step to take in winning the conflict 
were again in the finest authoritarian, bureaucratic tradition. The 
future seemed bright for "King and Fatherland." 
The full display of Conservative "freedom of elections" occurred 
in 1863 after Bismarck had become Minister President. In prepara-
tion for the elections the Conservatives in Berlin issued a broadsheet 
entitled "Advice on Conservative Election Agitation in Town and 
Country."24 The advice was divided into two sections, that for Berlin 
and the larger towns and that for the rural areas. The section on the 
cities came first. In each election district an election leader was to be 
named who would choose leaders in each precinct; he in turn would 
select efficient agents to assist him. These persons were to be respon-
22 Miiller, op. cit., pp. 37.38. 
"Von Roon, op. cit., II, 56·57 . 
•• Miiller, op. cit., pp. 73·75. 
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sible for the campaign. They should by writing or by word of mouth 
get in touch with the known Conservatives in their area and in private 
discussion gain further assistance and plan the campaign. Not merely 
prestige and wealth should be decisive in the selection of these agents, 
but influence, reliability and energy. Each should be assigned certain 
houses and streets in which he should learn the views of the residents, 
win over the undecided and stir up the lazy to participate in the 
election. The election leaders should work especially on the officials 
to vote the right way. 
Servants and workers dependent upon Conservatives should be in-
structed about the significance of the election and held strictly to 
account for their vote. They should be allowed the opportunity to 
attend Conservative rallies without any penalty for lost working time. 
In case of a large number of servants, the leader should first be won 
for the Conservative cause. Conservative landlords should place every 
possible obstacle in the way of agitation by the opponents. They 
should not permit propaganda by the opponents to be posted on their 
walls or literature to be distributed on their premises and should im-
mediately notify the Conservative agents of any attempts to do so. 
After the agents had found a sufficient number of supporters they 
should call a meeting to discuss political issues. In that discussion the 
danger from democracy to the existing social order should be em-
phasized and voters urged to participate in the election. All should 
promise verbally and by a shake of the hand to campaign for the 
Conservatives. The meeting should select the candidates for the role 
of elector in each precinct for all three classes. 
General district meetings should be attended in person in order to 
keep an eye on the opponents and openly and firmly to combat them. 
The liberal leaders should be sharply watched and reports should be 
made to the Conservative district leaders about the activities of these 
persons. Improper conduct of officials should also be reported. "All 
persons dependent on the government or bound by material interest 
and honor" should be kept under close observation. The Conservative 
pamphlets and broadsheets should be carefully read and used as a 
source of material for debates with opponents. The accuracy and 
completeness of the lists of voters should be checked. To cover costs 
of postage, publications and so on, a silver Groschen should be col-
lected from each member at each party meeting. 
For the election itself the names of the candidates should be pub-
lished under the superscription "Vote for the Monarchical Party Loyal 
to the King." Election literature should be posted and distributed 
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among the voters. On election day "stalwart and fearless men" should 
be stationed in front of the voting place and should once more dis-
tribute literature to the voters. The candidates should present them-
selves to the voters of their district, including the opponents, personally 
or by letter or by a printed address in calm language, and should ask 
for their support. Above all, one should see to it that at least one 
reliable member of the Conservative party should be in the election 
commission so that no unfair act could occur. The names of the 
candidates should be spoken loudly and firmly and Conservative elector 
candidates should vote for themselves. Any illegal acts should be 
quietly witnessed, and if the election favored the opponents, protest 
should be raised against the legality of the election. All voters should 
remain in the room until the conclusion of the balloting so that in 
case another ballot was necessary the Conservatives would not lose 
votes. 
The Conservatives regarded the campaigning in the rural areas as 
simpler than that in the towns and cities. First of all the Conserva-
tive leaders should arrive at an understanding with the pastors, the 
officials of the local government, and the estate-owners. These should 
have the duty of explaining the issues to the voters-"the dangers 
threatening them from the growing proletariat, the parcelling of 
estates, the expanding bureaucracy, the harm to church and school 
from separating them, the equalization of proletariat and taxpayers, 
of propertyless persons and peasants, the representation of rural in-
terests merely by county judges, the increasing predominance of the 
cities." Each meeting should be opened by prayer and song and three 
cheers for the King. The sense of military honor and the memory of 
military exploits should be aroused; the "old Prussian feeling," "na-
tional pride" and "the old love for the Royal House of the Hohen-
zollerns" should be strengthened. "One should make it a duty and an 
honor, an expression of Prussian loyalty and love, to vote for the King: 
that is Conservativel"211 
The central election committee sent to the provinces in 1863 a list 
of persons whose return to the Lower House should be especially 
pressed. The list read as follows: 26 
King's Counsel Wagener in Berlin 
von Blanckenburg of Zimmerhausen 
President von Gerlach in Magdeburg 
H Summarized in Muller, op. cit., pp. 73-75; also in Kolnische Zeitu"g, Oct. 9, 
1863 . 
•• Printed in Kolnische Zeitung, Oct. 10, 1863. 
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General-Director von Hiilsen in Merseburg 
Appellate Court Judge von Prittwitz in Breslau 
Superior Forest Master von Wedell in Erfurt 
von Tettau-Tolks 
Burgomaster Strosser in Herford 
Privy Administrative Counsellor Elwanger in Breslau 
von Nathusius in Konigsborn 
Professor Glaser in Konigsberg 
Consistory Director Noldechen in Magdeburg 
County Court Director Ebert in Liegnitz 
Appellate Court President von Brauchitsch in Stettin 
Chamberlain Count von Piickler of Weisteritz 
State's Attorney Wendt in Stargard 
King's Counsel Hiibner in Breslau 
Infantry General on Active Service von Brandt in Berlin 
Privy Superior Administrative Counsellor von Kliitzow in Berlin 
Superior Administrative Counsellor von Nordenflycht in Minden 
Active Privy Counsellor von Olfers in Berlin 
Privy Superior Administrative Counsellor Stiebel in Berlin 
Guild Supreme Master Neuhaus in Berlin 
Retired Major von Bliicher in Berlin 
von Rathkirch-Track of Panthen (Silesia) 
Landrat Prince von Hohenlohe of Lublinitz 
Landrat von Seydewitz in Garlitz 
Baron von Hertefeldt 
Appellate Court President Holzapfel in Ratibor 
City Court President Breithaupt in Berlin 
Count von Oriolla of Ruchendorf near Reichenbach 
Privy Superior Administrative Counsellor von Krocher in Berlin 
Retired City Councillor Doctor Woeniger in Berlin 
Retired King's Counsel Gerloff in Berlin 
The list contained the name of only one with even a title of hand-
worker. All the other persons were gentlemen, nobles, officials, 
officers, pastors, professors, lawyers. Twenty of them belonged to the 
nobility; the other fourteen were burghers. Such was the social dis-
tribution of candidates with which the Conservatives expected to win, 
if not the election (for they were doubtful about so great success), at 
least a large number of seats. 
In 1862 the number of stories of pressure on little people began 
to increase. The Conservatives threatened to cease patronizing hotels 
which allowed the liberals to use rooms for meetings. They withdrew 
trade from liberal merchants, restaurant owners, handworkers, and 
anyone else with whom they had business. They brought pressure to 
bear upon the peasants. When one merchant protested against such 
treatment, his client, the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-
Augustenburg zu Primkenau replied, "You demonstrated in favor of 
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the Progressive party; the men of the Progressive party are revolu-
tionary, subversive elements; they are the most dangerous people in 
the state. If they are re-elected, we have to expect revolution."27 
The vigor with which the non-official Conservatives followed the 
advice of the heads of the Volksverein may be seen from two incidents. 
One concerned industrial workers, the other, the rural people. Herr 
von Diiring, manager of the Saarbriicken Railway and of the Royal 
Machine Company, instructed his workers to vote against the liberal 
candidates for the Landtag. The workers refused to follow his coun-
sel, and after the election he dismissed four of them. Believing that he 
intended to punish all 150 of them by gradual dismissal, the workers 
announced that they would all quit of their own accord. Nothing 
more of Herr von Diiring's plan was heard.28 
The rural incident occurred on the estate of Prince von Pless in 
Upper Silesia and revealed the great amount of power over the peasants 
possessed by a big landlord, the methods by which the latter was able 
to use that power, and the extraordinary courage required on the part 
of the peasants to resist the pressure. The event was fully investigated 
and discussed in the Lower House of the Landtag, and the facts were 
well established. 
In the regular election a doubtful liberal named Rygulla had been 
victorious in the sixth Oppeln District. Because of election irregulari-
ties, the Lower House had refused to seat him. When a new election 
was held, Landrat von Seherr-Thoss was returned, only to have the 
Lower House refuse to seat him pending an investigation. Requested 
to report on the election, the Landrat Baron von Richthofen did so 
on the basis of material supplied mainly by Prince von Pless and failed 
to interview any of the persons protesting to the Lower House against 
the validity of the election. When a committee of the Lower House 
investigated the case it disclosed the following facts. Prince von Pless 
owned the largest estates in the district and had in his hands the 
economic fate of his numerous subjects and of many others with whom 
he· dealt. He had served on the government commission to conduct 
the elections along with the Duke of Ratibor, the second largest land-
owner in the area. The Prince von Pless was involved in controversies 
with individual peasants and entire communities over the settlement of 
the former servile economic obligations, and witnesses agreed that the 
'T See Volkszeitung, April 25, May 3. 14. 1862; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, 
Nov. 29. 1862; Tagesbericht. Jan. 15. 27. 1862 . 
•• Abg. H .• St. B., Nov. 28. 1863; I. 200-01. 
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prince's speech to the local peasant leaders given below and the voter's 
response were acts in this continuing battle, 
Schulze Wrobel was present at the prince's speech and later testi-
fied under oath before a court as follows: 
I know only the Polish language and since the last election 
I have been an elector. Shortly before the election of a deputy 
held on July 23, 1862, at Sorau a messenger from the Prince von 
Pless brought me , .. an invitation to Pless. I heeded the sum-
mons and found at least forty peasant Schulzes or electors gather-
ed in the Princely riding stables where the Princely Recorder 
Sarganeck received us in person. He invited those present to 
eat and drink. On the table meat, bread and butter were laid 
out and two casks of Bavarian beer, each cask being about half 
a tun. Sarganeck added: when we have become better acquaint-
ed we shall discuss something. 
After those present had eaten and drunk, Prince von Pless 
appeared and made a speech to us, his guests, in the German 
language which Sarganeck translated word for word into Polish. 
The Prince had papers in front of him on the table. I cannot 
recall the exact words of the speaker, but I do remember the 
sense of it. The Prince exhorted us to vote at the next election 
of a deputy, not again for Rygulla but for Landrat Baron Seherr-
Thoss. . . . Recorder Sarganeck actually said, "Whoever does 
not vote for Baron Seherr will feel it." I do not remember that 
the expression was used that anyone not voting for the Landrat 
would be ejected. We replied to the speaker that not all those 
Schulzes present were electors. Sarganeck then said, "The 
Schulzes who are not themselves electors should report to the 
electors of their communities what has been said here and 
should request them to vote for Baron Seherr; otherwise all will 
feel it." No more was said, but all of us present knew what this 
warning referred to, namely, the permission to gather leaves, 
branches and moss in the Princely forests at low prices for use 
in our own economy. This proved to be true. I did not let my-
self be influenced and cast my vote for Rygulla. When I sub-
sequently spoke to the Princely Forester Kleist at Wyrow about 
buying the forest refuse and moss, he refused me with the state-
ment that I should receive nothing. I know that the community 
Wilkowy, whose electors Pilch and Spyra voted in Sorau for 
Baron Seherr, have received moss and forest refuse from the 
Princely Forester for nothing. Pilch was, as I recall, also at the 
breakfast. 
Another Schulze who had been present at the meeting told several 
witnesses that if they failed to vote for his candidate, von Seherr, "it 
is possible that ... the Prince would not rent land to us any more." 
What did the Prince von Pless actually say to the peasants? For-
tunately, the prince had kept a copy of his speech. As an example of 
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an election address by an aristocrat living according to the standards 
of the Old Regime it is worthy of preservation. 
I have summoned you as the most influential men in the com-
munities in order to speak a serious word to you in this very seri-
ous time. You know that I have always lived with you in the 
fullest harmony and I can openly testify that I have always been 
proud of you, of your devotion to me and my house, of your 
trusting love for our King and Lord. When I have been together 
with the King and his highest servants I have often mentioned 
you with praise. When I speak a serious word of exhortation to 
you today I do so in order for this friendly agreement to con-
tinue. The matter is simple. Formerly we were always in agree-
ment on our acts; now you have given ear to persons whom I do 
not know and also refuse to know, persons who spread calumny 
against the intentions of our beloved King and against my in-
tentions, persons who did not even have the courage to put their 
names to the communication sent to you. That you have be-
lieved this calumny is proved by the way in which you par-
ticipated in the Landtag election while I was away from you, and 
by the way in which you openly regarded as your enemies me 
and those upon whom I bestow my trust. There is in this be-
havior such appalling ignorance of the truth that I must speak 
to you some words of clarification. Your welfare goes hand in 
hand with mine. I am a landowner as well as you, and since I 
am a large landowner, all the disadvantages which strike the 
landowner strike me in a greater measure. I have therefore only 
one interest-to care for your welfare because your welfare is also 
my welfare. That one or the other of you or even an entire com-
munity becomes involved in some controversy with one of my 
officials or even has a lawsuit, does not pertain to this matter. 
After all, this sort of thing occurs among neighbors. Instead of 
considering this simple fact you believed the persons who said to 
you that I am your opponent. I speak frankly to you and you 
be frank to me. Let one of you cite an instance in which I have 
intentionally offended one of my peasants, or, if he were in need, 
where I have not attempted to help him as much as possible. If 
no one can cite such an instance, what right have you to believe 
the lies spread against me? Now it is time for the elections 
again, and you have the opportunity to show what will be our 
relations in the future. I can only assume that if you choose a 
different deputy from me you place no confidence in me and do 
not wish to live in friendship with me any more. Although I 
shall be sorry not to be able to live with you in friendship any 
longer, I shall withdraw myself from you, since I shall assume 
that you, if you do not vote as I do, do not wish to live with me 
in friendship any longer. The results arising from this split 
desired by you are of your own making and you will dearly see 
that I shall not suffer from them. 
Now go in peacel Report to your communities what I have 
said to you. I make it your duty to do this at least before the 
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elections in Sorau on the twenty-third of this month so that the 
communities cannot subsequently excuse themselves on the 
grounds of ignorance, and the blame for the disadvantageous re-
sults of your neglect will not fall on you. Tell the electors that 
I expect them to appear at the election and to do their duty 
toward the King and the state. Once more. It is a question of 
showing at the election whether you wish friendship or hostility 
from me. The results of hostility will become apparent. Now 
vote as you wish. 
The effects of the prince's speech were immediately evident in the 
extent of participation in the election. The electors from a number 
of communities who had voted for Rygulla failed to appear at all. 
Fewer electors voted for all candidates than had in the preceding 
election voted for the winner alone. Such was the manner in which 
Landrat von Seherr-Thoss was returned. 
When the Lower House refused to seat the winner, the Conserva-
tive deputy Count Bethusy-Huc argued against the decision. Influence 
on an election, he said, could be exercised not only from above but 
from below. Pressure from one's equals, he asserted, was much more 
effective than that which was wielded from above upon individual 
votes. Such influence was entirely private in character, and so long 
as it did not violate the law it should not be considered by the Lower 
House. The Prince von Pless, he declared, had not overstepped his 
rights at all; if one considered the moral side of the case one should 
far more question whether one should annul the election of a deputy 
receiving the votes of these electors or annul the election of electors 
so susceptible to the attraction of a breakfast. Human nature could 
not be changed, he concluded, and so long as it remained what it was 
one had no guarantee of free elections in a moral sense and should 
restrict himself to preventing the exercise of illegal influence by state 
officials.29 
The story contained all the elements of the lord-peasant relation-
ship in a period of transition. The lord used his manorial power to 
preserve his authority under a system of parliamentary representation. 
He blended a nice assertion of friendship with a threat of punishment 
in case of disobedience. He entertained the peasants in a barn and 
appeared personally for a few minutes in order to read a warning 
speech. He glossed over the main source of trouble, the controversy 
with the peasants over the sum to be paid for the lord's having to re-
•• See the documents in Abg. H., St. B., Aug. 16. 1862; III. 1228. Ibid., Jan. 31. 
April 15, 1863; I. 140-43. II. 835-43. 
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linquish certain properties and rights to them-a part of the process 
of peasant emancipation. The peasants, who noted the exact measure-
ment of the casks of Bavarian beer, were aware that they furthered 
their own interests best by voting liberal. While many of them were 
frightened away from the voting booth or were induced to vote as 
their lord wished, a great many understood the meaning of the elec-
tion for peasant interests and defied the lord. Equally illuminating 
was the Count Bethusy-Huc's confusion of pressure from above and 
pressure from one's peers. To this good count the latter seemed worse 
than the former. Just how one could have elections without some 
influence from one's peers, he did not say. How one could continue 
to hold elections of any significance when pressure from above could 
be freely applied, he likewise did not say. He had recourse to the old 
Conservative argument: man is an evil being and as far as the law 
allows he must in private life be controlled by his superiors. 
The uniformity of Conservative election orders may be seen in the 
instructions issued to his subjects by Herr von Saldern of Meffersdorf, 
Lauban county: 
To the Royal Prussian voters of the Manors Meffersdorf, 
Schwerta and Volkersdorf. His Majesty our most gracious King 
and Sovereign has commanded that on the twentieth of this 
month the elections shall occur and has stated that the elections 
will be free only in case those persons are elected who agree with 
the views and wishes of His Majesty and His ministers. The 
former deputies of our election district have voted against the 
will of His Majesty and His ministers. Since I do not wish that 
those Royal Prussian voters who vote for electors who vote for a 
deputy in Garlitz on the 28th of this month who opposes the 
will of His Majesty and His Majesty's ministers should stand 
henceforth in any kind of business relations with me, I have 
commanded as follows: those voters who act to the contrary, if 
they are laborers in the forest or in the economy, be dismissed, 
and that the same be done to those in the brick-kiln, the peat-bed 
and the factory for oven and clay wares; that the officials of the 
forest, the economy, the garden, the mill, the bakery, be given 
notice; that final accounts be settled with artisans who have 
worked for the estates or for the other administrative branches, 
as well as with merchants who have sold them anything; more-
over that those who have rented a dwelling or land or a forest 
be immediately notified that as soon as the contract has expired 
it will not be renewed. I demand from all the above mentioned 
voters who stand in any kind of relations to me that they par-
ticipate in the voting on the twentieth of this month. Whoever 
fails to supply me personally with a satisfactory explanation for 
remaining away from the polls will receive the same treatment as 
those voters who vote for new deputies in opposition to the will 
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of His Majesty and His ministers. My manager, Inspector 
Demnitz, is given the commission to supply me with the informa-
tion according to individual categories from the election lists for 
Wigandsthal, Meffersdorf, Grenzdorf, Neugersdorf, Strossberg, 
Bergstrass, Heide, Heller, Ober-und Nieder-Schwerta and Vol-
kersdorf. Since the shortness of time does not permit inspection 
here of the election lists, Inspector Demnitz will ride to Garlitz 
for this purpose and have them laid before him by Election 
Commissioner Landrat von Seydewitz immediately after the 
election of deputies on the twenty-eighth of this month, in order 
at the same time to obtain information about the votes of the 
electors.so 
The gentleman covered the situation even more thoroughly than the 
government. He was a model Conservative. 
The Conservative method of campaigning in the rural areas was 
accurately described in an election appeal by the Progressive party in 
1862 as follows: 
The matter is made more difficult for you [the peasants] than 
in the towns. You lack the societies in which you can discuss your 
affairs. You are merely called together when you are to work on 
roads or pay new taxes or listen to the reading of an order from 
the Landrat. But when it comes to voting all sorts of instruc-
tions are issued to you, and if you do not wish to obey you are 
threatened with all kinds of real or imaginary terrors. Here 
comes your Schulze, there the police administrator, here the 
Landrat decrees, the pastor preaches at you what you should do. 
The one says the village, the other the county, the third the state, 
the fourth Christianity, the fifth the Church, and finally even 
your poor soul itself is in danger if you do not vote as you are 
told.s1 
The administration of the Administrative District of Breslau ex-
plained in 1862 the success of the Progressive party in the election by 
the fact "that its doctrines are much more attractive for the masses 
than the drier and much more reserved doctrines of the different Con-
servative political groups, and that almost all local papers and the 
larger daily papers with very few exceptions know how to exploit in 
the cleverest way the very attractive teachings of complete freedom and 
equality, of self-government, and to further the efforts of the advanced 
liberal parties." The writer reported complaints from the country 
that the bonds of discipline were loosening and that all personal 
authority was beginning to disappear.s2 
00 Reprinted in the Kolnische Zeitung, Oct. 25, 1863, from the Gorlitzer Anzeiger . 
• , See in Volkszeitung, April 24, 1862. 
32 Regierungs-Bezirk Breslau, May 8, 1862, Zeitungs-Bericht fur Man-April, 1862_ 
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What were "the drier and more reserved doctrines" which the 
Conservatives offered? The only fundamental tenet of the Con-
servatives was expressed by von Kleist-Retzow: "We demand of our 
people that they select us; then we must take care of them."ss Since 
the people were not quite satisfied with this program the Conservatives 
had to embellish it. In 1861 the Volksverein offered the following 
points to the ~lectors: 
I. Unity of our German Fatherland, not in the way of the Italian 
kingdom through blood and fire, but by the unity of its princes 
and peoples and in firmly holding to authority and law. No re-
pudiation of our Prussian Fatherland and its glorious history; no 
sinking into the filth of a German republic; no robbery of the 
Crown and nationality nonsense. II. No breach with the past 
in inner affairs of our state. No elimination of the Christian 
foundation and of the historically preserved elements of our 
constitution. No shifting of the center of emphasis of our 
European position through weakening the army. No parliamen· 
tary regime and no constitutional ministerial responsibility. Per-
sonal rule by our King by the grace of God and not of a constitu-
tion. Church marriage, Christian schools, Christian authority, 
no furtherance of the ever-spreading demoralization and dis-
respect for divine and human order. III. Defence of and respect 
for honorable work, property, rights and class. No favoring and 
exclusive rule of money capital. No sacrifice of the handworkers 
and of landed property in favor of the mistaken teachings and 
usurious arts of the time. Freedom of participation of subjects 
in legislation and in the autonomy and self-government of 
[feudal] corporations and communities. Freedom in the firm 
preservation of protecting order. No surrender to bureaucratic 
absolutism and to social serfdom by way of limitless and uncon-
trolled anarchy and the imitation of the political and social 
forms which have led France to Caesar ism. Development of our 
constitution in the sense of German freedom, in love and devo-
tion to King and Fatherland.s4 
The program of 1861 had been composed when the Conservatives 
had lost favor with the King. When early in the next year the King 
began to return to the fold, the party changed its platform from one 
of extensive negation to the simple and clear statement of support of 
the King. In an election appeal of March 19, 1862, a group of party 
leaders declared: "The campaign cry for which we fight today should 
be no other than that of the maintenance of the power of the Crown, 
•• Quoted in Dr. Sigmund Neumann. Die Stuten des Preussischen Konservatismus 
(Berlin. 1930). p. 75 note . 
•• Salomon, op. cit., I. 83·84. 
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the preservation of the full constitutional rights of the monarchy as 
the highest and decisive authority which, although bound by the rights 
of the representative assembly in certain respects, should never be sub-
ordinate to the will of the majority."35 The party did not deviate 
from this platform during the rest of the constitutional conflict. At last 
its loyalty to the crown was reciprocated by William's loyalty to the 
Prussian tradition. The party thereby made the strongest appeal of 
which it was capable to the voters, but still more to the monarchy, the 
court and the government. 
To know the thoughts and proposals of these Conservatives is 
difficult, for by nature they were disinclined to put their few ideas 
into words. They much preferred the status quo, and no fuss. Their 
ablest politician, Wagener, was vocal in the expression of Conservative 
views; but it is questionable whether his colleagues by and large 
bothered to follow his lines of reasoning or understood fully his pro-
posals. The more popular type of Conservative thinking may be 
exemplified from speeches made at local meetings. In September, 
1861, in Berlin the members were urged to "acknowledge our Lord 
Jesus Christ as the Lord and Savior of the world of Hearts" and to see 
to it that "in addition to continuous prayer for this important affair 
they should work according to their power in favor of the election of 
only God-fearing, sensible men as electors and deputies." At Bromberg 
in October, 1862, von Massenbach cited Psalms 66, Verse 14, to a 
conference of Conservatives and expressed fear that "divine punish-
ment must soon strike the present world." He could not look into any-
one's heart, he said, and did not wish to damn anyone; but the Pro-
gressives were "worse than all Frenchmen, for they wish to abolish all 
religion and even grant all sorts of rights to the Jews." Agreeing with 
these assertions Pastor Reinhardt added that "the Democrats even wish 
to mediatize God just as they wish to mediatize the King and every-
thing else."36 
A few months earlier the Kreuzzeitung published an article about 
the speech which Grabow, liberal deputy and high administrative 
official, had made in opening the sessions of the Lower House of the 
Landtag. In the article occurred the passage, "Woe to those who eat 
the Kings' bread and betray them; woe to those who seek to swindle 
the hearts of the people away from the King; woe to those whose 
8. Milller, op. cit., pp. 125-26 . 
•• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Sept. 8, 1861. By "mediatize" the Conserva-
tives meant the subordination of independent Prussia to the position of one state 
within a unified Germany. Volkszeitung, Oct. 25, 1862. 
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tongues are spears and arrows." About a year later a right-wing liberal 
aristocrat, von Flottwell, attended a lecture on "Monarchy by Divine 
Right" given by Ludwig von Gerlach in the Evangelical Verein. The 
ladies present applauded the speaker's assertion that "even the authori-
ty of the slave owner" is "a divine command and a law justified by 
God's grace."37 
An appeal by the Conservative election committee in Preussisch-
Holland, October, 1863, may be regarded as a classic of provincial 
Conservative thought and style. 
After secure hands of dead-tired steersmen have guided our 
ship of state through the storms of the shameful year of 1848 
over the roaring waves into the harbor of ordered conditions 
and noble peace, after the basis of all people's welfare appeared 
to be made secure among us again, the benefactors of the peo-
ple unjustly calling themselves Progressives, whose objective is 
to establish popular rule by the mob and who must therefore 
always be called by their true name "Democrats," have again 
raised their Hydra head and undermine by lies, suspicion and 
distortion the foundations of our new state constitution. Just 
as they have the precious life of our blessed King [Frederick Wil-
liam IV] on their consciences, so they are now laying hands 
again on the rights of his Most High Successor who bears his 
Crown by the grace of God; and since the elections are upon us, 
a word of warning to all voters appears to be necessary to guard 
against those false prophets who go in sheep's clothes but are 
really rapacious wolves. We must once more take up the battle 
against Beelzebub and his devilish companions; through the 
sound sense of the folk we must call a halt to this prevailing 
democratic epidemic and enter in the breach against heathenism 
and judaism, against mob rule and the murder of our brothers.3s 
At about the same time the distinguished Professor Leo in Halle 
defined freedom to the full satisfaction of the Kreuzzeitung as follows: 
\Ve also wish freedom, that is, the real feeling that wherever 
the welfare of our Fatherland or the discipline necessary for it 
does not set natural limits we can develop ourselves without 
restriction. But we have also had this feeling completely before 
there was talk of a constitution among us. Under our King, we 
were actually the most completely free people on the earth even 
though the liberal slogans did not fit us. We shall feel our-
selves most free again when firm discipline and respect for the 
Royal authority once more are everywhere firmly fixed in our 
'7 Volkszeitung, May 28, 1862; Manfred Laubert, Edward Flottwell, Ein Abriss 
seines Lebens (1919), p. 99. 
8. Kiilnische Zeitung, Oct. 14, 1863. 
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hearts. Abstract freedom represented by mechanical means in 
majorities and the like, we do not need at all. And that to a 
certain degree we can bear them is the best evidence of how 
much discipline still sticks everywhere in our hearts. But we can 
bear it only as long as a powerful monarchy stands in our midst. 
Whoever imagines that this discipline will remain as soon as 
sovereignity in Prussia has left the throne and has taken its seat 
in the majority of the deputies, is in politics a child.39 
When the Conservatives spoke of their opponents, they chose words 
and phrases of color without much restraint upon their emotions. 
Those around Elbing divided the Pruss ian people into two groups, the 
"well-disposed rural people" and the "real and incipient criminals and 
stock-exchange Junkers." In the latter category were put the Pro-
gressives. Another favorite phrase applied to the industrialists was 
"robber knights behind the smoke stacks." In one piece of election 
literature produced under the auspices of the Volksverein, the author, 
von Olfers, accused the liberals of robbery. "Whether one sticks his 
hand in his neighbor's pocket to steal five Thalers or whether he 
stretches out his hand after the King's Crown, the result is the same, 
for theft is theft and stealing is stealing." The same author asserted that 
the liberals aimed to parcel out the land in such small lots that horses 
could no longer be used in agriculture, that cows would have to be 
employed, and that finally "our artillery will have to be drawn by oxen 
and our cavalry ride on goats."40 
The accusations made by the Conservatives against the liberals, if 
believed, should have filled the population with shudders. When hard 
times hit Rosenberg county in 1861, the Preussisches Volksblatt blamed 
modern industrialism, "which plays such a great role in the New Era." 
An anonymous broadsheet entitled "The German Progressive Party 
and Its Aims" listed as the ultimate goal of that party "the abolition 
of property." From Elbing came the report that a Conservative had 
spread the statement "that if the Progressive party won the election 
(1862), Prussia would be partitioned within a year; the French would 
receive one part, the Russians another, and the Jews the third." Anti-
semitism was cultivated by the Conservatives as a Christian virtue 
which they accused the liberals of trying to destroy. The following 
incident in 1858 at a Kreistag in Silesia was typical. With the begin-
ning of the New Era five Jewish owners of noble estates appeared for 
•• Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 4, 1863 . 
• 0 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Dec. 21, 1861. Deputy von Beughem, Abg. H., 
St. B., March 18, 1861; I, 519·20. Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 21, 1863. 
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the first time to partiCipate in the proceedings. Von Haugwitz pro-
tested against the participation of the Jews in the corporation of the 
first estate, and Count Saurma-Jeltisch proposed to pay two Friedrichs 
d'or out of the county treasury to each Jewish owner of a noble estate 
who would voluntarily remain away from the Kreistag. When one 
of the Jews protested, the presiding officer, the Landrat, refused him 
the floor.41 The Conservatives specialized in arousing both class hatred 
and racial hatred. 
The liberal ideal of the legal state aroused the Conservatives' scorn. 
In the Lower House of the Landtag Deputy von Blanckenburg de-
clared that "the liberals are either not aware of the fact or do not 
wish to be aware of it that their principles ... always lead to ... half 
measures and tolerance of both sides, above and below." A Conserva-
tive paper declared early in 1861 that "to transform Prussia into a 
legal state means nothing more than to put Prussia in the hands of 
a few so that they can exploit the country in their own interest, promul-
gate laws which are of use to them, place the taxes on the masses while 
they use the money for themselves. The legal state of the liberals 
means plutocracy, oppression of religion, art, knowledge, the working 
force of the masses." In keeping with this thinking, the Berliner Revue 
declared in April, 1862, that "the independence of the judiciary ... 
has become a curse for our country .... Freedom of the press is also 
degraded for egoistic purposes, and in this wise we shall inevitably 
attain a situation where the survival of the state demands emergency 
curbs on egoism."42 . 
In keeping with their line of belief the Conservatives constantly 
accused the liberals of revolutionary intentions. In Prussia, they said, 
the liberals aimed to destroy the constitutional powers of the King 
and reduce the sovereign to a figure-head. The forthcoming elections 
in 1862, they stated in an election appeal in March, laid upon them 
"the sacred duty" of opposing these forces with all their power and 
energy. Not the Prussian people but their betrayers, they said, in-
tended to make the Prussian representative assembly a workshop for 
a German revolution, to use the constitutional rights of the people 
as a means of insurrection and anarchy. In 1861 Deputy von Blancken-
burg had already warned the liberals that "if you change the power of 
U Tagesbericht, No. 51, March 1, 1861; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, April 
15, 1861; Valkszeitung, April 25, 1862; Miiller, ap. cit., pp. 40, 70. J. Stein, ap. cit., 
p. 581. 
•• Abg. H., St. B., May 28, 1861; III, 1433. Tagesbericht, No. 11, Jan. 14, 1861. 
Kolnische Zeitung, April 29, 1862. 
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the Prussian monarchy, if you weaken it to the level of a constitutional 
parliamentary regime, then ... just as the military reorganization was 
put through in spite of you, so will the power of the Prussian monarchy 
also stride over the constitution." As a rule, however, the Conserva-
tives did not speak so bluntly. The more usual formulation was 
exemplified by that of Wagener, who in 1863 in a meeting of the 
Prussian Volksverein was reported to have said that only a royal dic-
tatorship would solve the present conflict in Prussia. He explained 
that he did not mean by dictatorship the abolition of the constitution; 
on the contrary, the dictatorship should preserve this "sacred constitu-
tion" to which the King had sworn and should defend it against the 
intended overthrow by the Progressive party. The Conservatives had 
sworn allegiance to the constitution in the sense intended by Frederick 
William IV: it should be so developed that it would be possible for 
the King to rule. "According to the constitution the deputies swore 
allegiance to the King, not the King to the deputies," Wagener stated. 
If the liberal parties sought to destroy the constitution, he continued, 
"by seeking to introduce into it the spirit of parliamentary despotism 
which is entirely alien to it, then the royal dictatorship must counter 
such actions .... We shall always follow the flag of the Hohenzollerns, 
but never the bell or the hat of the president of the Lower House." 
Wagener was stating in Conservative constitutional terms what von 
Blanckenburg had said more frankly: the King's power should be 
preserved at any cost. The end justified the means.43 
The Conservative program and methods failed to arouse the voters. 
In April, 1862, the Berliner Revue condemned its party for political 
ineptitude: 
One does not win battles ... with army orders alone; and 
with election decrees, no matter how well meant and resolute 
they are, one will hardly emerge from the election battle as vic-
tor. ... As matters are at present the election decrees have ac-
complished nothing but anarchy, a "pleasant anarchy," which is 
all the more disorganizing and depressing the more courageous 
and resolute the words sound at the beginning.44 
The results were evident in the number and personnel of those who 
won seats in the Lower House. Of the ten who were elected in 1862, 
five were Landrats, who in order to qualify for this position had to 
.s Miiller, op. cit., p. 125. Abg. H., St. B., Feb. 5, 1861; 1,69. Augsburg Allgemeine 
Zeitung, Oct. 15, 1863 . 
.. Quoted in Volkszeitung, April 23, 1862. 
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own knights' estates; four others were owners of knights' estates; the 
tenth was a state's attorney. All belonged to the nobility. In the 
election of 1863 the party returned only two persons, Wagener and von 
Blanckenburg, whose names had been placed on the preferred list 
quoted above. The roster of their thirty-six deputies contained twelve 
Landrats and one former Landrat; twelve other owners of large 
estates, most of them being knights' estates; one renter of crown land; 
two lawyers; two ministers of state and one former minister of state; 
one major; two justice officials; and two administrative officials. 
Twenty-seven of the deputies were nobles; the other nine were 
burghers. Apart from the absence of a member of the handicrafts, the 
delegation represented fairly well the Old Regime. 
Unfortunately for genuine conservatism it became tied to the Bis-
marckian kind of government policy. Possessing almost no popular 
appeal it had to follow the lead of a government that gave the illusion 
of moving in its direction. Bismarck carried the Conservatives far 
beyond the point at which they had wished to stop. The economic 
reforms in which he acquiesced were liberal rather than Conservative. 
His objective of national unification coincided with that of the 
liberals and not the Conservatives; and his methods of unification were 
in some respects as repugnant to one as to the other. While Ludwig 
von Gerlach and a few of his friends were utterly opposed to Bis-
marck's policy of unification, most of the Conservatives followed the 
Minister President faithfully in the act but not in the interpretation. 
They loved the military victories and the Pruss ian conquests, but they 
hated to see the existing legal structure of Germany violated and so 
many princes toppled. The Prussian Volksverein wished to be neither 
Bismarckian nor isolationist, neither German nor national; it sought 
to be Pruss ian and to preserve Prussia's power and influence against 
Austria or anyone else. 
Taken in tow by one of its own kind, a Prussian Junker, the "small 
but powerful party" did not recover from the shock of Bismarck's suc-
cess until the agrarian troubles of the 1870s brought it vociferously into 
the public arena once more in defence of its economic interests. Bis-
marckian unification of the nation along with industrial and commer-
cial expansion left the Conservatism of the 1860s rather behind the 
times. Nonetheless, Wagener's confident statement in 1863 expressed 
the assurance that this old-style Conservatism was far from dead: 
We must never disappear from the battleground. Never 
under any circumstances. For we have to represent not merely 
human plans! We have claimed and still claim today that in 
addition we represent eternal truths and eternal principles of 
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state and society. Let us hold firmly to our principles and our 
truths in all circumstances, whether the times be good or bad, 
whether they please human beings or not.411 
The Conservatives held to them until the Nazis and, in the Eastern 
part of Germany, the communists delivered their death blow . 
.. Muller, 01'. cit., p. 76. 
11 / The Government and the Elections 
T HE ROLE of the govemment m the dectio", of 1862 
and 1863 was determined fundamentally by King William himself. 
The Conservative ministers were happy to follow his general orders, 
which agreed entirely with their own desires; and Conservative county 
officials most responsible for the execution of the orders, the Landrats 
above all, improved upon them with enthusiasm. In a somewhat 
tentative and limited way in the election of 1862 and with full force in 
that of 1863 the government turned partisan and utilized the resources 
of the powerful bureaucracy to sway the vote in its favor. 
King William had been so disgusted at the chicanery and hypocrisy 
of the Manteuffel ministry under his brother in its handling of elections 
as well as other matters that on becoming regent in 1858 he had 
determined to stop such immoral action, as he called it, and permit 
free elections. As early as April of that year he had stated to von 
Vincke that the officials would not be allowed to interfere in the next 
elections as they had in the previous ones.1 In the autumn of that year 
Minister of Interior Flottwell issued the first election instruction to the 
officials under the authority of the Prince Regent. Since the instruc-
tion exemplifies the fundamental dilemma of William's attitude, it 
needs to be summarized. The government placed great value upon 
the unchanging loyalty, reliability and legality, as well as the political 
insight, of the deputies, and it was therefore the indispensable duty of 
the royal officials concerned directly or indirectly with the elections to 
1 Von Bernhardi, op. cit., III, 32. 
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work to the effect that men of these qualities were returned. At the 
same time the officials should take care not to exert official pressure 
upon the voters. They should not seek to intimidate the voters by 
threats of withdrawing certain advantages and rights which the 
bureaucracy disposed of. They should, however, cooperate with the 
important private individuals in their particular district to assure the 
return of reliable deputies. Government officials might run for office, 
Flottwell stated; but before they did so they should carefully consider 
whether they would be of more use to the state by becoming deputies 
or by remaining at their present positions. In case they were elected, 
he implied that they should support the ministry.2 
Within a few weeks the minister had to send further instructions 
to stop the provincial officials from interpreting the decree as meaning 
that they should assist only one party.3 The fact that this corrective 
had to be issued revealed the confusion of the Prince Regent's and the 
government's position. On the one hand, William wished free elec-
tions; on the other, as has been shown, he was determined to preserve 
intact his authority; on the one hand, he aimed to uphold the constitu-
tion and the law; on the other, he opposed "the stereotyped phrase," 
the "far-fetched ideas" of liberalism; on the one hand, he wished to 
develop the state on "sound, strong, conservative bases"; on the other 
he wished his subjects to follow him. In his confused mind he op-
posed what he called both extremes, the reaction of the 1850s and the 
radicalism of 1848. He expected to rule in accordance with "truth, 
legality, and consistency," but he did not know what these terms 
meant.4 He wished to govern with the aid of mild and cautious 
liberals, like Schwerin and Flottwell, and of Conservatives, but not 
reactionaries, who would follow his line of constitutional absolutism. 
As soon as he discovered that the majority of the deputies returned by 
the elections disapproved his theory and practice of rule, he im-
mediately proposed to interfere and to force the public to elect sup-
porters of his conceptions of rule. 
Early in 1861 the King aligned himself publicly against the liberals. 
To the burgomaster of Berlin, a city overwhelmingly liberal, he de-
clared: "I know that a party exists in my country which aims to renew 
the conditions of the year 1848. What was able to occur then by reason 
of surprise will not again succeed; one will find me prepared." As 
• Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. A. 
198. 
• Ibid. 
• Horst Kohl, op. cit., pp. 3-8. 
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the year continued similar and even more pointed stories began to ap-
pear in the press, for example, one about the King's reply to a deputa-
tion from Schweidnitz. 
I thank you for the patriotic views which you have expressed 
to me .... Manifest your patriotism and your love for Me and 
My House in the ... elections for the House of Representatives. 
I wish neither reactionaries nor democrats. Elect only such men 
as deputies who will go hand in hand with me. If that occurs 
then we shall certainly see each other in friendly manner again.1> 
When new elections were held in the autumn of 1861 the King 
wished to intervene personally, but was finally persuaded by the 
Minister of Interior von Schwerin to permit elections "freely and 
without hindrance." The officials were to vote according to their 
convictions; but if they disagreed with the government they should 
manifest reserve. Their sense of duty and honor, stated the minister's 
decree, would show them the way to harmonize the exercise of their 
rights as citizens with their duty as officials.6 Although sense of duty 
and honor did not lend itself to uniform interpretation, Count Schwer-
in succeeded in reducing the pressure of officials on voters to an ex-
tent that was reached in no other election. To the King the results 
were tragic: more and more liberals were returned.7 
Early in 1862 the ministry had to prepare for another election. This 
time the King believed that he should interfere personally, and in 
instructions of March 19 he ordered the ministry to use the officials 
for explaining to the public the King's policies and wishes. Since the 
liberal resistance to the government's, that is, the King's, program had 
led to the dissolution of the Lower House and the holding of new 
elections, it is clear that the King expected the officials not to support 
the opposition in any way, that he expected them to assure the return 
of a Lower House favorable to his policies.s 
By this extraordinary document the King took side definitely 
against the liberals, even against those mild ones who had been his 
ministers, and asked his people to support him. He reiterated his pro-
gram of 1858 and once more identified the welfare and safety of Prus-
sia with the preservation of Hohenzollern power within that state. He 
• Tagesbericht, No.7, Jan. 9, 1861, citing Preuss. Volksblatt, No.7; National 
Zeitung, Nov. 20, 1861. See also the King's statement to the burgomaster of Bran· 
denburg. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Dec. 24, 1861. 
• Abg. H., St. B., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, p. 605. 
• See ibid., July 4, 1862; I, 1862. 
• Die lnnere Politik, pp. 9·10. 
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appealed for a better-informed public, with his officials acting as the 
sources of enlightenment. He distinguished between the liberal de-
puties and the public as neatly as any Conservative politician would 
have done, and called upon the awakened and corrected public to vote 
in support of his ministers. Making the election a personal affair he 
asked for a vote of confidence in his conduct of government. The docu-
ment revealed a confusion of absolutism and constitutionalism, ex-
pressing again the King's desire and intention to have his own way, 
to rule absolutistically in accordance with the constitution. The in-
consistency of this position was not at all evident to him, for as certain 
contemporaries saw, he had no idea of how a constitutional govern-
ment worked. The election therefore became one of the liberals 
against the King. The liberals tried to deny the fact, as we shall see, 
but the Conservatives took up the election stand of the King and 
fought valiantly for it. With monarchy versus parliamentarianism as 
the issue the makings of a thoroughgoing constitutional conflict were 
present. 
A few days later Minister of Interior von Jagow sent to the officials 
an order concerning the elections that was in keeping with the King's 
instructions. While the instructions were given to all officials in all 
departments, they were particularly directed to those who had charge 
of the execution of the elections. The officials should make clearly 
understood "the guiding policies and intentions" of the government 
and prevent any misunderstanding or falsification of them. They 
should make it known that the government stood upon the authority 
of the constitution, and that it was its "absolute duty" to preserve the 
power of the Crown and to prevent a so-called "parliamentary govern-
ment" from being established. There should be freedom of voting, 
but at the same time the officials should unify, organize and assist all 
groups willing to support the government. They should participate 
actively in the campaign against the Progressives and other opponents 
of the government and King and in favor of the loyal elements. The 
instructions aligned the government and all officials with a few ultra-
right liberals and especially with the Conservative party.9 
It is difficult to comprehend how freedom of elections could be pre-, 
served when officials were expected to assist the election of candidates 
of one particular party. Those officials who supported passionately 
the Conservatives and hated the liberals interpreted the instructions 
• Ibid., pp. 10-12. See the contemporary press for numerous denunciations of this 
decree, especially those by the universities. 
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according to their own wishes_ When these acts were brought to the 
minister's attention in the Lower House in July, von Jagow denied 
that officials had ever been ordered to give up their party preference 
and follow the views of the government; but, he added, they had been 
forbidden to participate in hostile agitation. He disclaimed any 
knowledge of excesses and promised to take steps against "illegal and 
unjust" acts to influence the elections.lO 
The full program of action was drawn up and placed in operation 
only after Bismarck became Minister President in the autumn of 1862. 
His ministry employed every means at its disposal to coerce the public 
into supporting it. In a state with a powerful bureaucracy, a large 
army with a militaristic tradition, a dovetailing of administrative and 
military authority and social position and prestige, a tradition of 
authoritarian rule, the resources available to the government affected 
practically every part of Prussian life. The transitional and indefinite 
character of much of Pruss ian law enabled the government time after 
time to interpret the law in its favor. The advantage to the monarchy 
and to the Conservatives of having kept the terms of the constitution of 
1850 as vague as possible was now manifest. Whereas the liberals 
sought to construe these clauses and the laws derived from them in 
favor of freedom, the government undid the liberal gains of the New 
Era by interpreting the clauses and laws in a reactionary sense. Since 
Bismarck had an extraordinary gift for picking holes in legal docu-
ments to his own advantage and was devoid of respect for or fear of 
any force or any human being that opposed him, the fight against the 
liberals reached its fullest scope. In the election of 1863 the govern-
ment mobilized all its resources against the liberals. Every means 
used up to that time was brought into action and many new ones were 
added. The work of the Manteuffel ministry was greatly improved 
upon, and the King heartily endorsed the far more ruthless acts of 
Bismarck and his colleagues. It made a difference as to whose ox 
was gored.H 
The main instrument of the government for influencing the election 
in its favor continued to be the powerful, numerous and inclusive 
body of officials under its control. Count Eulenburg aimed to use 
them to the fullest extent. First the government obtained a statement 
from the highest court which placed the judiciary on its side in favor 
of restricting the freedom of officials to vote. N ext, the ministry is-
10 Abg. H., St. B., July 4, 1862; I, 460. 
11 Briefe, Reden und Schriften,. II, 64·65. 
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sued an order declaring that henceforth any official elected to and 
serving as deputy in the Lower House must pay the cost of his sub-
stitute while away from his official position; the money would be with-
held at the treasury. The government refused any longer to cover 
these costs.12 Then on September 24 the Minister of Interior instructed 
officials regarding their behavior in elections. 
Whoever as official has sworn to be loyal and obedient to the 
King his most gracious Lord is freed from this oath neither as 
voter nor as representative, and when His Majesty definitely 
delineates the constitutional way along which his officials must 
accompany him, they are all obliged to obey, and those whom 
because of special trust the King's grace has called to positions 
of political importance are also obliged to support actively the 
King's government.13 
By this order every official had to support actively the election of 
deputies favorable to the government. All pretence of neutrality was 
tossed aside; all respect for the rights of officials as citizens to vote as 
they saw fit was rejected. The officials were not permitted to remain 
inactive; they were required to take a vigorous and public part in 
securing the election of governmental supporters. The order was 
definitely based on the view often expressed by Conservatives that with 
the most powerful machinery in the state at its disposal, namely the 
bureaucracy, the government ought to win an election easily. It merely 
needed to apply its legal authority over the officialdom. It would 
thereby have with one determined act, so the Conservatives argued, 
an organization for political purposes incomparably more effective 
than any other in the state. It would possess the financial resources of 
the state for its political work; it would deprive the liberals of one of 
their most active and influential groups, namely the many liberal offi-
cials, many of whom sat in the Landtag, many more of whom were 
chosen as electors and cast ballots for liberal candidates, and even more 
of whom voted for liberal electors. It would destroy one of the main 
sources of the organization of liberal strength, that derived from the 
close association of officials. It would take away from the liberals one 
of the most respected large groups of leaders in local and state affairs 
which it possessed. The only question was how to force the officials 
into line and make them work actively for government supporters. 
Such a thing as an individual's conscience and convictions did not 
bother these aristocratic Conservatives. An official should have no 
12 Ministerial.Blatt, 1863, p. 194. 
13 Die Innere Politik, pp. 234·37. 
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other master than his superior and over him his King, he should have 
no other convictions than those which his superiors allowed him to 
have. The government plan was inclusive; in the execution of the 
plan it attempted to be thorough. 
The instructions were sent to all officials in all ministries, in pro-
vincial, district, county and local government, in church and education, 
in the economy. Only the army was excluded; for this government 
wished to keep it out of political controversy.14 The orders were even 
imparted to town and city councillors and to comparable members of 
village government, persons chosen by the local voters and not directly 
responsible to the state government. Officials had to watch over and 
be responsible for the political activity of their subordinates. Count 
Eulenburg stated that in case an official faced a problem too difficult 
for him to handle, he should report it to the government. The advice 
must have had extra point since this government's ability and willing-
ness to utilize the law, legally or illegally, to its own ends was becoming 
well known. 
Among all the officials to whom the election instructions were sent, 
the most important for the government's purpose were the Landrat and 
the village Schulze, the latter being subject to the control of the 
former. In the cities and towns the government lacked an official with 
the authority, will power and political views of the Landrat. It was 
always restricted by the greater ability and willingness of the urban 
centers to resist pressure than was the case with the scattered rural 
population; but its authority to approve the selection of the local 
officials and its use of these officials to execute state laws enabled it to 
exercise considerable influence, even though not so much as over the 
peasants. 
The full weight of responsibility for influencing elections fell on 
these officials; they were to utilize their prestige as popular local 
leaders to gain votes for the pro-government candidates and to ward off 
votes for the opposition. They were subject to pressure to participate 
actively in their dual capacity, as officials and as local popular leaders. 
They could slip easily from one capacity to the other in favor of the 
government party. An ideal arrangement was for both Landrat and 
Schulze to be elected as electors, who then would vote for the Landrat 
as a Conservative candidate for deputy to the Lower House. 
The significance of this combination arose from the predominantly 
rural character of Prussian life. In 1864 over 13,000,000 out of a total 
USee Abg. R., St. B., 1864, Vol IV, No. 95, pp. 606·07. 
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population of nearly 19,000,000 lived in the country. The village vote 
could have won the election for the Conservatives. For example, in 
Salzwedel County out of a total of 172 electors, 143 were elected by the 
186 rural communities. If the Schulze or his two assistants could have 
been chosen as electors throughout the state and controlled for the 
Conservatives, the results would have been an overwhelming victory 
for the government.15 The Schulze and the villagers felt the full force 
of government pressure. 
The election law of 1849 imposed upon the Landrat and the 
Schulze certain responsibilities which enhanced their ability to in-
fluence the voting. The Landrat or the community official, who except 
in the largest cities would also be under the authority of the former, 
drew up the list of voters, listened to and decided upon complaints, 
divided the voters into the three classes, and fixed the boundaries of 
the voting precincts. In their capacity as officials the Landrats acted 
as election commissioners who handled the administrative details of 
the voting.16 It will be seen how these duties opened up opportunities 
for the Landrat to try to affect the outcome of the vote. 
A few weeks before the election the government threw the influence 
of the King publicly into the campaign on its side. The public that 
read the newspapers and that had contacts with prominent persons 
already knew how the King felt, for on many occasions he had openly 
expressed his desires about the outcome of the election. These state-
ments had appeared in print even in the liberal papers. When the 
Steingrund peasants sent to the King their protestation of ardent 
loyalty, the latter replied in a letter which became widely known. The 
essential part read as follows: 
If the community wishes to show loyalty to Me in the elec-
tion it can do so only by the election of such men as have the firm 
resolve to support My ministers in the execution of the tasks 
imposed by Me upon them. A hostile attitude toward My 
government is not in harmony with loyalty to My Person; for 
My ministers are called to their positions by My confidence in 
15 Abg. H., St. B., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, p. 623. 
10 Count Schwerin had as Minister of Interior forbidden Landrats to serve as 
election commissioners in case they were candidates in the election. Bin von Jagow 
had already repealed the order before Count Eulenburg assumed office. Under the 
latter, Landrats were encouraged to act in the dual capacity, as Landrat Hoffman 
in Jiiterbogk-Luckenwalde discovered. Upon being selected by the Conservatives to 
run for deputy to the Lower House, he offered to resign as election commissioner, 
but his bureaucratic superior refused to agree. The government liked the combina-
tion. Abg. H., St. B., Nov_ 23, 1863; I, 120-28. 
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them and have to support Me in the fulfillment of My great and 
serious duties.17 
After the election was held and the Landtag convened, the new 
Lower House appointed a commission to investigate the violations of 
freedom of election. The evidence brought forth in the Lower House 
by individual members and by the commission vividly revealed the 
character of Prussian politics of the period. The role of the govern-
ment in politics, the political conceptions and behavior of officials, of 
aristocrats, burghers and peasants, of Conservatives and of liberals, 
were all disclosed with the authenticity of actual participation. A 
cross section of Prussian society was offered, a portrait of social rela-
tions, of cultural standards and moral values, of the mixture of the Old 
Regime and of modern, Western ways that characterized Prussia in 
this period. The evidence from the election of 1863 will be supple-
mented by a few examples of similar behavior during the preceding 
two elections, those for 1861 and 1862, when the government tried to 
exercise some restraint upon its subordinates. 
In accordance with the hierachical order of the bureaucracy, one 
might begin with the presidents and vice-presidents of the provinces. 
In 1861 President von Kotze of the province of East Prussia and Land-
rat von Spiess travelled through Mohrungen County and ordered lower 
officials to warn the population, mostly peasants, against the Pro-
gressive party. IS The next year the superior president in East Prussia 
sent the following communication to his subordinate officials: 
The Royal officials will be the best organs to explain in the 
election meetings the aims and goals of the government. For 
this purpose there should especially be used the meetings of 
election officers and their deputies for the discussion of the 
execution of the election regulations. 
It is self-evident that only such men are to be named as elec-
tion officers and their deputies about whose reliability and 
conservative views there is absolutely no doubt. ... 19 
Since the officials toured their districts at government expense, the 
Conservative party needed almost no party funds. It had the state bud-
get as a party campaign treasury, a sizable war chest which the liberals 
could not equal. Neither the government nor the Conservatives saw 
anything wrong about using the taxpayers' money to force them into 
agreeing with the views of the government. The holdover of absolut-
17 Die lnnere Politik, p. 241. 
18 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 29, 1861. 
,. Abg. H., St. B., July 4, 1862; I, 478-79. 
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ism was still too strong for these Conservatives to recognize anything 
incongruous about employing public money to defeat the will of the 
public. The liberals knew that the procedure was wrong. To them 
it was one more example of the kind of political behavior which they 
wished to abolish.20 
For the election of 1863 Minister Eulenburg's instructions gave the 
officials a free hand, and the Conservative ones applied all the pressure 
that their position afforded. Typical were the orders which the police 
president of Berlin sent to his subordinates, October 6, 1863. He re-
quested his officials not to vote for government opponents and 
threatened to use the power of the law against those who ignored these 
instructions. "I expect," he continued, "not only this but also that they 
will actively work to the best of their ability in behalf of the election 
of men who are ready to support His Majesty the King and the Royal 
government."21 
The presidents of the provincial administration and the police 
president of Berlin filled intermediate positions. They rarely came 
into direct contact with the public in the same way that their sub-
ordinates did. The official who entered most fully into the rough 
battle with groups and individuals was the Landrat, and most of the 
work affecting elections was organized and directed by him. While 
the evidence showed that a very small number of Landrats refused to 
execute the government's orders or assumed a passive attitude or at 
most one of advising without threatening voters, the overwhelming 
majority of them went into the campaign with crusading fanaticism. 
Even in 1861 Count Schwerin as Minister of Interior had been un-
able to curb all the Landrats from violating the freedom of electiom. 
Thus, Landrat von Brauchitsch had sent a number of copies of the 
program of the Pruss ian Volksverein to a Schulze near Danzig with 
instructions to distribute them and to collect names of persons willing 
to join the Verein. An evangelical pastor in Guttland had been used 
for the same purpose. Von Brauchitsch was seeking election to the 
Lower House as a Conservative, and in writing to electors to ask for 
their vote he had described the Progressive party's election material 
as containing "deceptive lies and insinuations of mistrust."22 
By the time of the election in the next year and with von Jagow as 
minister, the Landrats began to act as they had longed to do. Accord-
.0 Ibid. 
·'Ibid., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, p. 609 . 
•• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 15, Dec. 11, 1861. 
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ing to a report from Minden, Landrat von Horst referred in official 
business to the opponents of the ministry and of the Conservative party 
as "scoundrels."23 Another Landrat declared: "And who are the 
leaders of the majority in the dissolved Lower House? Democrats of 
the purest kind, against whom in the end only soldiers have been and 
will again be effective." Another one stated his constitutional views 
as follows: 
To our dear Friends and Comrades of Goldapp County: 
The deputies should be Royal advisers; the King wishes to hear 
not only his ministers and officials but also men from other 
classes. They should help him in the formulation of beneficial 
laws; they should support him in economical use of the taxes 
of his subjects; they should report to him when bad conditions 
obtain in the country and something useful is to be accomplish-
ed. 
Then the Landrat denounced the Lower House liberals for seeking to 
usurp the powers of the King, for having accomplished nothing, for 
having proposed unchristian, godless laws about marriage, the schools, 
usury and community government. "I could bring before you many 
other godless and foolish laws that are advocated in the Lower House, 
but those given above will suffice." He blamed not the King but the 
liberals for wasting funds; and he denounced the latter as democrats 
like those of the "shameful year 1848," and warned the public not to 
vote for them. He said he knew that many wished the King to rule 
alone and the elections to be abolished; but, he added, the King had 
ordered them to vote, and they must obey. "Forward into the elec-
tion," he cried, "with God for King and Fatherland!" 
The Landrats called meetings of Schulzes and other officials to 
instruct them on how they should vote. They frequently prohibited 
the distribution of campaign literature by the liberal opposition and 
cautioned all innkeepers to be vigilant against anyone's distributing 
leaflets, pamphlets and the like without a permit. Since the Conserva-
tives lacked an adequate number of newspapers to spread their views, 
the Landrats used the official county paper for that purpose. They 
threatened to cancel the permit of tavern keepers who allowed opposi-
tional meetings to be held in their quarters or literature to be posted 
or distributed.24 
The election instruction of Count Eulenburg in 1863 spurred the 
Landrats on to bolder and more efficient deeds than ever. They could 
·'Ibid., June 13, 1862-. 
•• Abg. H., St. B., July 4, 1862; I, 464-74, 481-83. Volksteitung, April 23, 1862. 
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now threaten any recalcitrant officials, they thought, with government 
approval and aid; and, as it turned out, they interpreted the minister's 
instruction correctly. Landrat von Gayl in Teltow County ordered the 
Schulzes to have themselves chosen as electors so that they could vote 
for candidates for the Lower House selected by their bureaucratic 
superiors. He threatened them with punishment and dismissal in case 
of disobedience. The same Landrat ordered teachers to vote Conserva-
tive or be dismissed. In Osterburg County Landrat Count von der 
Schulenburg wrote to the Schulzes on October 15, 1863, "You are im-
mediately to call a community meeting and in it to read aloud the 
enclosed statement by His Majesty the King to the Steingrund com-
munity .... " They were to say that those voting against the will of the 
King would be treated as "enemies of the King." His colleagues in 
other counties issued similar warnings. Landrat von Lattorff in 
Gardelegen sent a printed statement to all Schulzes demanding that 
they actively oppose the election of members of the Progressive party 
and support those candidates loyal to the government. He threatened 
disciplinary action against any official who did not follow this order. 
His colleague, Landrat von Puttkamer in Demmin, acted in the 
same way. "Whoever ... votes for the Progressive party is an enemy 
of the King," he declared, and would be punished. In many cases the 
Landrat threatened to dismiss Schulzes who voted against the govern-
ment and to force them to pay the costs of persons appointed in their 
place. In many others the official was faced with the prospect of hav-
ing to pay a fine. At Schievelbein the Landrat von der Golz threatened 
the hereditary Schulzes that in case they disobeyed the King by voting 
for the Progressive party he would initiate proceedings against them to 
deprive them of their office and to force them to pay the salary of their 
successors.25 
In the towns and cities the official pressure was exerted on big and 
little, on persons of importance and those made significant to the 
president and the Conservatives only by their power to vote. In 1862 
the president of the administration in Pomerania assembled all the 
members of the magistracy in Regenswalde and asked them to work for 
the election of candidates favorable to the government. When one 
merchant member refused, the president dropped the effort and left. 
In the next year he would not have been so mild, as a sampling of the 
evidence showed. Thus, Landrat von Goerten of Saarbriicken County 
36 Ibid., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, pp. 620-21, 623. Nov. II, 1863; I, 22·23. Nov. U, 
1863; I, 45·46. 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, pp. 614-15, 643-45, 619. 
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spoke to Burgomaster Schmidborn of Saarbriicken and Burgomaster 
Karcher of St. Johann as follows: He understoood that they were 
liberal candidates for election as electors. He announced that he was 
a Conservative candidate for election as deputy in the neighboring 
county, and he warned them to vote as the government ordered or they 
would lose their positions. At G6rlitz City Councillor Halberstadt, who 
served without compensation, was fined twenty Reichsthalers even 
prior to the election for being a member of the liberal election commit-
tee. His appeal to the Ministry of the Interior against the sentence had 
not been replied to when the new Lower House commission submitted 
its report on election irregularities. In Brieg a similar instance occurred, 
with the city councillors being censured rather than fined. Govern-
ment pressure in Berlin seems not to have been as heavy as elsewhere, 
but the following report revealed that it was far from being absent. 
According to the testimony of Edward Ludwig, a very minor 
official, the director of his office had called a meeting of his sub-
ordinates on October 11 or 12 and said that each could vote as he 
pleased. A few days later the director called them together again, read 
the instructions of the Minister of Interior, and declared that any 
one voting in opposition to the government or not voting at all would 
be dismissed. Each official was given the name of a person to consult 
about the candidate for whom he should vote.26 
Landrat von Koppy thought it necessary to force the Conservative 
views upon a meeting of liberals at Gross-Mahlendorf called by the 
retired Cavalry Captain von Reuss of Sonnenberg to select candidates 
for the position of electors. The sponsors of the meeting had fulfilled 
all legal requirements necessary to hold it. When it opened under 
the chairmanship of von Reuss, the Landrat appeared in official uni-
form accompanied by a gendarme to oversee the meeting. The Land-
rat, von Koppy, soon asked permission to speak and gave a lecture on 
the position of the government and the situation of the country. At 
a convenient point the chairman interrupted him and closed the meet-
ing with cheers for the King. Then von Reuss left, but the Landrat 
and others remained and the discussion became heated. The Landrat 
declared to a liberal teacher that he had acted like a cobbler. He de-
nounced the liberal legislation and threatened that if the county voted 
liberal the government would cut off poor relief and other forms of 
financial aid. He threatened to suspend two teachers if they voted 
.6 Volkszeitung, April 23, 1862; Abg. H., St. B., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, esp. pp. 
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against the government, called von Reuss "a bad official who forgot 
his duty." and said that if von Reuss voted as before he would be dis-
missed from the police administration. Of the townsmen he said that 
their votes, alas, would be again decisive. He blamed the popular 
meetings held in those centers; the meetings, he said, were mostly 
composed of loafers who paid no taxes and were only waiting for 
revolution as in 1848. He declared that when there had been no par-
liament and the King alone had made the laws, things had been much 
better than at present.27 
In its search for votes the government did not neglect a single source. 
For example, in some areas the renters of public land were very numer-
ous, and they in turn could exercise control over peasants and workers. 
Even in 1862 in the administrative district of Stralsund the pressure 
had been applied to them under threat of material loss. In the next 
year the pressure was increased throughout the state. Renters of 
public property were everywhere warned to vote for government can-
didates and were subjected to the usual threats. In Garlitz railway 
employees and laborers were told by Privy Counsellor Costenoble to 
vote as the government wished or to lose their positions. Government 
financial aid in such matters as road building and bridge building was 
to be given or withheld according to the way a district voted. Rector 
Marcus, editor of a liberal paper published in Gumbinnen for the 
country people, the Biirger-und Bauernfreund, was warned by the 
administration that he had to give up the editorship or his concession 
to conduct a school would be revoked. Doctor Senftleben, a physician, 
was dismissed from an engagement with an agricultural academy in 
Waldau because he was a democrat.28 
The government dominated three institutions which it particularly 
wished to keep clean of liberalism, the schools, the church, and the 
army. It proceeded to use the excellent facilities which it had for 
exerting influence on them. As early as 1861 Landrat von Brauchitsch 
of Danzig County had written to a teacher requesting him to cease sup-
porting and reading the Volkszeitung, accusing the paper of being 
hostile to the King and to the Christian religion, and saying that it 
aroused criticism when an official of a Christian church and an educa-
tor of the youth set a bad example by supporting such a journal.29 The 
following year von Kotze, one of the highest officials in East Prussia, 
27 Ibid., pp. 617-18. 
"Ibid., p. 613; Kolnische Zeitung, Oct. 20, 1863; Ibid., April 17, May 1, 10, 1862; 
Volkszeitung, Dec. 21, 23, 1862; KOinische Zeitung, Nov. 4, 1863 . 
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spoke to the teachers of West Preussisch-Holland in the presence of 
Superintendent Erdmann, Pastor Tackmann, Landrat von Schroter 
and Burgomaster Gisevius: 
It is unfortunately true that the teachers in the towns mostly 
incline toward the Progressive party; the young teachers cul-
tivate being enthusiastic about liberalism .... The inevitable 
result of democracy (for the Progressive party is nothing else 
than that) is the republic, and that this leads to inner decay and 
in the end opens the door to foreign enemies is evident from the 
old Greek republics and also from the example of North Amer-
ica .... The question is whether we have government by the 
King or by the people. That a parliamentary regime is some-
thing very deficient we see from the example of England, where 
everything is based on bribery. Elections demoralize the people; 
therefore I am altogether opposed to a system of government 
with elections, although conditions are not nearly as bad here 
as in England. . . . At the preceding election the unfortunate 
principle was established that officials should not be influenced 
in voting. . .. The democratic interpretation of the official's 
oath, that an official is committed only for his directly official 
activity but otherwise may work against the government, is very 
wrong. The official's oath lays upon him the obligation to be 
active for the government even outside his office .... The press 
causes an enormous harm; it spews poison among the people 
and causes the present epidemic movement. Liberalism is noth-
ing but an epidemic. I speak to you in this fashion not only be-
cause I have been ordered to do so and as a government official 
I am obligated to; I do so much more because it is my innermost 
conviction that I express. Under the previous ministry I dared 
not so speak .••• 
Then he urged those present to work for the election of Conservatives 
and to vote Conservative; and he declared that any official unable to 
support that party should resign. At about the same time School 
Counsellor Wantrup in Elbing, a notorious reactionary, told an elec-
tion meeting of his party that the word Volk (folk) was derived from 
Folgen (to follow), that therefore the folk had the duty to follow the 
princes. A liberal commented on this piece of etymological wisdom 
by asking whether the word Wantrup was not derived from Wahn 
(madness) and Trop! (a drop).3o 
The campaign of 1863 brought the teachers into the focus of govern-
ment attention on a wide scale. In Glatz the president of the regional 
administration said to the director of the gymnasium as well as to the 
burgomaster, "Either vote for the Conservatives or resign." Hegewalt 
8. Ibid., April 30, 1862; Kolnische Zeitung, April 17, 1862. 
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of the regional administration in Stettin threatened to discipline the 
teachers if they opposed the government. Regional President N au-
mann in Koslin issued an instruction on October 5, 1863, to about the 
same effect. The president of the administration at Magdeburg set 
forth the educational ideal that should be reflected in the election. 
"You will agree with me," he wrote the teachers, "that it is absolutely 
incompatible with the duties of a teacher and trainer of the youth, 
whose sacred duty includes awakening and cultivating in the youth 
under his care the feelings of piety and respect for the authority of our 
King and His Government through word and example, to participate 
in political agitation against the government and to vote against the 
King's will." Men of higher culture, he said, knew the difference 
between the government and the Progressive party.S1 
It would be difficult to conceive of further exertions of loyalty and 
obedience to the Conservative way of life which could have been de-
manded of the teachers. Every abuse of patriotism in favor of one 
political and social group in the state, every violation of freedom of 
instruction, every manifestation of the subservience of education to 
politics, every kind of violation of the right of the teacher as an in-
dividual were exemplified in these instructions. 
The Catholic priesthood could hardly be coerced by the govern-
ment into following the Conservatives, but the Protestant pastors were 
ordered to toe the line. In numerous cases these pastors shared the 
government's views with such devotion that they needed no urging. 
Even in 1861 and 1862, not to go further back, they had fulfilled their 
traditional function of maintaining civil obedience. In 1862, for 
example, a bookbinder wished to name his child "Waldeck," mani-
festly in honor of one of the most vigorous liberal leaders. The pastor 
refused to baptize the child under that name, and when the father 
appealed the case to the church consistory in Berlin, the latter upheld 
the pastor, replying "that in the evangelical church the giving of only 
those baptismal names is permitted which have been customary among 
Christians or at least have a deeper meaning and signify nothing ob-
jectionable."S2 It was offensive to the church for a child to be named 
for a liberal. In April of that year a pastor in Rummelsberg County 
declared in a sermon that "the Lower House ... which was composed of 
pardoned persons [that is, former criminals] had the aim to eradicate 
Christianity in Prussia .... Stupid boys wished to make laws." A 
.. Abg. R., St. B., Nov. 23, 1863; I, 132. Ibid., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, pp. 610-12 . 
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pastor in one of the rural election districts near Lyck spoke to the 
assembled peasants to the same effect. At the opening of the Landtag 
in May, 1862, the Superior Court Pastor von Hengstenberg surpassed 
all his colleagues. He preached a sermon to the Landtag which con-
sisted of a denunciation of the liberals. According to a deputy who 
was present, the pastor said that "many of the deputies have the mark 
of Cain on them" and accused the liberals of supporting lies. The 
sermon was delivered in the presence of the King.33 
General-Superintendent Moll in East Prussia issued an election 
statement in the same year which should rank with the finest examples 
of political piety. 
In the name of God the Father. of the Son and of the Holy 
Ghost. . Amen. Dear brothers in Jesus Christ. There is going 
through our land at present a movement the noise of which is 
great. Nonetheless. I should not speak to you about it at this 
time of preparation for Easter if nothing else than the roar of 
political election excitement were manifest in it. But I hear a 
roar not merely as of wild water but of the spirits of destruction 
which entice the excited people to great errors along the way of 
destruction. I hear with sorrow and shudders the brazen, sar-
castic speeches with which godless people in widely-read daily 
papers deride the pious minds of loyal men who seek the will of 
God even in state affairs, place their faith in the Lord even in 
the present confusion, and exhort the Christian dwellers of our 
country to devoted prayer about the results of the election ac-
cording to the heart of God. And I mourn deeply for our poor 
people that it still does not turn away from these evil tongues 
with abhorrence and revulsion, but that in part it is even eager 
for such bad food. I hear with concern and with painful 
astonishment what reception the false teachings of the sovereignty 
of the people find among the inexperienced. what secret satis-
faction the half-concealed, half-open attacks on the monarchy 
by divine right arouse among those already uncertain in their 
loyalty. And I cannot rid myself of the thought that those can-
not be the true friends of His Majesty the King who take offence 
that He took his hereditary Crown from God's altar and who 
cannot forgive Him for not having acce£ted the German im-
perial Crown out of the hands of unjustIfied party leaders and 
. for not having raised it out of the stream of fraternal blood with 
the point of his sword and set it on His gracious head by force.34 
The statement continued in the same vein. 
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Since churchmen expressed such views in 1861 and 1862, one can 
imagine the thoroughgoing participation expected of them in the 
elections of the next year, and further evidence scarcely needs to be 
given. Landrat von Lattorff of Gardelegen County instructed the 
superintendent of the church in October to have the pastors inform 
the elementary school teachers of their orders to assist in securing the 
victory of Conservatives in the election. Since the local pastors exerted 
considerable power over the schools as well as over the populace, the 
Landrat had chosen one of the most effective means for bringing 
morality to the aid of political pressure. In another case after the 
election Pastor Nothig of the Jakobi Church openly rebuked an 
elector who had voted liberal. The good pastor did so in church just 
before the Lord's Supper in front of the entire congregation. When 
the liberals requested an investigation, the consistory took a month to 
reply and saw no reason to discipline the pastor.35 
How many of the leading pastors felt about the political conflict 
was manifested again in June, 1865, when they signed a petition to the 
King condemning the Lower House in the name of Jesus Christ for 
violating the fourth commandment. They declared that hate and 
confusion reigned in the country to an unbelievable extent and that 
they found it difficult further to follow the requirement of praying 
for the Landtag when the latter misbehaved in such an unchristian 
way. They regarded as "one of the most sacred duties of the clergy 
to maintain old and young in the congregation in obedience to the 
ruler," and they warned that the wrath of God would descend upon 
a people that no longer walked in the ways of humility before not 
merely its Heavenly but its earthly master.36 
In 1863 the military were not permitted by the government to par-
ticipate in politics as much as before for fear of an undermining of 
discipline. The feelings of many or most officers were clear, however, 
from the behavior of these men in the previous election. They em-
ployed somewhat different phrases and tones from the teachers and 
pastors but achieved the same effect, and as became men of valor ,they 
occasionally used physical force. A favorite technique was for the 
commanding officer to call the Landwehr soldiers together before 
election time and deliver a speech to them, of which the following 
examples will suffice. Herr von Schmeling, Landwehr lieutenant in 
Heiligenbeil: "Comrades, you will see from the publication given you 
·'Ibid., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, pp. 622, 654. 
3' Spenersche Zeitung, June 23, 1865. 
400 / Prussia 1858-1864 
for whom you are to vote. Nonetheless, I will in short order make 
your position clear. It is a question of only two things-either the King 
continues to rule or the Jews. The democrats wish the latter. Dis-
missedl" In Seehausen Major von Bohn declared to the reserve on 
March 29, 1862, "The previous elections are a disgrace to Pruss ian 
history. They have hardened the heart of the King .... This disgrace 
must be made good; everyone must contribute to doing so .... Who-
ever does not is a scoundrel." At Lautenburg and Rheden the com-
manding officer said to the Landwehr men, "It would be best if the 
army took its weapons, went from one end of the state to the other and 
trampled everything in the mud!" The election at Herford was edi-
fied by the commanding officer's marching the soldiers to the voting 
place, where they voted Conservative in a body. At the previous elec-
tion the soldier vote had been cast for liberals, and their officer was 
taking no chance on a repetition of this offence. As the major left the 
voting place, he met a Landwehr man, the son of a local liberal mer-
chant, and said, "You should be ashamed to vote with the democrats. 
You have been a soldierl" A battalion commander wrote to a reserve 
officer "that . . . because of agitation for the democratic Progressive 
party and thereby the violation of your duties as officer toward the 
King's Majesty and because of your forsaking the honor of a Royal 
Prussian officer, a court-of-honor investigation has been initiated 
against you." In another town two women who received a small sum 
to help bring up children by their former soldier-husbands found 
themselves deprived of these sums because their present husbands, 
ordinary burgers, had voted for the liberals.31 
The pressure by officials in 1863 continued into the voting place. 
Deputy von Bernhardi reported in the Lower House on December 3 
of that year that where trouble occurred at the elections it was caused 
by the election commissioners and that in almost every case these were 
Landrats.38 Thus, at Warmbrunn the election commissioner Burgh-
ard, a librarian in the service of Count Schaffgotsch, made a long pro-
Conservative speech to the voters. When one voter complained about 
it to the Landrat as a violation of the election law, the latter replied 
that he fully approved of the speech, that the election law forbade dis-
., Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 10, 1863; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zei-
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1862, I, 467·68, 474; see Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, May 27, 1862, for the story 
of the assault by two army officers with drawn swords upon a defenseless civilian 
for having voted liberal. 
IS Abg. H., St. B., Dec. 3, 1863; I, 384. 
The Government and the Elections / 40i 
cussion and the voting on resolutions, but that the holding of a serious, 
patriotic speech just before the act of voting was both legal and com-
mendable.39 
Serving as election commissioner in the ninth Oppeln district, 
Landrat Baron von Koppy devised a more effective technique than 
that of the Schaffgotsch librarian. According to a report given the 
commission of the Lower House by County Judge Wagener, Estate-
Owner Lorentz, and two other liberals of the district, the following 
incident occurred. The Landrat election commissioner declared at 
the beginning of the voting that he would allow no discussion. During 
the balloting the rural voters who did not support the Conservatives 
had to come directly to the table and at the request of the commissioner 
repeat the names of their candidates two or three times. Naturally 
some of them became frightened and on the second balloting a few 
stayed away or changed their vote. When a Conservative vote was 
cast the election commissioner could hear the name from any place in 
the room, no matter how softly spoken or badly enunciated. He allow-
ed the Conservative voters in the room to converse among themselves, 
to make remarks to the voters, to talk with the voting officials, to look 
over the records, even to spill a pot of ink over the lists. If a non-
Conservative voter made any comment, the commissioner threatened 
to have him removed by force, and several policemen were stationed 
outside for that purpose. Such was the moral quality of Conserva-
tism:~o 
The results of the election of 1863 proved to be almost as dis-
appointing to the government and the Conservatives as the previous 
ones had been. The disgust of Landrat Freiherr von Massenbach, 
election commissioner in the third election district of Posen, expressed 
itself in the manner in which he notified one of the winning candidates 
of his election. "At the elections for the Lower House held today in 
Birnhaum and Samter Counties," the Landrat wrote Doctor Langer-
hans, "the majority composed mainly of Poles and Jews chose you as 
deputy."41 
The government immediately began to punish the higher officials 
who had disobeyed its orders; loyal higher officials in turn punished 
subordinates; and, wherever they could, officials and officers began 
to take vengeance on civilians who had ignored their dictates. The 
government's relations to the election contrasted sharply with those 
I. Ibid., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, p. 616. 
40 Ibid., Dec. 9, 1863; I, (1864), 357-58. 
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after the elections in the preceding two years; the behavior surpassed 
the worst excesses of the Manteuffel regime. Village Schulzes were 
disciplined right and left. They were personally censured, fined or dis-
missed from office.42 Judicial officials suffered treatment similar to 
that given administrative personnel. Legal defence was in the main 
ignored. In one way or another the offenders were punished. 
One Landrat felt impelled to take direct action against a liberal 
Schulze in Olbersdorf. In a letter to Deputy Berndt, the Schulze, Rob-
ert Kuschel, described the interview, which lasted two and a half hours. 
The Landrat accused him of having, against orders, violated his oath 
of loyalty to the King by voting for liberals. He had also been dis-
obedient, the Landrat continued, in that "after leaving the voting 
place you said to the county messenger Nowack, 'Victory, we have in 
spite of all put them through,' and you laughed scornfully. You have 
also been disobedient in that you laughed at the policeman Weniger 
in the market place and ten steps farther on you clapped two men 
on the shoulder." During the interview the Schulze stood firmly on 
his right to vote according to his conception of what was best for the 
state. The Landrat tried to dictate into the report on three occasions 
remarks by the Schulze which were not true; and when the latter ob-
jected the official became angry, hit him on the chest so hard that he 
knocked him over. The Schulze became frightened and tried to flee, 
but the Landrat held the door and shouted for the police. The secre-
tary tried to calm the Landrat, who finally did quiet down enough to 
finish the interview. At the end the Schulze refused to sign the pro-
tocol because he had not been properly treated. The Landrat imposed 
a fine upon him for misbehavior.43 
The vengeful hand of the government reached into the lives of per-
sons who had only an indirect connection with it. In Guben the owner 
of a factory, C. Lehmann, had been elected to the unpaid position of 
town representative, and Langner, another burgher of the town, to 
that of town councillor. The administration at Frankfort on the Oder 
at first confirmed Langner's election, but after the state elections for 
deputies to the Lower House it refused to confirm the election of either 
man. The two municipal officials-to-be had voted for liberals. In 
Frankfort on the Oder, Master Chimney Sweeper Kiinzel, town coun-
cillor, member of the poor commission and of the local liberal commit-
tee of long standing, learned after the election the disadvantages of be-
.. See the evidence in ibid., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95. 
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ing a liberal. The government cancelled his rental of a piece of public 
land; the government director of the railway and a number of govern-
ment agencies ceased employing him and gave the work to another 
master who had voted Conservative. On December 2 Kunzel was ap-
prehended by the police over the question of the size of the area within 
which he could operate his business. It appeared that the government 
would reduce the extent of it.44 
The military participated in the disciplinary action with full loyalty. 
Upon being called back to active duty an officer who had voted liberal 
found that his superior had imposed a social boycott upon him. No 
officer was allowed to associate with him. From Potsdam a number 
of town officials reported the following action by the military stationed 
there. Soldiers were forbidden to trade with anyone who had voted 
liberal or who had failed to vote; and since many merchants depended 
upon this trade for their livelihood, the prohibition meant their ruin. 
On the list were two barbers, three bakers, a flour merchant, a butcher, 
a forage dealer, and a brewer, along with many others. A widow had 
been told by an official that she would have to move out of a govern-
ment-owned apartment unless she persuaded her son not to vote for 
liberals. She had refused and had moved. The military had been 
given the names of the offending tradesmen by the public officials. 
One could see why it was useful for Conservatives to hold the position 
of election commissioners.45 
When the new Landtag convened in the autumn of 1863, the 
liberals soon brought up for discussion in the Lower House the whole 
question of the behavior of the government in the election. The de-
bate focused upon certain fundamental problems of government in the 
state and revealed clearly once more the issues in the constitutional 
conflict. What role or function did the ministry have, how much 
authority resided in the King, what powers did the Landtag possess 
over the ministry and over the bureaucracy, what rights as voters did 
the officials have under the constitution, what authority did the govern-
ment possess over the officials, what part should the government play 
in an election, in what sense should the articles of the constitution 
be interpreted? The arguments were concerned primarily about these 
questions, for all of them were involved in the question of free elec-
tions. 
The liberals knew that their existence as a political force was at 
stake and that the sympathetic population expected them to act. In 
"Ibid., 1864; Vol. IV, No. 95, p. 643. 
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a superb speech in the House, on November 28, Schulze-Delitzsch 
stated the full significance of the conflict: "We have the duty toward 
our voters that when they are restricted by the officials in the exercise 
of their most sacred rights, we must step in and fight for them with all 
the constitutional means at our disposal. Only thereby will they be en-
couraged; and if we do nothing, we only cause discouragement through-
out the country." This was the old constitutional conflict in a new 
form. Its meaning was brought home to the people to its fullest ex-
tent, he said, for the behavior of the government in the elections show-
ed that the conflict involved the most intimate of all civil rights, the 
right to vote. Addressing the Conservative deputies,he said: 
You must not feel entirely secure since you actually request 
the government to support your influence illegally by means of 
the officials. A genuine aristocracy does not think and act in 
this way .... Such behavior could rather destroy the aristocracy 
than strengthen it .... The gentlemen [the Conservatives] who 
already have such a favorable position through their important 
social standing display a testimonial of poverty and show that 
something must be rotten about their position because they do 
not trust this legitimate influence and evoke another force for 
their support, that of illegality .... 
Schulze-Delitzsch accused the government and the Conservatives of 
relying on what was low and vulgar in human nature, on venality, as 
the basis of their system of rule. And he said, 
That is a system which arouses against itself the most ter-
rible hate that one can think of among those whom one forces 
under control. It is the most awful humiliation, the worst af-
front, which one commits when one forces a man to admit this 
before his fellow men. The coerced one thinks of wife and 
child, of his miserable situation, of hunger and sorrow-but 
nonetheless he will not be free of the feeling that he appears to 
all his associates as a wretched person .... More than one has 
come to me in burning shame and with the bitterest com-
plaints.46 
Deputy Assman was equally bitter: 
Whoever speculates on revolutionary conditions should al-
low things to continue as they are and not oppose this activity 
of the Landrats. Like a poisonous fungus bitterness and pes-
simism are quickly and secretly spreading and are consuming the 
foundations of our state, while the state craftsmen are concern-
ed only to preserve the outer polish of the ornaments . 
•• Ibid., Nov. 28, 1863, Vol. I, (1864), p. 185. 
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We face, in fact, a bad calamity for the state. To avoid it 
exceptional measures are necessary, for these are not merely 
single excesses of individual officials which lie before us, but 
everything points to organized pressure.47 
Freiherr von Vincke, a right-wing liberal of the highest social stand-
ing and usually a severe critic of Schulze-Delitzsch, directed terms of 
equally strong condemnation against the government. He called the 
government's compulsion on the voters "unheard of" and not in har-
mony with the moral sense of the people. "Among the simple country 
folk, who are the most loyal supporters of the Royal House," he said, 
"there prevails the greatest bitterness. They are deeply angered over 
the offence against their personal rights." Von Vinke urged the 
government not to continue along this path. "If the Lower House is 
dissolved another time or two and such election pressure is again 
exerted as this time, no one can say what will happen. God defend 
our Fatherland against thatl"48 
The liberals were especially concerned about the position of officials 
with respect to the government. Many of them were or had been 
officials themselves and comprehended the full seriousness of the prob-
lem from personal experience. Freiherr von Vincke stated that no 
one demanded that the government remain silent during an election. 
It should use all legal means to inform the public about the issues, 
and the officials should be loyal to their superiors. Nonetheless, the 
officials must have freedom to follow their own political views. Very 
many officials who at present were considered loyal had formerly 
opposed the liberal Hohenzollern-Auerswald ministry, von Vincke 
added, without finding that attitude one of hostility to the King.49 
Deputy Wachler, a county judicial official elected on the Progres-
sive ticket and now serving as chairman of the commission of the Lower 
House investigating the violations of freedom of election, revealed to 
the Lower House the situation of the bureaucrat from personal experi-
ence. Landrat von Knebel-Doberitz of his county had warned all 
officials, Schulzes and others, against voting for him and his Progres-
sive colleague, Knight's Estate-Owner von Gablenz. As an official he 
had taken the oath of loyalty to three kings and had served the mon-
archy for almost forty years; yet the Landrat called him hostile to the 
government. Wachler emphasized how subversive of official prestige 
it was when a peasant or a townsman one day received a governmental 
.. Ibid., p. 168. 
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instruction signed "Wacbler" and the next day a statement from the 
Landrat that Wachler was hostile to the government, "a highly 
dangerous subject," and should not be supported at the election. If 
this was the way things were done, Wacbler continued, it would be 
better to abolish the constitution, abolish the Lower House, create a 
Tax Council and replace the Upper House by a Court Assembly which 
would be obedient.50 
Deputy Faucher condemned the government's action for another 
reason. 
If we had all the Schulzes as electors and only Landrats as 
deputies, the same administrative officials would serve as popu-
lar representatives who should be warned by the popular repre-
sentatives. Then the government, misled by a sham constitu-
tionalism, would allow itself to commit acts which it would later 
greatly regret and we would all have to say to ourselves that it 
would have been better if Prussia had remained an absolutistic 
state.51 
Deputy Waldeck, a liberal of 1848, a judge who had withstood 
government pressure many times, expressed further the dilemma of the 
official. 
Who is responsible for the present situation, that the consti-
tution is violated, that there is no budget, that expenditures are 
made for the army organization which the Lower House has re-
duced? The ministry is responsible. The official took the oath 
of allegiance to the constitution, and if upon being elected de-
puty he finds the government violating the constitution, what 
should be do? 
Waldeck blamed the government for putting the official in this dilem-
ma. The liberals gladly approved political agitation by the Conserva-
tive party, he said, and claimed for themselves the same right. They 
disapproved putting the officials in disciplinary investigation because 
of their vote. One cannot call voting, Waldeck concluded, political 
agitation.52 
What should be the relation between the official and the govern-
ment? The arguments chiefly revolved around this question. Deputy 
Virchow, the famous professor of medicine, declared that once a person 
was definitely appointed to an official position and once he was ex-
pected to fulfill his duty under all ministries, "you must allow him a 
•• Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
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certain neutral area within which he can move freely according to his 
own conscience. You must normalize precisely his official duties." With-
out this precise statement of obligations, he said, the Prussian state 
in its present form could not exist. Virchow considered the constitu-
tional rights of the individual as composing that area which the govern-
ment should not violate. 53 Count Schwerin, the former Minister of 
Interior and a friend of the King's, a member of the highest nobility, 
a liberal of the most moderate kind, condemned the government's 
treatment of officials as completely as any left-wing democrat. In the 
Lower House on November 13 he denounced the government for hav-
ing forced officials to put themselves at the head of "a certain party." 
This is "the worst thing that could happen to the Prussian state," he 
said, "for it damages the respect which in a state like Prussia the 
official must have." As minister, he stated, his rule had been that 
"as long as an official did his official duty and obeyed his superior, I 
did not ask about his political views." He had disciplined those who 
had agitated for any political party, whether liberal or Conservative. 
The present government should have been "more careful" in its instruc-
tions to officials. He feared that if present policies were continued, 
the country might be split between those who were loyal to the King 
and those who were not. He stated that no worse service could be done 
the Landrats than to make them the leaders of a certain political party, 
for thereby they would lose the general confidence on which their 
prestige depended. He accused the government of bringing them into 
this unfortunate position.54 
Deputy Twesten referred to Paragraph 315 of the code of criminal 
law in which an official "who abuses his official power to force some-
one illegally to an act, a sufferance or an omission should be punished 
by imprisonment of not less than a month's duration." The liberals 
could not at present initiate such proceedings, he said, because the 
ministry monopolized the authority to bring suit. But "misdemeanors 
of this kind are not cancelled for five years, and I think there will later 
be an opportunity to use this paragraph."~5 
On the Conservative side, the statements were equally blunt and 
problems were raised which the liberals had not actually handled. 
Since the Conservatives were few in the House and, with the exception 
of Deputy Wagener, not particularly vocal, their arguments came forth 
.a Ibid., Nov. 28, 1863; I, 175.76 . 
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mainly as fiats. Deputy von Blanckenburg demanded to know: "When 
the officials work in their offices as state officials in the name of the 
government and then in the evening as citizens agitate in clubs against 
the same government-does not that violate the moral conscience of the 
people more than when an official is simply forced back into doing 
his duty?"56 Deputy Wagener asked the liberals tartly whether the 
officials were only to be allowed to agitate against the government. 
He saw no difference between a Conservative Landrat's influencing a 
peasant and a liberal county judge's behaving in the same way. If the 
prestige of the one was damaged- by such action, the same held true 
for the other official. He preferred the prohibition of any political 
agitation on the part of the officials, a view, however, which his Con-
servative colleagues manifestly did not share.57 
For the government, Minister of Interior Count Eulenburg, who 
should have carried the burden of defence, proved at first to be rather 
tame and somewhat apologetic. He even acknowledged that some 
officials had gone too far in pressing their subordinates and said that 
he had given instructions to correct the excesses. Nonetheless, he 
denied that free elections were possible in a time of political excite-
ment like the present. At every election, he said, influence was exerted; 
every person was influenced and should be. Where different views 
existed and the government was convinced that its views were correct, 
it should use all legal means to influence the public in favor of them. 
He defended his election decree as constitutional and necessary, for a 
part of the bureaucracy had been getting out of hand and ignoring its 
official responsibility to the King. Without obedience such as he had 
demanded, there could be no orderly administration. He admitted 
that an independent bureaucracy no longer existed, and he blamed 
the loss upon the introduction of a representative legislative body. 
The two were incompatible, he said; to rule as before with an inde-
pendent bureaucracy was completely out of the question.58 
Minister President Bismarck knew the weakness of his colleague 
Eulenburg, and in one brief, frank and cool speech in the Upper 
House he expressed warm approval of the most extreme action of the 
Landrats and other officials and of the Conservatives in the recent 
election: 
You may be certain that the government has not been spoiled 
by an excess of loyal zeal to the extent that when this zeal is 
•• Ibid., Nov. 28, 1863; I, 174. 
'f I.bid". Nov. 13, 1863.; I (1864), 51. 
I. Ibid., Nov. 13, 23, 1863; I, 46, 50, 130. 
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manifested it does not esteem the honorable source of it. The 
government knows how to distinguish such an excess from the 
careful reserve which washes its hands in innocence and does not 
come into the position of seriously asking itself whether the 
limits which I described are touched or transgressed.59 
Thereby Bismarck described the actual situation without trying to 
cover up realities by piety and legalism. He criticized the moderate 
and fair officials, the ones who had tried to make possible the freedom 
of election. He calmly disavowed much of what the Minister of 
Interior said about the elections and reassured his supporters that the 
government stood behind them. 
The sharp difference in interpretation of the constitution between 
the government and the liberal majority of the Lower House showed 
itself in details at every point. The one wished to draw the limits to 
the power of the other as tightly as possible; the other sought to ex-
pand its authority as far as it could. An example arose in connection 
with the investigation of election irregularities. The House appointed 
a commission to conduct the investigation; and since most of the 
evidence concerned officials, the commission tried to obtain informa-
tion directly from lower officials. The government prohibited the 
latter from supplying any data except that which the ministry was 
willing to give. The government based its position on the constitution 
and asserted that by the provision for the separation of powers the 
legislative branch had no authority to consult private citizens or 
officials except by way of the executive. The Lower House was in-
clined in general to accept this view, certainly an extraordinary sign 
of inexperience on its part; but it believed that while the Lower House 
itself could not carry out an investigation of the sort proposed a com-
mittee of the House could do so. When the government forbade 
officials to appear before the committee, the House was compelled to 
acquiesce.6o The government won again because it had the power. 
It succeeded for the time being at least in making the House dependent 
upon the administration for all official investigatory work involving 
public hearings. It set up another barrier to effective relations between 
the House and the public. 
Constitutional or legal arguments had slight bearing on the con-
flict. Each side claimed legal authority for its action and views, for 
each referred to a different article of the constitution or a different 
•• Herrenhaus, St. B., Nov. 19, 1863; I, 48. 
00 See the discussion in Abg. H.,. St. B., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 90, pp. 554-57; No. 
95, pp. 625, 56. 
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law. In the stage of development in which Prussia found itself, the 
controversy could be resolved only by force; no court or Landtag could 
do so. The outcome depended upon whether the Lower House or 
the King and his government had the power to gain its way, and, as 
has already been seen, Bismarck knew this fact. The liberals brought 
forth excellent legal arguments, all of which were undoubtedly valid, 
if one accepted them as valid. So did the Conservatives.61 The gap 
theory could be applied to this question as easily as it could to that 
of the financial authority. The entire issue became one of brute power. 
This was a crucial period in the history of the relations of the 
officials and the government. In the pre-parliamentary era of ab-
solutism, particularly in the Stein-Hardenberg period, the officials had 
considered themselves in many cases as representatives of the people 
and had defended law and order against autocracy. Protected by ad-
ministrative law, they had enjoyed a degree of independence in judg-
ment and action which had enabled them at times to defy and block 
arbitrary measures. After the introduction of parliamentary institu-
tions they attempted to maintain their attitude of independence, even 
though conditions had changed. Formerly their opposition to the 
government had been held within the confines of the ruling group. 
Little or no public activity or expression of support had been involved. 
Under a parliamentary regime they extended their claim to inde-
pendence to the right to engage in political party conflicts and to ap-
peal to the public. Thereby they tended to violate the rules of the 
closed corporation of the, governing group. They undermined dis-
cipline by appealing to the public, a new power, against their own 
superiors. They claimed the right to participate in political party life 
while preserving the security of tenure of the Old Regime of bureau-
cratic absolutism. The Conservatives' demand that the officials fol-
low the orders of the absolute monarch was equally inappropriate. 
Misunderstanding the situation created by the introduction of parlia-
mentary institutions, the government claimed that the officials tlhould 
be active politically in its favor. Thereby it forced the latter into the 
position either of losing their rights as citizens to vote according to 
their conscience or of disobeying their superiors. Although in con-
trary directions, both liberals and conservatives were claiming more 
power with respect to the officials than was justified. 
The issue was critical because of the high importance of the officials 
in the political life of the Prussian state. Far more so than in a 
U See the Conservative view of 1856 as formulated by Minister von Westphalen. 
Ibid., Feb. 8, 1856; I, 354; also Deputy Heise's remarks. Ibidl, Feb. 8, 1856; I, 364-65. 
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country like England, the officials continued to provide much of the 
political leadership. Recognizing that fact, Bismarck and his col-
leagues determined to break the political independence of the bureau-
crats once and for all. By winning the constitutional conflict they 
were to succeed in reducing the officials to political silence or to active 
support of the government. This system was subsequently introduced 
into the unified Germany and lasted as long as the Second Reich. It 
offered one more example of how Bismarck and the Conservatives 
imposed upon a government with parliamentary institutions an auto-
cratic conception of the Old Regime. Their policy provided no solu-
tion, but it worked, that is, until eliminated by the same means by 
which it was introduced-sheer power. 
12 / The Elections of 1862 and 1863 
IN Ap,i1-May, 1862, and Oaobe,-Novembcr, 1863, 
elections were held for the Lower House of the Landtag. Of the 350 
deputies to be elected, the results according to party were as follows: 
Name of Party 
LIBERAL 
CONSERVATIVE 
CATHOLIC 
POLISH 
Number of Deputies 
Elected 
1862 
284 
10' 
33 
23 
1863 
258 
36 
30 
26 
In each election the liberals won by an overwhelming majority. Since 
all the Polish deputies and on most issues the Catholic Center Party 
opposed the Conservative program, the government enjoyed the sup-
port in the Lower House of only a very small band of Conservative 
faithful. 
Statistical data on the party vote in the two elections were not avail-
able at the time except in scattered form. No official figures on the 
results were published; and not even the liberals provided an un-
official tabulation. The government's compilation of the statistics 
was kept secret, reposing in the Prussian State Archives, where it was 
discovered by the present author.2 Although the compilation is not 
quite complete, it does provide figures for both elections on the vote 
of the electors for the four major political groups, the liberals, the Con-
• Deputy Hoffman, a Landrat of Oppeln II, IS regarded not as a Conservative but 
as a member of the Constitutional party. 
• Statistics on the Prussian Elections of 1862 and 1863, edited by Eugene N. 
Anderson (University of Nebraska Press, 1954). 
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servatives, the Catholic Center, and the Poles. The statistics analyze 
the vote by county and by urban and rural categories. They also supply 
the figures, by party, on the voters' vote in 1863 for each county, for 
each of the three classes of voters and for the urban and rural popula-
tion. These data make it possible for the first time to analyze the 
statistical evidence on the political attitude of the Prussian population 
in the crucial period of the constitutional conflict. They will be used 
as the basis for the discussion in this chapter. 
The size of the total vote cast was certainly not impressive. In the 
election of 1863, of 90,790 eligible to vote in Class I in the entire state, 
only 57 per cent voted; of 202,709 in Class II, 44 per cent voted; of 
803,954 in Class III, 27.3 per cent voted; of a total of 1,097,453 eligible 
voters in all three classes, only 30.9 per cent cast a ballot. The per-
centages were lowest in the two Western provinces (20.6 for West-
phalia and 18.1 for the Rhineland), highest for the province of Posen 
(53.3 per cent) . For the other provinces the figures ranged from 38.9 
per cent in the province of Brandenburg to 29 per cent in the province 
of Silesia. Frequently a candidate for the position of elector won in 
an election at which fewer than a dozen voters cast a ballot. In the 
towns the percentage in all classes participating in the election was 
usually greater than that in the rural districts. 
Since the statistics on the popular vote are available for the election 
of 1863, the number of popular votes necessary to elect a deputy for 
each party can be calculated. The following table contains the per-
tinent data: 
Consero-
Liberal ative Catholic Polish 
Total popular vote 566,000 327,000 48,000 131,000 
Number of popular votes per deputy 2,193 9,083 1,600 5,038 
Percentage of total popular vote 52.8 30.5 4.4 12.0 
Percentage of total number 
of deputies 73.4 10.3 8.5 7.4 
The Catholics manifestly fared best under the election system, the 
liberals next best, and the Poles and Conservatives suffered heavily. 
The party with the smallest popular vote seated proportionally far 
more deputies than any other party. If one were to judge the election 
system by the standards of equal, universal suffrage or by a system of 
proportional representation. one would have to conclude that the 
Catholics were greatly over-represented, the liberals considerably so, 
and the Poles and especially the Conservatives were greatly under-
represented. 
In the administrative district of Koslin, where the Conservatives 
won seven out of nine seats, on a proportional basis they did better 
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than the liberals in the same area. Their popular vote was 3,100 per 
deputy, that of the liberals 5,500 votes. They won about two-thirds 
of the popular votes and seated 77 per cent of the deputies. The 
liberals received the rest-one-third of the popular vote and 23 per 
cent of the deputies. In other administrative districts, like Breslau and 
Oppeln, where the Conservatives returned several deputies but far 
fewer than the liberals, they fared well or ill in proportion to the num-
ber of deputies they were able to return. The more deputies they 
elected, the lower the number of Conservative voters per deputy 
and the narrower the gap between the percentage of popular vote 
they received and of deputies they elected. In those administrative 
districts in which they seated no deputies and yet polled a large vote, 
the disparity was greatest. In the administrative district of Konigsberg, 
for example, the Conservatives polled 20,000 popular votes to 32,000 
for the liberals and did not seat a single deputy while the liberals re-
turned sixteen. The system of voting favored the party with concen-
trated strength in an election district, irrespective of whether or not 
that party had a large following in all or most parts of the state. The 
Conservatives formed a large minority throughout the state, but they 
could muster enough votes in 1863 to win in only twenty-one out of 
176 election districts. The results of the three-class system of voting 
proved to be similar to those obtained under any system based upon 
the returns from a single election district. A majority won; the 
minority, no matter how large, was unable to seat a representative. The 
Conservatives were not under-represented any more than a minority 
party is in England or the United States. They had a large popular 
following, and they showed that the Conservative government was not 
lacking in popular support; but they could not muster enough votes 
in the crucial places, the election districts, to win very many seats.s 
Although all parties entered the elections on equal terms, one 
should exercise great caution in drawing conclusions about the poli-
tical attitude of the Prussian people from the total vote polled by each 
party. The three-class system acted as a deterrent to voting, especially 
in Class III where most eligible voters were to be found. When for 
the entire state an average of 132 voters in Class III had the same voting 
power as 19.1 voters in Class II and as 7.1 in Class I, the masses saw 
little inducement to express their political opinions by balloting. Dur-
ing the decades in the first half of the century when the Stein Municipal 
Law had allowed equal suffrage in the towns and cities of the Eastern 
• Cf. Dr. J. Jastrow, Das Dreiklassensystem (Berlin, 1894) , pp. 89-90. 
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provinces, the public had participated in the local elections to an over-
whelming extent. It was to do so again when the Reich election law 
permitted equal and secret suffrage. The three-class system imposed 
such a handicap upon popular participation that it would be wrong to 
gauge the results of the elections by a yardstick which is inappropriate 
for that system of voting. Since the system did not allow equality of 
suffrage, one should not attempt to interpret the results by a standard 
that assumes equality of votes. A basis of judgment must be formed 
which is in keeping with the nature of the election system-a fact 
which neither the Conservatives and the liberals at the time nor sub-
sequent students of these elections have taken into account. The total 
figures reveal the political attitude of those who took the trouble to 
vote, of those who felt so strongly or were under such heavy pressure 
from other forces that they cast a ballot. The data do not indicate 
that those failing to vote were either uninterested in politics or were 
content with the status quo. 
The three-class system divided the voters in each election district 
according to the amount of direct taxes paid. The framers of the 
election law had assumed that the distribution of rich and poor would 
be about the same in each locality, an assumption that proved to be 
false, particularly as modern industrialism spread. In some precincts 
no individuals were eligible for the first class or even the first and 
second classes, and a few persons had to be arbitrarily assigned to these 
categories.4 In wealthy districts like Berlin the average direct tax paid 
by a member of the first class was 225.8 Reichsthalers, that of the 
second class 64.1, and that of the third, 6.38. In Heydekrug County in 
East Prussia the comparable figures were 20.0, 8.5, and 1.71 Reichs-
thalers. For the entire state they were 53.7, 16.9, and 2.55 Reichs-
thalers. The amount of taxes paid by individuals within each class 
varied widely. In Stuhm County in the province of Prussia the amount 
for voters in the first class ranged from 26 to 1,054 Thalers, in the 
second class from 9 to 129 Thalers, and in the third class from 2 to 37 
Thalers. The greatest disparity in voting power was found in the 
large towns and the cities, where differences in wealth were most pro-
nounced. 
In spite of the lack of state-wide uniformity it appears to have been 
generally true that the system roughly corresponded with the natural 
divisions of society at the time. In anyone district the leaders would 
usually be found in the first or the first and second classes and the 
• See Abg. H., St. B., May 26, 1862; I, 41 (speech by Deputy Neide) • 
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masses in the third. Regardless of whether one district was industrial 
and urban and another was agricultural and rural, the three-class sys-
tem represented grades of comparable social and economic importance 
within each district. A merchant of some wealth who was in Class III 
in an urban district would have far more income than persons in 
Class I in other districts. Nonetheless, in his district he occupied a 
social and economic position of third class; and an individual of much 
less wealth in a rural district might enjoy a position of first class. The 
voters represented definite social and economic interests according to 
the class in which they were placed. Exceptions occurred mainly in 
two cases. The first concerned intellectuals, who were frequently or 
usually leaders but on economic grounds were normally found in 
Class III. The second concerned two groups: wealthy individuals, 
some of whom, in certain areas, had to be relegated to Class II or Class 
III, and others where the extent of economic equality was such that 
persons for Class I or even Class II had to be chosen arbitrarily.5 
An adequate standard for judging the results of the three-class 
system of voting would take into account the fact of comparability of 
social and economic position in each district, irrespective of the diver-
sity of wealth, occupation, and social background. Instead of adding 
up total figures on the number of persons voting for each party through-
out the state, one should use total figures on the number of counties. 
The figures for each county should then be broken down according 
to voting class and according to whether they referred to urban or to 
rural areas. The vote should be tabulated for each county regardless 
of whether the party was able to return a deputy. If a party won in a 
county or in one or more classes or in the urban or rural areas even 
without being able to carry the election district, that fact should be 
recorded so that the size of the party's following can be shown. By 
using this method one is able to compile the following table on the 
liberals and the Conservatives.6 
In preparing the table the author has confronted the problem of 
what to do in case an election district returned members of two parties. 
In these instances it is impossible to learn the exact vote of each win-
ning party. The official compiler has recorded the vote of only one; 
that of the other party will vary from it according to class and according 
to the distribution of the vote between urban and rural areas. Where-
• Cf. von Gerlach, op. cit., pp. 29-34; R. B&kh, "Statistik der Urwahlen fUr das 
preussischen Abgeordnetenhaus vom 19. Nov. 1861," Zeitschrift der Preuss. Statis-
tischen Bureaus, 1862, II, 77-121. 
• A similar table on the Catholic and the Polish vote is given later in this chapter. 
Admin. 
District 
Konigsberg 
Gumbinnen 
Danzig 
Marienwerder 
Potsdam 
City of Berlin 
Frankfurt 
Stettin 
K&lin 
Stralsund 
Breslau 
Oppeln 
Liegnitz 
Posen 
Bromberg 
Magdeburg 
Merseburg 
Erfurt 
Miinster 
Minden 
Arnsberg 
Cologne 
Diisseldorf 
Coblenz 
Aachen 
Trier 
Sigmaringen 
Total 
The Voters' Vote 1863 by County Showing a Majority by Class 
'C' 
~.~ IN FAVOR ~LIBERALS 
-; ;: I 
IN FAVOR OF THE CONSERVATIVES 
" A-. ~ 
C ~! Total 
r... '"' I II III Tot'l 
20 
16 
8 
13 
15 
4 
17 
13 
10 
4 
24 
16 
19 
18 
9 
15 
17 
9 
II 
10 
14 
II 
18 
12 
II 
13 
4 
351 
14 14 II II 
15 12 14 15 
4 2 2 2 
7 766 
12 13 II 12 
444 4 
14 15 II 13 
12 10 8 7 
3 4 0 0 
3 3 3 3 
16 19 6 8 
4 4 4 4 
17 17 13 13 
I I 0 0 
444 4 
13 14 13 13 
15 17 14 14 
345 5 
4 4 3 5 
6 5 3 3 
12 12 13 13 
887 7 
15 14 13 13 
10 II II 10 
8 7 8 8 
13 13 13 13 
4 4 4 4 
241 242 204 210 
Urban Rural 
1 II III Tot'l 1 
15 14 14 14 9 
13 13 13 13 14 
II III Tot'l 
877 
II 13 12 
I 1 I 
7 (j 6 
5 5 I 3 2 
9 9 6 7 6 
13 14 15 15 6 
4 444 
II 3 5 
17 17 17 17 
13 13 13 13 
766 7 
4 444 
17 20 19 19 
5 5 5 5 
19 19 17 19 
4 3 I I 
4 4 4 4 
12 13 13 13 
16 16 16 16 
6 565 
564 5 
9 6 5 5 
12 12 13 13 
566 6 
14 15 13 14 
9 9 9 9 
996 7 
9II II II 
4 4 4 4 
259 262 245 253 
8 8 I 2 
6 5 4 4 
2 2 0 0 
2 2 I 1 
12 13 3 5 
3 3 3 3 
13 14 6 8 
o 0 0 0 
4 4 'i 4 
10 12 8 9 
13 14 10 12 
I 3 3 3 
3 3 3 4 
6 5 I I 
12 II 12 13 
7 7 6 6 
II II II II 
10 10 9 10 
6 4 6 6 
12 12 II 12 
4 4 4 4 
182 185 136 149 
Total I 
I II III Tot'll I 
2 2 5 5 I 
1 4 2 1 1 
I 2 2 2 0 
2 2 3 2 0 
3 2 4 3 2 
o 0 0 0 0 
3 2 6 4 0 
I 3 5 6 0 
7 6 10 10 3 
1 1 I 1 0 
8 5 18 16 6 
8 8 8 8 6 
2 2 6 6 0 
5 2 I 0 5 
o 0 0 0 0 
2 1 2 2 3 
2 0 3 3 1 
4 3 2 2 I 
o 0 0 0 0 
I I 2 2 0 
o 0 0 0 0 
o 0 I I I 
o I 2 2 I 
2 I I 2 0 
o 0 0 0 0 
I 1 1 1 2 
o 0 0 0 0 
56 49 85 79 33 
Rural Urban I 
II III Tot'l I II III Total 
788 
534 
222 
233 
3 II 9 
1 I 1 6 
I 1 1 2 
o 2 0 2 
o 3 2 3 
1 0 0 8 
000 
000 
000 
443 
000 
344 
666 
020 
300 
000 
222 
I 1 1 
212 
000 
000 
000 
I I 0 
o 2 I ,I 
000 
000 
000 
000 
25 30 23 
8 8 15 14 
6 7 8 8 
8 8 10 10 
223 3 
II 10 20 18 
888 8 
6 5 13 11 
4 3 I 2 
o 0 0 0 
3 2 6 5 
3 2 6 4 
644 4 
o 0 0 0 
1 244 
I I I I 
o 0 I 0 
I 222 
2 2 3 2 
o 0 0 0 
I I 2 I 
o 0 0 0 
92 86 134 123 
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ever a Conservative won, the compiler most likely tabulated his vote, 
for the government was most interested in the size of the vote for its 
supporters. In those cases where a Catholic and a liberal, or a Pole 
and a liberal, won, it is usually impossible to tell to which one the 
recorded vote pertains. In order to learn the maximum strength of 
the Conservatives the author has for this table regarded as Conservative 
the vote in the three election districts where a candidate of that party 
was returned along with a member of another party. The one excep-
tion to this rule, Erfurt II, is explained by the fact that the official 
compiler credited the victory to the Catholics. Where a liberal won 
along with one or two Catholics (in six election districts) or one or 
two Poles (in five election districts) , the author has included the vote 
not in the liberal columns but in those of the other winning party. 
By this method he has manifestly underestimated the strength of the 
Catholics by the three election districts in which they won along with 
a Conservative, and he has diminished the liberal showing even more 
by ignoring in this table their winning vote in eleven election districts 
comprising twenty-three counties. If the figures on the liberals were 
increased by the number of these counties, the results would be more 
nearly correct than those given in the above table. In that case the 
total figures for the liberals would be: 
Total 
I II 
264 275 
Urban 
III Total I II 
227 233 282 285 
Rural 
III Total I 
268 276 205 
II 
208 
III Total 
159 172 
The tables reveal that in Class I the liberals won over four times 
as many counties as the Conservatives, in Class II nearly five times as 
many, in Class III about two and one half times as many. In the urban 
areas the liberals won eight times as many in Class I and from ten to 
eleven times as many in Classes II and III and in the total. In the 
rural districts the liberals won twice as many in Classes I and II and 
gained a majority in Class III and in the total. 
The evidence shows that the overwhelming majority of the voters 
favored one of the liberal parties. Rural as well as urban population 
voted for the liberals. Counties that were entirely rural cast as high 
a percentage of ballots in favor of them as did the urban areas. Al-
though not as a rule in such large numbers, the voters of the Masurian 
and Lithuanian regions, of a few Polish counties and of many Catholic 
ones favored the liberals as staunchly as the solidly German Protestant 
districts. The Conservative strength among the voters was concentrated 
in very few areas. The party was able to win a majority of the popular 
votes in one half or more of the counties in only three administrative 
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districts, Breslau, Oppeln, and especially Koslin, though it also did 
well in Stettin and Liegnitz. If it had not been strong in the third 
class and among the rural voters, it would not have been so successful 
even in these five administrative districts, for the liberals or the other 
parties easily gained a majority of the total vote in the first two classes 
in three of these (Breslau, Stettin, and Liegnitz) and reduced the 
Conservative showing in Koslin. The urban voters greatly favored the 
liberals in everyone of these administrative districts. 
The liberals were able to win a seat in six election districts along 
with a member of the Catholic party, and in a few instances the Con-
servatives and the Catholics returned a deputy from the same district. 
In five cases a liberal won alongside a Pole; but with the one exception 
of those in Merseburg II the voters were too well informed to commit 
the mistake of imagining that a Conservative and a liberal could 
represent their district with equal accuracy. 
The percentage of the voters casting ballots in the counties that 
went Conservative in 1863 was about the same as that for the liberal 
counties. The degree of participation varied with the amount of in-
fluence of the vote, highest in the first class and lowest in the third, 
with the second class ranking not far behind the first and well above 
the third. The percentage of voters participating in the election in 
1862 was higher in the great majority of counties and classes than it 
was in 1863. The Conservatives polled as a rule a much larger vote 
in the rural areas than in the towns and cities. They showed the 
greatest strength in the third class and least in the second. They won 
most of their seats in counties of solidly German population in which 
Protestantism predominated to an overwhelming extent; but they like-
wise were able to return deputies from a few counties in Silesia where 
the population was largely Catholic or both Catholic and Polish. The 
increase in the number of Conservative deputies from 1862 to 1863 is 
only explicable by the effectiveness of governmental and social pressure. 
Wherever the local upper class remained Conservative and the general 
cultural conditions had scarcely felt the effects of new ideas and of 
commerce and industry, the population tended to follow traditional 
ways and to acquiesce in Conservative leadership. 
The urban vote did not predominate in the elections. The urban 
population in Prussia remained as yet a minority, and the percentage 
of voters casting ballots was not much larger in the towns than in the 
rural areas. The statistics show that the rural vote alone for the 
liberals by county and class was much greater than the combined urban 
and rural vote for the Conservatives. While the urban voters over-
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whelmingly supported the liberals, the rural population likewise gave 
them sufficient strength to win by a large majority over their main 
rival. 
The electors' vote reveals a similar disproportion in favor of the 
liberals. The data contained in the following table are divided into 
two sections. The upper part contains the results in those counties 
in which the conflict was fought between liberals and Conservatives or 
in which a liberal or a Conservative victory under one of the rubrics 
was manifest. The lower part contains the results in those counties in 
which a liberal or a Conservative won along with one or two members 
of another party.7 
Number of Counties in Which the Majority of Electors Voted 
Liberal or Conservative 
Admin. 
District 
Konigsberg 
Gumbinnen 
Danzig 
Marienwerder 
Berlin 
Potsdam 
Frankfurt 
Stettin 
Koslin 
Stralsund 
Breslau 
Oppeln 
Llegnitz 
Posen 
Bromberg 
Magdeburg 
Merseburg 
Erfurt 
Miinster 
Minden 
Arnsberg 
Cologne 
Diisseldorf 
Coblenz 
Trier 
Aachen 
Sigmaringen 
Total 
Koni~sberg 
DatlZlg 
Marienwerder 
Oppeln 
Posen 
Bromberg 
Merseburg 
Miinster 
Minden 
Arnsberg 
Cologne 
Aachen 
Total 
TOTAL 
LIBERAL 
Total 
1862 186J 
16 U 
16 15 
4 2 
9 6 
4 4 
14 II 
17 14 
13 9 
4 2 
4 3 
19 14 
2 II 
17 14 
3 1 
4 4 
15 14 
17 14 
7 4 
1 1 
4 5 
9 12 
8 8 
13 14 
12 12 
12 12 
6 8 
3 4 
253 223 
2 
6 
2 
2 
~ 
3 
2 
3 
24 
277 
2 
2 
2 
3 
6 
1 
2 
II 
21 
244 
Urban 
1862 186J 
16 13 
15 15 
5 4 
10 9 
4 4 
15 15 
17 17 
n 13 
9 8 
4 4 
21 20 
3 5 
19 19 
3 I 
4 4 
15 15 
17 13 
7 5 
I 1 
5 8 
9 12 
6 6 
II 14 
10 10 
10 II 
6 10 
2 4 
257 260 
2 
2 
2 2 
9 3 
2 5 
2 
2 
2 3 
2 
3 
I 3 
3 
26 22 
283 282 
CONSERVATIVE 
'INo.ot'l I 
Rural I Coun- Total Urban 
1862 186J ties 1862 186J 1862 186J 
13 9 20 0 3 0 I 
16 15 16 0 I 0 0 
2 18 1200 
8 6 13 I 3 0 0 
0040000 
12 7 15 I 4 0 0 
14 7 17 0 3 0 0 
9 5 13 0 4 0 0 
2 0 10 6 8 I 2 
2 140 I 00 
15 9 24 5 10 3 3 
2 11 16 2 5 I 5 
15 9 19 2 5 0 0 
2 0 18 lOIS 4 
4490000 
14 II 15 0 I 0 0 
12 13 17 0 I 0 2 
7090302 
I I II 0 0 0 0 
3 11 10 I 0 0 0 
8 12 14 I 0 0 0 
7 7 II 0 0 0 0 
II 10 18 I I I 0 
12 12 12 0 0 0 0 
II II 13 I 4 I 0 
3 6 II 0 0 0 0 
344 1020 
209 168 351 24 59 14 19 
2 
5 
I 
2 
2 
2 
2 
II 
4 
2 2 
2 
3 
4 
o 
5 I 
o 
3 
Rural 
1862 1 186J 
2 6 
o I 
2 2 
2 3 
o 0 
2 7 
2 9 
II 7 
8 10 
2 3 
8 14 
2 5 
4 10 
o 2 
o 0 
o 3 
4 I 
o 7 
o 0 
2 0 
2 0 
o 0 
I 2 
o 0 
I I 
o 0 
I 0 
48 93 
5 
1 
5 
2 
2 II 
3 
2 1 
22 18 
2111 186 2g I 6~ 1 l~ 1 2~ 1 5~ 1106 
• In case of a tie the author credits the victory to the Conservatives. Since the 
official compiler gave to the Catholics the entire Conservative vote in the adminis-
trative district of Aachen in 1863, it is assumed that the same allocation occurred 
in the election of 1862. 
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The data indicate the effectiveness of governmental pressure in re-
ducing the size of the liberal electors' vote in 1863, especially in the 
rural regions. The town voters were better organized and had more 
means of self-protection against the government than the rural popula-
tion. The number of counties in which a majority of urban electors 
favored the liberals remained practically the same in 1863 as in the 
previous year, whereas in the rural areas it declined by nineteen per 
cent. For both urban and rural electors the liberal vote declined only 
twelve per cent from 1862 to 1863. In any case the Conservatives could 
scarcely derive much consolation from these figures. The electors 
proved to be much more liberal than the voters. 
The disparity in the number of counties in which the voters' vote 
gave a majority to the liberals and that in which the electors' vote did 
so arises from the system of indirect elections. In the voters' balloting 
the majority was established not by adding up the total vote as one 
sum for the election district but by counting the vote within each 
class. A party might win a majority of the total vote and still lose a 
majority of the electors. Usually a victory in two classes meant a 
majority for the party in the entire district; but it was possible for a 
narrow margin of victory in two classes to be offset by a large majority 
in the other class. Thus, in some twenty counties the Conservatives 
won a majority in two or more classes or in the total vote in the voters' 
election, but a majority of the electors favored the liberals. In three 
other counties the reverse occurred; the liberal voters' vote was turned 
by the electors into a Conservative victory. It was also possible for 
candidates to be non-committal about their party affiliation during 
the campaign and after being chosen as electors to cast their ballot 
for the party they personally preferred. The statistics reveal that a 
number did so, particularly in the rural areas. Again the liberals 
profited from the change. 
The relative strength of the liberals and the Conservatives can be 
seen most realistically from a comparison of the total number of elec-
Table I 
Total number of election districts 
Total number of counties 
Number of election districts returning liberal deputies 
Percentage of election districts returning liberal deputies 
Number of counties in these election districts 
Percentage of counties in these election districts 
Number of election districts returning Conservative deputies 
Percentage of election districts returning Conservative 
deputies 
Number of counties in these election districts 
Percentage of counties in these election districts 
1862 
176 
351 
151 
85.8 
300 
85.0 
6 
3.4 
12 
U 
1863 
176 
351 
137 
77.8 
271 
77.0 
21 
12.0 
41 
11.6 
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tion districts and the inclusive counties from which each party elected 
one or more representatives. The figures given in the table below con-
tain the data on those districts and counties in which the parties were 
able to win all seats and also on those in which they divided the repre-
sentation with a second party. 
These gross figures may be broken down in order to reveal the geo-
graphic concentration of the Conservative following. The following 
table lists the election districts and the counties in which the party 
was able to seat one or more deputies. 
Election District 
Danzig I 
Marienwerder VIII 
Potsdam VIII 
Frankfurt V 
Stettin V 
Stettin VI 
Koslin I 
KOIilin II 
Koslin III 
Koslin V 
Breslau I 
Breslau II 
Breslau III 
Oppeln I 
Oppeln IV 
Oppeln VI 
Oppeln VII 
Oppeln IX 
Liegnitz IV 
Merseburg II 
Erfurt V 
Table II 
Name of County won in 
1862 1863 
Lauenburg 
Biitow 
Stolp 
Belgard 
Neustettin 
Guhrau 
Steinau 
Wohlau 
Kreuzburg 
Rosenberg 
Tost-Gleiwitz 
Ratibor 
Elbing 
Marienburg 
Flatow 
Deutsch-Krone 
Jiiterbogk 
Sternberg 
Naugardt 
Regenwalde 
Greifenberg 
Kammin 
Lauenburg 
Biitow 
Stolp 
Rummelsburg 
Schlawe 
Schievelbein 
Dramburg 
Belgard 
Neustettin 
Guhrau 
Steinau 
Wohlau 
Militsch 
Trebnitz 
Wartenberg 
Namslau 
Oels 
Kreuzburg 
Rosenberg 
Tost-Gleiwitz 
Pless 
Rybnick 
Ratibor 
Neustadt 
Falkenberg 
Bunzlau 
Lowenberg 
Schweinitz 
Wittenberg 
Schleusingen 
Ziegenriick 
The evidence from the electors' balloting confirms that gained from 
the analysis of the voters' vote. The Conservatives had most influence 
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in the administrative districts of Koslin, Breslau, and Oppeln and to 
a less extent of Stettin. ~n 1862 all ten of their deputies came from 
the first three of these districts; in 1863 twenty-two out of thirty-five 
were elected from the three districts and four more were seated from 
Stettin. Apart from the administrative district of Koslin the liberals 
returned more deputies from each of these areas than the Conservatives. 
Liberal political power spread over the entire state; that of the Con-
servatives was decidedly localized. 
Although in 1862 the Catholic Center party and the Polish party 
each elected over twice as many deputies as the Conservatives, the 
campaigns of these two parties were much less significant for the fate 
of Prussia than those of the other antagonists. Their vote will be 
analyzed here primarly as an aid to estimating the size of the popular 
hostility to the Conservatives and the government. As we have seen, 
the Polish party opposed the latter on all counts. Catholic opinion 
was divided; but by 1863 it almost completely aligned with the liberals 
against the government. While disliking the program of the liberals 
for national unity, the Catholic party staunchly participated in the 
fight against militarism and absolutism and condemned Bismarck as 
thoroughly as the liberals. What strength did these two minor parties 
have in the population? 
In 1864 the Prussian state contained 5,200,000 adherents to the 
Catholic church, excluding the two million Poles, in a total popula-
tion of nineteen million.s The Catholic party was able to elect thirty-
three deputies in 1862 and thirty in 1863, or one deputy in 1862 to 
every 157,575 members of the Church. In the case of the Protestants 
the ratio in that year was one to 41,320. One would infer from these 
figures that the Catholic party was unable to monopolize the vote of 
all the adherents to its religion, and the further evidence in the table 
given below substantiates that view. Even in the predominantly 
Catholic counties and election districts where the Catholic party won, 
it was not able to keep all its followers in line. Where Catholics con-
stituted over ninety per cent of the population and a liberal or a 
Conservative as well as a Catholic party member was elected, one must 
conclude that Catholics had voted for a liberal or a Conservative. 
Since, as we have seen, a Catholic won in the same election district 
with a Conservative in only three cases and with a liberal in six, one 
must conclude that more Catholic voters preferred liberals than Con-
servatives. 
• Meitzen. op. cit., I, 326. 
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Catholic Party II 
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Konigsberg V Braunsberg Menzel P. Marquardt 90.4 
Heilsberg Rehaag (by·election) Austen 93.4 2 
Konigsberg VIII Allenstein Stock Stock 92.9 73.9 2 
ROssel Siebert 88.9 20.6 
Oppeln I Kreuzburg Funke 26.1 73.0 2 
Rosenberg 85.2 88.0 
Oppeln II Oppeln Osterrath Foitzick 85.7 . 74.2 2 
Oppeln III Gr.·Str.ehlitz Biernacki Engelbrecht 94.8 88.4 2 
Lublinitz v. Renard v. Renard 94.0 89.7 
Oppeln VI Pless Wanjura Jaensch 89.1 88.9 11 
Rybnik ( by-election) Schnapka 94.5 88.4 
Oppeln VII Ratibor Strzybny Weitzel 96.4 44.6 2 
Oppeln VIII Kosel Wolff Wolff 95.6 84.1 3 
Leobschiitz l\ftinzer . Miinzer 91.6 2.3 
Oppeln IX Neustadt v. Oppersdorf Mader 91.4 49.4 2 
Falkenberg 70.1 11.1 
Erfurt II Heiligenstadt Zehrt Frantz 92.2 2 
Worbi. Ellering Ellering 77.6 
Miinster II Steinfurt Rohden Rohden 89.3 2 
Ahaus Ziegler Steinmann 96.9 
Miinster UI Munster City Froning Froning 90.8 2 
Munster County Scheffer-Boichorst v. Kleinsorgen 97.5 
Koesfeld 98.4 
Miinster IV Borken Schultz Schultz 95.7 2 
Recklinghausen 98.0 
Miinster V Liidinghausen Hobbeling Hobbeling 98.6 2 
Beckum A. Reichensperger 98.1 
Warendorf 98.7 
Minden III Wiedenbriick Schmidt Schmidt 76.1 2 
Paderborn v. M"lJinckrodt Kleinschmidt 95.0 
Buren 96.8 
Minden IV Warburg Evers Weber 92.0 2 
Hoxter Albers 88.4 
Arnsberg II OIpe Bender 96.4 
l\feschede 95.8 
Arnsberg VII Lippstadt Plassmann 89.2 
Armberg 95.6 2 
Brilon 95.8 
Cologne IV Sieg Reinhardt Reinhardt 88.9 
Miilheim 91.1 3 
WIpperfUrth 91.1 
Dusseldorf VI Rees Giitzloe 66.9 I 
Dusseldorf VII Kleve Krebs Krebs 88.6 I 
Diisseldorf IX Geldern P. Reichensperger P. Reichensperger 95.1 2 
Kempen Franol1x Haanen 96.4 
Aachen IV Geilenkirchen Blnm Blum 97.6 2 
Heinsberg Osterrath 97.7 
Erkelenz 94.5 
Total 48 33 30 
While the table discloses the relation between Catholic religious 
affiliation and political attitude in those election districts from which 
a Catholic representative was elected, further evidence is supplied by 
a study of those predominantly Catholic districts which did not return 
party members as deputies. The administrative district Breslau con-
• Statistics on Poles from Zeitschrift des Kgl. Preuss. Statistischen Bureaus, 1871 
(Berlin, 1871), pp. 359 If. Statistics on Catholic percentages taken from Meitzen, 
op. cit., IV, 200 If. 
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tained five counties overwhelmingly Catholic in religion, but it did 
not return a single deputy of the Catholic party in either election. In 
the eighth election district, composed of three counties overwhelmingly 
Catholic in religion, three liberals won, all members of the Progressive 
party. In the ninth district, composed of two counties also over-
whelmingly Catholic in religion, two liberals of the Left-Center party 
won. In the administrative district of Dusseldorf eleven counties out 
of seventeen had a majority belonging to the Catholic Church. The 
table shows how meager was the success of the party in winning seats 
in that district. In the administrative district of Cologne the party 
was even less effective. Nine out of eleven counties were overwhelm-
ingly Catholic in religion; yet only one Catholic deputy was returned 
at either election. The administrative district of Aachen (eleven 
counties) was almost entirely Catholic in religion. It elected one 
Catholic party member in 1862 and two in 1863. In the administrative 
district of Coblenz where nine out of twelve counties were pre-
dominantly Catholic (seven of them overwhelmingly so), the party 
seated no one in either 1862 or 1863. The neighboring administrative 
district of Trier (fourteen counties) was almost totally Catholic in 
religion, but did not elect a single Catholic party member in either 
year; and the same conditions were true for Hohenzollern (four 
counties). Although the Catholic party depended upon the Church 
for its support, religious affiliation did not determine party affiliation. 
It remained for Bismarck's political conduct to align the Catholics 
almost solidly in one party. The liberals of the period under dis-
cussion successfully appealed to Catholic as well as to Protestant voters. 
The counties of Catholic faith consistently manifested slight in-
terest in the elections. The percentage of participation was cons}der-
ably lower in Catholic counties than in neighboring Protestant ones; 
and in the Rhineland and Westphalia, where Catholicism pre-
dominated, the percentages were from twenty to forty points below 
those in most of the state. In these two provinces the third class of 
voters excelled in remaining at home on election day. It was common 
for less than ten per cent to cast ballots; the second class appeared to 
the extent of twenty to thirty per cent, and the first class, thirty to fifty 
per cent. The Catholics manifestly found satisfaction for their needs 
and wishes in some other way than politics. The rural population 
participated in general less than half as much as the urban. 
In the voters' vote for 1863 the results by class and by the urban-
rural distinction for the Catholic party were as follows: 
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CATHOLIC 
Admin. No. of i --J-
District Counties Total Urban Rural 
I II III Total I II III Total I II III Total 
Konigsberg 20 4 4 4 4 1 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 
Oppeln 16 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Erfurt 9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Munster 11 7 7 8 6 6 5 7 6 7 7 7 6 
Minden 10 3 4 5 5 1 4 5 5 3 3 5 5 
Arnsberg 14 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Cologne 11 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Dusseldorf 18 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 
Aachen 11 3 4 3 3 1 1 4 3 4 6 4 4 
Total 120 32 34 34 32 24 26 31 30 32 34 33 32 
The results show a greater homogeneity of political views among all 
three classes, rural and urban, than was the case even among the Poles. 
The urban voters manifested somewhat less loyalty to the party than 
the rural inhabitants. They were more exposed to liberal influence 
than the latter, and with the movement of population into the towns 
and cities already under way the urban population in Catholic regions 
was no longer as solidly Catholic as that of the country districts. None-
theless, wherever the Catholic party showed political strength it usually 
did so in all three classes, rural and urban alike. 
The Polish population in Prussia numbered about two millions in 
1864, or 77,000 to each of the twenty-six deputies elected in 1863. It 
was mainly concentrated in the administrative districts of Danzig, 
Marienwerder, Posen, Bromberg, Oppeln, and, to a much less extent, 
Breslau.10 The political attitude of the Poles in these districts de-
pended upon cultural conditions, especially upon whether a Polish 
landholding aristocracy or a Polish middle class was present to provide 
leadership. In the districts of Oppeln and Breslau the Poles lacked 
direction. They formed the economically dependent and culturally 
backward mass of the working people and served under German over-
lords, many of them old established noble houses with vast estates. In 
these two administrative districts the Polish party did not win a single 
seat, in spite of the fact that in one election district in A-Dll Breslau 
they constituted a majority of the population and in AD Oppeln they 
amounted to fifty-eight per cent of the population, with ten out of 
sixteen counties being seventy-three per cent or more Polish. In these 
two administrative districts the Poles had to vote for other parties, 
and each of the other three parties succeeded in winning sufficient 
10 The Poles in Konigsberg and Gumbinnen districts were referred to as Masurians 
and had become too thoroughly incorporated into German life for them to be in-
terested in Polish nationality politics. They are excluded here from consideration. 
11 Administrative District. 
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support from them to return some deputies. The effective political 
activity of the Poles was therefore restricted to the administrative dis-
tricts Danzig, Marienwerder, Posen, and Bromberg, where the presence 
of Polish leaders in town and country enabled the population to 
organize for political action. 
The following table shows the distribution of Polish political 
strength: 
Danzig III 
Danzig IV 
Neustadt 
Karthaus 
Berent 
Stargard 
Polish Party 12 
v. Olszewski 
v. Thokarski 
'" 
'" 00 
.... 
... -
" 
" 
" ~ 
v. Rolewski 
v. Thokarski 
Wagener 
Marienwerder III LBbau 
Marienwerder IV Strassburg 
Bartoszkiewicz 
Dekowski 
v. Sulerczycki 
v. Lyskowski 
Konitz 
Maricnwerder VII Schlochall 
Dekowski 
Posen II Posen County v. Chlapowski 
v. Plater 
v. Chlapowski 
Posen III 
Posen IV 
Posen V 
Posen VI 
Posen VII 
Posen VIIi 
Posen IX 
Bromberg III 
Bromberg IV 
Obornik 
Samter 
Birnbaum 
MeSeritz 
Bomst 
Buk 
Kosten 
haustadt 
KrBben 
v. L u bienski 
v. Cicszkowski 
A. v. Zoltowski 
Respondek 
v. Prusinowski 
v. Stablewski 
v. Lubienski 
Motty 
Gawrecky 
v. Cieszkowski 
A. v. Zoltowski 
Respondek 
v. Stablewski 
Schrimm v. Bentowski v. Potulicki 
Schroda v. Dzialynski v. Zycblinski 
Wreschen v. Gutt~ v. Guttry 
k~~~is~in M.~~':,ft~~~L M.~i.,,\~h::~i 
Adelnau v. Morawski Szumann 
Schildberg Pilaski Pilaski 
Schubin Wagner 
Inowraclaw Kantak Kantak 
Mogilno Libelt Libelt 
Gnesen v. Janiszewski v. Janiszewski 
Wongrowiec v. Koszutski Danielewski 
Total 80 23 26 
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42.1 
63.8 
52.1 
49.1 
79.2 
63.8 
54.3 
Il1.0 
75.4 
52.3 
59.8 
22.1 
11.2 
37.0 
56.6 
76.9 
22.6 
58.9 
73.7 
79.8 
87.9 
79.6 
65.7 
82.0 
80.9 
53.8 
65.2 
69.9 
76.9 
72.4 
£ 
.~ 
;; 
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.1<1 
~~ 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
In A-D Danzig the Poles were numerous in four counties, which 
with proper respect for justice the liberal election districting law of 
1860 had organized into two election districts. Karthaus (63.8 per cent 
Polish) and Neustadt (42.1 per cent Polish) formed election district III 
and returned two Polish deputies in the elections of both 1862 and 
1863. Stargard (49.1 per cent Polish) and Berent (52.1 per cent 
Polish) did not contain quite enough Poles to assure victory. When 
.. Statistics on the Polish population are taken from "Versuch einer Statistik der 
NationalWiten im Preussischen Staate fUr das Jahr 1867. Zeitschrift des Kgl. Preull6. 
Statistischen Bureaus, 1871 (Berlin, 1871), pp. 1159 ff. 
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the Germans all held together, as they did in 1862, they were able to 
win both seats for that election district (IV).13 When they became 
somewhat negligent and the percentage of those casting ballots de-
clined, as was the case in Berent in 1863, the Germans lost one seat to 
the Polish party. 
The situation in A-D Marienwerder resembled that in Danzig. The 
Poles made up a substantial majority of the population in the two 
counties (Lobau, 79.2 per cent Polish, and Strassburg, 63.8 per cent 
Polish), each of which formed an election district. The party won in 
Lobau in both elections, but it failed in Strassburg in 1862. In elec-
tion district VII, containing the counties Konitz (54.3 per cent Polish) 
and Schlochau (13 per cent Polish) the party was able to return one 
deputy out of two at each of the elections. In some four other counties 
in Marienwerder (Stuhm, Thorn, Kulm, and Schwetz) the Poles 
formed between forty per cent and fifty per cent of the population 
but failed to return a single deputy from them in either election. 
Five counties in A-D Bromberg had a majority of Polish inhabitants. 
Organized into two election districts (III and IV) the Poles won four 
out of five seats in 1862 and made a clean sweep in the next year. In 
four other counties where the population was from twenty per cent 
to thirty-five per cent Polish, they were unable to gain a single place. 
The Poles constituted 58.9 per cent of the population in A-D Posen. 
They had a majority.of seventy-five per cent or more in eight counties 
and one of fifty-five to sixty-nine per cent in five others. In only five 
counties did they amount to forty per cent or less of the inhabitants. 
The vote went along straight nationality lines. In the election districts 
where they had a large majority (II, V, VII, VIII, and IX) the Poles 
voted overwhelmingly for their own candidates and won every seat in 
each election. In election districts III, IV, and VI the Polish popula-
tion formed a large minority_ Two of these districts were composed 
of a county with a Polish majority and one with a large German 
majority. The Poles were unable to win more than one seat at either 
election in any of the three districts. The Germans gained the other 
place. In election district I the Polish people were clearly outnum-
bered and each time lost to a German. 
In the voters' balloti~g in 1863, the Polish party won in election 
districts comprising thirty counties. A analysis by class of the total 
vote and of the urban and rural vote reveals the following results: 
,. Kolnische Zeitung, May':lO, 1862. 
A.J, \41..-
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POLISH 
Admin. No. of f -.A--
District Counties Total Urban Rural 
I II III Total I II III Total I II III Total 
Danzig 8 3 4 4 4 1 1 3 2 3 4 4 4 
Marienwerder 13 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Posen 18 11 13 15 15 6 8 14 14 12 13 16 15 
Bromberg 9 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Total 23 26 28 28 16 18 26 25 24 26 29 28 
Although not to the same extent, the Polish party was strong in 
the urban centers as well as in the rural areas. It was almost as power-
ful in the second class as in the third, and its showing in the first class 
was not far behind that in the second, particularly in the country. 
These results can be explained on the grounds that wherever it is able 
to win at all, a party representing a culturally backward national 
minority should make a good showing in all three classes. The party 
should be, as it was, relatively weakest in the first class where the in-
fluence of the Germans should be greatest, and strongest in the third 
class, where numerically speaking the Poles should predominate. The 
Germans and some Poles formed the upper, wealthy social groups in 
these areas, but the Poles made up the mass of the population. While 
Polish numbers in the third class were unable to win an election, with 
leadership and voting aid from upper-class Poles in one or both the 
other voting classes, they could and did win. 
An analysis of the statistics for the elections of 1862 and 1863 reveals 
that in those election districts in which the Poles won, the voters iIi 
all three classes, urban and rural, participated in the balloting con-
sistently to a greater extent than the Germans did in districts of purely 
German nationality. Government pressure in 1863 did not succeed in 
reducing appreciably the Polish participation in any class. In thos~ 
districts where the Poles won, the percentage was highest in Class l-
in the large majority of counties between sixty per cent and eighty-four 
per cent; it was almost as high in Class II; and it was some ten to 
twenty points lower in Class III. Few solidly German counties could 
show such a record. 
The interpretation of the election results varied according to the 
interests, the wishes, and the party affiliation of the individual. To 
the liberals the evidence -seemed so overwhelming that they scarcely 
bothered to argue the magnitude of their victory. They took it for 
granted that the country supported them. Deputy von Unruh acknow-
ledged in the Lower House that the liberals had won with the support 
of a majority in the first and second classes arid that the participation 
of the third class in the election had been small. He defied the gov.ern-
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ment, however, to change the election law so as to induce the third 
class to vote in larger number than at present. "The present election 
law has not developed out of our principles," he said, "and we have 
nothing against changing it so that the homeopathic share for the third 
.:-lass is made the proper amount."14 In every case the liberals main-
tained that they represented at least the educated and propertied 
groups in the population, but they also declared that they spoke for 
the vast majority of the others. They claimed the support of both the 
voters and the non-voters and challenged the government to submit 
the issues to another election. 
The King never could understand why the public acclaimed him 
so enthusiastically and at the same time elected his enemies to the 
Landtag. It lay beyond his comprehension that a monarch with 
powers actually limited by the constitution could also be popular, and 
that his popularity rested upon his reputation for being loyal to that 
document. He was deeply touched by the deputations of loyal peasants 
and pastors led by a local Junker which the Conservative party 
organized and sent to court. They typified the Prussian folk as he 
wished them to be, and he was readily convinced that these few 
thousand carefully controlled groups represented the country far bet-
ter than the liberal Lower House.Hi 
Of the two ministers, von Roon and Bismarck, the former asserted 
to the Lower House quite frankly that he regarded the development 
of the system of political parties since 1848 as a "great misfortune." 
He claimed that many very respectable and honorable persons were 
not interested in political parties; they belonged, he said, to "the 
party of order, the peace-loving party," the party undisturbed by 
political problems and tasks. They were loyal to the King, his govern-
ment and the constitution, he said, and did not vote because of the 
terror employed by the liberals. If the government could stir them 
to vote, it would have an "overwhelming majority" of supporters in the 
Landtag; in the absence of this overt support, von Roon inferred, the 
government would continue to act on the assumption that this majority 
did favor it over the liberals.16 
Bismarck denied the basis of representation. How do you know, 
he asked the Lower House, that the population supports you? Accord-
ing to the constitution, he continued, both houses represent the entire 
people. The fact that the Lower House was composed of elected repre-
.. Adress-Debatte, pp. 264-65; K61nische Zeitung, May 9, 1862. 
J,II See Zechlin, op. cit., p. 207; Die Inn ere Politik, pp. 128-111, 149. 
18 A dress-De batte, pp. 159-60. 
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sentatives gave it, according to the constitution, no higher right than 
the House of Lords. Furthermore, he said, only a small percentage 
of the population was sufficiently interested to vote for the liberals. 
It was doubtful whether this small percentage actually followed the 
House's activity with full understanding and knew where this activity 
was leading the country. In June, 1865, he asserted to the Lower 
House: 
Most voters scarcely bother to form a personal opinion 
whether or not an army can exist with one less year of service, 
whether the state can get along with somewhat less or more 
taxes. At any rate they would be glad if it were possible. If 
an educated gentleman superior to them in insight and a Royal 
official in addition comes forth as election candidate and says 
to them: they deceive you dreadfully on that matter; an ex-
cellent army is possible with two years of military service; the 
state can exist with much less taxes; you are overburdened-
then the ~ople would agree and say: the gentleman speaks 
sensibly, our vote costs us nothing, let us try it. If what he says 
succeeds; then well and good; if he cannot do it, he will come 
again and say: it has not yet succeeded, but you must have the 
two years' service. The confidence of the people in the King ~s 
so great that they say to themselves: the Kmg would not permit 
them to ruin the country or put it in debt. As a result of former 
traditions the people underestimate the significance of the con-
stitution. I am convinced that the confidence which they place 
in the wisdom of the King will not cause them disappointmentP 
Leaving no loophole for the validity of statistical evidence, Bis-
marck asserted that numbers of votes or signatures 6f loyalty addresses 
had "no great value," for "we live not under the regime of general 
suffrage but under the rule of the King and the laws." "You do not 
feel and think like the Prussian people," he said to the Lower House 
liberals in January, 1864. "If the Prussian people felt like you, one 
would simply have to say that the Prussian state had. lived beyond its 
term, and the time had come in which it must give way to another 
historical creation. But we have not yet come so farl"18 Bismarck 
expressed the belief of his Conservative colleagues and of the King that 
on crucial issues votes must be not counted but weighed. In his view 
the King and a handful of Conservatives were right; everyone else was 
wrong. 
" Rothfets, op. cit., pp. 278-;~. 
'8 AdresS-Deblitte, pp. 260-61; Rothfels, op. cit., pp. 26, 209-10. 
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D U .. NG the Y"'" of the New E<a and the tom ti tu-
tional conflict was the Pruss ian population Conservative or liberal, or 
was it indifferent to the entire conflict? The data analyzed in the pre-
ceding chapters have been taken from a variety of aspects of Prussian 
life and should enable certain conclusions to be drawn. Consideration 
of the issues, of the organization of political groups and of the actions 
taken by the government, by the Conservatives and by the liberal 
parties leads to the view that the Pruss ian people overwhelmingly op-
posed the preservation of the vestiges of the Old Regime and desired 
reform. 
The most telling evidence was supplied by the government itself, 
particularly in 1863. The ministry and King used every possible form 
of pressure to insure an election in favor of the Conservatives. They 
requested the people actively and positively to vote for those can-
didates who supported the government. When the voters remained 
about as hostile to Conservatism as before and the percentage of non-
voters as large, the government claimed that the election results were 
relatively insignificant and that the non-voters were satisfied with the 
existing order of affairs. The inconsistency of ministerial action and 
ministerial words could hardly have been greater. With all the power 
of coercion at its disposal the government was unable to secure the 
active political support of the people. 
The statistics show that a vast majority of those casting ballots 
favored the liberals; but what about those who failed to go to the 
polls? Does the fact that the non-voters did not actively support the 
government indicate that they opposed the existing regime and favored 
liberalism? In view of the size of this element of the population one 
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must find ways to provide an answer. One possible way of doing so is 
to consider the nature of the issues at stake in the election. These 
were of state-wide significance; they dealt with general problems of 
the character of government, national and local, the abolition of 
privilege, the limitation of military burdens and of public financial 
costs, and the unification of the German nation. Everyone, irrespective 
of geographic area or social and economic position, was to be more or 
less affected by the outcome of these issues. The problems concerned 
general ideals and did not appeal to the politics of special interests. 
They dealt with the character of the total culture: should it be liberal 
or should it be that of the society of the Old Regime? From the politics 
of those active in public affairs and voting one should be able to draw 
some inferences about the attitude of the non-voting members of the 
groups in Prussian society with similar interests. 
The validity of the method of inference is subject to two major 
conditions, the extent of understanding of the issues and the amount 
of compulsion which the government and the Conservatives were able 
to exert on the people. Not all the areas of economic and social 
stagnation voted Conservative: many of them turned liberal because, 
through various means, usually the presence of a few liberal leaders 
in the area, the population had learned to judge the status quo by 
liberal ideals. Even in districts subject to intense governmental and 
Junker coercion liberal ideas and hopes were able to withstand the 
pressure. 
Subject to the conditions stated above, a significant basis for an 
over-all analysis of political attitude may be had in the social classes-
nobility, bourgeoisie and middle class, and peasantry (the proletariat 
was still too small and too lacking in class consciousness to count)-
and in the occupations. Of less importance were religion and na-
tionality. Some, but far from all, Catholics voted with the Catholic. 
party. Most Poles, the only large national minority, supported can-
didates of their own nationality and a program for the ultimate restora-
tion of an independent Poland. 
In all parts of the state some nobles chose liberalism. Most of those 
doing so resided in East Prussia and in the two Western provinces, and 
the fewest in Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia. The economic 
interests of the liberal nobility and of the Conservative nobility were 
usually similar. As a rule, the latter were found in agriculture, with 
some having industrial interests as well, but the liberal nobility in East 
Prussia was likewise interested almost entirely in agriculture and in 
small industries, like distilleries, for processing some of its products. 
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In the Western provinces and in Silesia, especially Upper Silesia; cer-
tain nobles were becotning heavily involved in tnining and the iron 
and steel industry. S<Ulie belonged to families recently ennobled; while 
others traced their aristocratic lineage to earlier centuries. An accurate 
statistical estimate cannot be given. Contemporaries, both middle-
class and aristocratic, regarded the nobility as predominantly Conserva-
tive; but one cannot infer that the conflict between Conservatism and 
liberalism altogether expressed a struggle between the noble and the 
middle classes. Even apart from the presence of many liberal nobles 
in the Lower House, many others actively supported liberalism in 
their own districts. Nor wete they confined to the most moderate wing; 
nobles were found in each liberal party. A few examples of liberal 
aristocrats may suffice: in Silesia, Count Henckel von Donnersmarck, 
Prince Hatzfeldt, Count Dohna of Katzenau, Count York, Count 
Conrad DJhrn, Prince Carl Schonaich-Carolath; in Nieder-und Ober 
Barnim Baron von Eckardstein and Count von Hacke. In East 
Prussia they were too numerous to name, but the von Saucken family 
may be cited as an 'example.! 
The bourgeoisie and middle class accepted almost entirely the liberal 
ideals. Wherever industrialism had developed, one could expect 
liberalism to keep pace with it; and commerce on other than a purely 
local scale meant usually the support of the same point of view. Iron 
and steel, textiles, banking, railroads, wholesale commerce, construc-
tion-these and many lesser economic enterprises meant as a rule that 
the participants voted liberal. Irrespective of geographic location, 
these interests normally wished change in the direction of freedom and 
national unity. One is entitled to agree with the liberals that the 
owners of movable property belonged to their side. Whereas the 
land owners were divided in their affiliation, some being liberal, 
especially those of middle-class origin, and others being Conservative, 
in the case of industrialists and merchants only the rare exceptions 
were Conservative. Although any copy of a contemporary newspaper 
near election time will provide all the evidence one can wish, a few 
examples may be chosen. In late autumn, 1862, about a hundred 
merchants and industrialists in the Rhineland and Westphalia signed 
a petition to the King to dismiss the Bismarck ministry. It was esti-
mated that the signers represerited a taxed wealth of 300,000,000 
1 Kolnische Zeitung, April 19, 1862; von Bernhardi, op. cit., III, 62, 66; National 
Zeitung, Oct. 27, ~863; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, May 27. 1862; v~n Bern-
hardi, op. cit., III, 45-46, 69-73; Poli%ei-Bericht, Breslau, Nov. 6, i863; National 
Zeitutig, Nov. 24. 1861; Parisius; von Hoverbeck, II, 65. 
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Thalers. In April, 1863, a hundred iron ind\l$trialists p{ the Rhineland 
and Westpha,li .. sent ;t mess;tge of fu~l suppprt to the Lower House. In 
Memel, Gorlitz, Halle, Breslau. in every town and city, the local mer-
chants, bankers, and industrialists supported the liberals.2 
The handworkers were divided in their political affiliation. In 
Breslau, for example, the police reporte~ that they voted for the Pro-
gressive party, a,nd from the list of electors in Konigsberg returned in 
April, 1862, it is evident that that party found many loyal supporters 
among them.s Three master bakers, fifteen master cabinetmakers, a 
worker in leather, a master tailor, two master masons, seven master 
cobblers were selected alongside seventy merchants, nine factory·owners, 
sixteen doctors of philosophy, and a sprinkling of nearly every occupa-
tion in the city. In Minden the handicraftsmen voted in 1862 almost 
without exception for liberals.4 The smaller towns and the rural areas, 
however, remained strongholds of guild sentiment, and insofar as they 
were politically active, the handicraftsmen usually voted Conservative.5 
Many persons who called themselves handicraftsmen had become capi-
talistic entrepreneurs employiflg other craftsmen as wage-earners. 
Since the guilds had been disintegrating for at least half a century, it 
would be impossible on the basis of present evidence to state who was 
a bona fide craftsman and who had risen economically into the 
bourgeoisie or declined into the status of factory worker or day laborer. 
It is nonetheless clear from the newspaper reports that the extent to 
which the handworkers voted liberal depended upon the degree of 
their understanding of the value of freedom of occupation and of their 
courage in facing a new type of economic life. 
Equally complicated was the political attitude of the peasantry. 
The peasant's political behavior was decided by the degree of his under-
standing of the issues and the extent of his economic independence. 
The peasants who owned their land were most likely to be liberal. 
The rural laborers usually followed the politics of their master, who, 
if a Conservative, marched them to the voting place and observed how 
they voted. In many areas the peasant popUlation was indifferent 
from sheer ignorance. The Volkszeitung published a story from the 
province of Posen about a local pastor's having persuaded the peasants 
• "Der Preussische Landtag von 1863," Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift (Stuttgart, 
1863), No.3, p. 124; National Zeitung, April 1, 1863; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zei-
tung, Dec. 29, 1861. 
• Polizei-Bericat, Br.eslau, May 31, 1862; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, April 
. 29, 1862. 
• Kolnische Zeitung, April 30, 1862. 
• See Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Sept. 19, Oct. 24, 1861. 
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of a village to subscribe to the Preussiches Volksblatt, a Conservative 
paper, only to learn subsequently that the postman by mistake had 
subscribed instead for the Volkszeitung, a Progressive paper. The 
peasants expressed themselves as very content with this journal and 
proceeded to vote liberal. In some districts the peasants even be-
longed to the National Verein.6 That they were capable of acting 
in their own interest when adequately informed and encouraged was 
attested to by the Conservative political leader, Moritz von Blancken-
burg, who wrote to Minister von Roon after the election of 1861 as 
follows: 
The outcome of the elections in Pomerania was decided by 
the peasants, who, excited by county judges and Jews, take an 
attitude most decidedly against us. They were persuaded that 
we were against the King! They believed this all the more easily 
because the administration here often went against us. Then 
one dangled before them the prospect of a new law on county 
government by which they would have the majority and would 
be able to throw off all communal burdens. The meetings were 
everywhere stormy; they scarcely listened to me, they were so 
entrancedF 
Von Blanckenburg's realistic estimate was confirmed by a writer in 
Die Zeit at the time of the election of 1862. The peasantry, the latter 
stated, knew that the interests of the King were not identical with 
those of the nobility. Except for a tiny minority the peasantry had 
learned to distinguish between royalty and Junkerism and was ready 
to defend its interests even against the former. It understood, he con-
tinued, that the liberal reform of county government had nothing to 
do with the rights of the crown, that this reform was in harmony with 
the size of the contributions, especially in the form of taxes, made to 
the state. He concluded that the feudal party had already lost the 
natural basis of its power, the agreement of views between itself and 
the peasantry, and he was very hopeful about the prospects of reform.s 
Even though the writer in Die Zeit was too optimistic, by and large 
the peasant frequently showed as much independence of spirit about 
voting against the wishes of the authorities a.:; any townsman. Even 
• See Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 27. 1861; KOlnische Zeitung, May 2. 
1862; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, May 2. 1862; Regierungs-Bezirk. Breslau. 
Zeitungs-Bericht fUr Jan.-Febr., 1861; Tagesbericht, No. 42. Feb. 19. 1861. citing 
Volkszeitung, No. 41; Volkszeitung, April II. 1862. 
• Von Roon, op. cit .• II. 55-56. 
8 KOlnische Zeitung, April 26. 1862. 
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at the risk of losing their positions, many Schulzes voted liberal.9 The 
encouragement of a liberal large landowner or the proximity to a 
town from which liberal ideas could spread was enough to win them 
to the liberal party. Nonetheless, the land population of the lower 
class suffered most from cultural backwardness and was least inclined 
of any of the social groups to participate in the elections. Its in-
difference in large part accounted for the small vote in the third class. 
It tended under pressure not to vote at all; or, as one Schulze did, it 
signed a petition supporting the Lower House and another supporting 
the King.1° That its interests lay with liberalism and that if informed 
and freely allowed to, it would have voted liberal seem beyond ques-
tion. 
Apart from the higher personnel, the Landrats and certain cate-
gories that were kept under strong government observation, govern-
ment officials supported the liberal parties to such an extent that the 
Conservatives became furious and the Bismarck government deter-
mined to regain political control of them. The justice officials, being 
more independent of the government than the ones in the administra-
tive branches, participated most aggressively in the liberal cause; 
but the great majority of officials in all lines of service was actively or 
passively liberal. Many preferred to be passive because of the ruthless 
policies of control applied by the Bismarck government. 
The teachers and professors aligned themselves in the main with 
the officials and businessmen. The university professors enjoyed 
sufficient independence by virtue of their tenure to act openly in sup-
port of the liberal parties. The teachers, especially in the villages, 
were like the peasants subject to discipline and pressure; but many 
instances are known of their open defiance of the injunctions of their 
Conservative superiors. Although as in the case of the other occupa-
tional groups the teaching profession showed many Conservative mem-
bers, a notorious example being the anti-Semitic, vituperative and 
vulgar Wantrup of Elbing, this profession as a whole sided definitely 
with liberalism. Accustomed to thinking and acting in terms of 
9 See Parisius' statement in Abg. H., St. B., Nov. 11, 1863; I, 22·23. Ibid., 1864, Vol. 
IV, No. 95, pp. 619-21. Ko{nische Zeitung, April 30, 1862; and all issues of news-
papers at election time. 
10 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 15, 1862. See also the story of the vil-
lage of Steingrund. Fifteen members of the community had signed the petition of 
loyalty to the King referred to above. At the election in 1863 out of ninety-six 
who were eligible only fourteen actually voted. Of these fourteen, seven were for 
and seven were against the Conservathes. See Abg. H., St. B., Nov. 28, 1863; I, 
199·200. 
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ide~ls, it felt most at home in the camp of those who looked toward 
the future. ll 
ReHgiou~ ~ffiliation played an important role in influencing the 
political action of Catholics and Jews but not of Protestants. The 
Catholics with political interests usually voted for their own Catholic 
Center party, ahhough especially in the election of 1863 many of them, 
inch.\ding mew.bers of the regular clergy, transferred their vote from 
right-wing Catholic candidates to liberals. The Jews, a minority 
group l1till suffering from social and some legal restrictions, were con-
sistently liberal; put the Mennonites around Elbing voted in 1863 for 
Conservatives. Both liberals and Conservatives were found among 
the Protestants, with the pastors being predominantly Conservative 
and active in !,!upport of that party.12 . 
Even the military personnel was divided in its affiliation. Officers 
and soldier!,! stood under such rigid control that few were able to do 
other than follow government orders; but occasional reports ap-
peared in the press of soldiers and officers voting liberal. Especially 
reserve officers tended to do so, to the anger of the regular army 
officers; and retired officers, many of whom had left the army at an 
early date in order to go into the civilian pursuits of agriculture and 
business, frequently voted liberal. The fact that Major General von 
Syburg in Berlin and Lieutenant Colonel von 8tosch, chief of the 
general staff in Posen, voted liberal, that the non-commissioned 
officers in 1861 were instructed to vote for Minister of War von Roon 
and cast their ballots instead for the liberal Kiihne, that the leaders in 
Gumbinnen in support of the re-election of two liberal deputies were 
almost all military and officiaI$-this kind of evidence shows that the 
army itself contained at all levels personnel of liberal viewS.13 
By way of summary, the contemporary analysis of votes by occupa-
tion in a few areas may be given. A correspondent from Swinemiinde 
to the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung (May 16, 1862) reported the 
following distribution of the votes in the election of that year. "For 
the Conservative candidate voted all noble estate-owners, all pastors, 
11 The evidence may be found in the contemporary press, especially at election 
time. One example m<!.y be offered. The Ostpreussische Zeitung, a Conservative paper 
of Konigsberg, published in November, 1863, a list of 131 royal officials aTid teachers 
in Konigsberg Who vot~ for the Progressive party. See Kolflische Zeitung, Nov. 7, 
1863. 
" See the evideTl~~ in the contemporary press. 
,. Von Bernhardi, op. cit., IV, 16, 166; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 16, 
1861; AugsbuTg Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 25, 1863; Kolnische Zeitung, April 30, 
1862. . 
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all military, all country school teachers, a number of inspectors, rOY'll 
and noble foresters, a few so-called petty rural persons, and very few 
peasants. For the candidates of the liberal party vqted all judges and 
attorneys, all merchants and factory-owners, all Jews, almost all mi~dle­
class large land owners and peasant owners, almost all handworkers, 
hotel and restaurant proprietors, town officials, in general the electors 
of the towns with scarcely any exception." For the election of 1861 it 
was reported to the same paper (April 2, 1862) that the distribution 
of votes among the three partie!!, Progressive, Constitutional, and Con-
servative, in the town district of Danzig was 30:3:7, and in the rural 
district 14:4:20. The towns were notqriously liberal. Practically every 
one with a population above 20,000 voted in opposition to the govern-
ment.14 One Conservative deputy in the Landtag as early as March, 
1861, felt called upon to question the assertion that only the liberals 
represented the towns. He claimed that all four towns in his district 
cast a majority for him.15 The small number of the towns in his dis-
trict reveals why they did: they were scarcely to be distinguished from 
the rural areas around them. In the rural communities of the West 
Havelland district the vote in 1861 went two-thirds for liberals and 
one-third for Conservatives.16 
What explanations were offered for the small participation in the 
elections? First of all, the left-wing liberals who favored universal man-
hood suffrage blamed the three-class system of voting. It scarcely 
seemed worthwhile to cast a ballot in the third class. The open ballot 
kept many away, especially those who might suffer material hardship 
as a result of revealing their political affiliation. Concern for earning 
a living prevented others from taking a day off to vote. The long 
distance to the polling place discouraged many. Where political 
agitation had not penetrated, the population tended to remain in-
different to politics, especially in rural areas. Some employers would 
not release their workers to vote, and some peasants, particularly the 
landless rural workers, when ordered by their lord to vote Conserva-
tive, preferred not to vote at all rather than to go against their liberal 
views. In certain areas the liberals felt so sure of victory that they 
failed to be very active and lost some votes. Since the representative 
system was new many had not yet become accustomed to voting; they 
preferred to continue their pre-1848 political habits. All in all, under 
1~ J'C)~;eitung, May 2, 1862. 
~9 Abg. H., St. B., March 8, 1861; 1,419 . 
.. See Konigsberg Uartungsche Zeitf,lng, Nov. 21, 1861. 
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the circumstances the great extent ot the participation in the elections 
is surprising,11 
The evidence, in sum, substantiates the following conclusions: that 
the urban population, irrespective of occupation, was overwhelmingly 
liberal and hostile to the government, that the rural people were more 
Conservative but that, irrespective of whether they voted or did not 
vote, they were largely hostile to the government; that the relatively 
small percentage of those actually casting a ballot does not detract 
from the facts that the vast majority of the Prussian population who 
understood the situation actively opposed the government and sup-
ported reform, and that the vast majority of the others would have 
done so if they had understood their own stake in the conflict. 
Whether Protestant or Catholic, rural or urban, Prussia was actually or 
potentially-and to an overwhelming extent-in favor of liberal reform 
within the country. The people usually split along religious lines on 
the question of national unity; but except for a handful of supporters 
of the Old Regime they wished liberal reforms and were unanimously 
opposed to the Conservative government. 
The liberals and the general public were much more able to com-
prehend issues than they were to know how to implement policies. 
They lacked experience in self-government and were timid about taking 
steps which might lead to the use of physical force by either side. The 
fact that the Prussian people did not take up arms and rebel or refuse 
to pay taxes in no way implies approval of government action. The 
population expected that time would help in solving these problems 
and did not think that extreme measures against the handful of leaders 
which had the instruments of physical coercion at its disposal would 
assist in introducing reforms. 
The liberals made their mistake in failing to be thoroughly liberal. 
They remained bound by a class prejudice of superiority over the 
masses and did not perceive the possibility of the peaceful organization 
of the population against the government. They missed opportuni-
ties during the New Era for developing popular support which could 
be used in an emergency. A new election law based on equal and 
universal manhood suffrage and the secret ballot was indispensable 
in order to provide the masses with an incentive to become politically 
active. An election under such conditions would have enabled the 
17 See Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 23, Dec. 12, 1861; July 5, 1862; 
Volkszeitung, May 8, 1862; National Zeitung, Nov. 26, 1861; Zeitungs-Bericht fur 
Okt.-Nov. 1861; Regierungs-Bezirk, Aachen, Dec. 6, 1861; Augsburg Allgemeine 
Zeitung, Oct. 22, 1863; Kolnische Zeitung, Oct. 30, Nov. 3, 1863. 
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opposition to supply convincing evidence to the King and the Con-
servatives about the extent of the latter's unpopularity. As long as 
the class system of voting persisted, as long as public organizations, like 
political parties, the National Verein, and many others, remained in-
struments largely of a middle-class elite, the liberals lacked open mass 
support, and the Conservatives could deny that the general public 
disapproved of the existing order of things. In this situation the only 
evidence capable of convincing the Conservatives of their widespread 
unpopularity would have had to be that of physical action, something 
to which the liberals and the masses were averse. When the crisis 
struck them, the liberals were unprepared. They had no resources 
beyond those of the New Era to throw into the fray. The King and the 
Conservative government controlled all the instruments of organized 
political power in the state. With a loyal army and with a bureaucracy 
shaped and trained during nearly two centuries of absolutism, they 
possessed the means for continuing to govern in spite of verbal re-
sistance. 
The outcome of the constitutional conflict lies beyond the scope 
of this work; but the historical significance of the events must be in-
dicated. Although the struggle dragged on for another two and a half 
years, a disinterested observer must have concluded at the beginning 
of 1864 that the liberals were defeated. They had no plan and no 
means of winning against the government. Bismarck continued in 
power; the administrative apparatus functioned as usual; the people 
paid their taxes; the government expended the public money; the 
soldiers remained loyal; and as a crowning act the hated ministry 
successfully participated in the war against Denmark. The denuncia-
tion of all these deeds by the liberals handicapped the hated govern-
ment very little and failed utterly to block or even to delay its actions. 
The march of industrialism continued vigorously, and the people were 
more prosperous than they had ever been. The liberals were so suc-
cessful in their private economy that they eased the government's road 
to victory with mounting tax returns. Although Bismarck knew too 
little economics to be aware of the fact, he enjoyed the blessing of 
coming to power during an upswing of the business cycle. He was 
not merely powerful, he was fortunate. 
The liberals did not surrender until Bismarck won the Austro-
Prussian War and set about unifying Germany in the klein-deutsch 
sense. They had held out during two wars, in itself an almost un-
paralleled achievement; but when the second war gained one of their 
major objectives, German unity, they succumbed along with the 
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Austrians. The liberals had opposed the King, the military reforms 
and Bismarck partly because they had fe<ired a repetition of the defeat 
of 1806. They had not believep ~ll~t an unreformed, increasingly 
militaristic Prussia could wuster the resources and arouse the patriotic 
spirit neces~afY to protect itself. They saw their moral and political 
assumptions being wrecked, and they calDe to believe in the superior 
efficiency of Realpolitik. 
The solution to the pruss ian and German conflicts which Bismarck 
imposed had facets that affected the Hohenzollern King, the Conserva-
tives, and the liberals, each in a different way. The r~ler preserved as 
much absolutism as one could possibly command under a free consti-
tution. The King remained in Prussia a sovereign by the grace of God, 
and ill the German Reich his authority was scarcely less impressive. 
Bismarck retained the military reorganizatioll, and by his use of the 
army in three wars of national unification he assured in the German 
Reich the popular as well as the legal continuation of Prussian mili-
tarism. For the King and the Conservatives he succeeded in keeping 
the social and political system of the Old Regime in local government 
and imparted to a declining agrarian nobility a new political vigor 
which kept that group in authority for two generations. With respect 
to the constitution he made the gap theory valid and kept it as an 
ultimate sanction for a governDlent that remained to a large degree 
irresponsible. He transferred the legal position of the ministry in 
Prussia to the chancellorship in the Reich. In each case the govern-
m~nt, declared nominally responsible in law, actually wielded authority 
out of harmony with the fact of constitutionality. To the liberals 
Bismarck gave national unity and a considerable amount of free eco-
nomic legislation, although not all that they wished. The King on 
the whole was satisfied with the results. Many Conservatives disliked 
intensely German unification and the liberal economic legislation. 
The liberals remained disgruntled with the vestiges of absolutism and 
caste. The remarkable fact was, however, that this political master, 
Bismarck, made it impossible for anyone of these forces fundamentally 
to change the system which he proposed to introduce. Bismarck had 
wop. not merely over the liberals but in different respects over the Con-
servatives and the King as well. 
The political and moral effects of the victory of Realpolitik were 
scarcely felt by the King and the Conservatives. The ruler and his 
Conservative supporters believed in power politics and practiced them 
in internal as well as international affairs. They continued as they 
always had to pursue Interessenpolitik under the guise of moral prin-
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ciples. Bismarck's victory meant the dominance of these metHods in 
Germany in an. age in which Western peoples were seeking to intro-
duce universal principles of liberal conduct. 
In the case of the liberals the success of Realpolitik destroyed the 
moral foundations of their beliefs. Wrong had proved to be effective; 
right had failed. Most of them swung to the side of Bismarck and 
joined the host of his adorers. The irreconcilable ones were doomed 
to continue a life of frustration. Until the end of the Second Reich 
in 1918 the pro-Bismarck liberals could not be depended upon to 
support a principle in a crisis; the anti-Bismarck ones could talk little 
but principles. Deprived of the opportilhity to learn responsibility 
in government and faced with the reality of living in an anti-liberal 
society, the latter continued to defend generalities. Germany became 
a country largely of doctrinaires and believers in Machtpolitik a la 
Bismarck. 
Did Bismarck settle the constitutional conflict in Prussia? The 
answer can only be thai: he did not, that he glossed it over by na-
tionalism and by success in international relations. He solved none 
of the crucial internal social and political problems; he only post-
poned a settlement. The evidence for this conclusion is found in the 
fact that within less than three generations the Bismarckian Reich 
was destroyed, the Junker Conservatives were ruined, and the Hohen-
zoUerns had lost their throne. The predictions of the liberals during 
the Constitutional conflict have proved to be basically accurate. In 
the case of Germany, history has substantiated the belief in the 
validity of moral principles in public life. 
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APPENDIX A 
Population Increase, 1849-1861, in Twenty Leading Prussian Cities'" 
Name of City 
Berlin 
Breslau 
Cologne 
Konigsberg 
Magdeburg 
Danzig 
Aachen 
Stettin 
Posen 
Potsdam 
Elberfeld 
Krefeld 
Barmen 
Halle 
Erfurt 
Frankfurt 
Dusseldorf 
Coblenz 
Munster 
Elbing 
No. df Population 
1849 1861 
423,902 547,571 
1l0,702 145,589 
94,789 120,568 
75,240 94,579 
70,488 86,301 
63,917 82,765 
50,533 59,941 
47,202 64,431 
44,963 51,232 
39,864 41,824 
38,663 56,307 
36,134 50,584 
35,989 49,787 
33,848 42,976 
32,224 37,012 
29,969 36,557 
26,463 41.292 
25,318 28,525 
24,664 27,332 
21,637 25,539 
Percentage Increase 
1849-1861 
29.17 
31.51 
28.95 
25.70 
22.43 
29.48 
18.61 
36.50 
13.94 
4.91 
45.63 
39.99 
38.33 
26.96 
14.85 
21.98 
56.03 
12.66 
10.81 
18.03 
• Zeitschrift des Kgl. Preussischen Statistischen Bureaus, 1863, pp. 236-39. 
APPENDIX B 
Distribution of Railroad Mileage, 1862'" 
Administrative Miles of Miles per sq. Miles per 
District Railroads Mile of Area 1000 Population 
Konigsberg 21.3 0.05 0.02 
Gumbinnen 12.6 0.04 O.oI 
Danzig 16.9 0.11 0.03 
Marienwerder 10.2 0.03 0.01 
Posen 26.1 0.08 0.02 
Bromberg 30.2 0.14 0.05 
Potsdam 58.1 0.15 0.03 
Frankfurt 49.3 0.14 0.05 
Stettin 23.5 0.09 0.03 
Koslin 13.6 0.05 0.02 
Stralsund 
Breslau 42.6 0.17 0.03 
Liegnitz 37.5 0.15 0.03 
Oppeln 73.5 0.30 0.06 
Magdeburg 46.8 0.22 0.06 
Merseburg 46.4 0.24 0.05 
Erfurt 01.3 0.02 
Munster 19.4 0.14 0.04 
Minden 22.9 0.23 0.04 
Arnsberg 52.7 0.37 0.07 
Cologne 22.5 0.31 0.03 
Dusseldorf 52.7 0.52 0.04 
Coblenz 29.7 0.27 0.05 
Trier 21.8 0.16 0.04 
Aachen 13.7 0.18 0.02 
Total 745.5 0.14 0.04 
• Zeitschritf des Kgl. Preussischen Statistischen Bureaus (1863), pp. 213-14. A mile was red-
oned as 7,532.5 meters. 
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APPENDIX C 
Data on the Deputies in Five Prussian Political Assemblies· 
Prussian Nat. I 
Lower House of Landtag 
IV VI IX 
Occupational Groups Assembly, 1848 1849 1855 1862 1866 
Deputies (398) (350) (350) (348) (347) 
Agrarians 77·19.3% 61-17.4% 78-22.3% 82-23.6% 83·23.9% 
Merchants, industrialists 30- 7.5% 24- 6.9% 15- 4.3% 25- 7.2% 28- 8.1% 
Officials, excluding 
justice and teachers 38- 9.5% 56-16.0% 118-33.7% 45-12.9% 71-20.5% 
Justice officials 78-19.6% 73-20.9% 56-16.0% 93-26.7% 54-15.6% 
Retired officials and officers 1-0.25% 7- 2.0% 18- 5.1% 17- 4.9% 25- 7.2% 
Officers 3- 0.9% 9- 2.6% 1- 0.3% 1- 0.3% 
Community and 
corporation officials 27- 6.8% 25- 7.1% 14- 4.0% 9- 2.6% 20· 5.8% 
Teachers and intellectuals 23- 5.8% 25- 7.1% 2- 0.6% 13- 3.7% 10- 2.9% 
Protestant clergy 22- 5.5% 11- 3.1% 4- 1.1% 8- 2.3% 2- 0.6% 
Catholic clergy 28- 7.0% 17- 4.9% 17- 4.9% 14- 4.0% 2- 0.6% 
Lawyers 17- 4.3% 19- 5.4% 6· 1.7% 14- 4.0% 12- 3.5% 
Private officials 2· 0.5% 2- 0.6% 
PhYSicians 15- 3.8% 10- 2.9% 2- 0.6% 6- 1.7% 9- 2.6% 
Writers and journalists 1- 0.3% 3- 0.9% 4- 1.2% 
Rentiers 1-0.25% 4- 1.1% 5- 1.4% 7- 2.0% 
Handworkers, laborers, 
employees 22- 5.5% 3- 0.9% 
Others 6· 1.5% 8- 2.3% 1- 0.3% 1- 0.3% 
No occupation or 
indefinite occup. 11- 2.8% 10- 2.9% 6- 1.7% 10- 2.9% 16- 4.6% 
• The first figure gives the actual number of deputies, the second, the percentage of the 
total representation. Gertrud Beushausen, Zur Strukturanalyse parlamentarischen Reprasentation 
in Deutschand vor der Griindung des Norddeutchen Bundes (Hamburg Dissertation 1926) pp. 
88·89. Beushansen adds that the number of middle and lower officials was very small. 
